docker-compose: SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS-Env durchreichen

Damit der Flag aus der .env auch im Container ankommt – Default
false (on-prem-kompatibel), Cloud-Deploys setzen in der .env
SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.dockerignore

@@ -46,6 +46,15 @@ backups
 backend/uploads
 backend/backups
 
+# Daten-Verzeichnis (Bind-Mounts zur Laufzeit, nicht im Build-Context)
+data/
+
+# Plesk-Test (nicht für Container)
+plesktest/
+
+# Backup-Klone des Repos
+opencrm-backup-*/
+
 # Prisma migrations (included, but not dev db)
 *.db
 *.db-journal

.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# OpenCRM – zentrale Konfiguration
+# ==================================
+# Kopiere diese Datei zu .env und passe die Werte an.
+# Diese .env wird sowohl vom Backend (npm run dev) als auch von Docker
+# Compose verwendet.
+
+# ============== PORTS (extern erreichbar auf dem Host) ==============
+OPENCRM_PORT=3010      # Backend + Frontend (alles unter einer URL)
+ADMINER_PORT=8090      # Adminer (Datenbank-UI). 8081 ist häufig schon belegt.
+DB_PORT=3306           # MariaDB extern (für lokale Tools/Dev). 0 = nicht freigeben.
+
+# ============== DATEN-PFADE (Bind-Mounts) ==============
+# Relativ zum Projektverzeichnis. Werden zur Laufzeit angelegt.
+DATA_DIR=./data
+DB_DATA_DIR=./data/db
+UPLOADS_DIR=./data/uploads
+FACTORY_DEFAULTS_DIR=./data/factory-defaults
+BACKUPS_DIR=./data/backups
+
+# ============== DATENBANK ==============
+# Der App-User (DB_USER) wird beim ersten Start automatisch von MariaDB
+# angelegt (über MARIADB_USER/MARIADB_PASSWORD im docker-compose) – mit
+# GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES auf ${DB_NAME}.*. Damit nutzt das Backend NICHT root.
+# DB_ROOT_PASSWORD ist nur für Adminer / Notfall-Wartung.
+DB_HOST=localhost            # Im Container überschreibt docker-compose das auf "db"
+DB_NAME=opencrm
+DB_USER=opencrm
+DB_PASSWORD=change-this-password
+DB_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-this-root-password
+
+# Connection-String wird aus den DB_*-Komponenten zusammengebaut (dotenv-expand).
+# Manuell überschreiben nur wenn Sonderfälle (z.B. extra Query-Parameter).
+# Hinweis: für lokales Dev mit MariaDB im Container nutze DB_HOST=localhost,
+# weil docker-compose den DB-Port auf 127.0.0.1:DB_PORT mappt.
+DATABASE_URL=mysql://${DB_USER}:${DB_PASSWORD}@${DB_HOST}:${DB_PORT}/${DB_NAME}
+
+# ============== SECURITY ==============
+# JWT-Secret: min. 32 Zeichen. Generieren: openssl rand -hex 64
+# Wird sowohl für Access- als auch Refresh-Token verwendet.
+JWT_SECRET=change-this-to-a-very-long-random-secret-please-rotate-before-production
+
+# Access-/Refresh-Token-Lifetimes
+# - Access-Token: kurzlebig, lebt nur im Browser-Memory (XSS-Schutz)
+# - Refresh-Token: lang, im httpOnly-Cookie (JS-unzugänglich)
+# Wenn der Access abläuft, holt das Frontend transparent einen neuen über
+# /api/auth/refresh – User merkt nichts. Logout invalidiert beide sofort.
+JWT_EXPIRES_IN=15m
+JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRES_IN=7d
+
+# Encryption-Key für Portal-Credentials: GENAU 64 Hex-Zeichen.
+# Generieren: openssl rand -hex 32
+ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-this-to-64-hex-characters-please-rotate-before-production-xx
+
+# Server
+NODE_ENV=development
+PORT=3001                  # Backend-internal Port (Dev: localhost:3001)
+LISTEN_ADDR=0.0.0.0        # In Docker = 0.0.0.0, in Bare-Metal-Production = 127.0.0.1
+
+# CORS – nur in Production setzen, wenn Frontend auf separater Domain läuft.
+# Beispiel: CORS_ORIGINS=https://crm.deine-domain.de
+# CORS_ORIGINS=
+
+# HTTPS-only-Header (HSTS + upgrade-insecure-requests) – NUR aktivieren, wenn
+# wirklich ein TLS-Proxy (Caddy/Traefik/Nginx) vor OpenCRM steht. Sonst sperrt
+# sich der Browser bei direktem http://ip:port-Zugriff selbst aus
+# (ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR auf den Assets).
+HTTPS_ENABLED=false
+
+# SSRF-Schutz: private IP-Ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12,
+# 192.168.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, localhost) bei Provider/SMTP-Test-Connection
+# blockieren. Default `false` damit On-Prem-Setups Plesk/Dovecot/Postfix auf
+# 127.0.0.1 oder im internen Netz nutzen können. Für Cloud-Deployments
+# (öffentlich erreichbares Backend) auf `true` setzen, sonst kann ein
+# eingeloggter Admin via /email-providers/test-connection interne Services
+# anpingen. Cloud-Metadata-Endpoints (169.254.169.254 etc.) sind UNABHÄNGIG
+# vom Flag immer geblockt.
+SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=false
+
+# ============== ADMINER (DB-UI) ==============
+# Theme-Auswahl. Verfügbare Designs im offiziellen adminer:latest Image:
+#   adminer-dark, brade, bueltge, dracula, esterka, flat, galkaev,
+#   haeckel, hever, konya, lavender-light, lucas-sandery, mancave,
+#   mvt, nette, ng9, nicu, pappu687, paranoiq, pepa-linha, pokorny,
+#   price, rmsoft, rmsoft_blue, rmsoft_blue-dark, win98
+# Empfehlung: dracula (dark) oder adminer-dark – beide modern.
+ADMINER_DESIGN=dracula
+
+# ============== SEED ==============
+# Bei leerer DB seedet der Container automatisch (legt admin@admin.com / admin
+# + Stammdaten an) – nichts zu konfigurieren.
+# Nur wenn man eine NICHT-leere DB nochmal forciert seeden will (z.B. nach
+# Reset / Stammdaten-Update), kurz auf 'true' setzen, neu starten, dann
+# wieder zurück.
+RUN_SEED=false

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Root-Gitignore: gemeinsame Patterns für Repo-Root + nested Verzeichnisse
+# (backend/, frontend/, docker/ haben zusätzlich eigene .gitignore-Files)
+
+# Environment – echte Secrets blocken, .env.example weiter mittracken
+.env
+.env.local
+.env.*.local
+!.env.example
+
+# OS
+.DS_Store
+Thumbs.db
+
+# IDE
+.idea/
+.vscode/
+*.swp
+*.swo
+
+# Logs
+*.log
+npm-debug.log*
+
+# Temp
+tmp/
+*.tmp
+*.bak
+
+# Docker-Bind-Mounts: Inhalt nicht tracken, Verzeichnisstruktur via .gitkeep behalten
+data/db/*
+!data/db/.gitkeep
+data/uploads/*
+!data/uploads/.gitkeep
+data/factory-defaults/*
+!data/factory-defaults/.gitkeep
+data/backups/*
+!data/backups/.gitkeep
+
+# Factory-Defaults-Drop-Box (Export-ZIPs zwischen dev/prod hin und her)
+factory-exports/*
+!factory-exports/.gitkeep

README.md

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 
 Web-basiertes CRM-System für Kundenverwaltung mit Verträgen (Energie, Telekommunikation, KFZ-Versicherung).
 
+**Version: 1.1.0** ([Changelog](#changelog))
+
 ## Features
 
 - **Kundenverwaltung**: Privat- und Geschäftskunden mit Stammdaten
@@ -11,6 +13,9 @@ Web-basiertes CRM-System für Kundenverwaltung mit Verträgen (Energie, Telekomm
 - **Zähler**: Strom-/Gaszähler mit Zählerstandhistorie
 - **Rechnungen**: Rechnungsverwaltung für Energieverträge mit Dokumenten-Upload
 - **Vertrags-Cockpit**: Dashboard zur Überwachung offener Aufgaben (fehlende Dokumente, Rechnungen)
+- **Auto-Vertragsstatus**: Lieferbestätigung-Upload setzt `DRAFT` → `ACTIVE` (mit Vertragsbeginn),
+  Kündigungsbestätigung-Upload setzt `ACTIVE` → `CANCELLED` (mit Datum),
+  nightly-Cron setzt `ACTIVE`-Verträge mit abgelaufenem `endDate` auf `EXPIRED`
 - **Verträge**:
   - Energie (Strom, Gas)
   - Telekommunikation (DSL, Glasfaser, Mobilfunk, TV)
@@ -20,7 +25,14 @@ Web-basiertes CRM-System für Kundenverwaltung mit Verträgen (Energie, Telekomm
 - **Email-Provisionierung**: Automatische E-Mail-Weiterleitung bei Plesk/cPanel/DirectAdmin
 - **Berechtigungssystem**: Admin, Mitarbeiter, Nur-Lesen, Kundenportal
 - **Verschlüsselte Zugangsdaten**: Portal-Passwörter AES-256-GCM verschlüsselt
-- **DSGVO-Compliance**: Audit-Logging, Einwilligungsverwaltung, Datenexport, Löschanfragen
+- **DSGVO-Compliance**: Audit-Logging mit Hash-Chain-Integritätsprüfung,
+  Einwilligungsverwaltung, Datenexport, Löschanfragen
+- **Sicherheits-Monitoring**: Realtime-Logging von Login-Fehlversuchen, IDOR-Abwehr,
+  SSRF-Blocks, JWT-Manipulation; Threshold-Detection (Brute-Force, IDOR-Probing) mit
+  Sofort-E-Mail-Alerts und stündlichem Digest – siehe Einstellungen → Monitoring
+- **Production-Hardening**: 10 dokumentierte Hardening-Runden inkl. CORS, Helmet,
+  IDOR-Schutz, Rate-Limiting, SSRF/DNS-Rebinding-Block, Per-File-Ownership-Check, mehr
+  in [docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md](docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md)
 - **Developer-Tools**: Datenbank-Browser und interaktives ER-Diagramm
 
 ## Tech Stack
@@ -29,38 +41,70 @@ Web-basiertes CRM-System für Kundenverwaltung mit Verträgen (Energie, Telekomm
 - **Backend**: Node.js, Express 4.x, TypeScript
 - **Datenbank**: MariaDB
 - **ORM**: Prisma
-- **Auth**: JWT mit Rollen-basierter Zugriffskontrolle
+- **Auth**: JWT-Access-Token (Memory, 15 min) + Refresh-Token im httpOnly-Cookie
+  (7 Tage). Rollen-basierte Zugriffskontrolle. XSS klaut maximal einen
+  15-min-Access-Token, der Refresh-Cookie ist JS-unzugänglich.
 
 > **Hinweis zu Express 5:** Das Projekt verwendet bewusst Express 4.x (nicht 5.x). Express 5 ist seit Jahren in der Beta-Phase und noch nicht offiziell stable. Bei der Installation darauf achten, dass `@types/express` zur Express-Version passt:
 > - Express 4.x → `@types/express@^4.17.x`
 > - Express 5.x → `@types/express@^5.x` (erst bei offiziellem Release empfohlen)
 
+## Quick-Start mit Docker (empfohlen)
+
+Komplettes Setup mit MariaDB + OpenCRM + Adminer (DB-UI) in 3 Befehlen:
+
+```bash
+git clone <repository-url>
+cd opencrm
+cp .env.example .env       # Werte anpassen, Secrets rotieren!
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+Browser:
+- **CRM**: http://localhost:3010 (Login: `admin@admin.com` / `admin`)
+- **Datenbank-UI** (Adminer): http://localhost:8081 (Server: `db`, User: `root`, DB: `opencrm`)
+
+Alle persistenten Daten liegen in `./data/`:
+
+| Pfad | Inhalt |
+|------|--------|
+| `./data/db/` | MariaDB-Datafiles |
+| `./data/uploads/` | User-Uploads (PDFs, Bilder) |
+| `./data/factory-defaults/` | Stammdaten-Kataloge |
+| `./data/backups/` | DB-Backups (`npm run db:backup`) |
+
+Ports + Pfade konfigurierst du in `./.env` (Default-Werte siehe `.env.example`).
+
+> **Erste Inbetriebnahme:** In der `.env` einmalig `RUN_SEED=true` setzen,
+> `docker compose up -d` ausführen, dann wieder auf `false`. Danach existiert
+> der initiale Admin-User `admin@admin.com` / `admin`.
+
 ## Voraussetzungen
 
-- Node.js 18+ (empfohlen: 20+)
+- Docker & Docker Compose v2
-- Docker & Docker Compose
+- Für Backend-Entwicklung außerhalb von Docker: Node.js 20+ und npm
-- npm
 
-## Installation
+## Installation für Entwicklung (ohne Container)
 
 ### 1. Repository klonen
 
 ```bash
 git clone <repository-url>
 cd opencrm
+cp .env.example .env       # Konfiguration anpassen
 ```
 
-### 2. MariaDB-Datenbank starten
+### 2. MariaDB-Container starten
 
 ```bash
-docker-compose up -d
+docker compose up -d db
 ```
 
-Dies startet einen MariaDB-Container mit:
+Das startet nur die Datenbank (mit Daten in `./data/db/`).
-- **Port:** 3306
+Konfiguration kommt aus `./.env`:
-- **Datenbank:** opencrm
+
-- **Root-Passwort:** rootpassword
+- **Port:** wie in `DB_PORT` (Standard: 3306, intern auf 127.0.0.1)
-- **Benutzer:** opencrm / opencrm123
+- **Datenbank/User/Passwort:** wie in `DB_*`-Variablen
 
 Warte ca. 10 Sekunden bis die Datenbank bereit ist.
 
@@ -82,9 +126,14 @@ Die `.env`-Datei sollte folgende Werte enthalten:
 # Database
 DATABASE_URL="mysql://root:rootpassword@localhost:3306/opencrm"
 
-# JWT
+# JWT – Access-/Refresh-Token-Pattern (SPA-Standard)
+#   Access-Token (Bearer-Header, nur im Browser-Memory, kurzlebig)
+#   Refresh-Token (httpOnly-Cookie, lang)
+# Beide werden mit JWT_SECRET signiert; Refresh wird nur am
+# /api/auth/refresh-Endpoint akzeptiert (type-Claim).
 JWT_SECRET="change-this-to-a-very-long-random-secret-in-production"
-JWT_EXPIRES_IN="7d"
+JWT_EXPIRES_IN="15m"          # Access-Token-Lifetime (Default: 15m)
+JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRES_IN="7d"   # Refresh-Token-Lifetime (Default: 7d)
 
 # Encryption (for portal credentials) - generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
 ENCRYPTION_KEY="0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
@@ -140,6 +189,197 @@ Nach dem Seed sind folgende Zugangsdaten verfügbar:
 - **E-Mail:** admin@admin.com
 - **Passwort:** admin
 
+> **Wichtig:** Vor dem ersten Production-Deployment das Default-Passwort sofort
+> ändern und Secrets rotieren – siehe [Production-Deployment](#production-deployment).
+
+## Production-Deployment
+
+Vor dem öffentlichen Schalten der Instanz muss in der Production-`.env`:
+
+```env
+NODE_ENV=production
+
+# Pflicht-Rotation – per `openssl rand` neu generieren!
+JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 64)              # min. 32 Zeichen
+ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)          # genau 64 Hex-Zeichen
+
+# Backend nur lokal lauschen lassen, public-Verkehr läuft über Reverse-Proxy
+LISTEN_ADDR=127.0.0.1
+
+# Bei separatem Frontend-Host: erlaubte Origins
+CORS_ORIGINS=https://crm.deine-domain.de
+```
+
+### Deployment-Modus: On-Prem vs. Cloud
+
+OpenCRM ist primär als **On-Prem-Anwendung** designed (eigener Server / VM,
+hinter Reverse-Proxy). Für **Cloud-Deployments** (öffentlich erreichbares
+Backend, Shared-Infrastructure, Hyperscaler) gibt es einen zusätzlichen
+SSRF-Schalter:
+
+```env
+# Cloud-Deploy: zusätzlich alle privaten IP-Ranges für Provider-/SMTP-
+# Test-Connection blockieren (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12,
+# 192.168.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, localhost). Default false, weil
+# On-Prem-Setups oft Plesk/Dovecot auf 127.0.0.1 brauchen.
+SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true
+```
+
+Cloud-Metadata-Endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal` etc.)
+sind UNABHÄNGIG vom Flag **immer** geblockt – das ist Mindestschutz gegen
+AWS/GCP/Azure-IMDS-Diebstahl.
+
+Plus:
+
+- **Reverse-Proxy** (Nginx/Plesk) so konfigurieren, dass `X-Forwarded-For` hart auf
+  die echte Client-IP gesetzt wird (nicht nur angefügt) – sonst Rate-Limit-Bypass möglich.
+- **Frontend + API müssen über dieselbe Origin laufen.** Die Auth nutzt einen
+  httpOnly-Refresh-Cookie mit `SameSite=Strict; Path=/api/auth` – wenn Frontend
+  und API auf getrennten Origins liegen (z.B. `crm.example.de` vs.
+  `api.example.de`), schickt der Browser das Cookie cross-site nicht mit
+  und der `/auth/refresh`-Endpoint kann den User nicht mehr nachladen
+  (= alle 15 min Re-Login). Beim NPM-Setup landen Frontend und API automatisch
+  auf derselben Domain via Proxy-Path.
+- **Default-Admin-Passwort ändern** (admin@admin.com / admin).
+- **Manuelle Test-Checkliste** aus [docs/TESTING.md](docs/TESTING.md) einmal komplett
+  durchklicken.
+- **Monitoring konfigurieren**: Einstellungen → Sicherheits-Monitoring → Alert-E-Mail
+  hinterlegen, Test-Alert senden, Digest aktivieren.
+- Vollständige Hardening-Story + restliche Trade-offs:
+  [docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md](docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md)
+
+### ⚠️ Wichtig: gzip für `/api/*` am Reverse-Proxy deaktivieren (BREACH-Schutz)
+
+Wenn ein TLS-Reverse-Proxy (Nginx Proxy Manager, Caddy, eigener Nginx, …) HTTPS
+terminiert und Antworten gzip-komprimiert, ist die **BREACH-Attacke** (CVE-2013-3587)
+theoretisch möglich: aus der gzip-komprimierten Response-Größe könnten unter
+ungünstigen Umständen Secrets erraten werden. Auch wenn unsere JWT-basierte SPA
+das Risiko praktisch klein hält (keine reflektierten Secrets im Response-Body),
+geht ein Penetration-Test mit testssl trotzdem auf „medium – Ausnutzbar: Ja".
+
+**Lösung:** gzip-Komprimierung nur für statische Frontend-Assets erlauben, für
+`/api/*` deaktivieren. Statische Bundles bleiben damit performant ausgeliefert,
+JSON-API-Responses werden ohne Kompression gesendet → BREACH ist dort kein
+Einfallstor mehr.
+
+**Nginx Proxy Manager (NPM):**
+1. Proxy-Hosts → den CRM-Host → **Edit**
+2. Tab **Custom Locations** → **„Add location"**
+3. **Define location:** `/api/`
+4. **Scheme:** `http`, **Forward Hostname/IP:** wie im Haupt-Host
+   (z.B. `172.0.2.39`), **Forward Port:** `3010`
+5. Zahnrad rechts an der Location → erweiterte Config eintragen:
+   ```nginx
+   gzip off;
+   proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+   proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+   # Information-Disclosure-Header weg (Pentest-Hygiene):
+   more_clear_headers Server X-Served-By;
+   ```
+6. **Save** (Location), **Save** (Proxy-Host)
+
+> Der `more_clear_headers`-Befehl kommt aus dem `headers-more`-Modul, das
+> bei NPM standardmäßig dabei ist. Damit verschwinden die Banner
+> `Server: openresty` und `x-served-by: …` aus den Responses – Pentest-
+> Tools können den eingesetzten Webserver nicht mehr direkt aus dem Header
+> ablesen. Wer das auch auf der Hauptlocation will, kann denselben Eintrag
+> zusätzlich im **Advanced**-Tab des Proxy-Hosts setzen.
+
+**Plain Nginx** (falls eigener Nginx statt NPM):
+```nginx
+location /api/ {
+    gzip off;
+    proxy_pass http://backend:3010;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+    more_clear_headers Server X-Served-By;   # braucht headers-more-Modul
+}
+# Optional global im server { … }-Block:
+server_tokens off;
+```
+
+**Verifikation:**
+```bash
+# 1) gzip ist für /api/ deaktiviert (sollte leer sein)
+curl -sI -H 'Accept-Encoding: gzip' https://kundencenter.deine-domain.de/api/health \
+  | grep -i content-encoding
+
+# 2) Server-/x-served-by-Banner sind weg (sollte leer sein)
+curl -sI https://kundencenter.deine-domain.de/api/health \
+  | grep -iE '^(server|x-served-by):'
+```
+
+#### Was mit gzip auf `/` (SPA-HTML) ist
+
+Pentest-Tools wie `testssl` melden BREACH **trotzdem weiter** für die
+Root-URL `/`, weil die SPA-`index.html` bewusst weiter gzip-komprimiert
+ausgeliefert wird (Performance: 50 KB → ~10 KB). Bei OpenCRM ist der
+Angriff dort nicht ausnutzbar:
+
+- Die `/`-Response ist die statische `index.html` aus dem Vite-Build
+- Sie reflektiert **keinen user-controlled Input**
+- Sie enthält **keine Secrets** (JWT-Access ist im `Authorization`-Header,
+  Refresh-Token im httpOnly-Cookie – beides nicht im HTML-Body)
+
+Ohne Secret-im-Body und ohne Input-Reflektion hat BREACH keinen Hebel.
+
+##### Wer den Audit-Marker trotzdem weg haben will
+
+Wichtig: nicht einfach eine Custom-Location für `/` mit `gzip off`
+anlegen – das wäre ein **prefix-Match** und würde **alle** Pfade
+außer `/api/*` betreffen, also auch `/assets/*.{js,css}`. Das JS-Bundle
+käme dann unkomprimiert (~500 KB statt ~150 KB) → spürbarer
+Performance-Verlust für nichts.
+
+Sauber ist eine **exact-Match-Location** (`location = /`) – die fängt
+nur die Root-URL ohne weitere Pfad-Komponente:
+
+**Variante A** – Custom Location im NPM-UI (falls `= /` im
+„Define location"-Feld akzeptiert wird):
+
+| Feld | Wert |
+|---|---|
+| Define location | `= /` |
+| Scheme | `http` |
+| Forward Hostname/IP | wie im Haupt-Host |
+| Forward Port | `3010` |
+
+Im Zahnrad-Edit der Location:
+```nginx
+gzip off;
+proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+# Information-Disclosure-Header weg (Pentest-Hygiene):
+more_clear_headers Server X-Served-By;
+```
+
+**Variante B** – wenn das NPM-UI das `=` nicht akzeptiert, dieselbe
+Logik im **Advanced**-Tab des Proxy-Hosts:
+```nginx
+location = / {
+    gzip off;
+    proxy_pass $forward_scheme://$server:$port;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+    more_clear_headers Server X-Served-By;
+}
+```
+
+Verifikation – `/` ohne gzip, `/assets/*` aber weiter mit:
+```bash
+# Root: kein Content-Encoding mehr
+curl -sI -H 'Accept-Encoding: gzip' https://kundencenter.deine-domain.de/ \
+  | grep -i content-encoding
+
+# /assets/<file>.js: weiterhin gzip (Performance bleibt erhalten)
+JS=$(curl -s https://kundencenter.deine-domain.de/ | grep -oE 'assets/index-[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.js' | head -1)
+curl -sI -H 'Accept-Encoding: gzip' "https://kundencenter.deine-domain.de/$JS" \
+  | grep -i content-encoding
+```
+
+Kostet 40 KB extra pro Tab-Reload – aber dafür ist auch der letzte
+BREACH-Marker weg und Pentest-Reports landen auf 0×MEDIUM.
+
 ## Developer-Tools aktivieren
 
 Die Developer-Tools (Datenbankstruktur, ER-Diagramm) sind standardmäßig für Admins verfügbar. Falls der Menüpunkt nicht erscheint:
@@ -991,8 +1231,9 @@ Folgende Felder werden in Audit-Logs gefiltert:
 ## Factory-Defaults: Stammdaten-Kataloge teilen
 
 Das **Factory-Defaults**-System erlaubt den Export und Import von
-Stammdaten-Katalogen (Anbieter, Tarife, PDF-Vorlagen usw.) zwischen verschiedenen
+Stammdaten-Katalogen (Anbieter, Tarife, PDF-Auftragsvorlagen, HTML-Standardtexte)
-OpenCRM-Installationen. Es ist bewusst **streng abgegrenzt** zu Datenbank-Backups:
+zwischen verschiedenen OpenCRM-Installationen. Es ist bewusst **streng abgegrenzt**
+zu Datenbank-Backups:
 
 ### Abgrenzung
 
@@ -1000,64 +1241,117 @@ OpenCRM-Installationen. Es ist bewusst **streng abgegrenzt** zu Datenbank-Backup
 |---|---|---|
 | Anbieter, Tarife, Kündigungsfristen, Laufzeiten, Kategorien | ✅ | ✅ |
 | PDF-Auftragsvorlagen (inkl. Dateien + Feldzuordnungen) | ✅ | ✅ |
+| HTML-Standardtexte: Datenschutzerklärung, Impressum, Vollmacht-Vorlage, Website-Datenschutz | ✅ | ✅ |
 | **Kundendaten, Verträge, Dokumente** | ❌ | ✅ |
 | **Emails, SMTP-/IMAP-Zugangsdaten** | ❌ | ✅ |
-| **System-Einstellungen, Datenschutzerklärungen, Impressum** | ❌ | ✅ |
+| **Secrets, JWT, Encryption-Keys, User-Accounts** | ❌ | ✅ |
 | Zwischen verschiedenen Installationen teilbar | ✅ | ❌ (zu firmen-spezifisch) |
 
-> **Kurz:** Factory-Defaults = reine Kataloge, Backup = alles.
+> **Kurz:** Factory-Defaults = generische Stammdaten + rechtliche Standardtexte,
+> Backup = die komplette Instanz.
 
-### Export (Installation A → ZIP)
+### Drei Wege, eine ZIP zu transportieren
 
+Es gibt drei Pfade, je nachdem wo die ZIP gerade liegen soll:
+
+| Wo | Pfad | Wann |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Laufende DB einer Instanz** | UI-Upload oder `./factory-import.sh` | Bestehende Live-Instanz updaten |
+| **Drop-Box im Repo** (`factory-exports/`) | `./factory-export.sh` legt ab, `./factory-import.sh` liest | Transfer zwischen dev und prod via `scp` |
+| **Werkseinstellung im Image** (`backend/factory-defaults/`) | `./factory-import.sh --save-as-builtin` oder manuell entpacken | Neue VMs sollen die Defaults beim allerersten Start mitbringen |
+
+Alle drei sind unabhängig, **alle drei zusammen** decken den typischen Workflow ab.
+
+### Export
+
+**Variante A – UI:**
 1. **Einstellungen** → **Factory-Defaults** öffnen
-2. Übersicht prüfen (Anzahl pro Kategorie)
+2. Button **„Factory-Defaults exportieren"** klicken
-3. Button **„Factory-Defaults exportieren"** klicken
+3. ZIP wird als `factory-defaults-YYYY-MM-DD.zip` heruntergeladen
-4. ZIP wird als `factory-defaults-YYYY-MM-DD.zip` heruntergeladen
+
+**Variante B – CLI (für scp-Transfers):**
+```bash
+./factory-export.sh                                  # → factory-exports/factory-defaults-…zip
+OPENCRM_URL=https://crm.prod.example.de \
+  OPENCRM_EMAIL=admin@example.de ./factory-export.sh # gegen Prod-Instanz
+```
+Ohne `OPENCRM_PASSWORD` wird das Passwort interaktiv abgefragt. Der Zielordner
+`factory-exports/` ist gitignored – die ZIPs landen also nicht ins Repo.
 
 **ZIP-Struktur:**
 ```
-factory-defaults-2026-04-23.zip
+factory-defaults-2026-05-07-1949.zip
 ├── manifest.json                      # Version + Datum + Counts
-├── providers/
+├── providers/providers.json
-│   └── providers.json                 # Anbieter inkl. zugehöriger Tarife
 ├── contract-meta/
-│   ├── cancellation-periods.json      # Kündigungsfristen (Code + Beschreibung)
+│   ├── cancellation-periods.json
-│   ├── contract-durations.json        # Laufzeiten (Code + Beschreibung)
+│   ├── contract-durations.json
-│   └── contract-categories.json       # Kategorien (Strom, Gas, DSL, ...)
+│   └── contract-categories.json
-└── pdf-templates/
+├── pdf-templates/
-    ├── pdf-templates.json             # Vorlagen-Metadaten + Feldzuordnungen
+│   ├── pdf-templates.json
-    └── *.pdf                          # Die eigentlichen PDF-Dateien
+│   └── *.pdf                          # Die eigentlichen PDF-Dateien
+└── app-settings/
+    └── app-settings.json              # HTML-Templates (Whitelist-only)
 ```
 
-Die ZIP kann an andere Installationen weitergegeben werden
+### Import
-(Partner, Test-System, neue Installation).
 
-### Import (ZIP → Installation B)
+**Variante A – UI:**
+1. **Einstellungen** → **Factory-Defaults**
+2. Bereich **Import** → **„ZIP hochladen"** → Datei wählen
+3. Erfolgs-Box zeigt Counts pro Kategorie
 
-1. ZIP herunterladen bzw. erhalten
+**Variante B – CLI:**
-2. Inhalt nach `backend/factory-defaults/` entpacken (Unterordnerstruktur beibehalten)
-3. Im Backend-Verzeichnis ausführen:
 ```bash
-   npm run seed:defaults
+./factory-import.sh                                  # nimmt jüngste ZIP aus factory-exports/
+./factory-import.sh ./factory-exports/foo.zip        # explizite ZIP
+./factory-import.sh --save-as-builtin                # zusätzlich ins Image-Default
+./factory-import.sh --save-as-builtin ./foo.zip      # entpacken (siehe unten)
+```
+
+Konfigurierbar per ENV: `OPENCRM_URL`, `OPENCRM_EMAIL`, `OPENCRM_PASSWORD`.
+
+**Variante C – Container-Bare-Metal (für Migration / mehrere ZIPs zusammenführen):**
+```bash
+# Inhalt der ZIP nach backend/factory-defaults/ entpacken (Unterordner beibehalten)
+cd backend && npm run seed:defaults
 ```
 
 **Beispiel-Output:**
 ```
-📦 Factory-Defaults werden eingespielt...
+✓ Anbieter: 10
-
+✓ Tarife: 4
-  ✓ Anbieter: 7, Tarife: 12
+✓ Kündigungsfristen: 18
-  ✓ Kündigungsfristen: 5
+✓ Laufzeiten: 18
-  ✓ Laufzeiten: 4
 ✓ Vertragskategorien: 8
-  ✓ PDF-Vorlagen: 3
+✓ PDF-Vorlagen: 2
-
+✓ HTML-Templates: 2
-✅ Factory-Defaults erfolgreich eingespielt.
 ```
 
-### Mehrere ZIPs kombinieren
+### `--save-as-builtin`: ZIP zur Werkseinstellung machen
 
-Du kannst mehrere Exporte in `backend/factory-defaults/` übereinanderlegen –
+Mit `--save-as-builtin` entpackt `factory-import.sh` die ZIP nach **erfolgreichem
-JSON-Dateien werden automatisch gemerged:
+DB-Import** zusätzlich in `backend/factory-defaults/`. Beim nächsten
+`docker-compose up --build` landen die Defaults im Image. Frisch hochgezogene
+VMs bringen sie dann beim ersten Start automatisch mit (Auto-Seed-Pfad im
+Container-Entrypoint).
+
+```bash
+# typischer Sync prod → dev → Image-Default
+ssh prod './factory-export.sh'
+scp prod:opencrm/factory-exports/factory-defaults-*.zip factory-exports/
+./factory-import.sh --save-as-builtin
+docker-compose up -d --build           # neuer Build, neue VMs starten direkt mit Defaults
+```
+
+Der Inhalt von `backend/factory-defaults/` wird beim `--save-as-builtin` vorher
+geleert (außer `README.md` und `.gitkeep`), damit nichts Veraltetes liegen
+bleibt.
+
+### Mehrere ZIPs kombinieren (CLI-only, Variante C)
+
+`backend/factory-defaults/` darf mehrere `*.json` pro Unterordner haben –
+`npm run seed:defaults` merged sie automatisch:
 
 ```
 backend/factory-defaults/
@@ -1067,44 +1361,121 @@ backend/factory-defaults/
     eigene.json        # 5 eigene Anbieter
 ```
 
-Das Import-Script liest **alle** `*.json` im jeweiligen Unterordner und merged per
+Bei gleichem Unique-Key gewinnt der zuletzt gelesene Eintrag. Der UI-/HTTP-Import
-unique Key (letzter Eintrag gewinnt). Duplikate sind also unproblematisch.
+nimmt nur eine ZIP entgegen – für Merges nutze `npm run seed:defaults`.
 
 ### Idempotenz
 
-Das Script nutzt ausschließlich Prisma `upsert`:
+Alle Pfade nutzen Prisma `upsert`:
 - **Neue Einträge** werden angelegt
-- **Bestehende Einträge** (per unique Key: `name`, `code`) werden aktualisiert
+- **Bestehende Einträge** (per unique Key: `name` / `code` / `key`) werden aktualisiert
 - Nichts wird gelöscht
 
-Du kannst `npm run seed:defaults` also beliebig oft ausführen, ohne Datenverlust
+Du kannst Imports also beliebig oft hintereinander ausführen, ohne Datenverlust
 oder Duplikate.
 
-### PDF-Dateien beim Import
+### PDF-Dateien
 
-Beim Import werden PDF-Vorlagen aus `factory-defaults/pdf-templates/*.pdf` nach
+Beim Import werden PDF-Vorlagen aus dem ZIP nach `uploads/pdf-templates/`
-`uploads/pdf-templates/` kopiert und die Pfade in der DB entsprechend gesetzt.
+kopiert (mit eindeutigem Suffix) und die `templatePath`-Spalte entsprechend
-Beim Re-Import wird die alte Datei in `uploads/` entsorgt und durch die neue
+gesetzt. Beim Re-Import wird die alte Datei in `uploads/` entsorgt und durch
-ersetzt.
+die neue ersetzt.
+
+### AppSettings-Whitelist
+
+Beim Import werden nur die Keys mit AppSetting-Schreibzugriff gewährt, die auch
+exportiert werden – aktuell:
+
+- `privacyPolicyHtml`
+- `imprintHtml`
+- `authorizationTemplateHtml`
+- `websitePrivacyPolicyHtml`
+
+Andere Keys (SMTP, JWT, etc.) werden mit einer Warnung ignoriert. Whitelist ist
+in [`backend/src/services/factoryDefaults.service.ts`](backend/src/services/factoryDefaults.service.ts)
+zentral gepflegt.
+
+### Auto-Seed beim Erst-Deploy
+
+Bei einer **frischen** Installation (leere DB) spielt der Container-Entrypoint
+nach dem Prisma-Seed automatisch das Built-in-Verzeichnis ein:
+
+```
+[entrypoint] DB ist leer (User-Count=0) – Auto-Seed wird ausgeführt
+[entrypoint] Spiele eingebaute Factory-Defaults ein…
+  ✓ Anbieter: 10, Tarife: 4
+  …
+```
+
+Bei bestehenden Installs passiert das **nicht** – nur frische DBs.
 
 ### Berechtigungen
 
 | Aktion | Berechtigung |
 |--------|--------------|
 | Factory-Defaults Vorschau | `settings:read` |
-| Factory-Defaults Export | `settings:update` |
+| Factory-Defaults Export (UI/CLI) | `settings:update` |
-| Factory-Defaults Import (CLI) | Server-Zugang (SSH/Shell) |
+| Factory-Defaults Import (UI/CLI) | `settings:update` |
+| Werkseinstellungen ändern (`--save-as-builtin` / `npm run seed:defaults`) | Server-Zugang (SSH/Shell) |
 
-### Typischer Einsatzzweck
+### Typische Einsatzzwecke
 
-- **Neue Installation aufsetzen**: Eine Kollegen-ZIP importieren und sofort mit
+- **Neue VM aufsetzen**: ZIP einmalig nach `backend/factory-defaults/` entpacken
-  gepflegtem Anbieter- und Vorlagenkatalog loslegen
+  (oder per `--save-as-builtin`), dann `docker-compose up --build` – die
+  Werkseinstellungen sind beim ersten Start automatisch drin.
+- **Prod-Stand zurück nach dev synchronisieren**: `./factory-export.sh` auf prod,
+  `scp` ins dev, `./factory-import.sh --save-as-builtin` lokal – damit ist
+  sowohl die dev-DB aktuell als auch der nächste Image-Build.
 - **Vorlagen-Paket teilen**: Eine ZIP mit nur PDF-Vorlagen weitergeben
-  (die anderen Ordner einfach aus der ZIP entfernen vor dem Entpacken)
+  (andere Ordner aus der ZIP entfernen vor dem Entpacken).
 - **Anbieter-Paket teilen**: ZIP mit nur `providers/` weitergeben
 - **Versionskontrolle**: Die entpackten JSON-Dateien unter Versionskontrolle
   stellen (außerhalb von `backend/factory-defaults/`, da der Ordner gitignored ist)
 
+## Changelog
+
+### 1.1.0 (2026-05-01)
+
+**Production-readiness** – die Version, die wirklich öffentlich gehen darf.
+
+- 🛡 **Security-Hardening**: 10 Runden statisches + dynamisches Audit, vollständig
+  dokumentiert in [docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md](docs/SECURITY-HARDENING.md)
+  (CORS/Helmet/JWT, IDOR-Schutz an 30+ Endpoints, Mass-Assignment-Whitelists,
+  Zip-Slip, Path-Traversal, Login-Timing-Side-Channel, XFF-Rate-Limit-Bypass,
+  Customer-Liste-Leak, SSRF + DNS-Rebinding, Per-File-Ownership statt
+  freiem `/api/uploads`, JWT-Logout, Audit-Log-Hash-Chain).
+- 🚨 **Sicherheits-Monitoring**: neue `SecurityEvent`-Tabelle + Hooks an Login,
+  Logout, Rate-Limit-Hit, IDOR-Abwehr, SSRF-Block, Password-Reset, JWT-Reject.
+  Threshold-Detection (Brute-Force, IDOR-Probing, SSRF-Probing) erzeugt
+  CRITICAL-Events. **Sofort-E-Mail-Alerts** für CRITICAL + **stündlicher Digest**
+  für HIGH/MEDIUM. UI in Einstellungen → Monitoring mit Filter, Pagination,
+  Log-leeren (mit optionalem Tage-Filter) und Test-Alert-Button.
+- 🔄 **Auto-Vertragsstatus**:
+  - Lieferbestätigung-Upload → `DRAFT` → `ACTIVE` + `startDate`
+  - Kündigungsbestätigung-Upload → `ACTIVE` → `CANCELLED` + `cancellationConfirmationDate`
+    (mit Datums-Modal beim Upload)
+  - Nightly-Cron 02:00: alle `ACTIVE`-Verträge mit `endDate < heute` → `EXPIRED`
+- 🔐 **Lazy bcrypt-Rehash**: Bestandshashes mit Cost 10 werden beim nächsten
+  Login transparent auf Cost 12 geupgradet.
+- 🚪 **Logout-Endpoint** `POST /api/auth/logout`: invalidiert JWTs serverseitig
+  über `tokenInvalidatedAt`.
+- 📦 **`npm audit fix`**: 8 transitive Vulnerabilities gefixt (lodash,
+  path-to-regexp, undici, minimatch).
+
+### 1.0.0
+
+Erste Release-Version.
+
+- Kunden-, Vertrags-, Adress-, Bankkarten-, Ausweis- und Zählerverwaltung
+- Energie-/Telekommunikations-/KFZ-Verträge mit typspezifischen Details
+- Vertrags-Cockpit mit Rechnungsprüfung
+- E-Mail-Client mit Anhang-Verwaltung
+- DSGVO-Compliance: Audit-Log, Einwilligungen, Datenexport, Löschanfragen
+- PDF-Auftragsvorlagen-System mit visueller Feldzuordnung
+- Factory-Defaults für Stammdaten-Kataloge
+- Mandantenfähigkeit über `customerEmailLabel` pro Provider
+- Passwort-Reset-Flow + Rate-Limiting + Auto-Geburtstagsgrüße
+
 ## Lizenz
 
 MIT

backend/.env

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# Database - Root für Migrationen, opencrm-User für Runtime
-DATABASE_URL="mysql://root:rootpassword@localhost:3306/opencrm"
-
-# JWT
-JWT_SECRET="change-this-to-a-very-long-random-secret-in-production"
-JWT_EXPIRES_IN="7d"
-
-# Encryption (for portal credentials) - generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
-ENCRYPTION_KEY="0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
-
-# Server
-PORT=3001
-NODE_ENV=development

backend/.env.example

@@ -1,9 +1,17 @@
+# Backend nutzt seit v1.1 die zentrale Root-.env im Projektverzeichnis.
+# → siehe ../.env.example für alle Variablen
+#
+# Diese Datei bleibt als Legacy-Fallback: wenn /.env nicht existiert,
+# liest das Backend backend/.env (z.B. für isolierte Backend-Tests).
+
 # Database
 DATABASE_URL="mysql://user:password@localhost:3306/opencrm"
 
 # JWT
 JWT_SECRET="your-super-secret-jwt-key-change-in-production"
-JWT_EXPIRES_IN="7d"
+# Access kurz (XSS-Schutz, nur JS-Memory). Refresh lang im httpOnly-Cookie.
+JWT_EXPIRES_IN="15m"
+JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRES_IN="7d"
 
 # Encryption (for portal credentials)
 ENCRYPTION_KEY="32-byte-hex-key-for-aes-256-gcm"

backend/.gitignore

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ node_modules/
 # Build
 dist/
 
-# Environment
+# Environment – echte Secrets blocken, .env.example weiter mittracken
 .env
 .env.local
 .env.*.local
+!.env.example
 
 # Database Backups (can be large, keep folder structure)
 prisma/backups/*

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Multi-Stage Build: Frontend bauen, dann Backend bauen, dann schlankes Runtime-Image
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Alle Stages auf node:20-slim (Debian-basiert) – dann passt die Prisma-Query-
+# Engine (glibc + openssl) zur Runtime.
+
+# ============== STAGE 1: Frontend bauen ==============
+FROM node:20-slim AS frontend-builder
+WORKDIR /build/frontend
+COPY frontend/package.json frontend/package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci --no-audit --no-fund --prefer-offline
+COPY frontend/ ./
+RUN npm run build
+# Output: /build/frontend/dist/
+
+# ============== STAGE 2: Backend bauen (TS → JS) ==============
+FROM node:20-slim AS backend-builder
+WORKDIR /build/backend
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+COPY backend/package.json backend/package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci --no-audit --no-fund --prefer-offline
+COPY backend/prisma ./prisma
+RUN npx prisma generate
+COPY backend/tsconfig.json ./
+COPY backend/src ./src
+RUN npx tsc
+# Output: /build/backend/dist/
+
+# ============== STAGE 3: Runtime ==============
+# Debian-slim statt Alpine: Prisma-Engines erwarten libssl 1.1, das in Alpine 3.19+
+# nicht mehr verfügbar ist. Slim hat openssl 3 ABI-kompatibel + native binaries.
+FROM node:20-slim
+WORKDIR /app
+
+# OpenSSL für Prisma-Query-Engine + wget für Healthcheck
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl wget \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Nur Production-Dependencies + Prisma-Client
+COPY backend/package.json backend/package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci --omit=dev --no-audit --no-fund --prefer-offline && npm cache clean --force
+
+# Build-Artefakte aus Stage 2
+COPY --from=backend-builder /build/backend/dist ./dist
+COPY --from=backend-builder /build/backend/node_modules/.prisma ./node_modules/.prisma
+COPY --from=backend-builder /build/backend/node_modules/@prisma ./node_modules/@prisma
+COPY backend/prisma ./prisma
+# src/ mitkopieren, damit prisma/*.ts-Wartungsskripte (cleanup, reset-admin-
+# password etc.) auch im Production-Container via `npx tsx` laufen können –
+# die importieren über '../src/lib/prisma.js' den shared Prisma-Client.
+# Server selbst läuft weiter aus dist/.
+COPY --from=backend-builder /build/backend/src ./src
+COPY backend/tsconfig.json ./tsconfig.json
+
+# Frontend-Build ins public/-Verzeichnis (wird in production-Mode statisch ausgeliefert)
+COPY --from=frontend-builder /build/frontend/dist ./public
+
+# Eingebaute Werkseinstellungen ins Image: bei Erstinstallation (leerer DB) zieht
+# der Entrypoint sie via tsx scripts/seed-factory-defaults.ts ein. Liegt in einem
+# eigenen Pfad – `factory-defaults/` selbst kann über Bind-Mount überlagert werden.
+COPY backend/factory-defaults /app/factory-defaults-builtin
+COPY backend/scripts /app/scripts
+
+# Daten-Verzeichnisse (werden via Bind-Mount überlagert; hier nur als Fallback)
+RUN mkdir -p uploads factory-defaults prisma/backups
+
+# Healthcheck
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=20s --retries=3 \
+  CMD wget --quiet --tries=1 --spider "http://localhost:${PORT:-3001}/api/health" || exit 1
+
+# Beim Start: prisma db push (idempotent), dann node
+COPY backend/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
+RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["docker-entrypoint.sh"]
+CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]

backend/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Container-Start:
+#   1) Auf DB warten
+#   2) Auto-Baseline für bestehende DBs (db-push-Ära ohne _prisma_migrations)
+#   3) `prisma migrate deploy` (idempotent, datenerhaltend)
+#   4) Auto-Seed bei leerer User-Tabelle (oder RUN_SEED=true)
+# Neue Schema-Änderung anlegen (lokal, im Dev): npm run schema:sync
+set -e
+
+# DATABASE_URL aus DB_*-Komponenten bauen, falls nicht explizit gesetzt.
+# Wichtig: encodeURIComponent für DB_USER + DB_PASSWORD, damit Sonderzeichen
+# wie $, !, #, @, :, / etc. nicht die URL-Authority-Syntax brechen.
+# Wir nutzen node-eval (ist eh installiert), kein extra-Tool wie jq nötig.
+if [ -z "$DATABASE_URL" ] && [ -n "$DB_USER" ] && [ -n "$DB_PASSWORD" ] && [ -n "$DB_NAME" ]; then
+  DATABASE_URL=$(node -e "
+    const u = encodeURIComponent(process.env.DB_USER);
+    const p = encodeURIComponent(process.env.DB_PASSWORD);
+    const h = process.env.DB_HOST || 'db';
+    const port = process.env.DB_PORT || '3306';
+    const n = process.env.DB_NAME;
+    process.stdout.write(\`mysql://\${u}:\${p}@\${h}:\${port}/\${n}\`);
+  ")
+  export DATABASE_URL
+  echo "[entrypoint] DATABASE_URL aus DB_*-Komponenten gebaut (host=${DB_HOST:-db})"
+fi
+
+echo "[entrypoint] Warte auf Datenbank…"
+# Erst auf DB-Verfügbarkeit warten via einfachem Connect-Check.
+# Wir nutzen Prisma's interne Engine, kein extra mysql-client nötig.
+TRIES=30
+until node -e "
+  const { PrismaClient } = require('@prisma/client');
+  const p = new PrismaClient();
+  p.\$queryRaw\`SELECT 1\`
+    .then(() => p.\$disconnect().then(() => process.exit(0)))
+    .catch(() => process.exit(1));
+" 2>/dev/null; do
+  TRIES=$((TRIES - 1))
+  if [ "$TRIES" -le 0 ]; then
+    echo "[entrypoint] DB nicht erreichbar – Abbruch"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  echo "[entrypoint] DB noch nicht bereit – retry in 2s ($TRIES Versuche übrig)"
+  sleep 2
+done
+echo "[entrypoint] DB erreichbar"
+
+# Auto-Baseline: Wenn die DB Anwendungs-Tabellen enthält (z.B. User), aber noch
+# keine _prisma_migrations-Tabelle, dann ist es eine "alte" DB, die früher mit
+# `prisma db push` synced wurde. Wir markieren 0_init als bereits angewendet,
+# damit `migrate deploy` nicht versucht, alle Tabellen nochmal anzulegen.
+NEEDS_BASELINE=$(node -e "
+  const { PrismaClient } = require('@prisma/client');
+  const p = new PrismaClient();
+  (async () => {
+    try {
+      const dbName = process.env.DB_NAME;
+      const tables = await p.\$queryRawUnsafe(
+        \`SELECT TABLE_NAME FROM information_schema.TABLES WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = ?\`,
+        dbName
+      );
+      const names = tables.map(t => t.TABLE_NAME);
+      const hasMigrations = names.includes('_prisma_migrations');
+      const hasUserTable  = names.includes('User');
+      // Existing DB (User da) ohne Migrations-Tracking => Baseline nötig
+      if (hasUserTable && !hasMigrations) process.stdout.write('yes');
+      else process.stdout.write('no');
+    } catch (e) {
+      process.stdout.write('no');
+    } finally {
+      await p.\$disconnect();
+    }
+  })();
+" 2>/dev/null)
+
+if [ "$NEEDS_BASELINE" = "yes" ]; then
+  echo "[entrypoint] Bestehende DB ohne Migrations-Tracking erkannt – markiere 0_init als angewendet (Baseline)"
+  npx prisma migrate resolve --applied 0_init || echo "[entrypoint] Baseline fehlgeschlagen – fahre trotzdem fort"
+fi
+
+# Migrations anwenden (idempotent: bereits angewendete werden übersprungen).
+# Im Gegensatz zu `db push` löscht `migrate deploy` keine Daten — Schema-
+# Änderungen werden über versionierte Migrations-Files unter prisma/migrations/
+# eingespielt. Neue Migration anlegen mit: npm run schema:sync (lokal, dev).
+echo "[entrypoint] Wende Migrations an…"
+if ! npx prisma migrate deploy; then
+  echo "[entrypoint] migrate deploy fehlgeschlagen – Abbruch"
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "[entrypoint] DB-Schema aktuell"
+
+# Auto-Seed: wenn die User-Tabelle leer ist (= Erstinstallation), automatisch seeden.
+# RUN_SEED=true erzwingt Seed auch bei nicht-leerer DB (z.B. nach Reset).
+USER_COUNT=$(node -e "
+  const { PrismaClient } = require('@prisma/client');
+  const p = new PrismaClient();
+  p.user.count()
+    .then((n) => { process.stdout.write(String(n)); process.exit(0); })
+    .catch(() => { process.stdout.write('-1'); process.exit(0); });
+" 2>/dev/null)
+
+RAN_SEED=false
+if [ "${RUN_SEED:-false}" = "true" ]; then
+  echo "[entrypoint] RUN_SEED=true – seede DB (Force)"
+  if npx prisma db seed; then RAN_SEED=true; else echo "[entrypoint] Seed fehlgeschlagen oder schon gelaufen – ignoriert"; fi
+elif [ "$USER_COUNT" = "0" ]; then
+  echo "[entrypoint] DB ist leer (User-Count=0) – Auto-Seed wird ausgeführt"
+  if npx prisma db seed; then RAN_SEED=true; else echo "[entrypoint] Auto-Seed fehlgeschlagen – ignoriert"; fi
+else
+  echo "[entrypoint] DB enthält $USER_COUNT User – kein Seed nötig"
+fi
+
+# Eingebaute Factory-Defaults nach Erstinstallation einspielen.
+# Das ist die Werkseinstellung für neue VMs: PDF-Vorlagen, Anbieter, Tarife,
+# HTML-Templates – alles aus /app/factory-defaults-builtin/. Erfolgt nur wenn
+# der Auto-Seed gerade lief (= frische DB), sonst werden Updates auf
+# bestehenden Installationen nicht ungewollt überschrieben.
+if [ "$RAN_SEED" = "true" ] && [ -d /app/factory-defaults-builtin ] \
+   && [ -n "$(ls -A /app/factory-defaults-builtin 2>/dev/null | grep -v -E '^(README\.md|\.gitkeep)$')" ]; then
+  echo "[entrypoint] Spiele eingebaute Factory-Defaults ein…"
+  FACTORY_DEFAULTS_DIR=/app/factory-defaults-builtin npx tsx scripts/seed-factory-defaults.ts \
+    || echo "[entrypoint] Factory-Defaults-Seed fehlgeschlagen – ignoriert"
+fi
+
+# Permissions + Rollen-Sync: Stellt sicher, dass nachträglich hinzugefügte
+# Permissions (z.B. audit:read auf der DSGVO-Rolle) auch auf bestehenden
+# DBs ankommen. Seed läuft NICHT auf nicht-leeren DBs, daher würden alte
+# Installationen sonst mit unvollständigen Role-Perms laufen. Idempotent,
+# fasst keine Stammdaten / User / Verträge an.
+echo "[entrypoint] Rollen + Permissions synchronisieren…"
+npx tsx prisma/sync-roles.ts \
+  || echo "[entrypoint] Role-Sync fehlgeschlagen – nicht kritisch"
+
+# Datenbereinigung: XSS-Strings aus Customer/User-Stringfeldern strippen,
+# nicht-whitelisted AppSettings entfernen, Pentest-Marker melden (Default
+# nur warnen; CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST=true löscht markierte Records).
+# Idempotent – läuft bei jedem Container-Start ohne Risiko.
+echo "[entrypoint] Datenbereinigung läuft…"
+npx tsx prisma/cleanup-xss-and-mass-assignment.ts \
+  || echo "[entrypoint] Cleanup übersprungen / fehlgeschlagen – nicht kritisch"
+
+echo "[entrypoint] Starte Backend…"
+exec "$@"

backend/factory-defaults/README.md

@@ -18,15 +18,21 @@ backend/factory-defaults/
 │   ├── cancellation-periods.json   # Kündigungsfristen
 │   ├── contract-durations.json     # Vertragslaufzeiten
 │   └── contract-categories.json    # Vertragskategorien (Strom/Gas/DSL/...)
-└── pdf-templates/
+├── pdf-templates/
-    ├── pdf-templates.json          # Metadaten + Feldzuordnungen
+│   ├── pdf-templates.json          # Metadaten + Feldzuordnungen
-    └── *.pdf                       # PDF-Vorlagen-Dateien
+│   └── *.pdf                       # PDF-Vorlagen-Dateien
+└── app-settings/
+    └── app-settings.json           # HTML-Templates: Datenschutz / Impressum /
+                                    # Vollmacht / Website-Datenschutz
 ```
 
 **Was NICHT enthalten ist:** Kundendaten, Verträge, Dokumente, E-Mails, SMTP-Einstellungen,
-Datenschutzerklärungen oder andere AppSettings. Dafür gibt es den separaten
+Secrets oder benutzerspezifische AppSettings. Dafür gibt es den separaten
 **Datenbank-Backup-Export** (Einstellungen → Datenbank & Zurücksetzen).
 
+Bei den AppSettings ist nur eine **Whitelist** vorgesehen (HTML-Texte für rechtliche
+Standardpflichten) – andere Keys werden beim Import ignoriert.
+
 ---
 
 ## Export (aus einer bestehenden Installation)
@@ -46,7 +52,8 @@ factory-defaults-2026-04-23.zip
 ├── contract-meta/contract-durations.json
 ├── contract-meta/contract-categories.json
 ├── pdf-templates/pdf-templates.json
-└── pdf-templates/*.pdf
+├── pdf-templates/*.pdf
+└── app-settings/app-settings.json
 ```
 
 Die ZIP kann an andere Installationen weitergegeben werden – z.B. für Test-Systeme,
@@ -56,7 +63,15 @@ neue Installationen oder Partner-Setups.
 
 ## Import (in eine andere Installation)
 
-### Schritt-für-Schritt
+### Variante A: Über die UI (empfohlen)
+
+1. Im Ziel-CRM als Admin einloggen
+2. **Einstellungen → Factory-Defaults**
+3. Im Bereich **Import** auf **„ZIP hochladen"** klicken
+4. Die exportierte ZIP wählen – der Import läuft direkt
+5. Erfolgsmeldung zeigt Counts pro Kategorie an
+
+### Variante B: Über die CLI (für Bare-Metal / Migration / mehrere ZIPs zusammenführen)
 
 1. **ZIP herunterladen** (aus einer Export-Installation oder von einer Vorlage)
 2. **Inhalt entpacken** in diesen Ordner (`backend/factory-defaults/`),
@@ -234,6 +249,24 @@ Array von Providern, jeweils inkl. zugehöriger Tarife:
 **Unique Key:** `name`
 **Wichtig:** Die `pdfFilename` muss zu einer PDF-Datei im selben Ordner passen.
 
+### `app-settings/app-settings.json`
+
+HTML-Standardtexte als Werkseinstellung. Es ist eine **Whitelist** aktiv – andere Keys
+werden beim Import ignoriert (Schutz vor versehentlichem Überschreiben von Secrets).
+
+```json
+[
+  { "key": "privacyPolicyHtml",        "value": "<h1>Datenschutzerklärung</h1>..." },
+  { "key": "imprintHtml",              "value": "<h1>Impressum</h1>..." },
+  { "key": "authorizationTemplateHtml","value": "<h1>Vollmacht</h1>..." },
+  { "key": "websitePrivacyPolicyHtml", "value": "<h1>Website-Datenschutz</h1>..." }
+]
+```
+
+**Unique Key:** `key`
+**Erlaubte Keys:** `privacyPolicyHtml`, `imprintHtml`, `authorizationTemplateHtml`,
+`websitePrivacyPolicyHtml`.
+
 ---
 
 ## Berechtigungen
@@ -242,6 +275,7 @@ Array von Providern, jeweils inkl. zugehöriger Tarife:
 |--------|--------------|
 | Factory-Defaults Vorschau | `settings:read` |
 | Factory-Defaults Export (UI) | `settings:update` |
+| Factory-Defaults Import (UI) | `settings:update` |
 | Factory-Defaults Import (CLI) | Server-Zugang (SSH/Shell) |
 
 ---

backend/package-lock.json

@@ -1,19 +1,22 @@
 {
   "name": "opencrm-backend",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "opencrm-backend",
-      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "version": "1.1.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@prisma/client": "^5.22.0",
+        "@types/cookie-parser": "^1.4.10",
         "adm-zip": "^0.5.16",
         "archiver": "^7.0.1",
         "bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",
+        "cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
         "cors": "^2.8.5",
         "dotenv": "^16.4.5",
+        "dotenv-expand": "^13.0.0",
         "express": "^4.21.1",
         "express-rate-limit": "^8.4.0",
         "express-validator": "^7.2.0",
@@ -26,6 +29,7 @@
         "nodemailer": "^7.0.13",
         "pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
         "pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
+        "tsx": "^4.19.2",
         "undici": "^6.23.0"
       },
       "devDependencies": {
@@ -42,7 +46,6 @@
         "@types/nodemailer": "^7.0.9",
         "@types/pdfkit": "^0.17.4",
         "prisma": "^5.22.0",
-        "tsx": "^4.19.2",
         "typescript": "^5.6.3"
       }
     },
@@ -53,7 +56,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "ppc64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "aix"
@@ -69,7 +71,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "android"
@@ -85,7 +86,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "android"
@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "android"
@@ -117,7 +116,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "darwin"
@@ -133,7 +131,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "darwin"
@@ -149,7 +146,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "freebsd"
@@ -165,7 +161,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "freebsd"
@@ -181,7 +176,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -197,7 +191,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -213,7 +206,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "ia32"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -229,7 +221,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "loong64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -245,7 +236,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "mips64el"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -261,7 +251,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "ppc64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -277,7 +266,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "riscv64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -293,7 +281,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "s390x"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -309,7 +296,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "linux"
@@ -325,7 +311,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "netbsd"
@@ -341,7 +326,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "netbsd"
@@ -357,7 +341,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "openbsd"
@@ -373,7 +356,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "openbsd"
@@ -389,7 +371,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "openharmony"
@@ -405,7 +386,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "sunos"
@@ -421,7 +401,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "win32"
@@ -437,7 +416,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "ia32"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "win32"
@@ -453,7 +431,6 @@
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
-      "dev": true,
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
         "win32"
@@ -511,7 +488,8 @@
     "node_modules/@pinojs/redact": {
       "version": "0.4.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@pinojs/redact/-/redact-0.4.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-k2ENnmBugE/rzQfEcdWHcCY+/FM3VLzH9cYEsbdsoqrvzAKRhUZeRNhAZvB8OitQJ1TBed3yqWtdjzS6wJKBwg=="
+      "integrity": "sha512-k2ENnmBugE/rzQfEcdWHcCY+/FM3VLzH9cYEsbdsoqrvzAKRhUZeRNhAZvB8OitQJ1TBed3yqWtdjzS6wJKBwg==",
+      "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/@pkgjs/parseargs": {
       "version": "0.11.0",
@@ -632,7 +610,6 @@
       "version": "1.19.6",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/body-parser/-/body-parser-1.19.6.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-HLFeCYgz89uk22N5Qg3dvGvsv46B8GLvKKo1zKG4NybA8U2DiEO3w9lqGg29t/tfLRJpJ6iQxnVw4OnB7MoM9g==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/connect": "*",
         "@types/node": "*"
@@ -642,11 +619,19 @@
       "version": "3.4.38",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/connect/-/connect-3.4.38.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-K6uROf1LD88uDQqJCktA4yzL1YYAK6NgfsI0v/mTgyPKWsX1CnJ0XPSDhViejru1GcRkLWb8RlzFYJRqGUbaug==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/node": "*"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/@types/cookie-parser": {
+      "version": "1.4.10",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/cookie-parser/-/cookie-parser-1.4.10.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-B4xqkqfZ8Wek+rCOeRxsjMS9OgvzebEzzLYw7NHYuvzb7IdxOkI0ZHGgeEBX4PUM7QGVvNSK60T3OvWj3YfBRg==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "peerDependencies": {
+        "@types/express": "*"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/@types/cors": {
       "version": "2.8.19",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/cors/-/cors-2.8.19.tgz",
@@ -660,7 +645,6 @@
       "version": "4.17.25",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/express/-/express-4.17.25.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-dVd04UKsfpINUnK0yBoYHDF3xu7xVH4BuDotC/xGuycx4CgbP48X/KF/586bcObxT0HENHXEU8Nqtu6NR+eKhw==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/body-parser": "*",
         "@types/express-serve-static-core": "^4.17.33",
@@ -672,7 +656,6 @@
       "version": "4.19.8",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/express-serve-static-core/-/express-serve-static-core-4.19.8.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-02S5fmqeoKzVZCHPZid4b8JH2eM5HzQLZWN2FohQEy/0eXTq8VXZfSN6Pcr3F6N9R/vNrj7cpgbhjie6m/1tCA==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/node": "*",
         "@types/qs": "*",
@@ -683,8 +666,7 @@
     "node_modules/@types/http-errors": {
       "version": "2.0.5",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/http-errors/-/http-errors-2.0.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-r8Tayk8HJnX0FztbZN7oVqGccWgw98T/0neJphO91KkmOzug1KkofZURD4UaD5uH8AqcFLfdPErnBod0u71/qg==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-r8Tayk8HJnX0FztbZN7oVqGccWgw98T/0neJphO91KkmOzug1KkofZURD4UaD5uH8AqcFLfdPErnBod0u71/qg=="
-      "dev": true
     },
     "node_modules/@types/jsonwebtoken": {
       "version": "9.0.10",
@@ -721,8 +703,7 @@
     "node_modules/@types/mime": {
       "version": "1.3.5",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/mime/-/mime-1.3.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-/pyBZWSLD2n0dcHE3hq8s8ZvcETHtEuF+3E7XVt0Ig2nvsVQXdghHVcEkIWjy9A0wKfTn97a/PSDYohKIlnP/w==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-/pyBZWSLD2n0dcHE3hq8s8ZvcETHtEuF+3E7XVt0Ig2nvsVQXdghHVcEkIWjy9A0wKfTn97a/PSDYohKIlnP/w=="
-      "dev": true
     },
     "node_modules/@types/ms": {
       "version": "2.1.0",
@@ -743,7 +724,6 @@
       "version": "22.19.7",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/node/-/node-22.19.7.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-MciR4AKGHWl7xwxkBa6xUGxQJ4VBOmPTF7sL+iGzuahOFaO0jHCsuEfS80pan1ef4gWId1oWOweIhrDEYLuaOw==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "undici-types": "~6.21.0"
       }
@@ -776,14 +756,12 @@
     "node_modules/@types/qs": {
       "version": "6.14.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/qs/-/qs-6.14.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-eOunJqu0K1923aExK6y8p6fsihYEn/BYuQ4g0CxAAgFc4b/ZLN4CrsRZ55srTdqoiLzU2B2evC+apEIxprEzkQ==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-eOunJqu0K1923aExK6y8p6fsihYEn/BYuQ4g0CxAAgFc4b/ZLN4CrsRZ55srTdqoiLzU2B2evC+apEIxprEzkQ=="
-      "dev": true
     },
     "node_modules/@types/range-parser": {
       "version": "1.2.7",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/range-parser/-/range-parser-1.2.7.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-hKormJbkJqzQGhziax5PItDUTMAM9uE2XXQmM37dyd4hVM+5aVl7oVxMVUiVQn2oCQFN/LKCZdvSM0pFRqbSmQ==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-hKormJbkJqzQGhziax5PItDUTMAM9uE2XXQmM37dyd4hVM+5aVl7oVxMVUiVQn2oCQFN/LKCZdvSM0pFRqbSmQ=="
-      "dev": true
     },
     "node_modules/@types/readdir-glob": {
       "version": "1.1.5",
@@ -798,7 +776,6 @@
       "version": "1.2.1",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/send/-/send-1.2.1.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-arsCikDvlU99zl1g69TcAB3mzZPpxgw0UQnaHeC1Nwb015xp8bknZv5rIfri9xTOcMuaVgvabfIRA7PSZVuZIQ==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/node": "*"
       }
@@ -807,7 +784,6 @@
       "version": "1.15.10",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/serve-static/-/serve-static-1.15.10.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-tRs1dB+g8Itk72rlSI2ZrW6vZg0YrLI81iQSTkMmOqnqCaNr/8Ek4VwWcN5vZgCYWbg/JJSGBlUaYGAOP73qBw==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/http-errors": "*",
         "@types/node": "*",
@@ -818,7 +794,6 @@
       "version": "0.17.6",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/send/-/send-0.17.6.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-Uqt8rPBE8SY0RK8JB1EzVOIZ32uqy8HwdxCnoCOsYrvnswqmFZ/k+9Ikidlk/ImhsdvBsloHbAlewb2IEBV/Og==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "@types/mime": "^1",
         "@types/node": "*"
@@ -986,6 +961,7 @@
       "version": "1.0.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/atomic-sleep/-/atomic-sleep-1.0.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-kNOjDqAh7px0XWNI+4QbzoiR/nTkHAWNud2uvnJquD1/x5a7EQZMJT0AczqK0Qn67oY/TTQ1LbUKajZpp3I9tQ==",
+      "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=8.0.0"
       }
@@ -1069,9 +1045,10 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/brace-expansion": {
-      "version": "2.0.2",
+      "version": "2.1.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-2.0.2.tgz",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-2.1.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Jt0vHyM+jmUBqojB7E1NIYadt0vI0Qxjxd2TErW94wDz+E2LAm5vKMXXwg6ZZBTHPuUlDgQHKXvjGBdfcF1ZDQ==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-TN1kCZAgdgweJhWWpgKYrQaMNHcDULHkWwQIspdtjV4Y5aurRdZpjAqn6yX3FPqTA9ngHCc4hJxMAMgGfve85w==",
+      "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "balanced-match": "^1.0.0"
       }
@@ -1274,6 +1251,25 @@
         "node": ">= 0.6"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/cookie-parser": {
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+        "node": ">= 12"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/sonic-boom": {
-      "version": "4.2.0",
+      "version": "4.2.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sonic-boom/-/sonic-boom-4.2.0.tgz",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/sonic-boom/-/sonic-boom-4.2.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-INb7TM37/mAcsGmc9hyyI6+QR3rR1zVRu36B0NeGXKnOOLiZOfER5SA+N7X7k3yUYRzLWafduTDvJAfDswwEww==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-w6AxtubXa2wTXAUsZMMWERrsIRAdrK0Sc+FUytWvYAhBJLyuI4llrMIC1DtlNSdI99EI86KZum2MMq3EAZlF9Q==",
+      "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "atomic-sleep": "^1.0.0"
       }
@@ -3040,6 +3139,7 @@
       "version": "4.2.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/split2/-/split2-4.2.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-UcjcJOWknrNkF6PLX83qcHM6KHgVKNkV62Y8a5uYDVv9ydGQVwAHMKqHdJje1VTWpljG0WYpCDhrCdAOYH4TWg==",
+      "license": "ISC",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">= 10.x"
       }
@@ -3193,6 +3293,7 @@
       "version": "4.0.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/thread-stream/-/thread-stream-4.0.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-4iMVL6HAINXWf1ZKZjIPcz5wYaOdPhtO8ATvZ+Xqp3BTdaqtAwQkNmKORqcIo5YkQqGXq5cwfswDwMqqQNrpJA==",
+      "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "real-require": "^0.2.0"
       },
@@ -3230,7 +3331,6 @@
       "version": "4.21.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tsx/-/tsx-4.21.0.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-5C1sg4USs1lfG0GFb2RLXsdpXqBSEhAaA/0kPL01wxzpMqLILNxIxIOKiILz+cdg/pLnOUxFYOR5yhHU666wbw==",
-      "dev": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "esbuild": "~0.27.0",
         "get-tsconfig": "^4.7.5"
@@ -3281,9 +3381,10 @@
       "integrity": "sha512-ARDJmphmdvUk6Glw7y9DQ2bFkKBHwQHLi2lsaH6PPmz/Ka9sFOBsBluozhDltWmnv9u/cF6Rt87znRTPV+yp/A=="
     },
     "node_modules/undici": {
-      "version": "6.23.0",
+      "version": "6.25.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici/-/undici-6.23.0.tgz",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici/-/undici-6.25.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-VfQPToRA5FZs/qJxLIinmU59u0r7LXqoJkCzinq3ckNJp3vKEh7jTWN589YQ5+aoAC/TGRLyJLCPKcLQbM8r9g==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ZgpWDC5gmNiuY9CnLVXEH8rl50xhRCuLNA97fAUnKi8RRuV4E6KG31pDTsLVUKnohJE0I3XDrTeEydAXRw47xg==",
+      "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=18.17"
       }
@@ -3291,8 +3392,7 @@
     "node_modules/undici-types": {
       "version": "6.21.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici-types/-/undici-types-6.21.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-iwDZqg0QAGrg9Rav5H4n0M64c3mkR59cJ6wQp+7C4nI0gsmExaedaYLNO44eT4AtBBwjbTiGPMlt2Md0T9H9JQ==",
+      "integrity": "sha512-iwDZqg0QAGrg9Rav5H4n0M64c3mkR59cJ6wQp+7C4nI0gsmExaedaYLNO44eT4AtBBwjbTiGPMlt2Md0T9H9JQ=="
-      "dev": true
     },
     "node_modules/unicode-properties": {
       "version": "1.4.1",

backend/package.json

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 {
   "name": "opencrm-backend",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
   "description": "OpenCRM Backend API",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "prisma": {
-    "seed": "tsx prisma/seed.ts"
+    "seed": "npx tsx prisma/seed.ts"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "tsx watch src/index.ts",
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
     "start": "node dist/index.js",
     "db:migrate": "prisma migrate dev",
     "db:push": "prisma db push",
+    "schema:sync": "prisma migrate dev --name auto_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)",
     "db:seed": "tsx prisma/seed.ts",
     "db:studio": "prisma studio",
     "db:backup": "tsx prisma/backup-data.ts",
@@ -20,11 +21,14 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@prisma/client": "^5.22.0",
+    "@types/cookie-parser": "^1.4.10",
     "adm-zip": "^0.5.16",
     "archiver": "^7.0.1",
     "bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",
+    "cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
     "cors": "^2.8.5",
     "dotenv": "^16.4.5",
+    "dotenv-expand": "^13.0.0",
     "express": "^4.21.1",
     "express-rate-limit": "^8.4.0",
     "express-validator": "^7.2.0",
@@ -37,6 +41,7 @@
     "nodemailer": "^7.0.13",
     "pdf-lib": "^1.17.1",
     "pdfkit": "^0.17.2",
+    "tsx": "^4.19.2",
     "undici": "^6.23.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
@@ -53,7 +58,6 @@
     "@types/nodemailer": "^7.0.9",
     "@types/pdfkit": "^0.17.4",
     "prisma": "^5.22.0",
-    "tsx": "^4.19.2",
     "typescript": "^5.6.3"
   }
 }

backend/prisma/cleanup-xss-and-mass-assignment.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/**
+ * Einmal-Bereinigung für Pentest-Reste (Runde 12 / 2026-05-18):
+ *
+ * 1. HTML-Tags aus Customer/User-Stringfeldern strippen (M2-Stored-XSS-Reste)
+ * 2. Unbekannte App-Settings entfernen, die durch Mass-Assignment in die DB
+ *    gerutscht sind, BEVOR die Whitelist eingezogen wurde (M1-Reste).
+ *
+ * Idempotent: wenn nichts zu tun ist, ändert sich nichts. Bei Bedarf
+ * mehrfach aufrufbar.
+ */
+import prisma from '../src/lib/prisma.js';
+import { stripHtml } from '../src/utils/sanitize.js';
+import { ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS } from '../src/services/appSetting.service.js';
+
+const CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS = [
+  'salutation', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName',
+  'birthPlace', 'email', 'phone', 'mobile',
+  'taxNumber', 'commercialRegisterNumber', 'notes',
+];
+
+const USER_STRING_FIELDS = [
+  'firstName', 'lastName', 'email',
+  'whatsappNumber', 'telegramUsername', 'signalNumber',
+];
+
+async function cleanupXss() {
+  const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
+  let touched = 0;
+  for (const c of customers) {
+    const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
+    for (const field of CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS) {
+      const v = (c as any)[field];
+      if (typeof v === 'string') {
+        const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
+        if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
+      }
+    }
+    if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
+      console.log(`  Customer #${c.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
+      await prisma.customer.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data: updates });
+      touched++;
+    }
+  }
+  console.log(`  → Customer bereinigt: ${touched}`);
+
+  const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
+  let userTouched = 0;
+  for (const u of users) {
+    const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
+    for (const field of USER_STRING_FIELDS) {
+      const v = (u as any)[field];
+      if (typeof v === 'string') {
+        const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
+        if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
+      }
+    }
+    if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
+      console.log(`  User #${u.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
+      await prisma.user.update({ where: { id: u.id }, data: updates });
+      userTouched++;
+    }
+  }
+  console.log(`  → User bereinigt: ${userTouched}`);
+}
+
+// HTML in Plain-Text-Settings strippen: WYSIWYG-Editoren liefern
+// absichtlich HTML, alles andere (companyName, defaultEmailDomain, ...)
+// muss reiner Text bleiben. Pentest 2026-05-19, MEDIUM.
+const HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS = new Set([
+  'authorizationTemplateHtml',
+  'imprintHtml',
+  'privacyPolicyHtml',
+  'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
+]);
+
+function stripHtmlString(s: string): string {
+  return s
+    .replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
+    .replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
+    .replace(/<\/?[a-z][^>]*>/gi, '')
+    .replace(/(?:javascript|data|vbscript)\s*:/gi, 'blocked:');
+}
+
+// Legitime CustomerConsent.source-Werte. Alles andere wird beim Cleanup
+// auf 'unknown' normalisiert. Pentest 2026-05-20.
+const ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES = new Set([
+  'portal',
+  'public-link',
+  'telefon',
+  'papier',
+  'email',
+  'crm-backend',
+]);
+
+// Legitimer documentPath: relativer Pfad unter uploads/, keine ".."-Segmente.
+// Schreibend werden Pfade ausschließlich vom multer-Upload erzeugt
+// (server-kontrollierter Dateiname), bestehende Pentest-Hinterlassenschaften
+// wie "../../../etc/passwd" oder "javascript:alert(1)" müssen aus der DB
+// raus (Pentest 2026-05-20 LOW 27.1).
+function isValidDocumentPath(v: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!v) return true; // null/leer ist OK
+  if (v.includes('..')) return false;
+  if (/(?:javascript|data|vbscript)\s*:/i.test(v)) return false;
+  if (/<[a-z!\/]/i.test(v)) return false; // HTML im Pfad
+  // erlaubt: "uploads/...", "/uploads/..."; keine Kontrollzeichen
+  return /^\/?uploads\/[A-Za-z0-9._\-\/]+$/.test(v);
+}
+
+async function cleanupConsents() {
+  // version + documentPath: HTML strippen (waren ohne Validierung).
+  // source: Whitelist erzwingen.
+  // documentPath zusätzlich gegen Pfad-Traversal absichern (27.1).
+  let versionStripped = 0;
+  let pathNulled = 0;
+  let sourceFixed = 0;
+  const consents = await prisma.customerConsent.findMany({
+    select: { id: true, source: true, documentPath: true, version: true },
+  });
+  for (const c of consents) {
+    const data: Record<string, string | null> = {};
+    if (c.version && c.version !== stripHtmlString(c.version)) {
+      data.version = stripHtmlString(c.version);
+      versionStripped++;
+    }
+    if (c.documentPath && !isValidDocumentPath(c.documentPath)) {
+      // ".../etc/passwd", "<script>", "javascript:..." etc. → NULL.
+      // Legitime Uploads bleiben unberührt (siehe isValidDocumentPath).
+      data.documentPath = null;
+      pathNulled++;
+    }
+    if (c.source && !ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES.has(c.source)) {
+      data.source = 'unknown';
+      sourceFixed++;
+    }
+    if (Object.keys(data).length > 0) {
+      await prisma.customerConsent.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data });
+    }
+  }
+  console.log(
+    `  → Consent bereinigt: version-stripped=${versionStripped}, ` +
+    `documentPath-genullt=${pathNulled}, source-whitelist=${sourceFixed}`,
+  );
+}
+
+// documentPath in den weiteren Tabellen prüfen. Schreibend wird er
+// server-seitig vom multer-Upload erzeugt – falls dort doch mal ein
+// dreckiger Wert reingerutscht ist (z.B. aus einem importierten Backup
+// vor unseren Sanitization-Fixes), nullen wir ihn hier raus.
+// ContractDocument hat documentPath NOT NULL → wir berichten dort nur,
+// löschen aber nicht (Records müssten manuell angeschaut werden).
+async function cleanupDocumentPaths() {
+  const findings: { table: string; id: number; value: string }[] = [];
+
+  const optional: Array<{
+    label: string;
+    fetch: () => Promise<{ id: number; documentPath: string | null }[]>;
+    update: (id: number) => Promise<unknown>;
+  }> = [
+    {
+      label: 'BankCard',
+      fetch: () => prisma.bankCard.findMany({ select: { id: true, documentPath: true } }),
+      update: (id) => prisma.bankCard.update({ where: { id }, data: { documentPath: null } }),
+    },
+    {
+      label: 'IdentityDocument',
+      fetch: () => prisma.identityDocument.findMany({ select: { id: true, documentPath: true } }),
+      update: (id) => prisma.identityDocument.update({ where: { id }, data: { documentPath: null } }),
+    },
+    {
+      label: 'Invoice',
+      fetch: () => prisma.invoice.findMany({ select: { id: true, documentPath: true } }),
+      update: (id) => prisma.invoice.update({ where: { id }, data: { documentPath: null } }),
+    },
+    {
+      label: 'RepresentativeAuthorization',
+      fetch: () => prisma.representativeAuthorization.findMany({
+        select: { id: true, documentPath: true },
+      }),
+      update: (id) => prisma.representativeAuthorization.update({
+        where: { id }, data: { documentPath: null },
+      }),
+    },
+  ];
+
+  let nulled = 0;
+  for (const t of optional) {
+    const rows = await t.fetch();
+    for (const r of rows) {
+      if (r.documentPath && !isValidDocumentPath(r.documentPath)) {
+        findings.push({ table: t.label, id: r.id, value: r.documentPath.slice(0, 80) });
+        await t.update(r.id);
+        nulled++;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // ContractDocument: documentPath ist NOT NULL → wir berichten nur.
+  const contractDocs = await prisma.contractDocument.findMany({
+    select: { id: true, documentPath: true },
+  });
+  let contractDocsDirty = 0;
+  for (const d of contractDocs) {
+    if (!isValidDocumentPath(d.documentPath)) {
+      findings.push({ table: 'ContractDocument', id: d.id, value: d.documentPath.slice(0, 80) });
+      contractDocsDirty++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  console.log(`  → documentPath bereinigt: ${nulled} genullt, ${contractDocsDirty} ContractDocument-Records auffällig (NOT NULL, manuell prüfen)`);
+  for (const f of findings.slice(0, 10)) {
+    console.log(`     [${f.table}#${f.id}] "${f.value}"`);
+  }
+}
+
+async function reportOrphanedUsers() {
+  // User ohne jegliche Rollenzuordnung können sich zwar einloggen, sind aber
+  // im Permission-System unsichtbar. Meist Überrest von gescheiterten Seeds
+  // oder manuellen DB-Edits. Wir löschen NICHT (könnte legitime
+  // Spezial-User treffen) – nur warnen.
+  const orphans = await prisma.user.findMany({
+    where: { roles: { none: {} } },
+    select: { id: true, email: true, createdAt: true },
+  });
+  if (orphans.length === 0) {
+    console.log('  → Keine User ohne Rollenzuordnung.');
+    return;
+  }
+  console.log(`  ⚠️  ${orphans.length} User ohne Rollenzuordnung:`);
+  for (const u of orphans.slice(0, 10)) {
+    console.log(`     [User#${u.id}] ${u.email} (created ${u.createdAt.toISOString()})`);
+  }
+  console.log('     → Rolle zuweisen oder User löschen.');
+}
+
+async function cleanupAppSettings() {
+  const settings = await prisma.appSetting.findMany();
+  const removed: string[] = [];
+  let stripped = 0;
+  for (const s of settings) {
+    if (!ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
+      removed.push(s.key);
+      await prisma.appSetting.delete({ where: { key: s.key } });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
+      const cleaned = stripHtmlString(s.value);
+      if (cleaned !== s.value) {
+        await prisma.appSetting.update({ where: { key: s.key }, data: { value: cleaned } });
+        stripped++;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  console.log(`  → AppSettings entfernt: ${removed.length}${removed.length ? ' (' + removed.join(', ') + ')' : ''}`);
+  if (stripped > 0) {
+    console.log(`  → AppSettings HTML-gestrippt: ${stripped}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// Pattern, die auf typische Pentest-/Test-Daten hindeuten. Bewusst eng
+// gefasst – legitime Kunden mit "Hacker" als Nachnamen sollen nicht
+// fälschlich getroffen werden (gibt's reichlich, gerade hier).
+// Konkret weggelassen: `^hacker@` würde Verwandte/Kunden mit
+// `hacker@familie-hacker.de` o.ä. fängen.
+const PENTEST_MARKERS = [
+  /@evil\./i,
+  /^attacker@/i,
+  /^pentest@/i,
+  /<script\b/i,        // unverwechselbarer XSS-Marker
+  /\bonerror\s*=/i,    // <img onerror=…>
+  /javascript:/i,      // javascript:-URL
+  /'\s*OR\s*'1'\s*=\s*'1/i, // SQL-Injection
+  /\.\.\/.*etc\/passwd/i,   // Path-Traversal
+];
+
+function looksLikePentestData(value: unknown): boolean {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
+  return PENTEST_MARKERS.some((re) => re.test(value));
+}
+
+async function findOrPurgePentestRecords() {
+  const purge = process.env.CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST === 'true';
+  const suspect: Array<{ kind: string; id: number; reason: string }> = [];
+
+  const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
+  for (const c of customers) {
+    for (const f of ['email', 'phone', 'mobile', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName', 'notes']) {
+      if (looksLikePentestData((c as any)[f])) {
+        suspect.push({ kind: 'Customer', id: c.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((c as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
+  for (const u of users) {
+    for (const f of ['email', 'firstName', 'lastName']) {
+      if (looksLikePentestData((u as any)[f])) {
+        suspect.push({ kind: 'User', id: u.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((u as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (suspect.length === 0) {
+    console.log('  → Keine Pentest-Marker in Customer/User-Records gefunden.');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  console.log(`  → ${suspect.length} verdächtige Records (Pentest-Marker):`);
+  for (const s of suspect) {
+    console.log(`     [${s.kind}#${s.id}] ${s.reason}`);
+  }
+
+  if (!purge) {
+    console.log('  ℹ️  Zum Löschen Container mit CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST=true neu starten,');
+    console.log('     oder Records manuell über adminer entfernen.');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  for (const s of suspect) {
+    if (s.kind === 'Customer') {
+      await prisma.customer.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
+        console.log(`     [Customer#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
+      });
+    } else if (s.kind === 'User') {
+      await prisma.user.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
+        console.log(`     [User#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  console.log(`  → ${suspect.length} verdächtige Records gelöscht.`);
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  console.log('=== Cleanup: XSS-Reste + Mass-Assignment-AppSettings ===');
+  await cleanupXss();
+  await cleanupAppSettings();
+  await cleanupConsents();
+  await cleanupDocumentPaths();
+  await reportOrphanedUsers();
+  await findOrPurgePentestRecords();
+  console.log('=== Fertig. ===');
+}
+
+main()
+  .catch((e) => {
+    console.error('Cleanup fehlgeschlagen:', e);
+    process.exit(1);
+  })
+  .finally(async () => {
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });

backend/prisma/migrations/0_init/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,989 @@
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `PdfTemplate` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `description` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `providerName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `templatePath` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `originalName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `fieldMapping` LONGTEXT NOT NULL,
+    `phoneFieldPrefix` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `maxPhoneFields` INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 8,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `PdfTemplate_name_key`(`name`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `EmailLog` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `fromAddress` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `toAddress` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `subject` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `context` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `triggeredBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `smtpServer` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `smtpPort` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `smtpEncryption` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `smtpUser` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `success` BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
+    `messageId` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `errorMessage` TEXT NULL,
+    `smtpResponse` TEXT NULL,
+    `sentAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+    INDEX `EmailLog_sentAt_idx`(`sentAt`),
+    INDEX `EmailLog_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
+    INDEX `EmailLog_success_idx`(`success`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `AppSetting` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `key` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `value` TEXT NOT NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `AppSetting_key_key`(`key`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `User` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `email` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `password` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `firstName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `lastName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `tokenInvalidatedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `passwordResetToken` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `passwordResetExpiresAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `whatsappNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `telegramUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `signalNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `User_email_key`(`email`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `User_passwordResetToken_key`(`passwordResetToken`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `User_customerId_key`(`customerId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Role` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `description` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Role_name_key`(`name`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Permission` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `resource` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `action` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Permission_resource_action_key`(`resource`, `action`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `RolePermission` (
+    `roleId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `permissionId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`roleId`, `permissionId`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `UserRole` (
+    `userId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `roleId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`userId`, `roleId`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Customer` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `type` ENUM('PRIVATE', 'BUSINESS') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PRIVATE',
+    `salutation` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `firstName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `lastName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `companyName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `foundingDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `birthDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `birthPlace` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `email` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `phone` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `mobile` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `taxNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `businessRegistrationPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `commercialRegisterPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `commercialRegisterNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `privacyPolicyPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `consentHash` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `notes` TEXT NULL,
+    `portalEnabled` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `portalEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `portalPasswordHash` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `portalPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `portalLastLogin` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `portalPasswordResetToken` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `portalPasswordResetExpiresAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `portalTokenInvalidatedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `lastBirthdayGreetingYear` INTEGER NULL,
+    `useInformalAddress` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `autoBirthdayGreeting` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `autoBirthdayChannel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_customerNumber_key`(`customerNumber`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_consentHash_key`(`consentHash`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_portalEmail_key`(`portalEmail`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_portalPasswordResetToken_key`(`portalPasswordResetToken`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `CustomerRepresentative` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `representativeId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `notes` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `CustomerRepresentative_customerId_representativeId_key`(`customerId`, `representativeId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `RepresentativeAuthorization` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `representativeId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `isGranted` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `grantedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `withdrawnAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `source` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `notes` TEXT NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `RepresentativeAuthorization_customerId_representativeId_key`(`customerId`, `representativeId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Address` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `type` ENUM('DELIVERY_RESIDENCE', 'BILLING') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'DELIVERY_RESIDENCE',
+    `street` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `houseNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `postalCode` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `city` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `country` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Deutschland',
+    `isDefault` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `ownerCompany` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerFirstName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerLastName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerStreet` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerHouseNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerPostalCode` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerCity` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerPhone` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerMobile` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ownerEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `BankCard` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `accountHolder` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `iban` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `bic` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `bankName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `expiryDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `IdentityDocument` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `type` ENUM('ID_CARD', 'PASSPORT', 'DRIVERS_LICENSE', 'OTHER') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ID_CARD',
+    `documentNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `issuingAuthority` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `issueDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `expiryDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `licenseClasses` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `licenseIssueDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `EmailProviderConfig` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `type` ENUM('PLESK', 'CPANEL', 'DIRECTADMIN') NOT NULL,
+    `apiUrl` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `apiKey` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `username` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `passwordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `domain` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `defaultForwardEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `imapServer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `imapPort` INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 993,
+    `smtpServer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `smtpPort` INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 465,
+    `imapEncryption` ENUM('SSL', 'STARTTLS', 'NONE') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'SSL',
+    `smtpEncryption` ENUM('SSL', 'STARTTLS', 'NONE') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'SSL',
+    `allowSelfSignedCerts` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `systemEmailAddress` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `systemEmailPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `customerEmailLabel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `isDefault` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `EmailProviderConfig_name_key`(`name`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `StressfreiEmail` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `email` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `platform` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `notes` TEXT NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `isProvisioned` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `provisionedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `provisionError` TEXT NULL,
+    `hasMailbox` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `emailPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `CachedEmail` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `stressfreiEmailId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `folder` ENUM('INBOX', 'SENT') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'INBOX',
+    `messageId` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `uid` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `subject` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `fromAddress` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `fromName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `toAddresses` TEXT NOT NULL,
+    `ccAddresses` TEXT NULL,
+    `receivedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+    `textBody` LONGTEXT NULL,
+    `htmlBody` LONGTEXT NULL,
+    `hasAttachments` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `attachmentNames` TEXT NULL,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `assignedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `assignedBy` INTEGER NULL,
+    `isAutoAssigned` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `isRead` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `isStarred` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `isDeleted` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `deletedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    INDEX `CachedEmail_contractId_idx`(`contractId`),
+    INDEX `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_folder_receivedAt_idx`(`stressfreiEmailId`, `folder`, `receivedAt`),
+    INDEX `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_isDeleted_idx`(`stressfreiEmailId`, `isDeleted`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_messageId_folder_key`(`stressfreiEmailId`, `messageId`, `folder`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Meter` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `meterNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `type` ENUM('ELECTRICITY', 'GAS') NOT NULL,
+    `tariffModel` ENUM('SINGLE', 'DUAL') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'SINGLE',
+    `location` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `MeterReading` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `meterId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `readingDate` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+    `value` DOUBLE NOT NULL,
+    `valueNt` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `unit` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'kWh',
+    `notes` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `reportedBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `status` ENUM('RECORDED', 'REPORTED', 'TRANSFERRED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'RECORDED',
+    `transferredAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `transferredBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `SalesPlatform` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `contactInfo` TEXT NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `SalesPlatform_name_key`(`name`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `CancellationPeriod` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `code` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `description` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `CancellationPeriod_code_key`(`code`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractDuration` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `code` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `description` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `ContractDuration_code_key`(`code`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Provider` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `portalUrl` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `usernameFieldName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `passwordFieldName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Provider_name_key`(`name`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Tariff` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `providerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Tariff_providerId_name_key`(`providerId`, `name`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractCategory` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `code` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `icon` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `color` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `sortOrder` INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `ContractCategory_code_key`(`code`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Contract` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `type` ENUM('ELECTRICITY', 'GAS', 'DSL', 'CABLE', 'FIBER', 'MOBILE', 'TV', 'CAR_INSURANCE') NOT NULL,
+    `status` ENUM('DRAFT', 'PENDING', 'ACTIVE', 'CANCELLED', 'EXPIRED', 'DEACTIVATED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'DRAFT',
+    `contractCategoryId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `addressId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `billingAddressId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `bankCardId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `identityDocumentId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `salesPlatformId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `cancellationPeriodId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `contractDurationId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `previousContractId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `previousProviderId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `previousCustomerNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `previousContractNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `providerId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `tariffId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `providerName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `tariffName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `customerNumberAtProvider` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `contractNumberAtProvider` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `priceFirst12Months` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `priceFrom13Months` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `priceAfter24Months` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `startDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `endDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `commission` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `cancellationLetterPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `cancellationConfirmationPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `cancellationLetterOptionsPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `cancellationConfirmationOptionsPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `cancellationConfirmationDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `cancellationConfirmationOptionsDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `wasSpecialCancellation` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `portalUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `portalPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `stressfreiEmailId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `nextReviewDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `notes` TEXT NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Contract_contractNumber_key`(`contractNumber`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `Contract_previousContractId_key`(`previousContractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractDocument` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `documentType` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `originalName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `notes` TEXT NULL,
+    `uploadedBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+    INDEX `ContractDocument_contractId_idx`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractHistoryEntry` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `title` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `description` TEXT NULL,
+    `isAutomatic` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractTask` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `title` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `description` TEXT NULL,
+    `status` ENUM('OPEN', 'COMPLETED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'OPEN',
+    `visibleInPortal` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `completedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractTaskSubtask` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `taskId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `title` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `status` ENUM('OPEN', 'COMPLETED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'OPEN',
+    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `completedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `meterId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `maloId` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `annualConsumption` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `annualConsumptionKwh` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `basePrice` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `unitPrice` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `unitPriceNt` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `bonus` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `previousProviderName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `previousCustomerNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `EnergyContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `ContractMeter` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `energyContractDetailsId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `meterId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `position` INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    `installedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `removedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `finalReading` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+    INDEX `ContractMeter_energyContractDetailsId_idx`(`energyContractDetailsId`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `ContractMeter_energyContractDetailsId_meterId_key`(`energyContractDetailsId`, `meterId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `Invoice` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `energyContractDetailsId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `invoiceDate` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+    `invoiceType` ENUM('INTERIM', 'FINAL', 'NOT_AVAILABLE') NOT NULL,
+    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `notes` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    INDEX `Invoice_energyContractDetailsId_idx`(`energyContractDetailsId`),
+    INDEX `Invoice_contractId_idx`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `InternetContractDetails` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `downloadSpeed` INTEGER NULL,
+    `uploadSpeed` INTEGER NULL,
+    `routerModel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `routerSerialNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `installationDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `internetUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `internetPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `propertyType` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `propertyLocation` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `connectionLocation` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `homeId` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `activationCode` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `InternetContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `PhoneNumber` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `internetContractDetailsId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `phoneNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `isMain` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `sipUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `sipPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `sipServer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `MobileContractDetails` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `requiresMultisim` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `dataVolume` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `includedMinutes` INTEGER NULL,
+    `includedSMS` INTEGER NULL,
+    `deviceModel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `deviceImei` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `phoneNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `simCardNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `MobileContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `SimCard` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `mobileDetailsId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `phoneNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `simCardNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `pin` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `puk` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isMultisim` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `isMain` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `TvContractDetails` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `receiverModel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `smartcardNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `package` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `TvContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `CarInsuranceDetails` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `licensePlate` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `hsn` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `tsn` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `vin` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `vehicleType` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `firstRegistration` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `noClaimsClass` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `insuranceType` ENUM('LIABILITY', 'PARTIAL', 'FULL') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'LIABILITY',
+    `deductiblePartial` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `deductibleFull` DOUBLE NULL,
+    `policyNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `previousInsurer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `CarInsuranceDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `AuditLog` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `userId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `userEmail` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `userRole` TEXT NULL,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `isCustomerPortal` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `action` ENUM('CREATE', 'READ', 'UPDATE', 'DELETE', 'EXPORT', 'ANONYMIZE', 'LOGIN', 'LOGOUT', 'LOGIN_FAILED') NOT NULL,
+    `sensitivity` ENUM('LOW', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', 'CRITICAL') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'MEDIUM',
+    `resourceType` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `resourceId` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `resourceLabel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `endpoint` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `httpMethod` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `ipAddress` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `userAgent` TEXT NULL,
+    `changesBefore` LONGTEXT NULL,
+    `changesAfter` LONGTEXT NULL,
+    `changesEncrypted` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `dataSubjectId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `legalBasis` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `success` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `errorMessage` TEXT NULL,
+    `durationMs` INTEGER NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `hash` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `previousHash` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+
+    INDEX `AuditLog_userId_idx`(`userId`),
+    INDEX `AuditLog_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
+    INDEX `AuditLog_resourceType_resourceId_idx`(`resourceType`, `resourceId`),
+    INDEX `AuditLog_dataSubjectId_idx`(`dataSubjectId`),
+    INDEX `AuditLog_action_idx`(`action`),
+    INDEX `AuditLog_createdAt_idx`(`createdAt`),
+    INDEX `AuditLog_sensitivity_idx`(`sensitivity`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `CustomerConsent` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `consentType` ENUM('DATA_PROCESSING', 'MARKETING_EMAIL', 'MARKETING_PHONE', 'DATA_SHARING_PARTNER') NOT NULL,
+    `status` ENUM('GRANTED', 'WITHDRAWN', 'PENDING') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+    `grantedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `withdrawnAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `source` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `version` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `ipAddress` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    INDEX `CustomerConsent_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
+    INDEX `CustomerConsent_consentType_idx`(`consentType`),
+    INDEX `CustomerConsent_status_idx`(`status`),
+    UNIQUE INDEX `CustomerConsent_customerId_consentType_key`(`customerId`, `consentType`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `DataDeletionRequest` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `status` ENUM('PENDING', 'IN_PROGRESS', 'COMPLETED', 'PARTIALLY_COMPLETED', 'REJECTED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+    `requestedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `requestSource` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `requestedBy` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `processedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `processedBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `deletedData` LONGTEXT NULL,
+    `retainedData` LONGTEXT NULL,
+    `retentionReason` TEXT NULL,
+    `proofDocument` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    INDEX `DataDeletionRequest_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
+    INDEX `DataDeletionRequest_status_idx`(`status`),
+    INDEX `DataDeletionRequest_requestedAt_idx`(`requestedAt`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `AuditRetentionPolicy` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `resourceType` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
+    `sensitivity` ENUM('LOW', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', 'CRITICAL') NULL,
+    `retentionDays` INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    `description` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `legalBasis` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
+
+    UNIQUE INDEX `AuditRetentionPolicy_resourceType_sensitivity_key`(`resourceType`, `sensitivity`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE `SecurityEvent` (
+    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+    `type` ENUM('LOGIN_FAILED', 'LOGIN_SUCCESS', 'RATE_LIMIT_HIT', 'ACCESS_DENIED', 'SSRF_BLOCKED', 'PASSWORD_RESET_REQUEST', 'PASSWORD_RESET_CONFIRM', 'LOGOUT', 'TOKEN_REJECTED', 'PERMISSION_CHANGED', 'SUSPICIOUS') NOT NULL,
+    `severity` ENUM('INFO', 'LOW', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', 'CRITICAL') NOT NULL,
+    `message` TEXT NOT NULL,
+    `ipAddress` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `userId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `customerId` INTEGER NULL,
+    `userEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `endpoint` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+    `details` JSON NULL,
+    `alerted` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    `alertedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
+    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+    INDEX `SecurityEvent_type_createdAt_idx`(`type`, `createdAt`),
+    INDEX `SecurityEvent_severity_createdAt_idx`(`severity`, `createdAt`),
+    INDEX `SecurityEvent_ipAddress_createdAt_idx`(`ipAddress`, `createdAt`),
+    INDEX `SecurityEvent_alerted_severity_idx`(`alerted`, `severity`),
+    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `User` ADD CONSTRAINT `User_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `RolePermission` ADD CONSTRAINT `RolePermission_roleId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`roleId`) REFERENCES `Role`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `RolePermission` ADD CONSTRAINT `RolePermission_permissionId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`permissionId`) REFERENCES `Permission`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `UserRole` ADD CONSTRAINT `UserRole_userId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`userId`) REFERENCES `User`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `UserRole` ADD CONSTRAINT `UserRole_roleId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`roleId`) REFERENCES `Role`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `CustomerRepresentative` ADD CONSTRAINT `CustomerRepresentative_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `CustomerRepresentative` ADD CONSTRAINT `CustomerRepresentative_representativeId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`representativeId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `RepresentativeAuthorization` ADD CONSTRAINT `RepresentativeAuthorization_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `RepresentativeAuthorization` ADD CONSTRAINT `RepresentativeAuthorization_representativeId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`representativeId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Address` ADD CONSTRAINT `Address_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `BankCard` ADD CONSTRAINT `BankCard_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `IdentityDocument` ADD CONSTRAINT `IdentityDocument_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `StressfreiEmail` ADD CONSTRAINT `StressfreiEmail_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `CachedEmail` ADD CONSTRAINT `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`stressfreiEmailId`) REFERENCES `StressfreiEmail`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `CachedEmail` ADD CONSTRAINT `CachedEmail_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Meter` ADD CONSTRAINT `Meter_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `MeterReading` ADD CONSTRAINT `MeterReading_meterId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`meterId`) REFERENCES `Meter`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Tariff` ADD CONSTRAINT `Tariff_providerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`providerId`) REFERENCES `Provider`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_contractCategoryId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractCategoryId`) REFERENCES `ContractCategory`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_addressId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`addressId`) REFERENCES `Address`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_billingAddressId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`billingAddressId`) REFERENCES `Address`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_bankCardId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`bankCardId`) REFERENCES `BankCard`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_identityDocumentId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`identityDocumentId`) REFERENCES `IdentityDocument`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_salesPlatformId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`salesPlatformId`) REFERENCES `SalesPlatform`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_cancellationPeriodId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`cancellationPeriodId`) REFERENCES `CancellationPeriod`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_contractDurationId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractDurationId`) REFERENCES `ContractDuration`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_previousContractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`previousContractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_previousProviderId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`previousProviderId`) REFERENCES `Provider`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_providerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`providerId`) REFERENCES `Provider`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_tariffId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`tariffId`) REFERENCES `Tariff`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_stressfreiEmailId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`stressfreiEmailId`) REFERENCES `StressfreiEmail`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `ContractDocument` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractDocument_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `ContractHistoryEntry` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractHistoryEntry_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `ContractTask` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractTask_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `ContractTaskSubtask` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractTaskSubtask_taskId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`taskId`) REFERENCES `ContractTask`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `EnergyContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `EnergyContractDetails_meterId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`meterId`) REFERENCES `Meter`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `ContractMeter` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractMeter_energyContractDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`energyContractDetailsId`) REFERENCES `EnergyContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `ContractMeter` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractMeter_meterId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`meterId`) REFERENCES `Meter`(`id`) ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Invoice` ADD CONSTRAINT `Invoice_energyContractDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`energyContractDetailsId`) REFERENCES `EnergyContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `Invoice` ADD CONSTRAINT `Invoice_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `InternetContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `InternetContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `PhoneNumber` ADD CONSTRAINT `PhoneNumber_internetContractDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`internetContractDetailsId`) REFERENCES `InternetContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `MobileContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `MobileContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `SimCard` ADD CONSTRAINT `SimCard_mobileDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`mobileDetailsId`) REFERENCES `MobileContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `TvContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `TvContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `CarInsuranceDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `CarInsuranceDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+-- AddForeignKey
+ALTER TABLE `CustomerConsent` ADD CONSTRAINT `CustomerConsent_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120162147_init/migration.sql

@@ -1,354 +0,0 @@
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `User` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `email` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `password` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `firstName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `lastName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `User_email_key`(`email`),
-    UNIQUE INDEX `User_customerId_key`(`customerId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Role` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `description` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Role_name_key`(`name`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Permission` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `resource` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `action` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Permission_resource_action_key`(`resource`, `action`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `RolePermission` (
-    `roleId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `permissionId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`roleId`, `permissionId`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `UserRole` (
-    `userId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `roleId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`userId`, `roleId`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Customer` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `type` ENUM('PRIVATE', 'BUSINESS') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PRIVATE',
-    `salutation` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `firstName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `lastName` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `companyName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `email` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `phone` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `mobile` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `taxNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `businessRegistration` TEXT NULL,
-    `commercialRegister` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `notes` TEXT NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_customerNumber_key`(`customerNumber`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Address` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `type` ENUM('DELIVERY_RESIDENCE', 'BILLING') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'DELIVERY_RESIDENCE',
-    `street` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `houseNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `postalCode` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `city` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `country` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Deutschland',
-    `isDefault` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `BankCard` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `accountHolder` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `iban` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `bic` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `bankName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `expiryDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `IdentityDocument` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `type` ENUM('ID_CARD', 'PASSPORT', 'DRIVERS_LICENSE', 'OTHER') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ID_CARD',
-    `documentNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `issuingAuthority` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `issueDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `expiryDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Meter` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `meterNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `type` ENUM('ELECTRICITY', 'GAS') NOT NULL,
-    `location` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `MeterReading` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `meterId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `readingDate` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-    `value` DOUBLE NOT NULL,
-    `unit` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'kWh',
-    `notes` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `SalesPlatform` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `contactInfo` TEXT NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `SalesPlatform_name_key`(`name`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Contract` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `type` ENUM('ELECTRICITY', 'GAS', 'DSL', 'FIBER', 'MOBILE', 'TV', 'CAR_INSURANCE') NOT NULL,
-    `status` ENUM('DRAFT', 'PENDING', 'ACTIVE', 'CANCELLED', 'EXPIRED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'DRAFT',
-    `addressId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `bankCardId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `identityDocumentId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `salesPlatformId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `previousContractId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `providerName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `tariffName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `customerNumberAtProvider` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `startDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `endDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `cancellationPeriod` INTEGER NULL,
-    `commission` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `portalUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `portalPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `notes` TEXT NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Contract_contractNumber_key`(`contractNumber`),
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Contract_previousContractId_key`(`previousContractId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `meterId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `annualConsumption` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `basePrice` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `unitPrice` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `bonus` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `previousProviderName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `previousCustomerNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `EnergyContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `InternetContractDetails` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `downloadSpeed` INTEGER NULL,
-    `uploadSpeed` INTEGER NULL,
-    `routerModel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `routerSerialNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `installationDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `InternetContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `PhoneNumber` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `internetContractDetailsId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `phoneNumber` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `isMain` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `MobileContractDetails` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `phoneNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `simCardNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `dataVolume` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `includedMinutes` INTEGER NULL,
-    `includedSMS` INTEGER NULL,
-    `deviceModel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `deviceImei` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `MobileContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `TvContractDetails` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `receiverModel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `smartcardNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `package` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `TvContractDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `CarInsuranceDetails` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `licensePlate` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `hsn` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `tsn` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `vin` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `vehicleType` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `firstRegistration` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `noClaimsClass` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `insuranceType` ENUM('LIABILITY', 'PARTIAL', 'FULL') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'LIABILITY',
-    `deductiblePartial` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `deductibleFull` DOUBLE NULL,
-    `policyNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `previousInsurer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `CarInsuranceDetails_contractId_key`(`contractId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `User` ADD CONSTRAINT `User_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `RolePermission` ADD CONSTRAINT `RolePermission_roleId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`roleId`) REFERENCES `Role`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `RolePermission` ADD CONSTRAINT `RolePermission_permissionId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`permissionId`) REFERENCES `Permission`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `UserRole` ADD CONSTRAINT `UserRole_userId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`userId`) REFERENCES `User`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `UserRole` ADD CONSTRAINT `UserRole_roleId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`roleId`) REFERENCES `Role`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Address` ADD CONSTRAINT `Address_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `BankCard` ADD CONSTRAINT `BankCard_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `IdentityDocument` ADD CONSTRAINT `IdentityDocument_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Meter` ADD CONSTRAINT `Meter_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `MeterReading` ADD CONSTRAINT `MeterReading_meterId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`meterId`) REFERENCES `Meter`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_addressId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`addressId`) REFERENCES `Address`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_bankCardId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`bankCardId`) REFERENCES `BankCard`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_identityDocumentId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`identityDocumentId`) REFERENCES `IdentityDocument`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_salesPlatformId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`salesPlatformId`) REFERENCES `SalesPlatform`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_previousContractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`previousContractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `EnergyContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `EnergyContractDetails_meterId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`meterId`) REFERENCES `Meter`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `InternetContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `InternetContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `PhoneNumber` ADD CONSTRAINT `PhoneNumber_internetContractDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`internetContractDetailsId`) REFERENCES `InternetContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `MobileContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `MobileContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `TvContractDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `TvContractDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `CarInsuranceDetails` ADD CONSTRAINT `CarInsuranceDetails_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120165550_add_document_path/migration.sql

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `BankCard` ADD COLUMN `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `IdentityDocument` ADD COLUMN `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120174530_add_customer_birthdate/migration.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Customer` ADD COLUMN `birthDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `birthPlace` VARCHAR(191) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120182703_add_license_fields/migration.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `IdentityDocument` ADD COLUMN `licenseClasses` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `licenseIssueDate` DATETIME(3) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120223350_add_company_document/migration.sql

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/*
-  Warnings:
-
-  - You are about to drop the column `businessRegistration` on the `Customer` table. All the data in the column will be lost.
-  - You are about to drop the column `commercialRegister` on the `Customer` table. All the data in the column will be lost.
-
-*/
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Customer` DROP COLUMN `businessRegistration`,
-    DROP COLUMN `commercialRegister`,
-    ADD COLUMN `businessRegistrationPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `commercialRegisterNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `commercialRegisterPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `foundingDate` DATETIME(3) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120230109_add_privacy_policy_price_fields_cancellation_periods/migration.sql

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/*
-  Warnings:
-
-  - You are about to drop the column `cancellationPeriod` on the `Contract` table. All the data in the column will be lost.
-
-*/
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` DROP COLUMN `cancellationPeriod`,
-    ADD COLUMN `cancellationPeriodId` INTEGER NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `priceAfter24Months` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `priceFirst12Months` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `priceFrom13Months` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Customer` ADD COLUMN `privacyPolicyPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `CancellationPeriod` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `code` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `description` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `CancellationPeriod_code_key`(`code`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_cancellationPeriodId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`cancellationPeriodId`) REFERENCES `CancellationPeriod`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260120231330_add_contract_duration/migration.sql

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `contractDurationId` INTEGER NULL;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `ContractDuration` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `code` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `description` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `ContractDuration_code_key`(`code`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_contractDurationId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractDurationId`) REFERENCES `ContractDuration`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260121000502_add_cancellation_documents_and_fields/migration.sql

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `cancellationConfirmationDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `cancellationConfirmationOptionsDate` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `cancellationConfirmationOptionsPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `cancellationConfirmationPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `cancellationLetterOptionsPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `cancellationLetterPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `wasSpecialCancellation` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260121082734_add_provider_tariff/migration.sql

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `providerId` INTEGER NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `tariffId` INTEGER NULL;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Provider` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `portalUrl` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `usernameFieldName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `passwordFieldName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Provider_name_key`(`name`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Tariff` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `providerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `Tariff_providerId_name_key`(`providerId`, `name`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Tariff` ADD CONSTRAINT `Tariff_providerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`providerId`) REFERENCES `Provider`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_providerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`providerId`) REFERENCES `Provider`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_tariffId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`tariffId`) REFERENCES `Tariff`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260123080428_add_simcards/migration.sql

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `MobileContractDetails` ADD COLUMN `requiresMultisim` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `SimCard` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `mobileDetailsId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `phoneNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `simCardNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `pin` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `puk` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `isMultisim` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `isMain` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `SimCard` ADD CONSTRAINT `SimCard_mobileDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`mobileDetailsId`) REFERENCES `MobileContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260123104730_add_contract_categories/migration.sql

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `contractCategoryId` INTEGER NULL;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `ContractCategory` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `code` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `icon` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `color` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `sortOrder` INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `ContractCategory_code_key`(`code`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_contractCategoryId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractCategoryId`) REFERENCES `ContractCategory`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260123110457_extend_internet_details/migration.sql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` MODIFY `type` ENUM('ELECTRICITY', 'GAS', 'DSL', 'CABLE', 'FIBER', 'MOBILE', 'TV', 'CAR_INSURANCE') NOT NULL;
-
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `InternetContractDetails` ADD COLUMN `activationCode` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `homeId` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `internetPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `internetUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `PhoneNumber` ADD COLUMN `sipPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `sipServer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `sipUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260130231219_add_email_trash_fields/migration.sql

@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-/*
-  Warnings:
-
-  - A unique constraint covering the columns `[portalEmail]` on the table `Customer` will be added. If there are existing duplicate values, this will fail.
-
-*/
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `stressfreiEmailId` INTEGER NULL,
-    MODIFY `status` ENUM('DRAFT', 'PENDING', 'ACTIVE', 'CANCELLED', 'EXPIRED', 'DEACTIVATED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'DRAFT';
-
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Customer` ADD COLUMN `portalEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `portalEnabled` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    ADD COLUMN `portalLastLogin` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `portalPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `portalPasswordHash` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `AppSetting` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `key` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `value` TEXT NOT NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `AppSetting_key_key`(`key`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `CustomerRepresentative` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `representativeId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `notes` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `CustomerRepresentative_customerId_representativeId_key`(`customerId`, `representativeId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `EmailProviderConfig` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `name` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `type` ENUM('PLESK', 'CPANEL', 'DIRECTADMIN') NOT NULL,
-    `apiUrl` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `apiKey` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `username` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `passwordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `domain` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `defaultForwardEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `imapServer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `imapPort` INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 993,
-    `smtpServer` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `smtpPort` INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 465,
-    `imapEncryption` ENUM('SSL', 'STARTTLS', 'NONE') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'SSL',
-    `smtpEncryption` ENUM('SSL', 'STARTTLS', 'NONE') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'SSL',
-    `allowSelfSignedCerts` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `isDefault` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `EmailProviderConfig_name_key`(`name`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `StressfreiEmail` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `email` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `platform` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `notes` TEXT NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `isProvisioned` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `provisionedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `provisionError` TEXT NULL,
-    `hasMailbox` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `emailPasswordEncrypted` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `CachedEmail` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `stressfreiEmailId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `folder` ENUM('INBOX', 'SENT') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'INBOX',
-    `messageId` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `uid` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `subject` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `fromAddress` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `fromName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `toAddresses` TEXT NOT NULL,
-    `ccAddresses` TEXT NULL,
-    `receivedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-    `textBody` LONGTEXT NULL,
-    `htmlBody` LONGTEXT NULL,
-    `hasAttachments` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `attachmentNames` TEXT NULL,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `assignedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `assignedBy` INTEGER NULL,
-    `isAutoAssigned` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `isRead` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `isStarred` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `isDeleted` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `deletedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    INDEX `CachedEmail_contractId_idx`(`contractId`),
-    INDEX `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_folder_receivedAt_idx`(`stressfreiEmailId`, `folder`, `receivedAt`),
-    INDEX `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_isDeleted_idx`(`stressfreiEmailId`, `isDeleted`),
-    UNIQUE INDEX `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_messageId_folder_key`(`stressfreiEmailId`, `messageId`, `folder`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `ContractTask` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `title` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `description` TEXT NULL,
-    `status` ENUM('OPEN', 'COMPLETED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'OPEN',
-    `visibleInPortal` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `completedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `ContractTaskSubtask` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `taskId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `title` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `status` ENUM('OPEN', 'COMPLETED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'OPEN',
-    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `completedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateIndex
-CREATE UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_portalEmail_key` ON `Customer`(`portalEmail`);
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `CustomerRepresentative` ADD CONSTRAINT `CustomerRepresentative_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `CustomerRepresentative` ADD CONSTRAINT `CustomerRepresentative_representativeId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`representativeId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `StressfreiEmail` ADD CONSTRAINT `StressfreiEmail_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `CachedEmail` ADD CONSTRAINT `CachedEmail_stressfreiEmailId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`stressfreiEmailId`) REFERENCES `StressfreiEmail`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `CachedEmail` ADD CONSTRAINT `CachedEmail_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_stressfreiEmailId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`stressfreiEmailId`) REFERENCES `StressfreiEmail`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `ContractTask` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractTask_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `ContractTaskSubtask` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractTaskSubtask_taskId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`taskId`) REFERENCES `ContractTask`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260130233909_add_token_invalidation/migration.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `User` ADD COLUMN `tokenInvalidatedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260204074019_add_billing_address/migration.sql

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `billingAddressId` INTEGER NULL;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_billingAddressId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`billingAddressId`) REFERENCES `Address`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260205190935_add_annual_consumption_kwh/migration.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` ADD COLUMN `annualConsumptionKwh` DOUBLE NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260205192000_add_malo_id/migration.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `EnergyContractDetails` ADD COLUMN `maloId` VARCHAR(191) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260207220248_add_invoice_model/migration.sql

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `Invoice` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `energyContractDetailsId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `invoiceDate` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-    `invoiceType` ENUM('INTERIM', 'FINAL', 'NOT_AVAILABLE') NOT NULL,
-    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `notes` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    INDEX `Invoice_energyContractDetailsId_idx`(`energyContractDetailsId`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Invoice` ADD CONSTRAINT `Invoice_energyContractDetailsId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`energyContractDetailsId`) REFERENCES `EnergyContractDetails`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260208081918_add_next_review_date/migration.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `nextReviewDate` DATETIME(3) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260208130924_add_contract_number_at_provider/migration.sql

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `contractNumberAtProvider` VARCHAR(191) NULL;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260208132553_add_previous_provider_fields/migration.sql

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD COLUMN `previousContractNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `previousCustomerNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `previousProviderId` INTEGER NULL;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `Contract` ADD CONSTRAINT `Contract_previousProviderId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`previousProviderId`) REFERENCES `Provider`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260208174811_add_contract_history/migration.sql

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `ContractHistoryEntry` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `contractId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `title` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `description` TEXT NULL,
-    `isAutomatic` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `ContractHistoryEntry` ADD CONSTRAINT `ContractHistoryEntry_contractId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`contractId`) REFERENCES `Contract`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260208232823_add_gdpr_audit_logging/migration.sql

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `AuditLog` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `userId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `userEmail` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `userRole` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `isCustomerPortal` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `action` ENUM('CREATE', 'READ', 'UPDATE', 'DELETE', 'EXPORT', 'ANONYMIZE', 'LOGIN', 'LOGOUT', 'LOGIN_FAILED') NOT NULL,
-    `sensitivity` ENUM('LOW', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', 'CRITICAL') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'MEDIUM',
-    `resourceType` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `resourceId` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `resourceLabel` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `endpoint` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `httpMethod` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `ipAddress` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `userAgent` TEXT NULL,
-    `changesBefore` LONGTEXT NULL,
-    `changesAfter` LONGTEXT NULL,
-    `changesEncrypted` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
-    `dataSubjectId` INTEGER NULL,
-    `legalBasis` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `success` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `errorMessage` TEXT NULL,
-    `durationMs` INTEGER NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `hash` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `previousHash` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-
-    INDEX `AuditLog_userId_idx`(`userId`),
-    INDEX `AuditLog_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
-    INDEX `AuditLog_resourceType_resourceId_idx`(`resourceType`, `resourceId`),
-    INDEX `AuditLog_dataSubjectId_idx`(`dataSubjectId`),
-    INDEX `AuditLog_action_idx`(`action`),
-    INDEX `AuditLog_createdAt_idx`(`createdAt`),
-    INDEX `AuditLog_sensitivity_idx`(`sensitivity`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `CustomerConsent` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `consentType` ENUM('DATA_PROCESSING', 'MARKETING_EMAIL', 'MARKETING_PHONE', 'DATA_SHARING_PARTNER') NOT NULL,
-    `status` ENUM('GRANTED', 'WITHDRAWN', 'PENDING') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
-    `grantedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `withdrawnAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `source` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `documentPath` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `version` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `ipAddress` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `createdBy` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    INDEX `CustomerConsent_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
-    INDEX `CustomerConsent_consentType_idx`(`consentType`),
-    INDEX `CustomerConsent_status_idx`(`status`),
-    UNIQUE INDEX `CustomerConsent_customerId_consentType_key`(`customerId`, `consentType`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `DataDeletionRequest` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `customerId` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `status` ENUM('PENDING', 'IN_PROGRESS', 'COMPLETED', 'PARTIALLY_COMPLETED', 'REJECTED') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
-    `requestedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `requestSource` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `requestedBy` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `processedAt` DATETIME(3) NULL,
-    `processedBy` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `deletedData` LONGTEXT NULL,
-    `retainedData` LONGTEXT NULL,
-    `retentionReason` TEXT NULL,
-    `proofDocument` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    INDEX `DataDeletionRequest_customerId_idx`(`customerId`),
-    INDEX `DataDeletionRequest_status_idx`(`status`),
-    INDEX `DataDeletionRequest_requestedAt_idx`(`requestedAt`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- CreateTable
-CREATE TABLE `AuditRetentionPolicy` (
-    `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
-    `resourceType` VARCHAR(191) NOT NULL,
-    `sensitivity` ENUM('LOW', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', 'CRITICAL') NULL,
-    `retentionDays` INTEGER NOT NULL,
-    `description` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `legalBasis` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    `isActive` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-    `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
-    `updatedAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL,
-
-    UNIQUE INDEX `AuditRetentionPolicy_resourceType_sensitivity_key`(`resourceType`, `sensitivity`),
-    PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
-) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-
--- AddForeignKey
-ALTER TABLE `CustomerConsent` ADD CONSTRAINT `CustomerConsent_customerId_fkey` FOREIGN KEY (`customerId`) REFERENCES `Customer`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260216_add_consent_hash_and_user_messaging/migration.sql

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `Customer` ADD COLUMN `consentHash` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- AlterTable
-ALTER TABLE `User` ADD COLUMN `whatsappNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `telegramUsername` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
-    ADD COLUMN `signalNumber` VARCHAR(191) NULL;
-
--- CreateIndex
-CREATE UNIQUE INDEX `Customer_consentHash_key` ON `Customer`(`consentHash`);

backend/prisma/migrations/20260516173552_portal_password_must_change/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-- AlterTable
+-- IF NOT EXISTS: macht das Hochziehen auf prod-DBs sicher, die das Feld
+-- über `prisma db push` schon erhalten haben (vor dem Migrations-Workflow).
+-- MariaDB unterstützt das seit 10.0.2, MySQL 8 ebenfalls.
+ALTER TABLE `Customer` ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS `portalPasswordMustChange` BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;

backend/prisma/migrations/20260519100000_backup_log/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-- BackupLog: persistierte Historie aller Backup-/Restore-Vorgänge mit
+-- Status + Volltext-Log. UI zeigt in zwei Listen (je CREATE und RESTORE).
+--
+-- IF NOT EXISTS damit Re-Deploys auf bestehende DBs nicht crashen, falls
+-- jemand vorher manuell `prisma db push` gefahren hat.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `BackupLog` (
+  `id` INTEGER NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
+  `operation` ENUM('CREATE', 'RESTORE') NOT NULL,
+  `backupName` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+  `success` BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
+  `durationMs` INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+  `summary` TEXT NOT NULL,
+  `fullLog` LONGTEXT NOT NULL,
+  `userId` INTEGER NULL,
+  `userEmail` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+  `ipAddress` VARCHAR(191) NULL,
+  `createdAt` DATETIME(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(3),
+
+  INDEX `BackupLog_operation_createdAt_idx`(`operation`, `createdAt`),
+  INDEX `BackupLog_createdAt_idx`(`createdAt`),
+  PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
+) DEFAULT CHARACTER SET utf8mb4 COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;

backend/prisma/reset-admin-password.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/**
+ * Notfall-Reset: setzt das Passwort eines Mitarbeiter-Users direkt in der DB.
+ * Wird vom scripts/admin-rescue.sh-Wrapper im Container ausgeführt, wenn ein
+ * Admin sich ausgesperrt hat (z.B. weil admin@admin.com keine echte
+ * E-Mail-Adresse ist und der Passwort-vergessen-Flow daher nicht greift).
+ *
+ * Aufruf:
+ *   npx tsx prisma/reset-admin-password.ts <email>            # generiert PW
+ *   npx tsx prisma/reset-admin-password.ts <email> <passwort> # eigenes PW
+ *
+ * Setzt zusätzlich `tokenInvalidatedAt = now()` → alle bestehenden Sessions
+ * dieses Users werden sofort ausgeloggt (Defense gegen Wiederverwendung
+ * gestohlener Tokens).
+ */
+import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
+import prisma from '../src/lib/prisma.js';
+import { validatePasswordComplexity, STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH } from '../src/utils/passwordGenerator.js';
+
+const BCRYPT_COST = 12;
+
+function generateRescuePassword(): string {
+  const upper = 'ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ';
+  const lower = 'abcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz';
+  const digits = '23456789';
+  const special = '!@#$%&*+=?';
+  const all = upper + lower + digits + special;
+  const pick = (s: string) => s[Math.floor(Math.random() * s.length)];
+  const chars = [pick(upper), pick(lower), pick(digits), pick(special)];
+  for (let i = chars.length; i < 28; i++) chars.push(pick(all));
+  for (let i = chars.length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+    const j = Math.floor(Math.random() * (i + 1));
+    [chars[i], chars[j]] = [chars[j], chars[i]];
+  }
+  return chars.join('');
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  const email = process.argv[2];
+  const providedPw = process.argv[3];
+
+  if (!email) {
+    console.error('Aufruf: npx tsx prisma/reset-admin-password.ts <email> [passwort]');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
+    where: { email },
+    select: { id: true, email: true, firstName: true, lastName: true },
+  });
+  if (!user) {
+    console.error(`User "${email}" nicht gefunden.`);
+    process.exit(2);
+  }
+
+  let plain: string;
+  if (providedPw) {
+    const c = validatePasswordComplexity(providedPw, { minLength: STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH });
+    if (!c.ok) {
+      console.error('Übergebenes Passwort erfüllt Mitarbeiter-Komplexität nicht:');
+      for (const e of c.errors) console.error('  - ' + e);
+      process.exit(3);
+    }
+    plain = providedPw;
+  } else {
+    plain = generateRescuePassword();
+  }
+
+  const hash = await bcrypt.hash(plain, BCRYPT_COST);
+  await prisma.user.update({
+    where: { id: user.id },
+    data: {
+      password: hash,
+      passwordResetToken: null,
+      passwordResetExpiresAt: null,
+      tokenInvalidatedAt: new Date(),
+    },
+  });
+
+  console.log('========================================================');
+  console.log(`  User: ${user.email} (${user.firstName} ${user.lastName})`);
+  console.log(`  Neues Passwort: ${plain}`);
+  console.log('  ⚠️  Wird hier EINMAL ausgegeben – sofort kopieren!');
+  console.log('  Alle bestehenden Sessions wurden invalidiert.');
+  console.log('========================================================');
+}
+
+main()
+  .catch((e) => {
+    console.error('Reset fehlgeschlagen:', e);
+    process.exit(99);
+  })
+  .finally(async () => {
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });

backend/prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ model Customer {
   portalPasswordResetExpiresAt DateTime?
   // Portal Session-Invalidation (nach Passwort-Reset / Rechte-Änderung)
   portalTokenInvalidatedAt     DateTime?
+  // Einmalpasswort: gesetzt durch "Zugangsdaten versenden"-Button. Beim ersten
+  // erfolgreichen Login wird der Hash sofort gelöscht (OTP verbraucht) und
+  // Frontend in Force-Change-Password-Flow geleitet.
+  portalPasswordMustChange     Boolean        @default(false)
 
   // Geburtstagsmodal: Jahr in dem dem Kunden der Geburtstagsgruß gezeigt wurde (vermeidet mehrfaches Anzeigen)
   lastBirthdayGreetingYear     Int?
@@ -1113,3 +1117,80 @@ model AuditRetentionPolicy {
 
   @@unique([resourceType, sensitivity])
 }
+
+// ==================== SECURITY MONITORING ====================
+// Sicherheitsrelevante Events für Realtime-Alerting + Forensik.
+// Im Gegensatz zum AuditLog (forensisch, hash-gekettet) ist das hier
+// optimiert für schnelles Filtern + Alerting (nicht-tamper-evident, dafür
+// effizient querybar). Threshold-Detection läuft per Cron.
+
+enum SecurityEventType {
+  LOGIN_FAILED            // falsches Passwort / unbekannter User
+  LOGIN_SUCCESS           // erfolgreicher Login (informativ)
+  RATE_LIMIT_HIT          // express-rate-limit hat zugeschlagen
+  ACCESS_DENIED           // 403 von canAccess* (versuchter IDOR)
+  SSRF_BLOCKED            // ssrfGuard hat geblockte Adresse abgefangen
+  PASSWORD_RESET_REQUEST  // Reset-Mail angefordert
+  PASSWORD_RESET_CONFIRM  // Reset abgeschlossen
+  LOGOUT                  // expliziter Logout
+  TOKEN_REJECTED          // ungültiger / abgelaufener / manipulierter JWT
+  PERMISSION_CHANGED      // Admin hat Rolle/Permission geändert
+  SUSPICIOUS              // generischer Catch-All
+}
+
+enum SecuritySeverity {
+  INFO      // Login-Success, Logout
+  LOW       // Einzelner failed Login, einzelner 403
+  MEDIUM    // Rate-Limit-Hit, mehrere 403er
+  HIGH      // SSRF-Block, JWT-Manipulation
+  CRITICAL  // Threshold überschritten (>10 failed login/h, >5 403/min)
+}
+
+enum BackupOperation {
+  CREATE
+  RESTORE
+}
+
+// Persistiertes Log für Backup-Vorgänge.
+// `summary` ist die einzeilige Anzeige in der Liste (z.B. "4859 Datensätze
+// wiederhergestellt"), `fullLog` der detaillierte Output inkl. Stack-Trace
+// für das Modal. Wird beim Build/Restore in `backup.controller.ts`
+// geschrieben.
+model BackupLog {
+  id          Int             @id @default(autoincrement())
+  operation   BackupOperation
+  backupName  String?
+  success     Boolean
+  durationMs  Int             @default(0)
+  summary     String          @db.Text
+  fullLog     String          @db.LongText
+  userId      Int?
+  userEmail   String?
+  ipAddress   String?
+  createdAt   DateTime        @default(now())
+
+  @@index([operation, createdAt])
+  @@index([createdAt])
+}
+
+model SecurityEvent {
+  id          Int                @id @default(autoincrement())
+  type        SecurityEventType
+  severity    SecuritySeverity
+  message     String             @db.Text
+  ipAddress   String?
+  userId      Int?               // Mitarbeiter (falls eingeloggt)
+  customerId  Int?               // Portal-Kunde (falls eingeloggt)
+  userEmail   String?            // beste Schätzung – auch bei nicht eingeloggt
+  endpoint    String?            // betroffener Endpoint
+  details     Json?              // strukturierte Zusatzinfo
+  alerted     Boolean            @default(false)  // schon per Email versendet?
+  alertedAt   DateTime?
+
+  createdAt   DateTime           @default(now())
+
+  @@index([type, createdAt])
+  @@index([severity, createdAt])
+  @@index([ipAddress, createdAt])
+  @@index([alerted, severity])
+}

backend/prisma/seed.ts

@@ -221,8 +221,41 @@ async function main() {
 
   console.log('Roles created');
 
-  // Create admin user
+  // Admin-User anlegen. Standard-Passwort darf NIEMALS in der Source-Repo
-  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash('admin', 10);
+  // landen (Pentest Runde 12: "admin" verletzt die eigene 12-Zeichen-
+  // Komplexitätspolicy). Stattdessen:
+  //  - SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD-ENV → wird verwendet (z.B. via docker-compose env)
+  //  - sonst → zufälliges 16-Zeichen-Passwort, wird ein einziges Mal beim
+  //    Seed in stdout ausgegeben. Wer das Log nicht sieht, muss
+  //    Passwort-vergessen-Flow nutzen.
+  // Hash-Cost: 12 (OWASP 2026), nicht mehr 10.
+  function generateInitialPassword(): string {
+    const upper = 'ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ';
+    const lower = 'abcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz';
+    const digits = '23456789';
+    const special = '!@#$%&*+=?';
+    const all = upper + lower + digits + special;
+    // Kryptografisch sichere Auswahl – Math.random() ist vorhersagbar
+    // und reicht für ein Initial-Admin-Passwort nicht (Pentest 2026-05-20).
+    const pick = (s: string) => s[crypto.randomInt(0, s.length)];
+    // mind. einen aus jeder Klasse + Rest zufällig
+    const chars = [pick(upper), pick(lower), pick(digits), pick(special)];
+    // 28 Zeichen → Komplexität + komfortable Marge über dem 25-Zeichen-
+    // Mitarbeiter-Schwellwert (Pentest Runde 13).
+    for (let i = chars.length; i < 28; i++) chars.push(pick(all));
+    // Fisher-Yates Shuffle mit kryptografisch starkem Random.
+    for (let i = chars.length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+      const j = crypto.randomInt(0, i + 1);
+      [chars[i], chars[j]] = [chars[j], chars[i]];
+    }
+    return chars.join('');
+  }
+
+  const envPassword = process.env.SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
+  const adminPlainPassword = envPassword && envPassword.length >= 25
+    ? envPassword
+    : generateInitialPassword();
+  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(adminPlainPassword, 12);
 
   const adminUser = await prisma.user.upsert({
     where: { email: 'admin@admin.com' },
@@ -238,7 +271,19 @@ async function main() {
     },
   });
 
-  console.log('Admin user created: admin@admin.com / admin');
+  console.log('========================================================');
+  console.log('  Admin-User: admin@admin.com');
+  if (envPassword && envPassword.length >= 25) {
+    console.log('  Passwort: aus SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD');
+  } else {
+    if (envPassword && envPassword.length < 25) {
+      console.log('  ⚠️  SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD < 25 Zeichen, wird ignoriert!');
+    }
+    console.log(`  Initial-Passwort: ${adminPlainPassword}`);
+    console.log('  ⚠️  Dieses Passwort wird hier EINMAL ausgegeben!');
+    console.log('  Bitte sofort nach dem ersten Login ändern.');
+  }
+  console.log('========================================================');
 
   // Create some sales platforms
   const platforms = ['Moon Fachhandel', 'Verivox', 'Check24', 'Eigenvermittlung'];

backend/prisma/sync-roles.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/**
+ * Idempotenter Permissions+Rollen-Sync für den Container-Start.
+ *
+ * Hintergrund: seed.ts läuft nur auf leeren DBs (USER_COUNT=0). Wer das
+ * System schon installiert hat, bekommt nachträglich hinzugefügte
+ * Permissions oder neue Rollenzuordnungen NICHT — die DSGVO-Rolle kann
+ * dann z.B. ohne audit:read landen, obwohl Settings.tsx das voraussetzt.
+ *
+ * Dieses Skript synchronisiert ausschließlich:
+ *  - Permission-Katalog (resource/action-Paare aus dem Code)
+ *  - Roll-Zuordnungen (Admin, Developer, DSGVO, Mitarbeiter,
+ *    Mitarbeiter (Nur-Lesen), Kunde)
+ *
+ * KEINE Stammdaten, KEINE User, KEINE Verträge — das Skript ist auf
+ * laufenden Prod-DBs sicher.
+ */
+
+import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
+
+const prisma = new PrismaClient();
+
+const RESOURCE_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, string[]> = {
+  customers: ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  contracts: ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  users: ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  platforms: ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  providers: ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  tariffs: ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  'cancellation-periods': ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  'contract-durations': ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  'contract-categories': ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  'email-providers': ['create', 'read', 'update', 'delete'],
+  settings: ['read', 'update'],
+  developer: ['access'],
+  emails: ['delete'],
+  audit: ['read', 'export', 'admin'],
+  gdpr: ['export', 'delete', 'admin'],
+};
+
+async function syncRolePermissions(roleId: number, permissionIds: number[]) {
+  const existing = await prisma.rolePermission.findMany({
+    where: { roleId },
+    select: { permissionId: true },
+  });
+  const existingIds = new Set(existing.map((e) => e.permissionId));
+  const targetIds = new Set(permissionIds);
+
+  const missing = permissionIds.filter((id) => !existingIds.has(id));
+  if (missing.length > 0) {
+    await prisma.rolePermission.createMany({
+      data: missing.map((permissionId) => ({ roleId, permissionId })),
+      skipDuplicates: true,
+    });
+    console.log(`  → +${missing.length} Permissions an Rolle #${roleId}`);
+  }
+
+  const excess = existing
+    .filter((e) => !targetIds.has(e.permissionId))
+    .map((e) => e.permissionId);
+  if (excess.length > 0) {
+    await prisma.rolePermission.deleteMany({
+      where: { roleId, permissionId: { in: excess } },
+    });
+    console.log(`  → -${excess.length} Permissions von Rolle #${roleId}`);
+  }
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  console.log('[sync-roles] Permissions-Katalog upserten…');
+  for (const [resource, actions] of Object.entries(RESOURCE_PERMISSIONS)) {
+    for (const action of actions) {
+      await prisma.permission.upsert({
+        where: { resource_action: { resource, action } },
+        update: {},
+        create: { resource, action },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  const allPermissions = await prisma.permission.findMany();
+  console.log(`[sync-roles] ${allPermissions.length} Permissions vorhanden`);
+
+  // Admin: alles AUSSER developer:access und audit/gdpr (DSGVO + Developer
+  // sind separate hidden roles, über Checkboxen zugewiesen)
+  const adminPermIds = allPermissions
+    .filter(
+      (p) =>
+        !(p.resource === 'developer' && p.action === 'access') &&
+        p.resource !== 'audit' &&
+        p.resource !== 'gdpr'
+    )
+    .map((p) => p.id);
+
+  // Developer: alles
+  const developerPermIds = allPermissions.map((p) => p.id);
+
+  // DSGVO: audit + gdpr komplett
+  const gdprPermIds = allPermissions
+    .filter((p) => p.resource === 'audit' || p.resource === 'gdpr')
+    .map((p) => p.id);
+
+  // Mitarbeiter: customers + contracts + read auf Stammdaten
+  const employeePermIds = allPermissions
+    .filter(
+      (p) =>
+        p.resource === 'customers' ||
+        p.resource === 'contracts' ||
+        (p.action === 'read' &&
+          [
+            'platforms',
+            'providers',
+            'tariffs',
+            'cancellation-periods',
+            'contract-durations',
+            'contract-categories',
+          ].includes(p.resource))
+    )
+    .map((p) => p.id);
+
+  // Read-only Mitarbeiter + Kunde: nur read auf Haupt-Entities + Stammdaten
+  const readOnlyResources = [
+    'customers',
+    'contracts',
+    'platforms',
+    'providers',
+    'tariffs',
+    'cancellation-periods',
+    'contract-durations',
+    'contract-categories',
+  ];
+  const readOnlyPermIds = allPermissions
+    .filter((p) => p.action === 'read' && readOnlyResources.includes(p.resource))
+    .map((p) => p.id);
+
+  const rolesSpec: Array<{ name: string; description: string; permIds: number[] }> = [
+    { name: 'Admin', description: 'Voller Zugriff auf alle Funktionen', permIds: adminPermIds },
+    { name: 'Developer', description: 'Voller Zugriff inkl. Entwickler-Tools', permIds: developerPermIds },
+    { name: 'DSGVO', description: 'DSGVO-Zugriff: Audit-Logs und Datenschutz-Verwaltung', permIds: gdprPermIds },
+    { name: 'Mitarbeiter', description: 'Kann Kunden und Verträge verwalten', permIds: employeePermIds },
+    { name: 'Mitarbeiter (Nur-Lesen)', description: 'Kann nur lesen, keine Änderungen', permIds: readOnlyPermIds },
+    { name: 'Kunde', description: 'Kann nur eigene Daten lesen', permIds: readOnlyPermIds },
+  ];
+
+  for (const r of rolesSpec) {
+    const role = await prisma.role.upsert({
+      where: { name: r.name },
+      update: { description: r.description },
+      create: { name: r.name, description: r.description },
+    });
+    await syncRolePermissions(role.id, r.permIds);
+  }
+
+  console.log('[sync-roles] fertig.');
+}
+
+main()
+  .catch((e) => {
+    console.error('[sync-roles] Fehler:', e);
+    process.exit(1);
+  })
+  .finally(async () => {
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });

backend/scripts/seed-factory-defaults.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@ import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
 
 const prisma = new PrismaClient();
 
-const ROOT = path.join(process.cwd(), 'factory-defaults');
+// ROOT kann via FACTORY_DEFAULTS_DIR überschrieben werden (Container-Bootstrap
+// mit eingebauten Defaults aus dem Image).
+const ROOT = process.env.FACTORY_DEFAULTS_DIR
+  ? path.resolve(process.env.FACTORY_DEFAULTS_DIR)
+  : path.join(process.cwd(), 'factory-defaults');
 const UPLOADS_ROOT = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads');
 const PDF_UPLOAD_DIR = path.join(UPLOADS_ROOT, 'pdf-templates');
 
@@ -61,6 +65,19 @@ interface PdfTemplateDef {
   pdfFilename: string; // Dateiname im pdf-templates/-Ordner
 }
 
+interface AppSettingDef {
+  key: string;
+  value: string;
+}
+
+// Whitelist – muss synchron zu factoryDefaults.service.ts sein.
+const FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS = new Set([
+  'privacyPolicyHtml',
+  'authorizationTemplateHtml',
+  'imprintHtml',
+  'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
+]);
+
 /**
  * Liest alle *.json Dateien aus einem Ordner und gibt die zusammengeführten Arrays zurück.
  */
@@ -299,6 +316,31 @@ async function seedPdfTemplates() {
   console.log(`  ✓ PDF-Vorlagen: ${count}${skipped > 0 ? ` (${skipped} übersprungen)` : ''}`);
 }
 
+async function seedAppSettings() {
+  const items = readJsonArrays<AppSettingDef>(path.join(ROOT, 'app-settings'));
+  if (items.length === 0) {
+    console.log('  app-settings – keine Einträge');
+    return;
+  }
+  let count = 0;
+  let skipped = 0;
+  for (const s of items) {
+    if (!s.key || typeof s.value !== 'string') continue;
+    if (!FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
+      console.warn(`  ⚠  AppSetting-Key '${s.key}' nicht auf Whitelist – übersprungen`);
+      skipped++;
+      continue;
+    }
+    await prisma.appSetting.upsert({
+      where: { key: s.key },
+      update: { value: s.value },
+      create: { key: s.key, value: s.value },
+    });
+    count++;
+  }
+  console.log(`  ✓ HTML-Templates: ${count}${skipped > 0 ? ` (${skipped} übersprungen)` : ''}`);
+}
+
 async function main() {
   console.log('\n📦 Factory-Defaults werden eingespielt...\n');
 
@@ -313,6 +355,7 @@ async function main() {
   await seedContractDurations();
   await seedContractCategories();
   await seedPdfTemplates();
+  await seedAppSettings();
 
   console.log('\n✅ Factory-Defaults erfolgreich eingespielt.\n');
 }

backend/src/controllers/appSetting.controller.ts

@@ -41,10 +41,22 @@ export async function updateSetting(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<vo
       return;
     }
 
+    // Whitelist-Check (Pentest Runde 11, M1)
+    if (!appSettingService.isAllowedSettingKey(key)) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: `Unbekannter Setting-Key: ${key}`,
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
     const before = await prisma.appSetting.findUnique({ where: { key } });
     const oldValue = before?.value ?? '-';
-    const newValue = String(value);
+    // HTML-Tags aus Plain-Text-Keys strippen, bevor sie in der DB landen.
+    // Pentest 2026-05-19, MEDIUM: companyName="<img onerror=...>" landete
+    // sonst ungefiltert in E-Mail-Templates / PDFs.
+    const newValue = appSettingService.sanitizeSettingValue(key, String(value));
 
     await appSettingService.setSetting(key, newValue);
 
@@ -78,12 +90,24 @@ export async function updateSettings(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<v
       return;
     }
 
+    // Whitelist-Check für jeden Key (Pentest Runde 11, M1: Mass Assignment)
+    const unknownKeys = Object.keys(settings).filter(
+      (k) => !appSettingService.isAllowedSettingKey(k),
+    );
+    if (unknownKeys.length > 0) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: `Unbekannte Setting-Keys: ${unknownKeys.join(', ')}`,
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
     // Vorherige Werte laden für Audit
     const changes: Record<string, { von: unknown; nach: unknown }> = {};
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(settings)) {
       const before = await prisma.appSetting.findUnique({ where: { key } });
       const oldValue = before?.value ?? '-';
-      const newValue = String(value);
+      const newValue = appSettingService.sanitizeSettingValue(key, String(value));
       if (oldValue !== newValue) {
         changes[key] = { von: oldValue, nach: newValue };
       }

backend/src/controllers/auth.controller.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,57 @@
-import { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { Request, Response, CookieOptions } from 'express';
 import * as authService from '../services/auth.service.js';
 import { AuthRequest, ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import { emit as emitSecurityEvent, contextFromRequest } from '../services/securityMonitor.service.js';
+import { validatePasswordComplexity, STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, PORTAL_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH } from '../utils/passwordGenerator.js';
+
+// Refresh-Token-Cookie-Konfiguration. Der Cookie:
+// - httpOnly → kein JavaScript-Zugriff → bei XSS nicht klaubar
+// - secure   → nur über HTTPS (in Prod via HTTPS_ENABLED, in Dev egal)
+// - sameSite 'strict' → CSRF-Schutz; Cross-Site-Requests senden den Cookie nicht
+// - path '/api/auth' → wird nur an Auth-Endpoints mitgeschickt
+const REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME = 'refresh_token';
+function getRefreshCookieOptions(): CookieOptions {
+  return {
+    httpOnly: true,
+    secure: process.env.HTTPS_ENABLED === 'true',
+    sameSite: 'strict',
+    path: '/api/auth',
+    maxAge: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 7 Tage, gleicht Refresh-JWT-Lifetime
+  };
+}
+function setRefreshCookie(res: Response, token: string): void {
+  res.cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, token, getRefreshCookieOptions());
+}
+function clearRefreshCookie(res: Response): void {
+  res.clearCookie(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/api/auth' });
+}
+
+// Whitelist von Fehlermeldungen, die wir an Login-Clients durchreichen dürfen.
+// ALLES andere (Prisma-Internals, DB-Connection-Errors, Schema-Fehler, ...)
+// wird als generisches "Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen" maskiert – die Original-
+// Message bleibt im Server-Log, leakt aber nicht im HTTP-Response. Pentest
+// Runde 3 (2026-05-16): `prisma.customer.findUnique() invocation: The column
+// X does not exist` war im Body sichtbar → Tabellen-/Spaltennamen geleakt.
+const SAFE_LOGIN_ERRORS = new Set([
+  'Ungültige Anmeldedaten',
+  'E-Mail und Passwort erforderlich',
+]);
+function safeLoginError(err: unknown): string {
+  if (err instanceof Error && SAFE_LOGIN_ERRORS.has(err.message)) {
+    return err.message;
+  }
+  if (err instanceof Error) {
+    console.error('[Login] Unerwarteter Fehler (maskiert):', err.message);
+  }
+  return 'Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen';
+}
 
 // Mitarbeiter-Login
 export async function login(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  const { email, password } = req.body || {};
+  const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
   try {
-    const { email, password } = req.body;
-
     if (!email || !password) {
       res.status(400).json({
         success: false,
@@ -16,20 +61,43 @@ export async function login(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
     }
 
     const result = await authService.login(email, password);
-    res.json({ success: true, data: result } as ApiResponse);
+    // Refresh-Token in httpOnly-Cookie, Access-Token im Body (Frontend hält
+    // ihn nur in memory). `token`-Feld bleibt aus Kompatibilität bestehen.
+    setRefreshCookie(res, result.refreshToken);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGIN_SUCCESS',
+      severity: 'INFO',
+      message: `Mitarbeiter-Login: ${email}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      userId: result.user.id,
+      userEmail: email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: { token: result.accessToken, user: result.user },
+    } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGIN_FAILED',
+      severity: 'LOW',
+      message: `Login-Fehlversuch (Mitarbeiter): ${email || '<leer>'}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      userEmail: email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
     res.status(401).json({
       success: false,
-      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen',
+      error: safeLoginError(error),
     } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
 
 // Kundenportal-Login
 export async function customerLogin(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  const { email, password } = req.body || {};
+  const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
   try {
-    const { email, password } = req.body;
-
     if (!email || !password) {
       res.status(400).json({
         success: false,
@@ -39,11 +107,32 @@ export async function customerLogin(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
     }
 
     const result = await authService.customerLogin(email, password);
-    res.json({ success: true, data: result } as ApiResponse);
+    setRefreshCookie(res, result.refreshToken);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGIN_SUCCESS',
+      severity: 'INFO',
+      message: `Portal-Login: ${email}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      customerId: result.user.customerId,
+      userEmail: email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: { token: result.accessToken, user: result.user },
+    } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGIN_FAILED',
+      severity: 'LOW',
+      message: `Login-Fehlversuch (Portal): ${email || '<leer>'}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      userEmail: email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
     res.status(401).json({
       success: false,
-      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen',
+      error: safeLoginError(error),
     } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
@@ -114,6 +203,17 @@ export async function requestPasswordReset(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
 
     await authService.requestPasswordReset(email, userType === 'portal' ? 'portal' : 'admin');
 
+    const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'PASSWORD_RESET_REQUEST',
+      severity: 'MEDIUM',
+      message: `Passwort-Reset angefordert (${userType === 'portal' ? 'Portal' : 'Mitarbeiter'}): ${email}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      userEmail: email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+      details: { userType: userType === 'portal' ? 'portal' : 'admin' },
+    });
+
     // IMMER success senden, damit Angreifer nicht herausfinden kann welche Emails existieren
     res.json({
       success: true,
@@ -144,21 +244,43 @@ export async function confirmPasswordReset(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
       return;
     }
 
-    if (password.length < 6) {
+    // Audience anhand des Tokens bestimmen, damit Admin-Reset 25 Zeichen
+    // verlangt und Portal-Customer-Reset weiterhin 12 reicht.
+    const audience = await authService.getPasswordResetAudience(token);
+    const minLength = audience === 'admin' ? STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH : PORTAL_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH;
+    const complexity = validatePasswordComplexity(password, { minLength });
+    if (!complexity.ok) {
       res.status(400).json({
         success: false,
-        error: 'Das Passwort muss mindestens 6 Zeichen lang sein',
+        error: 'Passwort erfüllt Mindestanforderungen nicht: ' + complexity.errors.join(', '),
       } as ApiResponse);
       return;
     }
 
     await authService.confirmPasswordReset(token, password);
 
+    const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'PASSWORD_RESET_CONFIRM',
+      severity: 'HIGH',
+      message: 'Passwort-Reset abgeschlossen',
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
+
     res.json({
       success: true,
       message: 'Passwort erfolgreich zurückgesetzt. Du kannst dich jetzt einloggen.',
     } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
+    const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'TOKEN_REJECTED',
+      severity: 'MEDIUM',
+      message: 'Passwort-Reset mit ungültigem/abgelaufenem Token versucht',
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
     res.status(400).json({
       success: false,
       error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Passwort-Reset fehlgeschlagen',
@@ -166,6 +288,87 @@ export async function confirmPasswordReset(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Logout: invalidiert den aktuellen JWT serverseitig durch Setzen von
+ * tokenInvalidatedAt / portalTokenInvalidatedAt auf jetzt. Auth-Middleware
+ * prüft dieses Feld und lehnt Tokens ab, deren `iat` davor liegt.
+ *
+ * Hinweis: Da JWTs stateless sind, gibt es keine echte Token-Revocation
+ * ohne dieses Pattern. Logout invalidiert ALLE aktiven Sessions des Users
+ * (auch andere Geräte) – akzeptabel für ein Sicherheits-Logout.
+ */
+export async function logout(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const user = req.user as any;
+    if (!user) {
+      res.json({ success: true, message: 'Bereits abgemeldet' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (user.isCustomerPortal && user.customerId) {
+      await prisma.customer.update({
+        where: { id: user.customerId },
+        data: { portalTokenInvalidatedAt: new Date() },
+      });
+    } else if (user.userId) {
+      await prisma.user.update({
+        where: { id: user.userId },
+        data: { tokenInvalidatedAt: new Date() },
+      });
+    }
+    // Refresh-Cookie löschen, sonst könnte der Browser einen abgemeldeten User
+    // direkt wieder einloggen (server-seitige Invalidation oben fängt das ab,
+    // aber UI würde sich verirren).
+    clearRefreshCookie(res);
+    const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGOUT',
+      severity: 'INFO',
+      message: `Logout: ${user.email || (user.isCustomerPortal ? 'Portal-User' : 'Mitarbeiter')}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      userId: ctx.userId,
+      customerId: ctx.customerId,
+      userEmail: user.email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+    });
+    res.json({ success: true, message: 'Abgemeldet' } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: 'Fehler beim Abmelden',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+// Neuen Access-Token aus dem httpOnly-Refresh-Cookie holen. Wird vom Frontend
+// (axios-Interceptor) bei 401 oder beim App-Start aufgerufen.
+export async function refresh(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const cookies = (req as any).cookies || {};
+    const refreshToken = cookies[REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME];
+    if (!refreshToken) {
+      res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Refresh-Token vorhanden' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const result = await authService.refreshAccessToken(refreshToken);
+    // Refresh-Cookie rotieren – verhindert Replay eines geklauten Refresh-Tokens
+    // bis zur vollen Lifetime.
+    setRefreshCookie(res, result.refreshToken);
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: { token: result.accessToken, user: result.user },
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Refresh fehlgeschlagen: Cookie wegputzen, damit der Browser nicht
+    // weiter mit einem invaliden Token weiterhin den Endpoint klopft.
+    clearRefreshCookie(res);
+    res.status(401).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Refresh fehlgeschlagen',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
 export async function register(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const { email, password, firstName, lastName, roleIds } = req.body;
@@ -178,6 +381,16 @@ export async function register(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
       return;
     }
 
+    // Mitarbeiter-Anlage: 25-Zeichen-Schwellwert
+    const complexity = validatePasswordComplexity(password, { minLength: STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH });
+    if (!complexity.ok) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Passwort erfüllt Mindestanforderungen nicht: ' + complexity.errors.join(', '),
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
     const user = await authService.createUser({
       email,
       password,
@@ -197,3 +410,86 @@ export async function register(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
     } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
+
+// Kurzlebiger Download-Token (60s) für Aufrufe, die den Token in der URL
+// brauchen (PDF-iframes, window.open für Audit-Export usw.). Aufrufer
+// authentifiziert sich normal per Bearer-Header. Antwort: ein download-
+// scoped JWT, das die Auth-Middleware nur via `?token=` akzeptiert.
+export async function createDownloadToken(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    if (!req.user) {
+      res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Nicht authentifiziert' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const payload: any = {
+      email: req.user.email,
+      permissions: req.user.permissions,
+      isCustomerPortal: !!req.user.isCustomerPortal,
+    };
+    if (req.user.userId) payload.userId = req.user.userId;
+    if (req.user.customerId) payload.customerId = req.user.customerId;
+    if ((req.user as any).representedCustomerIds) {
+      payload.representedCustomerIds = (req.user as any).representedCustomerIds;
+    }
+    const token = authService.signDownloadToken(payload);
+    res.json({ success: true, data: { token } } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: 'Fehler beim Erstellen des Download-Tokens',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+// Vom Endkunden selbst nach Einmalpasswort-Login aufgerufen, um sein eigenes
+// Passwort zu vergeben. Server invalidiert die laufende Session, Frontend
+// loggt aus und schickt zurück zum Login.
+export async function changeInitialPortalPassword(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    if (!req.user?.isCustomerPortal || !req.user?.customerId) {
+      res.status(403).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Nur für Kundenportal-Login',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    // Pflicht-Check: NUR im Einmalpasswort-Flow erlaubt. Sonst könnte jeder
+    // eingeloggte Portal-User sein Passwort ohne Kenntnis des alten ändern
+    // (z.B. nach XSS-Token-Diebstahl). Pentest Runde 5 (2026-05-16) – KRITISCH.
+    const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
+      where: { id: req.user.customerId },
+      select: { portalPasswordMustChange: true },
+    });
+    if (!customer?.portalPasswordMustChange) {
+      res.status(403).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Nicht erlaubt',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const { newPassword } = req.body || {};
+    if (!newPassword || typeof newPassword !== 'string') {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Neues Passwort erforderlich',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const complexity = validatePasswordComplexity(newPassword);
+    if (!complexity.ok) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Passwort erfüllt Mindestanforderungen nicht: ' + complexity.errors.join(', '),
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    await authService.changeInitialPortalPassword(req.user.customerId, newPassword);
+    clearRefreshCookie(res);
+    res.json({ success: true, message: 'Passwort geändert' } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Passwort konnte nicht geändert werden',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}

backend/src/controllers/backup.controller.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import * as backupService from '../services/backup.service.js';
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 
 /**
  * Validiert Backup-Namen: nur Zeichen die auch der Backup-Generator erstellen darf
@@ -11,6 +12,83 @@ function isValidBackupName(name: string): boolean {
 }
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
 
+// Fängt console.log/info/warn/error für die Laufzeit einer Operation in
+// einen Puffer mit ab (zusätzlich landet alles weiterhin in stdout/stderr).
+// Wird in createBackup/restoreBackup verwendet, um den vollständigen
+// Verlauf in `BackupLog.fullLog` zu persistieren. Da die Backup-Operationen
+// in der Praxis nicht parallel laufen (Single-User-Admin-UI), reicht die
+// process-globale Patch-Variante.
+function startLogCapture(): { lines: string[]; restore: () => void } {
+  const lines: string[] = [];
+  const orig = {
+    log: console.log,
+    info: console.info,
+    warn: console.warn,
+    error: console.error,
+  };
+  function fmt(args: unknown[]): string {
+    return args
+      .map((a) => {
+        if (a instanceof Error) return a.stack || a.message;
+        if (typeof a === 'object') {
+          try {
+            return JSON.stringify(a);
+          } catch {
+            return String(a);
+          }
+        }
+        return String(a);
+      })
+      .join(' ');
+  }
+  console.log = (...args: unknown[]) => { lines.push(fmt(args)); orig.log(...args); };
+  console.info = (...args: unknown[]) => { lines.push(fmt(args)); orig.info(...args); };
+  console.warn = (...args: unknown[]) => { lines.push(`[WARN] ${fmt(args)}`); orig.warn(...args); };
+  console.error = (...args: unknown[]) => { lines.push(`[ERROR] ${fmt(args)}`); orig.error(...args); };
+  return {
+    lines,
+    restore: () => {
+      console.log = orig.log;
+      console.info = orig.info;
+      console.warn = orig.warn;
+      console.error = orig.error;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+async function recordBackupLog(opts: {
+  req: Request;
+  operation: 'CREATE' | 'RESTORE';
+  backupName: string | null;
+  success: boolean;
+  durationMs: number;
+  summary: string;
+  fullLog: string;
+}) {
+  try {
+    const user = (opts.req as any).user;
+    await prisma.backupLog.create({
+      data: {
+        operation: opts.operation,
+        backupName: opts.backupName,
+        success: opts.success,
+        durationMs: opts.durationMs,
+        summary: opts.summary.slice(0, 2000),
+        // LongText: bis ~4 GB, aber wir cappen bei 1 MB damit nichts entgleist
+        fullLog: opts.fullLog.slice(0, 1_000_000),
+        userId: user?.userId ?? null,
+        userEmail: user?.email ?? null,
+        ipAddress:
+          (opts.req as any).socket?.remoteAddress ||
+          (opts.req.headers?.['x-forwarded-for'] as string) ||
+          null,
+      },
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('[BackupLog] Konnte Log nicht persistieren:', err);
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Liste aller Backups abrufen
  * GET /api/settings/backups
@@ -29,19 +107,44 @@ export async function listBackups(req: Request, res: Response) {
  * POST /api/settings/backup
  */
 export async function createBackup(req: Request, res: Response) {
+  const start = Date.now();
+  const capture = startLogCapture();
   try {
     const result = await backupService.createBackup();
+    const durationMs = Date.now() - start;
 
     if (result.success) {
+      capture.restore();
+      const summary = `Backup ${result.backupName} erstellt (${(durationMs / 1000).toFixed(1)}s)`;
+      await recordBackupLog({
+        req, operation: 'CREATE', backupName: result.backupName ?? null,
+        success: true, durationMs, summary,
+        fullLog: capture.lines.join('\n') || summary,
+      });
       await logChange({
         req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'Backup',
         label: `Backup ${result.backupName} erstellt`,
       });
       res.json({ data: { backupName: result.backupName }, message: 'Backup erfolgreich erstellt' });
     } else {
+      capture.restore();
+      await recordBackupLog({
+        req, operation: 'CREATE', backupName: null,
+        success: false, durationMs,
+        summary: `Backup fehlgeschlagen: ${result.error || 'unbekannt'}`,
+        fullLog: capture.lines.join('\n') + '\n[Fehler] ' + (result.error || ''),
+      });
       res.status(500).json({ error: 'Backup fehlgeschlagen', details: result.error });
     }
   } catch (error: any) {
+    const durationMs = Date.now() - start;
+    capture.restore();
+    await recordBackupLog({
+      req, operation: 'CREATE', backupName: null,
+      success: false, durationMs,
+      summary: `Fehler: ${error?.message || 'unbekannt'}`,
+      fullLog: capture.lines.join('\n') + '\n[Exception] ' + (error?.stack || error?.message || error),
+    });
     res.status(500).json({ error: 'Fehler beim Erstellen des Backups', details: error.message });
   }
 }
@@ -50,17 +153,63 @@ export async function createBackup(req: Request, res: Response) {
  * Backup wiederherstellen
  * POST /api/settings/backup/:name/restore
  */
+// Macht eine Fehlermeldung admin-lesbar OHNE den globalen ORM-Leak-Filter
+// auszulösen: Stack-Frames raus, "TypeError: …" → "Code-Fehler: …",
+// "Cannot read properties of undefined" → "Interner Code-Fehler".
+// Vollständiger Stack landet immer im Server-Log (siehe `console.error`).
+function makeRestoreErrorReadable(raw: unknown): string {
+  if (!raw) return 'Unbekannter Fehler';
+  let s = typeof raw === 'string' ? raw : (raw as any)?.message || String(raw);
+  // Stack-Frames "    at …(…:123:45)" abschneiden
+  s = s.split('\n').filter((line: string) => !/^\s*at\s+/.test(line)).join('\n').trim();
+  // Bekannte JS-Runtime-Marker rephrasen, damit der orm-leak-guard nicht
+  // alles auf "Operation fehlgeschlagen" maskiert.
+  s = s
+    .replace(/^TypeError:?\s*/i, 'Code-Fehler: ')
+    .replace(/^ReferenceError:?\s*/i, 'Code-Fehler: ')
+    .replace(/^SyntaxError:?\s*/i, 'Code-Fehler: ')
+    .replace(/^RangeError:?\s*/i, 'Code-Fehler: ')
+    .replace(/Cannot read propert(?:y|ies) of (undefined|null) \(reading '([^']+)'\)/i, 'Wert fehlt: $2')
+    .replace(/is not a function/i, '(ungültiger Funktionsaufruf)')
+    .replace(/is not defined$/i, '(Wert nicht definiert)')
+    .replace(/Invalid `prisma\.[^`]+`/i, 'DB-Fehler');
+  return s.slice(0, 500); // Längenlimit für UI
+}
+
 export async function restoreBackup(req: Request, res: Response) {
-  try {
+  const start = Date.now();
   const { name } = req.params;
 
   if (!name || !isValidBackupName(name)) {
     return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Ungültiger Backup-Name' });
   }
 
+  // Pflicht-Confirm im Body, gleiche Defensive wie factoryReset.
+  // Pentest 2026-05-19 (KRITISCH): leerer POST-Body löste vorher
+  // sofort den destruktiven Restore aus – ein versehentlicher
+  // Re-Fire (Browser-Tab, CSRF auf eingeloggten Admin, doppelter
+  // Klick) konnte die DB ungewollt überschreiben. Der String ist
+  // bewusst ein unique Magic-Value, kein Boolean.
+  const confirm = (req.body && req.body.confirm) ? String(req.body.confirm) : '';
+  if (confirm !== 'RESTORE-BESTAETIGT') {
+    return res.status(400).json({
+      error: 'Bestätigung fehlt. Body muss { "confirm": "RESTORE-BESTAETIGT" } enthalten.',
+    });
+  }
+
+  const capture = startLogCapture();
+  try {
     const result = await backupService.restoreBackup(name);
+    const durationMs = Date.now() - start;
 
     if (result.success) {
+      capture.restore();
+      const summary = `${result.restoredRecords} Datensätze, ${result.restoredFiles || 0} Dateien (${(durationMs / 1000).toFixed(1)}s)`;
+      await recordBackupLog({
+        req, operation: 'RESTORE', backupName: name,
+        success: true, durationMs, summary,
+        fullLog: capture.lines.join('\n') || summary,
+      });
       await logChange({
         req, action: 'UPDATE', resourceType: 'Backup',
         label: `Backup ${name} wiederhergestellt`,
@@ -73,10 +222,35 @@ export async function restoreBackup(req: Request, res: Response) {
         message: `${result.restoredRecords} Datensätze und ${result.restoredFiles || 0} Dateien wiederhergestellt`,
       });
     } else {
-      res.status(500).json({ error: 'Wiederherstellung fehlgeschlagen', details: result.error });
+      console.error(`[restore] Backup ${name} fehlgeschlagen:`, result.error);
+      capture.restore();
+      await recordBackupLog({
+        req, operation: 'RESTORE', backupName: name,
+        success: false, durationMs,
+        summary: `Fehlgeschlagen: ${makeRestoreErrorReadable(result.error)}`,
+        fullLog: capture.lines.join('\n') + '\n[Fehler] ' + (result.error || ''),
+      });
+      res.status(500).json({
+        error: 'Wiederherstellung fehlgeschlagen',
+        details: makeRestoreErrorReadable(result.error),
+        hint: 'Vollständiger Verlauf in den Backup-Logs unterhalb der Backup-Liste.',
+      });
     }
   } catch (error: any) {
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Fehler bei der Wiederherstellung', details: error.message });
+    const durationMs = Date.now() - start;
+    console.error(`[restore] Exception bei Backup ${name}:`, error?.stack || error);
+    capture.restore();
+    await recordBackupLog({
+      req, operation: 'RESTORE', backupName: name,
+      success: false, durationMs,
+      summary: `Exception: ${makeRestoreErrorReadable(error)}`,
+      fullLog: capture.lines.join('\n') + '\n[Exception] ' + (error?.stack || error?.message || error),
+    });
+    res.status(500).json({
+      error: 'Fehler bei der Wiederherstellung',
+      details: makeRestoreErrorReadable(error),
+      hint: 'Vollständiger Verlauf in den Backup-Logs unterhalb der Backup-Liste.',
+    });
   }
 }
 
@@ -176,6 +350,22 @@ export async function uploadBackup(req: Request, res: Response) {
  */
 export async function factoryReset(req: Request, res: Response) {
   try {
+    // Bestätigung erforderlich: client MUSS explizit
+    // `confirm: "FACTORY-RESET-BESTAETIGT"` schicken. Ohne diesen Schritt
+    // konnte ein eingeloggter Admin die komplette DB mit einem einfachen
+    // POST plätten (Pentest Runde 11 (2026-05-18) – C2 KRITISCH:
+    // 3× DB-Plättung in einer Session). Body-Wert ist absichtlich ein
+    // unique String und kein boolean, damit kein Auto-JSON-Tooling /
+    // Replay-Angriff aus Versehen triggern kann.
+    const confirm = (req.body && req.body.confirm) ? String(req.body.confirm) : '';
+    if (confirm !== 'FACTORY-RESET-BESTAETIGT') {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Bestätigung fehlt. Body muss { "confirm": "FACTORY-RESET-BESTAETIGT" } enthalten.',
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+
     const result = await backupService.factoryReset();
 
     if (result.success) {
@@ -190,6 +380,65 @@ export async function factoryReset(req: Request, res: Response) {
       res.status(500).json({ error: 'Werkseinstellungen fehlgeschlagen', details: result.error });
     }
   } catch (error: any) {
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Fehler bei Werkseinstellungen', details: error.message });
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Fehler bei Werkseinstellungen' });
+    console.error('factoryReset error:', error);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Liste der Backup-Logs (CREATE oder RESTORE)
+ * GET /api/settings/backup-logs?operation=CREATE|RESTORE&limit=50
+ * Liefert die Übersichtsdaten OHNE den großen fullLog.
+ */
+export async function listBackupLogs(req: Request, res: Response) {
+  try {
+    const op = String(req.query.operation || '').toUpperCase();
+    const limit = Math.min(Math.max(parseInt(String(req.query.limit || '50'), 10) || 50, 1), 200);
+
+    const where: any = {};
+    if (op === 'CREATE' || op === 'RESTORE') {
+      where.operation = op;
+    }
+
+    const logs = await prisma.backupLog.findMany({
+      where,
+      orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
+      take: limit,
+      select: {
+        id: true,
+        operation: true,
+        backupName: true,
+        success: true,
+        durationMs: true,
+        summary: true,
+        userEmail: true,
+        ipAddress: true,
+        createdAt: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    res.json({ data: logs });
+  } catch (error: any) {
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Fehler beim Laden der Logs', details: error.message });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detail eines Backup-Logs inkl. fullLog
+ * GET /api/settings/backup-logs/:id
+ */
+export async function getBackupLogDetail(req: Request, res: Response) {
+  try {
+    const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(id) || id < 1) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Ungültige ID' });
+    }
+    const log = await prisma.backupLog.findUnique({ where: { id } });
+    if (!log) {
+      return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Log-Eintrag nicht gefunden' });
+    }
+    res.json({ data: log });
+  } catch (error: any) {
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Fehler beim Laden des Log-Details', details: error.message });
   }
 }

backend/src/controllers/birthday.controller.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ import { createAuditLog } from '../services/audit.service.js';
  */
 export async function getUpcomingBirthdays(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
+    // Portal-Kunden haben hier nichts zu suchen. Endpoint listet Namen, E-Mail,
+    // Telefon und Geburtsdatum ALLER Kunden – ausschließlich Mitarbeiter-UI.
+    // Pentest Runde 6 (2026-05-16) – HOCH.
+    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal) {
+      res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Nicht erlaubt' });
+      return;
+    }
     const past = req.query.past ? parseInt(String(req.query.past)) : 7;
     const future = req.query.future ? parseInt(String(req.query.future)) : 30;
 

backend/src/controllers/cachedEmail.controller.ts

@@ -8,22 +8,37 @@ import { sendEmail, SmtpCredentials, SendEmailParams, EmailAttachment } from '..
 import { fetchAttachment, appendToSent, ImapCredentials } from '../services/imapService.js';
 import { getImapSmtpSettings } from '../services/emailProvider/emailProviderService.js';
 import { decrypt } from '../utils/encryption.js';
-import { ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
+import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
+import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 import { getCustomerTargets, getContractTargets, getIdentityDocumentTargets, getBankCardTargets, documentTargets } from '../config/documentTargets.config.js';
 import { generateEmailPdf } from '../services/pdfService.js';
+import { maybeActivateOnDeliveryConfirmation } from '../services/contractStatusScheduler.service.js';
 import { DocumentType } from '@prisma/client';
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import path from 'path';
 import fs from 'fs';
-import { AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 import {
   canAccessCustomer,
   canAccessContract,
   canAccessCachedEmail,
+  canAccessStressfreiEmail,
 } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 // ==================== E-MAIL LIST ====================
 
+// Hilfsfunktion: Query-Param zu boolean parsen ('true' / 'false' / fehlt).
+function parseBoolParam(v: unknown): boolean | undefined {
+  if (v === 'true') return true;
+  if (v === 'false') return false;
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+function parseDateParam(v: unknown): Date | undefined {
+  if (typeof v !== 'string' || !v.trim()) return undefined;
+  const d = new Date(v);
+  return isNaN(d.getTime()) ? undefined : d;
+}
+
 // E-Mails für einen Kunden abrufen
 export async function getEmailsForCustomer(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
@@ -41,6 +56,17 @@ export async function getEmailsForCustomer(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Pro
       limit,
       offset,
       includeBody: false,
+      search: typeof req.query.search === 'string' ? req.query.search : undefined,
+      fromFilter: typeof req.query.fromFilter === 'string' ? req.query.fromFilter : undefined,
+      toFilter: typeof req.query.toFilter === 'string' ? req.query.toFilter : undefined,
+      subjectFilter: typeof req.query.subjectFilter === 'string' ? req.query.subjectFilter : undefined,
+      bodyFilter: typeof req.query.bodyFilter === 'string' ? req.query.bodyFilter : undefined,
+      attachmentNameFilter: typeof req.query.attachmentNameFilter === 'string' ? req.query.attachmentNameFilter : undefined,
+      hasAttachments: parseBoolParam(req.query.hasAttachments),
+      isRead: parseBoolParam(req.query.isRead),
+      isStarred: parseBoolParam(req.query.isStarred),
+      receivedFrom: parseDateParam(req.query.receivedFrom),
+      receivedTo: parseDateParam(req.query.receivedTo),
     });
 
     res.json({ success: true, data: emails } as ApiResponse);
@@ -112,9 +138,10 @@ export async function getEmail(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 // E-Mail als gelesen/ungelesen markieren
-export async function markAsRead(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function markAsRead(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, id))) return;
     const { isRead } = req.body;
 
     if (isRead) {
@@ -134,9 +161,10 @@ export async function markAsRead(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 // E-Mail Stern umschalten
-export async function toggleStar(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function toggleStar(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, id))) return;
     const isStarred = await cachedEmailService.toggleEmailStar(id);
 
     res.json({ success: true, data: { isStarred } } as ApiResponse);
@@ -152,10 +180,12 @@ export async function toggleStar(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 // ==================== CONTRACT ASSIGNMENT ====================
 
 // E-Mail einem Vertrag zuordnen
-export async function assignToContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function assignToContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     const { contractId } = req.body;
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const userId = (req as any).userId; // Falls Auth-Middleware userId setzt
 
     const email = await cachedEmailService.assignEmailToContract(emailId, contractId, userId);
@@ -171,9 +201,10 @@ export async function assignToContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<voi
 }
 
 // Vertragszuordnung aufheben
-export async function unassignFromContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function unassignFromContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
 
     const email = await cachedEmailService.unassignEmailFromContract(emailId);
 
@@ -188,9 +219,10 @@ export async function unassignFromContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
 }
 
 // E-Mail-Anzahl pro Ordner für ein Konto
-export async function getFolderCounts(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getFolderCounts(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const stressfreiEmailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, stressfreiEmailId))) return;
 
     const counts = await cachedEmailService.getFolderCountsForAccount(stressfreiEmailId);
 
@@ -205,9 +237,10 @@ export async function getFolderCounts(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void
 }
 
 // E-Mail-Anzahl pro Ordner für einen Vertrag
-export async function getContractFolderCounts(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getContractFolderCounts(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
 
     const counts = await cachedEmailService.getFolderCountsForContract(contractId);
 
@@ -224,9 +257,10 @@ export async function getContractFolderCounts(req: Request, res: Response): Prom
 // ==================== SYNC & SEND ====================
 
 // E-Mails für ein Konto synchronisieren (INBOX + SENT)
-export async function syncAccount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function syncAccount(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const stressfreiEmailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, stressfreiEmailId))) return;
     const fullSync = req.query.full === 'true';
 
     // Synchronisiert sowohl INBOX als auch SENT
@@ -256,12 +290,31 @@ export async function syncAccount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
+// Security: verhindert Header-Injection via CRLF in E-Mail-Feldern.
+// nodemailer prüft das zwar auch selbst, aber besser vor dem Versand
+// einen sauberen 400er zurückgeben als einen unklaren SMTP-Fehler.
+function hasCRLF(value: unknown): boolean {
+  if (typeof value === 'string') return /[\r\n]/.test(value);
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.some(hasCRLF);
+  return false;
+}
+
 // E-Mail senden
-export async function sendEmailFromAccount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function sendEmailFromAccount(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const stressfreiEmailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, stressfreiEmailId))) return;
     const { to, cc, subject, text, html, inReplyTo, references, attachments, contractId } = req.body;
 
+    // Header-Injection (CRLF) in Empfänger/Betreff ablehnen
+    if (hasCRLF(to) || hasCRLF(cc) || hasCRLF(subject) || hasCRLF(inReplyTo) || hasCRLF(references)) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Ungültige Zeichen in E-Mail-Feldern (Zeilenumbrüche nicht erlaubt)',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
     // StressfreiEmail laden
     const stressfreiEmail = await stressfreiEmailService.getEmailWithMailboxById(stressfreiEmailId);
 
@@ -514,10 +567,26 @@ export async function downloadAttachment(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promi
       return;
     }
 
-    // Datei senden - inline (öffnen) oder attachment (download)
+    // Security: Content-Type aus IMAP kommt vom Absender und kann `text/html`
-    const disposition = req.query.view === 'true' ? 'inline' : 'attachment';
+    // o.ä. sein. Für inline-Preview nur eine Whitelist "harmloser" Typen
-    res.setHeader('Content-Type', attachment.contentType);
+    // zulassen, sonst zwingend als Download (attachment) ausliefern, um XSS
-    res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `${disposition}; filename="${encodeURIComponent(attachment.filename)}"`);
+    // via inline-HTML-Anhang zu verhindern. Zusätzlich nosniff setzen.
+    const INLINE_SAFE_TYPES = new Set([
+      'application/pdf',
+      'image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/jpg', 'image/gif', 'image/webp',
+      'image/svg+xml' /* wird unten trotzdem als download erzwungen */,
+      'text/plain',
+    ]);
+    const rawType = (attachment.contentType || 'application/octet-stream').toLowerCase();
+    // SVG kann Skripte enthalten → niemals inline
+    const isSafeInline = INLINE_SAFE_TYPES.has(rawType) && rawType !== 'image/svg+xml';
+    const requestedDisposition = req.query.view === 'true' ? 'inline' : 'attachment';
+    const disposition = requestedDisposition === 'inline' && isSafeInline ? 'inline' : 'attachment';
+    // Filename: Steuerzeichen entfernen (CRLF-Injection in Header)
+    const safeFilename = (attachment.filename || 'attachment').replace(/[\r\n"\\]/g, '_');
+    res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', isSafeInline ? rawType : 'application/octet-stream');
+    res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `${disposition}; filename="${encodeURIComponent(safeFilename)}"`);
     res.setHeader('Content-Length', attachment.size);
     res.send(attachment.content);
   } catch (error) {
@@ -547,9 +616,10 @@ export async function downloadAttachment(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promi
 // ==================== MAILBOX ACCOUNTS ====================
 
 // Mailbox-Konten eines Kunden abrufen
-export async function getMailboxAccounts(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getMailboxAccounts(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
 
     const accounts = await cachedEmailService.getMailboxAccountsForCustomer(customerId);
 
@@ -564,9 +634,10 @@ export async function getMailboxAccounts(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<v
 }
 
 // Mailbox nachträglich aktivieren
-export async function enableMailbox(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function enableMailbox(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     const result = await stressfreiEmailService.enableMailbox(id);
 
@@ -589,9 +660,10 @@ export async function enableMailbox(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // Mailbox-Status mit Provider synchronisieren
-export async function syncMailboxStatus(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function syncMailboxStatus(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     const result = await stressfreiEmailService.syncMailboxStatus(id);
 
@@ -620,9 +692,10 @@ export async function syncMailboxStatus(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<vo
 }
 
 // E-Mail-Thread abrufen
-export async function getThread(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getThread(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     const thread = await cachedEmailService.getEmailThread(id);
 
@@ -637,9 +710,13 @@ export async function getThread(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 // Mailbox-Zugangsdaten abrufen (IMAP/SMTP)
-export async function getMailboxCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getMailboxCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    // Ownership-Check: ohne diesen Check konnte ein Portal-Kunde mit
+    // bekannter Stressfrei-Email-ID die kompletten IMAP/SMTP-Credentials
+    // eines anderen Kunden abrufen (IDOR). Pentest-Finding 2026-05-XX.
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     // StressfreiEmail laden
     const stressfreiEmail = await stressfreiEmailService.getEmailWithMailboxById(id);
@@ -674,6 +751,15 @@ export async function getMailboxCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promis
     // IMAP/SMTP-Einstellungen laden
     const settings = await getImapSmtpSettings();
 
+    // Klartext-Mailbox-Passwort-Read auditieren (CRITICAL)
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'READ',
+      resourceType: 'MailboxCredentials',
+      resourceId: id.toString(),
+      label: `Klartext-Mailbox-Zugangsdaten von ${stressfreiEmail.email} entschlüsselt`,
+    });
+
     res.json({
       success: true,
       data: {
@@ -701,7 +787,7 @@ export async function getMailboxCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promis
 }
 
 // Ungelesene E-Mails zählen
-export async function getUnreadCount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getUnreadCount(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = req.query.customerId ? parseInt(req.query.customerId as string) : undefined;
     const contractId = req.query.contractId ? parseInt(req.query.contractId as string) : undefined;
@@ -709,8 +795,10 @@ export async function getUnreadCount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
     let count = 0;
 
     if (customerId) {
+      if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
       count = await cachedEmailService.getUnreadCountForCustomer(customerId);
     } else if (contractId) {
+      if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
       count = await cachedEmailService.getUnreadCountForContract(contractId);
     }
 
@@ -725,9 +813,10 @@ export async function getUnreadCount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // E-Mail in Papierkorb verschieben (nur Admin)
-export async function deleteEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteEmail(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     // Prüfen ob E-Mail existiert
     const email = await cachedEmailService.getCachedEmailById(id);
@@ -762,9 +851,10 @@ export async function deleteEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 // ==================== TRASH OPERATIONS ====================
 
 // Papierkorb-E-Mails für einen Kunden abrufen
-export async function getTrashEmails(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getTrashEmails(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
 
     const emails = await cachedEmailService.getTrashEmails(customerId);
 
@@ -779,9 +869,10 @@ export async function getTrashEmails(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // Papierkorb-Anzahl für einen Kunden
-export async function getTrashCount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getTrashCount(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
 
     const count = await cachedEmailService.getTrashCount(customerId);
 
@@ -796,9 +887,10 @@ export async function getTrashCount(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // E-Mail aus Papierkorb wiederherstellen
-export async function restoreEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function restoreEmail(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     const result = await cachedEmailService.restoreEmailFromTrash(id);
 
@@ -821,9 +913,10 @@ export async function restoreEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 // E-Mail endgültig löschen (aus Papierkorb)
-export async function permanentDeleteEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function permanentDeleteEmail(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, id))) return;
 
     const result = await cachedEmailService.permanentDeleteEmail(id);
 
@@ -848,9 +941,10 @@ export async function permanentDeleteEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
 // ==================== ATTACHMENT TARGETS ====================
 
 // Verfügbare Dokumenten-Ziele für E-Mail-Anhänge abrufen
-export async function getAttachmentTargets(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getAttachmentTargets(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
 
     // E-Mail mit StressfreiEmail laden
     const email = await cachedEmailService.getCachedEmailById(emailId);
@@ -1030,9 +1124,10 @@ export async function getAttachmentTargets(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
 }
 
 // E-Mail-Anhang in ein Dokumentenfeld speichern
-export async function saveAttachmentTo(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function saveAttachmentTo(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     const filename = decodeURIComponent(req.params.filename);
     const { entityType, entityId, targetKey } = req.body;
 
@@ -1317,9 +1412,10 @@ export async function saveAttachmentTo(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<voi
 // ==================== SAVE EMAIL AS PDF ====================
 
 // E-Mail als PDF exportieren und in Dokumentenfeld speichern
-export async function saveEmailAsPdf(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function saveEmailAsPdf(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     const { entityType, entityId, targetKey } = req.body;
 
     console.log('[saveEmailAsPdf] Request:', { emailId, entityType, entityId, targetKey });
@@ -1564,9 +1660,10 @@ export async function saveEmailAsPdf(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 // ==================== SAVE EMAIL AS INVOICE ====================
 
 // E-Mail als PDF exportieren und als Rechnung speichern
-export async function saveEmailAsInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function saveEmailAsInvoice(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     const { invoiceDate, invoiceType, notes } = req.body;
 
     console.log('[saveEmailAsInvoice] Request:', { emailId, invoiceDate, invoiceType, notes });
@@ -1690,9 +1787,10 @@ export async function saveEmailAsInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<v
 // ==================== SAVE ATTACHMENT AS INVOICE ====================
 
 // E-Mail-Anhang als Rechnung speichern
-export async function saveAttachmentAsInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function saveAttachmentAsInvoice(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     const filename = decodeURIComponent(req.params.filename);
     const { invoiceDate, invoiceType, notes } = req.body;
 
@@ -1853,9 +1951,10 @@ export async function saveAttachmentAsInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Prom
  * Anhang einer E-Mail als Vertragsdokument (ContractDocument) speichern.
  * Nutzt die flexible ContractDocument-Tabelle mit documentType (Auftragsformular, Lieferbestätigung, etc.)
  */
-export async function saveAttachmentAsContractDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function saveAttachmentAsContractDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCachedEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     const filename = decodeURIComponent(req.params.filename);
     const { documentType, notes } = req.body;
 
@@ -1891,6 +1990,9 @@ export async function saveAttachmentAsContractDocument(req: Request, res: Respon
       return;
     }
 
+    // Ownership-Check (Portal-Kunde darf nur auf eigenen/vertretenen Vertrag)
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req as AuthRequest, res, contract.id))) return;
+
     // Für gesendete E-Mails: Prüfen ob UID vorhanden
     if (email.folder === 'SENT' && email.uid === 0) {
       res.status(400).json({
@@ -1967,6 +2069,10 @@ export async function saveAttachmentAsContractDocument(req: Request, res: Respon
       },
     });
 
+    // Falls Lieferbestätigung: DRAFT → ACTIVE + startDate setzen falls leer
+    const deliveryDate = typeof req.body?.deliveryDate === 'string' ? req.body.deliveryDate : null;
+    await maybeActivateOnDeliveryConfirmation(contract.id, documentType, req, deliveryDate);
+
     res.json({ success: true, data: doc } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     console.error('saveAttachmentAsContractDocument error:', error);

backend/src/controllers/consent-public.controller.ts

@@ -138,7 +138,13 @@ export async function grantAllConsents(req: Request, res: Response) {
       }
     }
 
-    res.json({ success: true, data: results });
+    // Minimal-Response: NUR die Anzahl + Status. Kein ipAddress, kein createdBy,
+    // keine internen IDs – das war früher der volle CustomerConsent-Record und
+    // hat unnötig Daten geleakt (Pentest Runde 5, 2026-05-16).
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: { granted: results.length },
+    });
   } catch (error: any) {
     console.error('Fehler beim Erteilen der Einwilligungen:', error);
     res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: error.message || 'Fehler beim Erteilen' });

backend/src/controllers/contract.controller.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ import * as contractHistoryService from '../services/contractHistory.service.js'
 import * as authorizationService from '../services/authorization.service.js';
 import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
+import { sanitizeContract, sanitizeContractStrict, sanitizeContracts, sanitizeContractsStrict } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
 import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
+import { maybeActivateOnDeliveryConfirmation } from '../services/contractStatusScheduler.service.js';
 
 export async function getContracts(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
@@ -45,9 +47,15 @@ export async function getContracts(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<voi
       page: page ? parseInt(page as string) : undefined,
       limit: limit ? parseInt(limit as string) : undefined,
     });
+    // Portal-User bekommen die Strict-Variante (ohne commission/notes/
+    // nextReviewDate/portalPasswordEncrypted), Mitarbeiter die normale.
+    const isPortal = !!req.user?.isCustomerPortal;
+    const data = isPortal
+      ? sanitizeContractsStrict(result.contracts as any[])
+      : sanitizeContracts(result.contracts as any[]);
     res.json({
       success: true,
-      data: result.contracts,
+      data,
       pagination: result.pagination,
     } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
@@ -88,7 +96,11 @@ export async function getContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void
       }
     }
 
-    res.json({ success: true, data: contract } as ApiResponse);
+    const isPortal = !!req.user?.isCustomerPortal;
+    const data = isPortal
+      ? sanitizeContractStrict(contract as any)
+      : sanitizeContract(contract as any);
+    res.json({ success: true, data } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
       success: false,
@@ -97,8 +109,19 @@ export async function getContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void
   }
 }
 
-export async function createContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function createContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    // Input-Validierung: type + customerId sind Pflicht, sonst stürzte der
+    // Service mit einer kryptischen JS-Message ab (Pentest Runde 12, INFO).
+    const body = (req.body || {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (!body.type || typeof body.type !== 'string') {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Vertrags-Typ (type) ist erforderlich' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!body.customerId || typeof body.customerId !== 'number') {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Kunde (customerId) ist erforderlich' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
     const contract = await contractService.createContract(req.body);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'Contract',
@@ -106,7 +129,9 @@ export async function createContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
       label: `Vertrag ${contract.contractNumber} angelegt`,
       customerId: contract.customerId,
     });
-    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: contract } as ApiResponse);
+    const isPortal = !!req.user?.isCustomerPortal;
+    const sanitized = isPortal ? sanitizeContractStrict(contract as any) : sanitizeContract(contract as any);
+    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(400).json({
       success: false,
@@ -178,7 +203,13 @@ export async function updateContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<v
       customerId: before?.customerId,
     });
 
-    res.json({ success: true, data: contract } as ApiResponse);
+    // Response sanitisieren – sonst leakt portalPasswordEncrypted etc.
+    // (Pentest Runde 15, gleiche Klasse wie 20.3 für Customer).
+    const isPortal = !!req.user?.isCustomerPortal;
+    const sanitized = isPortal
+      ? sanitizeContractStrict(contract as any)
+      : sanitizeContract(contract as any);
+    res.json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(400).json({
       success: false,
@@ -210,6 +241,7 @@ export async function deleteContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 export async function createFollowUp(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const previousContractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, previousContractId))) return;
 
     // Vorgängervertrag laden für Vertragsnummer
     const previousContract = await prisma.contract.findUnique({
@@ -246,7 +278,9 @@ export async function createFollowUp(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<v
       customerId: contract.customerId,
     });
 
-    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: contract } as ApiResponse);
+    const isPortal = !!req.user?.isCustomerPortal;
+    const sanitized = isPortal ? sanitizeContractStrict(contract as any) : sanitizeContract(contract as any);
+    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(400).json({
       success: false,
@@ -255,6 +289,61 @@ export async function createFollowUp(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<v
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * VVL = Vertragsverlängerung beim selben Anbieter.
+ * Erstellt einen neuen Vertrag mit allen Daten des Vorgängers (außer
+ * Auftragsdokument), Startdatum = altes Start + Vertragslaufzeit.
+ */
+export async function createRenewal(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const previousContractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, previousContractId))) return;
+
+    const previousContract = await prisma.contract.findUnique({
+      where: { id: previousContractId },
+      select: { contractNumber: true },
+    });
+    if (!previousContract) {
+      res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Vorgängervertrag nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const contract = await contractService.createRenewalContract(previousContractId);
+    if (!contract) {
+      res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'VVL konnte nicht erstellt werden' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const createdBy = req.user?.email || 'unbekannt';
+
+    await contractHistoryService.createRenewalHistoryEntry(
+      previousContractId,
+      contract.contractNumber,
+      createdBy,
+    );
+    await contractHistoryService.createNewRenewalFromPredecessorEntry(
+      contract.id,
+      previousContract.contractNumber,
+      createdBy,
+    );
+
+    await logChange({
+      req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'Contract',
+      resourceId: contract.id.toString(),
+      label: `VVL erstellt für ${previousContract.contractNumber}`,
+      customerId: contract.customerId,
+    });
+
+    const isPortal = !!req.user?.isCustomerPortal;
+    const sanitized = isPortal ? sanitizeContractStrict(contract as any) : sanitizeContract(contract as any);
+    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(400).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Erstellen der VVL',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
 export async function getContractPassword(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
@@ -268,6 +357,14 @@ export async function getContractPassword(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Prom
       } as ApiResponse);
       return;
     }
+    // Klartext-Passwort-Read auditieren (CRITICAL)
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'READ',
+      resourceType: 'ContractPassword',
+      resourceId: contractId.toString(),
+      label: `Klartext-Anbieter-Passwort von Vertrag #${contractId} entschlüsselt`,
+    });
     res.json({ success: true, data: { password } } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -292,6 +389,14 @@ export async function getSimCardCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Pr
     if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, sim.mobileDetails.contractId))) return;
 
     const credentials = await contractService.getSimCardCredentials(simCardId);
+    // Klartext-Read (PIN/PUK) auditieren (CRITICAL)
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'READ',
+      resourceType: 'SimCardCredentials',
+      resourceId: simCardId.toString(),
+      label: `Klartext-SIM-Karten-PIN/PUK von SIM #${simCardId} (Vertrag #${sim.mobileDetails.contractId}) entschlüsselt`,
+    });
     res.json({ success: true, data: credentials } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -307,6 +412,14 @@ export async function getInternetCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): P
     if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
 
     const credentials = await contractService.getInternetCredentials(contractId);
+    // Klartext-DSL/Internet-Login auditieren (CRITICAL)
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'READ',
+      resourceType: 'InternetCredentials',
+      resourceId: contractId.toString(),
+      label: `Klartext-Internet-Zugangsdaten von Vertrag #${contractId} entschlüsselt`,
+    });
     res.json({ success: true, data: credentials } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -331,6 +444,14 @@ export async function getSipCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promis
     if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, phone.internetDetails.contractId))) return;
 
     const credentials = await contractService.getSipCredentials(phoneNumberId);
+    // Klartext-SIP/Telefon-Login auditieren (CRITICAL)
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'READ',
+      resourceType: 'SipCredentials',
+      resourceId: phoneNumberId.toString(),
+      label: `Klartext-SIP-Zugangsdaten von Rufnummer #${phoneNumberId} (Vertrag #${phone.internetDetails.contractId}) entschlüsselt`,
+    });
     res.json({ success: true, data: credentials } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -344,7 +465,22 @@ export async function getSipCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promis
 
 export async function getCockpit(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const cockpitData = await contractCockpitService.getCockpitData();
+    // Portal-User dürfen nur ihre eigenen + vertretene Kunden (mit Vollmacht) sehen.
+    // Analog zu getContracts. Sonst leakt das Cockpit ALLE Verträge ALLER Kunden
+    // (Pentest Runde 4, 2026-05-16: HOCH).
+    let customerIds: number[] | undefined;
+    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal && req.user.customerId) {
+      customerIds = [req.user.customerId];
+      const representedIds: number[] = req.user.representedCustomerIds || [];
+      for (const repCustId of representedIds) {
+        const hasAuth = await authorizationService.hasAuthorization(repCustId, req.user.customerId);
+        if (hasAuth) {
+          customerIds.push(repCustId);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    const cockpitData = await contractCockpitService.getCockpitData({ customerIds });
     res.json({ success: true, data: cockpitData } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     console.error('Cockpit error:', error);
@@ -426,6 +562,7 @@ export async function removeContractMeter(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Prom
   try {
     const contractMeterId = parseInt(req.params.contractMeterId);
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     await prisma.contractMeter.delete({ where: { id: contractMeterId } });
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'DELETE', resourceType: 'ContractMeter',
@@ -461,7 +598,8 @@ export async function getContractDocuments(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Pro
 export async function uploadContractDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
-    const { documentType, notes } = req.body;
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
+    const { documentType, notes, deliveryDate } = req.body;
 
     if (!req.file) {
       res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Keine Datei hochgeladen' } as ApiResponse);
@@ -494,6 +632,9 @@ export async function uploadContractDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): P
       customerId: contract?.customerId,
     });
 
+    // Falls Lieferbestätigung: DRAFT → ACTIVE + startDate setzen falls leer
+    await maybeActivateOnDeliveryConfirmation(contractId, documentType, req, deliveryDate);
+
     res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: doc } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(400).json({
@@ -507,6 +648,7 @@ export async function deleteContractDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): P
   try {
     const documentId = parseInt(req.params.documentId);
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
 
     const doc = await prisma.contractDocument.findUnique({ where: { id: documentId } });
     if (!doc || doc.contractId !== contractId) {
@@ -544,9 +686,10 @@ export async function deleteContractDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): P
 
 // ==================== SNOOZE (VERTRAG ZURÜCKSTELLEN) ====================
 
-export async function snoozeContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function snoozeContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const id = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, id))) return;
     const { nextReviewDate, months } = req.body;
 
     let reviewDate: Date | null = null;

backend/src/controllers/contractHistory.controller.ts

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@ import { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import * as contractHistoryService from '../services/contractHistory.service.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
 import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
+import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 export async function getHistoryEntries(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const entries = await contractHistoryService.getHistoryEntries(contractId);
     res.json({ success: true, data: entries } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
@@ -19,6 +21,7 @@ export async function getHistoryEntries(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promis
 export async function createHistoryEntry(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const { title, description } = req.body;
 
     if (!title || typeof title !== 'string' || title.trim().length === 0) {
@@ -54,6 +57,7 @@ export async function createHistoryEntry(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promi
 export async function updateHistoryEntry(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const entryId = parseInt(req.params.entryId);
     const { title, description } = req.body;
 
@@ -80,6 +84,7 @@ export async function updateHistoryEntry(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promi
 export async function deleteHistoryEntry(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const entryId = parseInt(req.params.entryId);
 
     await contractHistoryService.deleteHistoryEntry(contractId, entryId);

backend/src/controllers/contractTask.controller.ts

@@ -5,19 +5,30 @@ import * as customerService from '../services/customer.service.js';
 import * as appSettingService from '../services/appSetting.service.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
 import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
+import { canAccessContract, getPortalAllowedCustomerIds } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 // ==================== ALL TASKS (Dashboard & Task List) ====================
 
 export async function getAllTasks(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const { status, customerId } = req.query;
+    const customerIdNum = customerId ? parseInt(customerId as string) : undefined;
 
-    // Für Kundenportal: Filter auf erlaubte Kunden
+    // Für Kundenportal: Filter auf erlaubte Kunden (mit Live-Vollmacht-Check)
+    const allowedIds = await getPortalAllowedCustomerIds(req);
     let customerPortalCustomerIds: number[] | undefined;
     let customerPortalEmails: string[] | undefined;
 
-    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal && req.user.customerId) {
+    if (allowedIds) {
-      customerPortalCustomerIds = [req.user.customerId, ...(req.user.representedCustomerIds || [])];
+      // Wenn der Portal-User explizit nach einer customerId filtert, die er
+      // nicht (mehr) vertreten darf → 403 statt 200 mit leerem Array
+      // (Pentest Runde 10 – LOW: konsistentes Response-Verhalten nach
+      // Vollmacht-Widerruf).
+      if (customerIdNum !== undefined && !allowedIds.includes(customerIdNum)) {
+        res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Zugriff auf diese Kundendaten' } as ApiResponse);
+        return;
+      }
+      customerPortalCustomerIds = allowedIds;
       const customers = await customerService.getCustomersByIds(customerPortalCustomerIds);
       customerPortalEmails = customers
         .map((c: { id: number; portalEmail: string | null }) => c.portalEmail)
@@ -26,7 +37,7 @@ export async function getAllTasks(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void
 
     const tasks = await contractTaskService.getAllTasks({
       status: status as 'OPEN' | 'COMPLETED' | undefined,
-      customerId: customerId ? parseInt(customerId as string) : undefined,
+      customerId: customerIdNum,
       customerPortalCustomerIds,
       customerPortalEmails,
     });
@@ -42,12 +53,13 @@ export async function getAllTasks(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void
 
 export async function getTaskStats(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    // Für Kundenportal: Filter auf erlaubte Kunden
+    // Für Kundenportal: Filter auf erlaubte Kunden (mit Live-Vollmacht-Check)
+    const allowedIds = await getPortalAllowedCustomerIds(req);
     let customerPortalCustomerIds: number[] | undefined;
     let customerPortalEmails: string[] | undefined;
 
-    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal && req.user.customerId) {
+    if (allowedIds) {
-      customerPortalCustomerIds = [req.user.customerId, ...(req.user.representedCustomerIds || [])];
+      customerPortalCustomerIds = allowedIds;
       const customers = await customerService.getCustomersByIds(customerPortalCustomerIds);
       customerPortalEmails = customers
         .map((c: { id: number; portalEmail: string | null }) => c.portalEmail)
@@ -75,33 +87,17 @@ export async function getTasks(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
     const { status } = req.query;
 
-    // Prüfe Zugriff auf den Vertrag
+    // Zentraler canAccessContract-Check inkl. Live-Vollmacht-Prüfung über
-    const contract = await contractService.getContractById(contractId);
+    // hasAuthorization (Pentest Runde 6 – HOCH-04: widerrufene Vollmachten
-    if (!contract) {
+    // hatten vorher weiter Zugriff, weil nur representedCustomerIds-Array
-      res.status(404).json({
+    // konsultiert wurde, ohne Status-Check).
-        success: false,
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
-        error: 'Vertrag nicht gefunden',
-      } as ApiResponse);
-      return;
-    }
 
-    // Für Kundenportal: Zugriffsprüfung
+    // Für Kundenportal-Benutzer: Lade E-Mails der erlaubten Kunden (mit Live-Vollmacht-Check)
-    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal && req.user.customerId) {
-      const allowedCustomerIds = [req.user.customerId, ...(req.user.representedCustomerIds || [])];
-      if (!allowedCustomerIds.includes(contract.customerId)) {
-        res.status(403).json({
-          success: false,
-          error: 'Kein Zugriff auf diesen Vertrag',
-        } as ApiResponse);
-        return;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Für Kundenportal-Benutzer: Lade E-Mails der erlaubten Kunden
     let customerPortalEmails: string[] | undefined;
-    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal && req.user.customerId) {
+    const allowedIds = await getPortalAllowedCustomerIds(req);
-      const allowedCustomerIds = [req.user.customerId, ...(req.user.representedCustomerIds || [])];
+    if (allowedIds) {
-      const customers = await customerService.getCustomersByIds(allowedCustomerIds);
+      const customers = await customerService.getCustomersByIds(allowedIds);
       customerPortalEmails = customers
         .map((c: { id: number; portalEmail: string | null }) => c.portalEmail)
         .filter((email: string | null): email is string => !!email);
@@ -187,27 +183,8 @@ export async function createSupportTicket(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Prom
       return;
     }
 
-    // Prüfe Zugriff auf den Vertrag
+    // canAccessContract inkl. Live-Vollmacht-Prüfung (siehe getTasks).
-    const contract = await contractService.getContractById(contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
-    if (!contract) {
-      res.status(404).json({
-        success: false,
-        error: 'Vertrag nicht gefunden',
-      } as ApiResponse);
-      return;
-    }
-
-    // Zugriffsprüfung für Kundenportal
-    if (req.user?.customerId) {
-      const allowedCustomerIds = [req.user.customerId, ...(req.user.representedCustomerIds || [])];
-      if (!allowedCustomerIds.includes(contract.customerId)) {
-        res.status(403).json({
-          success: false,
-          error: 'Kein Zugriff auf diesen Vertrag',
-        } as ApiResponse);
-        return;
-      }
-    }
 
     const createdBy = req.user?.email;
 
@@ -376,15 +353,26 @@ export async function createCustomerReply(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Prom
       return;
     }
 
-    // Prüfe ob der Kunde berechtigt ist (eigenes Ticket oder freigegebener Kunde)
+    if (!req.user?.isCustomerPortal || !req.user.customerId) {
-    if (req.user?.isCustomerPortal && req.user.customerId) {
+      res.status(403).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Nur für Kundenportal-Benutzer',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Strikter Owner-Check über den Vertrag (mit Live-Vollmacht-Prüfung
+    // via hasAuthorization, Pentest Runde 6 – HOCH-04). Damit kann ein
+    // Portal-User keine fremde Task-ID mit visibleInPortal=true abgreifen.
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, task.contractId))) return;
+
+    // Zusätzlich: portal-User darf nur antworten, wenn die Task von ihm
+    // initiiert wurde ODER explizit für ihn sichtbar markiert ist.
     const allowedCustomerIds = [req.user.customerId, ...(req.user.representedCustomerIds || [])];
     const customers = await customerService.getCustomersByIds(allowedCustomerIds);
     const allowedEmails = customers
       .map((c: { id: number; portalEmail: string | null }) => c.portalEmail)
       .filter((email: string | null): email is string => !!email);
-
-      // Task muss entweder visibleInPortal sein ODER vom Kunden erstellt worden sein
     const isOwnTask = task.createdBy && allowedEmails.includes(task.createdBy);
     if (!task.visibleInPortal && !isOwnTask) {
       res.status(403).json({
@@ -393,13 +381,6 @@ export async function createCustomerReply(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Prom
       } as ApiResponse);
       return;
     }
-    } else {
-      res.status(403).json({
-        success: false,
-        error: 'Nur für Kundenportal-Benutzer',
-      } as ApiResponse);
-      return;
-    }
 
     const createdBy = req.user?.email;
 

backend/src/controllers/customer.controller.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import * as customerService from '../services/customer.service.js';
 import * as authService from '../services/auth.service.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
+import { validatePasswordComplexity, generateSecurePassword } from '../utils/passwordGenerator.js';
 import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 import {
   sanitizeCustomer,
@@ -10,29 +11,42 @@ import {
   sanitizeCustomerStrict,
   pickCustomerCreate,
   pickCustomerUpdate,
+  isValidEmail,
 } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
 import {
   canAccessMeter,
   canAccessAddress,
   canAccessBankCard,
   canAccessIdentityDocument,
+  canAccessCustomer,
+  getPortalAllowedCustomerIds,
 } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 // Customer CRUD
 export async function getCustomers(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const { search, type, page, limit } = req.query;
+
+    // Portal-User dürfen nur ihre eigenen + vertretene Kunden (mit aktiver
+    // Vollmacht) sehen. Wir geben die Liste direkt als DB-Filter mit, damit
+    // auch `pagination.total` nur über diese IDs zählt (Pentest Runde 6
+    // MITTEL-02: `total: 4271` leakte vorher die globale Kunden-Zahl).
+    const allowedIds = await getPortalAllowedCustomerIds(req);
+
     const result = await customerService.getAllCustomers({
       search: search as string,
       type: type as 'PRIVATE' | 'BUSINESS',
       page: page ? parseInt(page as string) : undefined,
       limit: limit ? parseInt(limit as string) : undefined,
+      allowedIds: allowedIds ?? undefined,
     });
+    const customers = result.customers as any[];
+
     // Portal-Kunden oder andere Rollen sehen kein portalPasswordEncrypted
     const canSeePasswords = req.user?.permissions?.includes('customers:update') ?? false;
     const sanitized = canSeePasswords
-      ? sanitizeCustomers(result.customers as any)
+      ? sanitizeCustomers(customers)
-      : (result.customers as any[]).map((c) => sanitizeCustomerStrict(c)).filter(Boolean);
+      : customers.map((c) => sanitizeCustomerStrict(c)).filter(Boolean);
     res.json({ success: true, data: sanitized, pagination: result.pagination } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -44,7 +58,9 @@ export async function getCustomers(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<voi
 
 export async function getCustomer(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const customer = await customerService.getCustomerById(parseInt(req.params.id));
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
+    const customer = await customerService.getCustomerById(customerId);
     if (!customer) {
       res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Kunde nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
       return;
@@ -64,6 +80,16 @@ export async function createCustomer(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   try {
     // Whitelist: nur erlaubte Felder aus req.body übernehmen
     const data: any = pickCustomerCreate(req.body);
+    // Email-Format prüfen, sonst landet "test@x.de\nBcc:evil@..." als
+    // SMTP-Header-Injection-Vektor in der DB (Pentest 29.4).
+    if (data.email && !isValidEmail(data.email)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (data.portalEmail && !isValidEmail(data.portalEmail)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges Portal-E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
     // Convert birthDate string to Date if present
     if (data.birthDate) {
       data.birthDate = new Date(data.birthDate);
@@ -75,7 +101,14 @@ export async function createCustomer(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
       label: `Kunde ${customer.customerNumber} angelegt (${customer.firstName} ${customer.lastName})`,
       customerId: customer.id,
     });
-    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: customer } as ApiResponse);
+    // Response sanitisieren (Pentest Runde 15, 20.3/20.4): die Service-
+    // Funktion gibt das rohe DB-Objekt mit portalPasswordHash + Reset-Token
+    // zurück. Ohne sanitize-Aufruf leakte das beim Erstellen + Update.
+    const canSeePasswords = (req as AuthRequest).user?.permissions?.includes('customers:update') ?? false;
+    const sanitized = canSeePasswords
+      ? sanitizeCustomer(customer as any)
+      : sanitizeCustomerStrict(customer as any);
+    res.status(201).json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(400).json({
       success: false,
@@ -88,6 +121,15 @@ export async function updateCustomer(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.id);
     // Whitelist: nur erlaubte Felder aus req.body übernehmen (Mass-Assignment-Schutz)
+    // Email-Validierung gegen SMTP-Header-Injection (Pentest 29.4)
+    if (req.body?.email && !isValidEmail(req.body.email)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (req.body?.portalEmail && !isValidEmail(req.body.portalEmail)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges Portal-E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
     const data: any = pickCustomerUpdate(req.body);
 
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
@@ -154,7 +196,14 @@ export async function updateCustomer(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
       }
     }
 
-    res.json({ success: true, data: customer } as ApiResponse);
+    // Response sanitisieren – sonst leakt portalPasswordHash +
+    // portalPasswordResetToken + consentHash + portalPasswordMustChange.
+    // Pentest Runde 15 (20.3 KRITISCH, 20.4 HOCH).
+    const canSeePasswords = (req as AuthRequest).user?.permissions?.includes('customers:update') ?? false;
+    const sanitized = canSeePasswords
+      ? sanitizeCustomer(customer as any)
+      : sanitizeCustomerStrict(customer as any);
+    res.json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     console.error('Update customer error:', error);
     res.status(400).json({
@@ -185,18 +234,21 @@ export async function deleteCustomer(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // Addresses
-export async function getAddresses(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getAddresses(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const addresses = await customerService.getCustomerAddresses(parseInt(req.params.customerId));
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
+    const addresses = await customerService.getCustomerAddresses(customerId);
     res.json({ success: true, data: addresses } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden der Adressen' } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
 
-export async function createAddress(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function createAddress(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const address = await customerService.createAddress(customerId, req.body);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'Address',
@@ -213,9 +265,10 @@ export async function createAddress(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   }
 }
 
-export async function updateAddress(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateAddress(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const addressId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessAddress(req, res, addressId))) return;
     const data = req.body;
 
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
@@ -276,9 +329,10 @@ export async function updateAddress(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   }
 }
 
-export async function deleteAddress(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteAddress(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const addressId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessAddress(req, res, addressId))) return;
     const addr = await prisma.address.findUnique({ where: { id: addressId }, select: { customerId: true } });
     const customerId = addr?.customerId;
     await customerService.deleteAddress(addressId);
@@ -298,22 +352,22 @@ export async function deleteAddress(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // Bank Cards
-export async function getBankCards(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getBankCards(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const showInactive = req.query.showInactive === 'true';
-    const cards = await customerService.getCustomerBankCards(
+    const cards = await customerService.getCustomerBankCards(customerId, showInactive);
-      parseInt(req.params.customerId),
-      showInactive
-    );
     res.json({ success: true, data: cards } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden der Bankkarten' } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
 
-export async function createBankCard(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function createBankCard(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const card = await customerService.createBankCard(customerId, req.body);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'BankCard',
@@ -330,9 +384,10 @@ export async function createBankCard(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   }
 }
 
-export async function updateBankCard(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateBankCard(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const cardId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessBankCard(req, res, cardId))) return;
     const data = req.body;
 
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
@@ -388,9 +443,10 @@ export async function updateBankCard(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   }
 }
 
-export async function deleteBankCard(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteBankCard(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const cardId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessBankCard(req, res, cardId))) return;
     const card = await prisma.bankCard.findUnique({ where: { id: cardId }, select: { customerId: true } });
     const customerId = card?.customerId;
     await customerService.deleteBankCard(cardId);
@@ -410,22 +466,22 @@ export async function deleteBankCard(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // Identity Documents
-export async function getDocuments(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getDocuments(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const showInactive = req.query.showInactive === 'true';
-    const docs = await customerService.getCustomerDocuments(
+    const docs = await customerService.getCustomerDocuments(customerId, showInactive);
-      parseInt(req.params.customerId),
-      showInactive
-    );
     res.json({ success: true, data: docs } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden der Ausweise' } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
 
-export async function createDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function createDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const doc = await customerService.createDocument(customerId, req.body);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'IdentityDocument',
@@ -442,9 +498,10 @@ export async function createDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   }
 }
 
-export async function updateDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const docId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessIdentityDocument(req, res, docId))) return;
     const data = req.body;
 
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
@@ -506,9 +563,10 @@ export async function updateDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
   }
 }
 
-export async function deleteDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const docId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessIdentityDocument(req, res, docId))) return;
     const doc = await prisma.identityDocument.findUnique({ where: { id: docId }, select: { customerId: true } });
     const customerId = doc?.customerId;
     await customerService.deleteDocument(docId);
@@ -528,22 +586,22 @@ export async function deleteDocument(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 }
 
 // Meters
-export async function getMeters(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getMeters(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const showInactive = req.query.showInactive === 'true';
-    const meters = await customerService.getCustomerMeters(
+    const meters = await customerService.getCustomerMeters(customerId, showInactive);
-      parseInt(req.params.customerId),
-      showInactive
-    );
     res.json({ success: true, data: meters } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden der Zähler' } as ApiResponse);
   }
 }
 
-export async function createMeter(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function createMeter(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const meter = await customerService.createMeter(customerId, req.body);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'Meter',
@@ -560,9 +618,10 @@ export async function createMeter(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
-export async function updateMeter(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateMeter(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const meterId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessMeter(req, res, meterId))) return;
     const data = req.body;
 
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
@@ -617,9 +676,10 @@ export async function updateMeter(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
-export async function deleteMeter(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteMeter(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const meterId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessMeter(req, res, meterId))) return;
     await customerService.deleteMeter(meterId);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'DELETE', resourceType: 'Meter',
@@ -647,10 +707,11 @@ export async function getMeterReadings(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise
   }
 }
 
-export async function addMeterReading(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function addMeterReading(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const { readingDate, value, valueNt, unit, notes } = req.body;
     const meterId = parseInt(req.params.meterId);
+    if (!(await canAccessMeter(req, res, meterId))) return;
     const reading = await customerService.addMeterReading(meterId, {
       readingDate: new Date(readingDate),
       value: parseFloat(value),
@@ -683,8 +744,10 @@ export async function addMeterReading(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void
   }
 }
 
-export async function updateMeterReading(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateMeterReading(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    const meterId = parseInt(req.params.meterId);
+    if (!(await canAccessMeter(req, res, meterId))) return;
     const { readingDate, value, valueNt, unit, notes } = req.body;
     const updateData: Record<string, unknown> = {};
     if (readingDate !== undefined) updateData.readingDate = new Date(readingDate);
@@ -694,7 +757,7 @@ export async function updateMeterReading(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<v
     if (notes !== undefined) updateData.notes = notes;
 
     const reading = await customerService.updateMeterReading(
-      parseInt(req.params.meterId),
+      meterId,
       parseInt(req.params.readingId),
       updateData as any
     );
@@ -712,13 +775,12 @@ export async function updateMeterReading(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<v
   }
 }
 
-export async function deleteMeterReading(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteMeterReading(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    const meterId = parseInt(req.params.meterId);
+    if (!(await canAccessMeter(req, res, meterId))) return;
     const readingId = parseInt(req.params.readingId);
-    await customerService.deleteMeterReading(
+    await customerService.deleteMeterReading(meterId, readingId);
-      parseInt(req.params.meterId),
-      readingId
-    );
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'DELETE', resourceType: 'MeterReading',
       resourceId: readingId.toString(),
@@ -819,6 +881,7 @@ export async function getMyMeters(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void
 export async function markReadingTransferred(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const meterId = parseInt(req.params.meterId);
+    if (!(await canAccessMeter(req, res, meterId))) return;
     const readingId = parseInt(req.params.readingId);
 
     const reading = await prisma.meterReading.update({
@@ -847,9 +910,11 @@ export async function markReadingTransferred(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): P
 
 // ==================== PORTAL SETTINGS ====================
 
-export async function getPortalSettings(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getPortalSettings(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const settings = await customerService.getPortalSettings(parseInt(req.params.customerId));
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
+    const settings = await customerService.getPortalSettings(customerId);
     if (!settings) {
       res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Kunde nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
       return;
@@ -876,7 +941,27 @@ export async function getPortalSettings(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<vo
 export async function updatePortalSettings(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
-    const { portalEnabled, portalEmail } = req.body;
+    // `password` (oder password-ähnliche Felder) gehören NICHT in den
+    // Settings-Update. Sonst denkt der Client, sein Passwort wurde gesetzt
+    // (HTTP 200), während das Feld stillschweigend ignoriert wird. Wer
+    // ein Passwort setzen will, nutzt POST /portal/password mit
+    // Komplexitäts-Check. (Pentest-Befund.)
+    const body = req.body || {};
+    const forbidden = ['password', 'portalPassword', 'portalPasswordHash', 'portalPasswordEncrypted'];
+    const offending = forbidden.filter((k) => k in body);
+    if (offending.length > 0) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: `Felder nicht erlaubt: ${offending.join(', ')}. Bitte POST /customers/${customerId}/portal/password nutzen.`,
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const { portalEnabled, portalEmail } = body;
+    // Email-Validierung gegen SMTP-Header-Injection (Pentest 29.4)
+    if (portalEmail && !isValidEmail(portalEmail)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges Portal-E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
 
     // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
     const before = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
@@ -936,13 +1021,115 @@ export async function updatePortalSettings(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Generiert ein zufälliges, komplexes Passwort (16 Zeichen, gemischt).
+ * Setzt es NICHT direkt — wird im Frontend in den Setzen-Button-Flow gefüttert.
+ * Damit hat der Admin Wahlfreiheit (Generieren → ggf. anpassen → speichern).
+ */
+export async function generatePortalPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const password = generateSecurePassword({ length: 16 });
+    res.json({ success: true, data: { password } } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Generieren des Passworts',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verschickt die Portal-Zugangsdaten per E-Mail an die hinterlegte
+ * `email` (bevorzugt) oder fallback auf `portalEmail` des Kunden. Das
+ * Passwort wird aus dem `portalPasswordEncrypted`-Feld entschlüsselt
+ * (= das aktuell aktive Klartext-Passwort, das auch in der UI angezeigt wird).
+ */
+export async function sendPortalCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
+      where: { id: customerId },
+      select: {
+        id: true, firstName: true, lastName: true, salutation: true, companyName: true,
+        email: true, portalEmail: true, portalEnabled: true,
+        portalPasswordEncrypted: true, portalPasswordHash: true,
+      },
+    });
+    if (!customer) {
+      res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Kunde nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!customer.portalEnabled) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Portal ist für diesen Kunden nicht aktiviert',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!customer.portalPasswordHash) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Es ist noch kein Portal-Passwort gesetzt',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const targetEmail = customer.email || customer.portalEmail;
+    if (!targetEmail) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Kunde hat keine E-Mail-Adresse hinterlegt',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const loginEmail = customer.portalEmail || customer.email!;
+    const plaintextPassword = await authService.getCustomerPortalPassword(customerId);
+    if (!plaintextPassword) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Klartext-Passwort nicht verfügbar (alte Anlage ohne Encrypted-Feld – bitte neu setzen)',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    await authService.sendPortalCredentialsEmail({
+      to: targetEmail,
+      customer,
+      loginEmail,
+      password: plaintextPassword,
+    });
+
+    // Versendetes Passwort ist ein Einmalpasswort → beim ersten Login muss
+    // der Kunde sich ein eigenes setzen.
+    await authService.markPortalPasswordForChange(customerId);
+
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'UPDATE',
+      resourceType: 'PortalSettings',
+      resourceId: customerId.toString(),
+      label: `Portal-Zugangsdaten per E-Mail versendet an ${targetEmail} (Einmalpasswort)`,
+      customerId,
+    });
+
+    res.json({ success: true, message: `Zugangsdaten an ${targetEmail} versendet (Einmalpasswort)` } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Versenden der Zugangsdaten',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
 export async function setPortalPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const { password } = req.body;
-    if (!password || password.length < 6) {
+    // Komplexität: 12 Zeichen, Groß/Klein/Zahl/Sonderzeichen (zentrale Regel)
+    const complexity = validatePasswordComplexity(password);
+    if (!complexity.ok) {
       res.status(400).json({
         success: false,
-        error: 'Passwort muss mindestens 6 Zeichen lang sein',
+        error: 'Passwort erfüllt Mindestanforderungen nicht: ' + complexity.errors.join(', '),
       } as ApiResponse);
       return;
     }
@@ -963,9 +1150,22 @@ export async function setPortalPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<vo
   }
 }
 
-export async function getPortalPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getPortalPassword(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const password = await authService.getCustomerPortalPassword(parseInt(req.params.customerId));
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
+    const password = await authService.getCustomerPortalPassword(customerId);
+    // Klartext-Passwort-Read auditieren (CRITICAL): wer hat wann das Portal-
+    // Passwort eines Kunden entschlüsselt? Wichtig für DSGVO-Nachvollziehbarkeit
+    // + Insider-Threat-Erkennung.
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'READ',
+      resourceType: 'PortalPassword',
+      resourceId: customerId.toString(),
+      label: `Klartext-Portal-Passwort von Kunde #${customerId} entschlüsselt`,
+      customerId,
+    });
     res.json({ success: true, data: { password } } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -977,10 +1177,12 @@ export async function getPortalPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<vo
 
 // ==================== REPRESENTATIVE MANAGEMENT ====================
 
-export async function getRepresentatives(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getRepresentatives(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     // Wer kann diesen Kunden vertreten (representedBy)?
-    const representedBy = await customerService.getRepresentedByList(parseInt(req.params.customerId));
+    const representedBy = await customerService.getRepresentedByList(customerId);
     res.json({ success: true, data: representedBy } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
     res.status(500).json({
@@ -990,9 +1192,10 @@ export async function getRepresentatives(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<v
   }
 }
 
-export async function addRepresentative(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function addRepresentative(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const { representativeId, notes } = req.body;
     const representative = await customerService.addRepresentative(
       customerId,
@@ -1014,9 +1217,10 @@ export async function addRepresentative(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<vo
   }
 }
 
-export async function removeRepresentative(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function removeRepresentative(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     await customerService.removeRepresentative(
       customerId,
       parseInt(req.params.representativeId)
@@ -1035,8 +1239,13 @@ export async function removeRepresentative(req: Request, res: Response): Promise
   }
 }
 
-export async function searchForRepresentative(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function searchForRepresentative(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
+    // KRITISCH (Pentest Runde 6): ohne canAccessCustomer kann ein Portal-User
+    // mit beliebigem :customerId-Pfad alle Kunden durchsuchen → komplette
+    // Kunden-DB-Enumeration via Buchstaben-Brute-Force.
+    const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const { search } = req.query;
     if (!search || typeof search !== 'string' || search.length < 2) {
       res.json({ success: true, data: [] } as ApiResponse);
@@ -1044,7 +1253,7 @@ export async function searchForRepresentative(req: Request, res: Response): Prom
     }
     const customers = await customerService.searchCustomersForRepresentative(
       search,
-      parseInt(req.params.customerId)
+      customerId,
     );
     res.json({ success: true, data: customers } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {

backend/src/controllers/emailProvider.controller.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import { ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
 import { testImapConnection, ImapCredentials } from '../services/imapService.js';
 import { testSmtpConnection, SmtpCredentials } from '../services/smtpService.js';
 import { decrypt } from '../utils/encryption.js';
+import { assertAllowedHost, safeResolveHost } from '../utils/ssrfGuard.js';
+import { emit as emitSecurityEvent, contextFromRequest } from '../services/securityMonitor.service.js';
 import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
 
 const prisma = new PrismaClient();
@@ -118,6 +120,33 @@ export async function testConnection(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
       domain: req.body.domain,
     } : undefined;
 
+    // SSRF-Guard inkl. DNS-Rebinding: testData.apiUrl-Hostname zu IP auflösen
+    // und prüfen. Wenn DNS auf eine geblockte IP zeigt, abbrechen – ohne dass
+    // ein zweiter Lookup zur Connection-Zeit eine andere IP liefern könnte.
+    if (testData?.apiUrl) {
+      try {
+        const url = new URL(testData.apiUrl);
+        await safeResolveHost(url.hostname, 'apiUrl-Host');
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof Error && (err.message.includes('geblockte') || err.message.includes('DNS'))) {
+          const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+          emitSecurityEvent({
+            type: 'SSRF_BLOCKED',
+            severity: 'HIGH',
+            message: err.message,
+            ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+            userId: ctx.userId,
+            userEmail: ctx.userEmail,
+            endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+            details: { apiUrl: testData.apiUrl },
+          });
+          res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: err.message } as ApiResponse);
+          return;
+        }
+        // URL-Parse-Fehler ignorieren – Backend reagiert sowieso mit Fehler
+      }
+    }
+
     const result = await emailProviderService.testProviderConnection({ id, testData });
     res.json({ success: result.success, data: result } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
@@ -214,24 +243,56 @@ export async function testMailAccess(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
       return;
     }
 
+    // SSRF-Guard inkl. DNS-Rebinding: Hostnames pre-resolven und gegen
+    // geblockte IPs prüfen. Connection läuft danach gegen die IP, der
+    // ursprüngliche Hostname wird als TLS-servername gesetzt – damit kann
+    // ein zweiter DNS-Lookup keine andere IP unterschieben.
+    let smtpResolved: { ip: string; servername: string };
+    let imapResolved: { ip: string; servername: string };
+    try {
+      [smtpResolved, imapResolved] = await Promise.all([
+        safeResolveHost(smtpServer, 'SMTP-Server'),
+        safeResolveHost(imapServer, 'IMAP-Server'),
+      ]);
+    } catch (err) {
+      const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+      emitSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'SSRF_BLOCKED',
+        severity: 'HIGH',
+        message: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Ungültige Server-Adresse',
+        ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+        userId: ctx.userId,
+        userEmail: ctx.userEmail,
+        endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+        details: { smtpServer, imapServer },
+      });
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Ungültige Server-Adresse',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
     // IMAP testen
     const imapCredentials: ImapCredentials = {
-      host: imapServer,
+      host: imapResolved.ip,
       port: imapPort,
       user: emailAddress,
       password,
       encryption: imapEncryption,
       allowSelfSignedCerts,
+      servername: imapResolved.servername,
     };
 
     // SMTP testen
     const smtpCredentials: SmtpCredentials = {
-      host: smtpServer,
+      host: smtpResolved.ip,
       port: smtpPort,
       user: emailAddress,
       password,
       encryption: smtpEncryption,
       allowSelfSignedCerts,
+      servername: smtpResolved.servername,
     };
 
     let imapResult: { success: boolean; error?: string } = { success: false };

backend/src/controllers/factoryDefaults.controller.ts

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ export async function previewFactoryDefaults(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
           contractDurations: data.contractDurations.length,
           contractCategories: data.contractCategories.length,
           pdfTemplates: data.pdfTemplates.length,
+          appSettings: data.appSettings.length,
         },
       },
     });
@@ -62,3 +63,39 @@ export async function previewFactoryDefaults(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
     res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden' });
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * Factory-Defaults aus ZIP importieren (Upload via multipart/form-data, Feld 'zip').
+ * Idempotent: bestehende Einträge werden per unique-Key aktualisiert, nichts wird gelöscht.
+ */
+export async function importFactoryDefaults(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
+  try {
+    const file = (req as any).file as Express.Multer.File | undefined;
+    if (!file || !file.buffer) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Keine ZIP-Datei hochgeladen' });
+    }
+
+    const result = await factoryDefaultsService.importFactoryDefaults(file.buffer);
+
+    await createAuditLog({
+      userId: req.user?.userId,
+      userEmail: req.user?.email || 'unknown',
+      // 'UPDATE' weil Factory-Defaults DB-Records upserted; das Label nennt
+      // den Vorgang explizit als Import.
+      action: 'UPDATE',
+      resourceType: 'FactoryDefaults',
+      resourceLabel: `Factory-Defaults importiert: ${result.providers} Anbieter, ${result.tariffs} Tarife, ${result.pdfTemplates} PDF-Vorlagen, ${result.appSettings} HTML-Templates`,
+      endpoint: req.path,
+      httpMethod: req.method,
+      ipAddress: req.socket.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
+    });
+
+    res.json({ success: true, data: result });
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('Fehler beim Factory-Defaults-Import:', error);
+    res.status(400).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Import',
+    });
+  }
+}

backend/src/controllers/fileDownload.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+import { Response } from 'express';
+import path from 'path';
+import fs from 'fs';
+import { AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
+import { findUploadOwner } from '../services/fileDownload.service.js';
+import { canAccessCustomer, canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
+
+/**
+ * Authentifizierter Download-Endpoint mit Per-File-Ownership-Check.
+ * Ersetzt das ungeschützte `express.static('/api/uploads')`.
+ *
+ * Aufruf: GET /api/files/download?path=/uploads/<subDir>/<filename>
+ *
+ * Schritte:
+ *   1. Pfad-Format prüfen (muss mit /uploads/ beginnen, kein Traversal)
+ *   2. Owner via DB-Lookup ermitteln (welcher Customer/Contract gehört dazu?)
+ *   3. canAccessCustomer / canAccessContract / Permission-Check
+ *   4. Datei senden (mit korrektem Content-Type)
+ *
+ * Sicherheitsgewinn ggü. dem alten static-Handler: ein eingeloggter
+ * Portal-Kunde kann jetzt nur seine eigenen Files (oder die seiner
+ * vertretenen Kunden mit Vollmacht) herunterladen – nicht mehr beliebige
+ * Pfade von fremden Kunden, selbst wenn er die Filenames irgendwo
+ * mitgeschnitten hätte.
+ */
+export async function downloadFile(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  const requested = typeof req.query.path === 'string' ? req.query.path : '';
+  if (!requested) {
+    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'path-Parameter fehlt' });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Format-Validierung (Traversal-Schutz)
+  if (!requested.startsWith('/uploads/') || requested.includes('..') || requested.includes('\0')) {
+    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiger Pfad' });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Owner ermitteln
+  const owner = await findUploadOwner(requested);
+  if (!owner) {
+    res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Datei nicht gefunden' });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Access-Check je nach Owner-Typ
+  if (owner.kind === 'customer') {
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, owner.customerId))) return;
+  } else if (owner.kind === 'contract') {
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, owner.contractId))) return;
+  } else if (owner.kind === 'admin') {
+    // PDF-Vorlagen: nur Mitarbeiter mit settings:read
+    const perms = req.user?.permissions || [];
+    if (!perms.includes('settings:read') && !perms.includes('settings:update')) {
+      res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Keine Berechtigung' });
+      return;
+    }
+  } else if (owner.kind === 'gdpr-admin') {
+    const perms = req.user?.permissions || [];
+    if (!perms.includes('gdpr:admin')) {
+      res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Keine Berechtigung' });
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Datei vom Disk lesen
+  // requested startet mit /uploads/, wir mappen das auf process.cwd()/uploads/...
+  const relative = requested.substring('/uploads/'.length);
+  const absolute = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads', relative);
+  // Letzter Pfad-Sicherheitscheck: absolute Path muss noch unter uploads/ liegen.
+  const uploadsRoot = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads') + path.sep;
+  if (!absolute.startsWith(uploadsRoot)) {
+    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiger Pfad' });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!fs.existsSync(absolute)) {
+    res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Datei nicht gefunden' });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Stored-XSS-Schutz (Pentest 2026-05-20 MEDIUM 30.13):
+  // Multer prüfte beim Upload nur den client-gemeldeten MIME-Type.
+  // Eine `.html`-Datei mit `Content-Type: application/pdf` rutschte
+  // durch und wurde mit Original-Extension auf Disk geschrieben.
+  // Beim Download bestimmt res.sendFile() den Content-Type aus der
+  // Extension – also `text/html` – und der Browser hätte das als
+  // Stored-XSS gerendert. `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` schützt
+  // nicht, wenn der Server selbst text/html liefert.
+  //
+  // Fix: alle Files via Content-Disposition: attachment ausliefern.
+  // Der Browser lädt herunter statt zu rendern, egal welcher Type.
+  // Für legitime PDF/Bild-Vorschau ist das vertretbar – Browser
+  // öffnen den Download dann eben aus dem Datei-Manager.
+  const filename = path.basename(absolute).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, '_');
+  res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+  res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${filename}"`);
+  res.sendFile(absolute);
+}

backend/src/controllers/gdpr.controller.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import * as gdprService from '../services/gdpr.service.js';
 import * as consentService from '../services/consent.service.js';
 import * as consentPublicService from '../services/consent-public.service.js';
 import * as appSettingService from '../services/appSetting.service.js';
+import { canAccessCustomer } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 import { createAuditLog, logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
 import { ConsentType, DeletionRequestStatus } from '@prisma/client';
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ import fs from 'fs';
 import { sendEmail, SmtpCredentials } from '../services/smtpService.js';
 import { getSystemEmailCredentials } from '../services/emailProvider/emailProviderService.js';
 import * as authorizationService from '../services/authorization.service.js';
+import { stripHtml } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
 
 /**
  * Kundendaten exportieren (DSGVO Art. 15)
@@ -229,6 +231,7 @@ export async function getDashboardStats(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
 export async function getCustomerConsents(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const consents = await consentService.getCustomerConsents(customerId);
 
     // Labels hinzufügen
@@ -251,6 +254,7 @@ export async function getCustomerConsents(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
 export async function checkConsentStatus(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     const result = await consentService.hasFullConsent(customerId);
     res.json({ success: true, data: result });
   } catch (error) {
@@ -266,7 +270,14 @@ export async function updateCustomerConsent(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
     const consentType = req.params.consentType as ConsentType;
-    const { status, source, documentPath, version } = req.body;
+    // BEWUSST nur `status` aus dem Body übernehmen. `source`, `documentPath`
+    // und `version` darf der Portal-User NICHT setzen – Pentest 2026-05-20
+    // (MEDIUM): "ADMIN_OVERRIDE" als source bzw. "<script>" als version
+    // landeten vorher ungefiltert in der DB. source ist für diesen
+    // Endpoint immer 'portal'; documentPath wird ausschließlich vom
+    // Auth-Upload-Endpoint server-seitig gesetzt; version pflegt das CRM
+    // (falls überhaupt) später nach.
+    const { status } = req.body;
 
     // Nur Kundenportal-Benutzer dürfen Einwilligungen ändern
     if (!(req.user as any)?.isCustomerPortal) {
@@ -276,17 +287,9 @@ export async function updateCustomerConsent(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
       });
     }
 
-    // Portal: nur eigene + vertretene Kunden
+    // canAccessCustomer inkl. Live-Vollmacht-Check (Pentest Runde 6 HOCH-04:
-    const allowed = [
+    // widerrufene Vollmachten hatten vorher noch Zugriff)
-      (req.user as any).customerId,
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
-      ...((req.user as any).representedCustomerIds || []),
-    ];
-    if (!allowed.includes(customerId)) {
-      return res.status(403).json({
-        success: false,
-        error: 'Keine Berechtigung für diesen Kunden',
-      });
-    }
 
     if (!Object.values(ConsentType).includes(consentType)) {
       return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiger Consent-Typ' });
@@ -301,9 +304,7 @@ export async function updateCustomerConsent(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
 
     const consent = await consentService.updateConsent(customerId, consentType, {
       status,
-      source: source || 'portal',
+      source: 'portal',
-      documentPath,
-      version,
       ipAddress: req.socket.remoteAddress,
       createdBy: req.user?.email || 'unknown',
     });
@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ export async function updateCustomerConsent(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'UPDATE', resourceType: 'CustomerConsent',
       label: status === 'GRANTED' ? `Einwilligung "${consentName}" erteilt` : `Einwilligung "${consentName}" widerrufen`,
-      details: { einwilligung: consentName, status, quelle: source || 'portal' },
+      details: { einwilligung: consentName, status, quelle: 'portal' },
       customerId,
     });
 
@@ -799,6 +800,7 @@ export async function sendAuthorizationRequest(req: AuthRequest, res: Response)
 export async function getAuthorizations(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
     const customerId = parseInt(req.params.customerId);
+    if (!(await canAccessCustomer(req, res, customerId))) return;
     // Sicherstellen dass Einträge für alle aktiven Vertreter existieren
     await authorizationService.ensureAuthorizationEntries(customerId);
     const authorizations = await authorizationService.getAuthorizationsForCustomer(customerId);
@@ -818,9 +820,15 @@ export async function grantAuthorization(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
     const representativeId = parseInt(req.params.representativeId);
     const { source, notes } = req.body;
 
+    // Whitelist erzwingen, sonst landen Phantasie-Werte wie "ADMIN_OVERRIDE"
+    // oder `<script>` in der DB (Pentest 2026-05-20). notes wird durch
+    // stripHtml geschickt (Plain-Text-Feld).
+    const safeSource = consentService.sanitizeConsentSource(source, 'crm-backend');
+    const safeNotes = typeof notes === 'string' ? stripHtml(notes) : notes;
+
     const auth = await authorizationService.grantAuthorization(customerId, representativeId, {
-      source: source || 'crm-backend',
+      source: safeSource,
-      notes,
+      notes: safeNotes as string | undefined,
     });
 
     const rep = await prisma.customer.findUnique({ where: { id: representativeId }, select: { firstName: true, lastName: true } });
@@ -883,6 +891,78 @@ export async function uploadAuthorizationDocument(req: AuthRequest, res: Respons
       return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Keine Datei hochgeladen' });
     }
 
+    // Strukturelle PDF-Validierung: multer prüft nur den client-gemeldeten
+    // MIME-Type, ein Angreifer kann beliebige Daten als "application/pdf"
+    // hochladen. Wir verlangen:
+    //   1) Magic-Bytes "%PDF-" am Anfang
+    //   2) "%%EOF"-Marker in den letzten 1024 Bytes (Standard-PDF-Ende)
+    //   3) keinen Shebang ("#!") und kein "<script"/"<?php" in den
+    //      ersten 4 KB (Pentest 28.3 Partial: "%PDF-1.4\n#!/bin/bash"
+    //      passierte die reine Magic-Byte-Prüfung).
+    // Wer trotzdem eine PDF mit eingebettetem JS hochlädt, bekommt das
+    // hier nicht erkannt – aber das ist Adobe-Acrobat-Risiko und nicht
+    // mehr ein CRM-Backend-Bug. Hier geht's um simple File-Type-Spoofs.
+    const PDF_MAGIC = Buffer.from([0x25, 0x50, 0x44, 0x46, 0x2d]); // %PDF-
+    try {
+      const stat = fs.statSync(req.file.path);
+      const fd = fs.openSync(req.file.path, 'r');
+
+      // Header
+      const head = Buffer.alloc(5);
+      fs.readSync(fd, head, 0, 5, 0);
+      if (!head.equals(PDF_MAGIC)) {
+        fs.closeSync(fd);
+        try { fs.unlinkSync(req.file.path); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        return res.status(400).json({
+          success: false,
+          error: 'Datei ist keine gültige PDF (Magic-Bytes fehlen).',
+        });
+      }
+
+      // Erste 4 KB scannen auf verbotene Marker (Shell-Script,
+      // HTML/PHP-Payload). Ein echtes PDF enthält am Anfang nur
+      // Binärdaten + ein paar ASCII-Marker, "#!" / "<script" sind
+      // klare Spoof-Indikatoren.
+      const headSize = Math.min(stat.size, 4096);
+      const headBuf = Buffer.alloc(headSize);
+      fs.readSync(fd, headBuf, 0, headSize, 0);
+      const headStr = headBuf.toString('latin1').toLowerCase();
+      const forbidden = ['#!/', '<script', '<?php', '<%', 'mz']; // last = PE/Windows exe
+      const hit = forbidden.find((m) => headStr.includes(m));
+      if (hit) {
+        fs.closeSync(fd);
+        try { fs.unlinkSync(req.file.path); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        return res.status(400).json({
+          success: false,
+          error: `Datei enthält verdächtiges Payload-Pattern ("${hit}").`,
+        });
+      }
+
+      // EOF-Marker in den letzten 1 KB. Strikt PDF/A wäre genau am
+      // Dateiende, aber viele Tools schreiben Whitespace/Newlines
+      // nach %%EOF, deshalb prüfen wir das letzte KB.
+      if (stat.size >= 5) {
+        const tailSize = Math.min(stat.size, 1024);
+        const tailBuf = Buffer.alloc(tailSize);
+        fs.readSync(fd, tailBuf, 0, tailSize, stat.size - tailSize);
+        if (!tailBuf.toString('latin1').includes('%%EOF')) {
+          fs.closeSync(fd);
+          try { fs.unlinkSync(req.file.path); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+          return res.status(400).json({
+            success: false,
+            error: 'Datei ist keine gültige PDF (EOF-Marker fehlt).',
+          });
+        }
+      }
+      fs.closeSync(fd);
+    } catch (_e) {
+      try { fs.unlinkSync(req.file.path); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      return res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Hochgeladene Datei konnte nicht gelesen werden.',
+      });
+    }
+
     const documentPath = `/uploads/authorizations/${req.file.filename}`;
     const auth = await authorizationService.updateAuthorizationDocument(
       customerId,
@@ -966,12 +1046,27 @@ export async function toggleMyAuthorization(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
     const representativeId = parseInt(req.params.representativeId);
     const { grant } = req.body;
 
-    // Vertreter-Name laden
+    // Validierungen:
-    const representative = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
+    // 1) Self-Grant verhindern (sinnlos und schafft Datenmüll).
-      where: { id: representativeId },
+    if (representativeId === user.customerId) {
-      select: { firstName: true, lastName: true },
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Self-Grant möglich' });
+    }
+    // 2) Existenz + aktives Vertreter-Verhältnis in EINEM Lookup prüfen.
+    //    Beide Fälle (representative existiert nicht / keine aktive Beziehung)
+    //    geben identisch 403, damit ein Angreifer keine Customer-IDs aus der
+    //    DB enumerieren kann (kein 404-vs-403-Disclosure).
+    const relation = await prisma.customerRepresentative.findFirst({
+      where: { customerId: user.customerId, representativeId, isActive: true },
+      include: { representative: { select: { firstName: true, lastName: true } } },
     });
-    const repName = representative ? `${representative.firstName} ${representative.lastName}` : `#${representativeId}`;
+    if (!relation) {
+      return res.status(403).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Kein Vertreter-Verhältnis – Vollmacht nicht erlaubt',
+      });
+    }
+
+    const repName = `${relation.representative.firstName} ${relation.representative.lastName}`;
 
     let auth;
     if (grant) {
@@ -987,10 +1082,9 @@ export async function toggleMyAuthorization(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
     res.json({ success: true, data: auth });
   } catch (error) {
     console.error('Fehler beim Ändern der Vollmacht:', error);
-    res.status(400).json({
+    // Generische Fehlermeldung – Prisma-Errors enthalten Pfad/Schema und
-      success: false,
+    // sollten nicht an Endkunden geleakt werden.
-      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Ändern',
+    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Vollmacht konnte nicht aktualisiert werden' });
-    });
   }
 }
 

backend/src/controllers/invoice.controller.ts

@@ -2,14 +2,15 @@ import { Request, Response } from 'express';
 import * as invoiceService from '../services/invoice.service.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
 import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
-import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
+import { canAccessContract, canAccessEnergyContractDetails } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 /**
  * Alle Rechnungen für ein EnergyContractDetails abrufen
  */
-export async function getInvoices(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getInvoices(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const ecdId = parseInt(req.params.ecdId);
+    if (!(await canAccessEnergyContractDetails(req, res, ecdId))) return;
     const invoices = await invoiceService.getInvoices(ecdId);
     res.json({ success: true, data: invoices } as ApiResponse);
   } catch (error) {
@@ -24,10 +25,11 @@ export async function getInvoices(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 /**
  * Einzelne Rechnung abrufen
  */
-export async function getInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function getInvoice(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const ecdId = parseInt(req.params.ecdId);
     const invoiceId = parseInt(req.params.invoiceId);
+    if (!(await canAccessEnergyContractDetails(req, res, ecdId))) return;
     const invoice = await invoiceService.getInvoice(ecdId, invoiceId);
 
     if (!invoice) {
@@ -51,9 +53,10 @@ export async function getInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 /**
  * Neue Rechnung hinzufügen
  */
-export async function addInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function addInvoice(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const ecdId = parseInt(req.params.ecdId);
+    if (!(await canAccessEnergyContractDetails(req, res, ecdId))) return;
     const { invoiceDate, invoiceType, documentPath, notes } = req.body;
 
     if (!invoiceDate || !invoiceType) {
@@ -90,10 +93,11 @@ export async function addInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 /**
  * Rechnung aktualisieren
  */
-export async function updateInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateInvoice(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const ecdId = parseInt(req.params.ecdId);
     const invoiceId = parseInt(req.params.invoiceId);
+    if (!(await canAccessEnergyContractDetails(req, res, ecdId))) return;
     const { invoiceDate, invoiceType, documentPath, notes } = req.body;
 
     const invoice = await invoiceService.updateInvoice(ecdId, invoiceId, {
@@ -122,10 +126,11 @@ export async function updateInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
 /**
  * Rechnung löschen
  */
-export async function deleteInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteInvoice(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const ecdId = parseInt(req.params.ecdId);
     const invoiceId = parseInt(req.params.invoiceId);
+    if (!(await canAccessEnergyContractDetails(req, res, ecdId))) return;
 
     await invoiceService.deleteInvoice(ecdId, invoiceId);
 

backend/src/controllers/monitoring.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+import { Response } from 'express';
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import { AuthRequest, ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
+import * as appSettingService from '../services/appSetting.service.js';
+import { sendAlertEmail, sendDigest } from '../services/securityAlert.service.js';
+import type { SecurityEventType, SecuritySeverity } from '@prisma/client';
+
+/**
+ * GET /api/monitoring/events
+ * Liste der Security-Events mit Filter + Pagination.
+ */
+export async function listEvents(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const page = parseInt((req.query.page as string) || '1');
+    const limit = Math.min(parseInt((req.query.limit as string) || '50'), 200);
+    const type = req.query.type as SecurityEventType | undefined;
+    const severity = req.query.severity as SecuritySeverity | undefined;
+    const search = req.query.search as string | undefined;
+    const since = req.query.since as string | undefined;
+    const ip = req.query.ip as string | undefined;
+
+    const where: any = {};
+    if (type) where.type = type;
+    if (severity) where.severity = severity;
+    if (ip) where.ipAddress = ip;
+    if (since) where.createdAt = { gte: new Date(since) };
+    if (search) {
+      where.OR = [
+        { message: { contains: search } },
+        { userEmail: { contains: search } },
+        { endpoint: { contains: search } },
+      ];
+    }
+
+    const [events, total, byType, bySeverity] = await Promise.all([
+      prisma.securityEvent.findMany({
+        where,
+        orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
+        take: limit,
+        skip: (page - 1) * limit,
+      }),
+      prisma.securityEvent.count({ where }),
+      prisma.securityEvent.groupBy({
+        by: ['type'],
+        where: since ? { createdAt: { gte: new Date(since) } } : {},
+        _count: true,
+      }),
+      prisma.securityEvent.groupBy({
+        by: ['severity'],
+        where: since ? { createdAt: { gte: new Date(since) } } : {},
+        _count: true,
+      }),
+    ]);
+
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: events,
+      pagination: { page, limit, total, totalPages: Math.ceil(total / limit) },
+      stats: {
+        byType: Object.fromEntries(byType.map((r: any) => [r.type, r._count])),
+        bySeverity: Object.fromEntries(bySeverity.map((r: any) => [r.severity, r._count])),
+      },
+    } as any);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('listEvents error:', error);
+    res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden der Security-Events' } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * GET /api/monitoring/settings
+ */
+export async function getMonitoringSettings(_req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const alertEmail = await appSettingService.getSetting('monitoringAlertEmail');
+    const digestEnabled = await appSettingService.getSettingBool('monitoringDigestEnabled');
+    const lastDigest = await appSettingService.getSetting('monitoringLastDigestAt');
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: {
+        alertEmail: alertEmail || '',
+        digestEnabled,
+        lastDigestAt: lastDigest || null,
+      },
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden' } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * PUT /api/monitoring/settings
+ */
+export async function updateMonitoringSettings(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const { alertEmail, digestEnabled } = req.body || {};
+    if (typeof alertEmail === 'string') {
+      // Email-Validierung minimal: muss @ enthalten oder leer sein
+      if (alertEmail !== '' && !alertEmail.includes('@')) {
+        res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültige E-Mail-Adresse' } as ApiResponse);
+        return;
+      }
+      await appSettingService.setSetting('monitoringAlertEmail', alertEmail);
+    }
+    if (typeof digestEnabled === 'boolean') {
+      await appSettingService.setSetting('monitoringDigestEnabled', digestEnabled ? 'true' : 'false');
+    }
+    res.json({ success: true, message: 'Einstellungen gespeichert' } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Speichern' } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * POST /api/monitoring/test-alert
+ * Versendet eine Test-Alert-Mail an die konfigurierte Adresse.
+ */
+export async function testAlert(_req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const alertEmail = await appSettingService.getSetting('monitoringAlertEmail');
+    if (!alertEmail) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Keine Alert-E-Mail konfiguriert',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const result = await sendAlertEmail(alertEmail, {
+      subject: '[OpenCRM] Test-Alert',
+      events: [{
+        type: 'SUSPICIOUS' as any,
+        severity: 'INFO' as any,
+        message: 'Dies ist eine Test-Mail vom Monitoring-System. Alles in Ordnung.',
+        createdAt: new Date(),
+      } as any],
+      isDigest: false,
+    });
+    if (result.success) {
+      res.json({ success: true, message: `Test-Alert an ${alertEmail} versendet` } as ApiResponse);
+    } else {
+      res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: result.error || 'Versand fehlgeschlagen' } as ApiResponse);
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Test-Alert fehlgeschlagen',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * DELETE /api/monitoring/events
+ * Löscht alle SecurityEvents (oder optional nur älter als ?olderThanDays).
+ * Alert-versendete CRITICAL-Events werden vorher noch geloggt, damit der
+ * Audit-Trail erhalten bleibt.
+ */
+export async function clearEvents(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const olderThanDays = req.query.olderThanDays
+      ? parseInt(req.query.olderThanDays as string)
+      : undefined;
+
+    const where: any = {};
+    if (olderThanDays && olderThanDays > 0) {
+      const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - olderThanDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+      where.createdAt = { lt: cutoff };
+    }
+
+    const result = await prisma.securityEvent.deleteMany({ where });
+
+    // Audit-Spur: Wer hat geleert
+    const user = (req as any).user;
+    await prisma.securityEvent.create({
+      data: {
+        type: 'PERMISSION_CHANGED',
+        severity: 'INFO',
+        message: `Security-Log geleert: ${result.count} Einträge gelöscht${olderThanDays ? ` (älter als ${olderThanDays} Tage)` : ''}`,
+        userId: user?.userId || null,
+        userEmail: user?.email || null,
+        ipAddress: req.ip || 'unknown',
+        endpoint: 'DELETE /api/monitoring/events',
+      },
+    });
+
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      message: `${result.count} Events gelöscht`,
+      data: { deletedCount: result.count },
+    } as any);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('clearEvents error:', error);
+    res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Löschen fehlgeschlagen' } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * POST /api/monitoring/run-digest (manueller Trigger für den Hourly-Digest)
+ */
+export async function runDigestNow(_req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const result = await sendDigest({ force: true });
+    res.json({ success: true, data: result } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Digest fehlgeschlagen',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}

backend/src/controllers/pdfTemplate.controller.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Response } from 'express';
 import { AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 import * as pdfTemplateService from '../services/pdfTemplate.service.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
+import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 export async function getTemplates(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ export async function getRequiredInputs(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
     const templateId = parseInt(req.params.id);
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const inputs = await pdfTemplateService.getRequiredInputs(templateId, contractId);
     res.json({ success: true, data: inputs });
   } catch (error) {
@@ -160,6 +162,7 @@ export async function generatePdf(req: AuthRequest, res: Response) {
   try {
     const templateId = parseInt(req.params.id);
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.contractId);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
 
     // Extras aus Body (POST) oder Query-Parametern (GET)
     const stressfreiEmailId = req.body?.stressfreiEmailId || req.query.stressfreiEmailId;

backend/src/controllers/provider.controller.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,20 @@ export async function getProviders(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 
 export async function getProvider(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const provider = await providerService.getProviderById(parseInt(req.params.id));
+    // `req.params.id` ist Pfad-Segment – bei /api/providers/email landet
+    // hier der String "email", den parseInt zu NaN macht. Ohne Validierung
+    // fuhr Prisma dann gegen `WHERE id = NaN` und warf 500.
+    // Pentest 2026-05-20, 29.5: explizit 404 statt 500. Andere Sub-Routes
+    // wie /api/providers/<id>/tariffs greifen weiter wie gehabt.
+    const id = parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(id) || id < 1) {
+      res.status(404).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Anbieter nicht gefunden',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const provider = await providerService.getProviderById(id);
     if (!provider) {
       res.status(404).json({
         success: false,

backend/src/controllers/rateLimitAdmin.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+import { Response } from 'express';
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import { AuthRequest, ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
+import { loginRateLimiter, passwordResetRateLimiter } from '../middleware/rateLimit.js';
+import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
+
+const LOGIN_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+
+type ActiveLock = {
+  ipAddress: string;
+  email: string | null;    // null = Passwort-Reset oder Login ohne Email
+  lastHit: Date;
+  hitCount: number;
+  lastEndpoint: string | null;
+  limiters: string[];       // 'login' / 'password-reset'
+};
+
+function lockKey(ip: string, email: string | null): string {
+  return `${ip}|${(email || '').toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Listet aktive Sperren als (IP, Email)-Tupel. Jedes Tupel ist ein eigener
+ * Bucket im Limiter – Reset gilt exakt für dieses Paar.
+ */
+export async function getActiveRateLimits(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const since = new Date(Date.now() - LOGIN_WINDOW_MS);
+    const events = await prisma.securityEvent.findMany({
+      where: { type: 'RATE_LIMIT_HIT', createdAt: { gte: since } },
+      orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
+      select: {
+        ipAddress: true,
+        userEmail: true,
+        endpoint: true,
+        createdAt: true,
+        details: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    const byKey = new Map<string, ActiveLock>();
+    for (const ev of events) {
+      const ip = ev.ipAddress || 'unknown';
+      const email = (ev.userEmail || '').toLowerCase() || null;
+      const limiter = (ev.details as any)?.limiter ?? 'unknown';
+      const key = lockKey(ip, email);
+      const existing = byKey.get(key);
+      if (existing) {
+        existing.hitCount += 1;
+        if (!existing.limiters.includes(limiter)) existing.limiters.push(limiter);
+      } else {
+        byKey.set(key, {
+          ipAddress: ip,
+          email,
+          lastHit: ev.createdAt,
+          hitCount: 1,
+          lastEndpoint: ev.endpoint,
+          limiters: [limiter],
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Bereits manuell freigegebene aus der Liste werfen. Reset-Audit-Logs
+    // nutzen resourceId = "<ip>|<email>" (gleicher Schlüssel wie Bucket).
+    const candidates = Array.from(byKey.entries()).map(([k, e]) => ({
+      mapKey: k,
+      resourceId: k,
+      lastHit: e.lastHit,
+    }));
+    if (candidates.length > 0) {
+      const recentResets = await prisma.auditLog.findMany({
+        where: {
+          resourceType: 'RateLimit',
+          resourceId: { in: candidates.map((c) => c.resourceId) },
+          createdAt: { gte: since },
+        },
+        select: { resourceId: true, createdAt: true },
+        orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
+      });
+      const resetMap = new Map<string, Date>();
+      for (const r of recentResets) {
+        if (r.resourceId && !resetMap.has(r.resourceId)) resetMap.set(r.resourceId, r.createdAt);
+      }
+      for (const c of candidates) {
+        const reset = resetMap.get(c.resourceId);
+        if (reset && reset >= c.lastHit) byKey.delete(c.mapKey);
+      }
+    }
+
+    const list = Array.from(byKey.values()).sort(
+      (a, b) => b.lastHit.getTime() - a.lastHit.getTime(),
+    );
+    res.json({ success: true, data: list } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('getActiveRateLimits error:', error);
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: 'Fehler beim Laden der aktiven Rate-Limits',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reset für ein konkretes (IP, Email)-Tupel. Body MUSS ipAddress enthalten
+ * + optional email. Bei fehlender Email wird `<ip>|<no-email>` reseted
+ * (für Login-Versuche mit leerem Body). Für Passwort-Reset-Limit wird der
+ * IP-only-Key (alter Stil) zusätzlich reseted.
+ */
+export async function resetRateLimit(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const ip = (req.body?.ipAddress || '').toString().trim();
+    const email = (req.body?.email || '').toString().trim().toLowerCase();
+
+    if (!ip) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'IP-Adresse erforderlich',
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Login-Tuple-Bucket: `${ip}|${email}` bzw. `${ip}|<no-email>`
+    const loginKey = email ? `${ip}|${email}` : `${ip}|<no-email>`;
+    await (loginRateLimiter as any).resetKey?.(loginKey);
+
+    // Passwort-Reset-Limit ist (noch) IP-only – auch zurücksetzen
+    await (passwordResetRateLimiter as any).resetKey?.(ip);
+
+    // Audit-Resource-ID = der Bucket-Key, damit getActiveRateLimits den
+    // Eintrag aus der Anzeige filtern kann.
+    const audited = `${ip}|${email || ''}`;
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'UPDATE',
+      resourceType: 'RateLimit',
+      resourceId: audited,
+      label: email
+        ? `Rate-Limit für (IP ${ip}, Email ${email}) manuell freigegeben`
+        : `Rate-Limit für IP ${ip} manuell freigegeben`,
+    });
+
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      message: email
+        ? `Rate-Limit für (${ip}, ${email}) freigegeben`
+        : `Rate-Limit für ${ip} freigegeben`,
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('resetRateLimit error:', error);
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: 'Fehler beim Zurücksetzen des Rate-Limits',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}

backend/src/controllers/stressfreiEmail.controller.ts

@@ -68,9 +68,11 @@ export async function createEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
-export async function updateEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function updateEmail(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const email = await stressfreiEmailService.updateEmail(parseInt(req.params.id), req.body);
+    const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
+    const email = await stressfreiEmailService.updateEmail(emailId, req.body);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'UPDATE', resourceType: 'StressfreiEmail',
       resourceId: email.id.toString(),
@@ -85,9 +87,10 @@ export async function updateEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
-export async function deleteEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function deleteEmail(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
     await stressfreiEmailService.deleteEmail(emailId);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'DELETE', resourceType: 'StressfreiEmail',
@@ -103,9 +106,50 @@ export async function deleteEmail(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
-export async function resetPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+export async function syncForwarding(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
-    const result = await stressfreiEmailService.resetMailboxPassword(parseInt(req.params.id));
+    const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
+
+    const result = await stressfreiEmailService.syncForwardingForEmail(emailId);
+    if (!result.success) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: result.error } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const labelParts = [`Weiterleitungen: ${(result.forwardTargets || []).join(', ')}`];
+    if (result.passwordReset) labelParts.push('Mailbox-Passwort am Provider neu gesetzt');
+
+    await logChange({
+      req,
+      action: 'UPDATE',
+      resourceType: 'StressfreiEmail',
+      resourceId: emailId.toString(),
+      label: `Stressfrei-Sync: ${labelParts.join(' | ')}`,
+    });
+
+    res.json({
+      success: true,
+      data: {
+        forwardTargets: result.forwardTargets,
+        customerEmail: result.customerEmail,
+        passwordReset: result.passwordReset,
+      },
+      message: 'Weiterleitungen aktualisiert',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(500).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Synchronisieren der Weiterleitungen',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
+export async function resetPassword(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const emailId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessStressfreiEmail(req, res, emailId))) return;
+    const result = await stressfreiEmailService.resetMailboxPassword(emailId);
     if (!result.success) {
       res.status(400).json({
         success: false,

backend/src/controllers/user.controller.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import * as userService from '../services/user.service.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
 import { ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
-import { pickUserCreate, pickUserUpdate } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
+import { pickUserCreate, pickUserUpdate, isValidEmail } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
+import { validatePasswordComplexity, STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH } from '../utils/passwordGenerator.js';
 
 // Users
 export async function getUsers(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
@@ -51,7 +52,24 @@ export async function getUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 export async function createUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     // Whitelist: nur erlaubte Felder aus req.body übernehmen (Mass-Assignment-Schutz)
-    const user = await userService.createUser(pickUserCreate(req.body) as any);
+    const data = pickUserCreate(req.body) as any;
+    // Email-Format prüfen, sonst landet "x@y\nBcc:..." in der DB
+    // (Pentest 29.4 – SMTP-Header-Injection).
+    if (!isValidEmail(data?.email) || !data?.email) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (data?.password) {
+      const c = validatePasswordComplexity(data.password, { minLength: STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH });
+      if (!c.ok) {
+        res.status(400).json({
+          success: false,
+          error: 'Passwort erfüllt Mindestanforderungen nicht: ' + c.errors.join(', '),
+        } as ApiResponse);
+        return;
+      }
+    }
+    const user = await userService.createUser(data);
     await logChange({
       req, action: 'CREATE', resourceType: 'User',
       resourceId: user.id.toString(),
@@ -69,11 +87,53 @@ export async function createUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
 export async function updateUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const userId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    // `permissions` und `password` darf der generische Update nicht
+    // entgegennehmen. Vorher landeten sie auf dem Floor (Whitelist-Drop),
+    // der Caller bekam aber 200 zurück und glaubte fälschlich, die Werte
+    // wären übernommen worden. Stattdessen sofort 400, damit Tooling /
+    // Client den Fehler sieht. (Pentest 2026-05-20)
+    //   - permissions kommen aus Rollen (PUT roleIds bzw. die DSGVO-/
+    //     Developer-Checkboxen) und können nicht direkt am User hängen.
+    //   - password wird über POST /users/:id/password gesetzt
+    //     (eigene Komplexitäts-Validierung + Audit-Trail).
+    const body = req.body || {};
+    const forbidden = ['permissions', 'password', 'passwordHash'];
+    const offending = forbidden.filter((k) => k in body);
+    if (offending.length > 0) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: `Felder nicht erlaubt: ${offending.join(', ')}. ` +
+          (offending.includes('permissions')
+            ? 'Permissions werden über roleIds / hasGdprAccess / hasDeveloperAccess gesteuert. '
+            : '') +
+          (offending.includes('password') || offending.includes('passwordHash')
+            ? `Passwort über POST /users/${userId}/password setzen.`
+            : ''),
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
     // Whitelist: nur erlaubte Felder aus req.body übernehmen (Mass-Assignment-Schutz)
     const data = pickUserUpdate(req.body);
+    // Email-Validierung gegen SMTP-Header-Injection (Pentest 29.4).
+    // null/leer ist OK (Email darf optional sein), nur falsches Format prüfen.
+    if (data?.email !== undefined && !isValidEmail(data.email)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiges E-Mail-Format' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
 
-    // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit
+    // Vorherigen Stand laden für Audit – inkl. Rollen, damit hasGdprAccess /
-    const before = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
+    // hasDeveloperAccess (versteckte Rollen) korrekt verglichen werden.
+    const beforeUser = await prisma.user.findUnique({
+      where: { id: userId },
+      include: { roles: { include: { role: true } } },
+    });
+    const before = beforeUser
+      ? {
+          ...beforeUser,
+          hasGdprAccess: beforeUser.roles.some((ur) => ur.role.name === 'DSGVO'),
+          hasDeveloperAccess: beforeUser.roles.some((ur) => ur.role.name === 'Developer'),
+        }
+      : null;
 
     const user = await userService.updateUser(userId, data as any);
     if (user) {
@@ -82,6 +142,7 @@ export async function updateUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
         const changes: Record<string, { von: unknown; nach: unknown }> = {};
         const fieldLabels: Record<string, string> = {
           email: 'E-Mail', firstName: 'Vorname', lastName: 'Nachname', isActive: 'Aktiv',
+          hasGdprAccess: 'DSGVO-Zugriff', hasDeveloperAccess: 'Entwicklerzugriff',
         };
         for (const [key, newVal] of Object.entries(data)) {
           if (['id', 'createdAt', 'updatedAt'].includes(key)) continue;
@@ -121,6 +182,45 @@ export async function updateUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
+// Admin setzt das Passwort eines anderen Users zurück. Separat vom
+// generischen Update damit der Vorgang explizit auditiert wird und nicht
+// versehentlich über Mass-Assignment passieren kann.
+// Pentest Runde 12 (2026-05-18) MITTEL.
+export async function setUserPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const userId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    const { password } = req.body || {};
+    if (!password || typeof password !== 'string') {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Passwort erforderlich' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const c = validatePasswordComplexity(password, { minLength: STAFF_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH });
+    if (!c.ok) {
+      res.status(400).json({
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Passwort erfüllt Mindestanforderungen nicht: ' + c.errors.join(', '),
+      } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    const user = await userService.updateUser(userId, { password } as any);
+    if (!user) {
+      res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Benutzer nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
+      return;
+    }
+    await logChange({
+      req, action: 'UPDATE', resourceType: 'User',
+      resourceId: user.id.toString(),
+      label: `Passwort für Benutzer ${user.firstName} ${user.lastName} (${user.email}) durch Admin gesetzt`,
+    });
+    res.json({ success: true, message: 'Passwort gesetzt' } as ApiResponse);
+  } catch (error) {
+    res.status(400).json({
+      success: false,
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Fehler beim Setzen des Passworts',
+    } as ApiResponse);
+  }
+}
+
 export async function deleteUser(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
   try {
     const userId = parseInt(req.params.id);

backend/src/index.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,34 @@
 import express from 'express';
+import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
 import cors from 'cors';
 import helmet from 'helmet';
 import path from 'path';
 import dotenv from 'dotenv';
+import dotenvExpand from 'dotenv-expand';
+
+// .env-Dateien laden – Root-.env hat Priorität (zentrale Konfiguration für
+// Dev + Docker), backend/.env als Legacy-Fallback. Im Container sind
+// Variablen schon via env_file/environment gesetzt – dotenv überschreibt
+// existierende process.env-Werte nicht.
+// __dirname zeigt auf src/ (dev via tsx) oder dist/ (build). In beiden Fällen
+// liegt Root /.env zwei Ebenen darüber.
+//
+// dotenvExpand löst ${VAR}-Substitution auf, sodass z.B.
+// DATABASE_URL=mysql://${DB_USER}:${DB_PASSWORD}@${DB_HOST}:${DB_PORT}/${DB_NAME}
+// dynamisch aus den Komponenten zusammengebaut wird (kein Doppel-Pflegen).
+dotenvExpand.expand(dotenv.config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../../.env') }));
+dotenvExpand.expand(dotenv.config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../.env') }));
+dotenvExpand.expand(dotenv.config());
+
+// Fallback: wenn DATABASE_URL nicht direkt gesetzt ist (oder Substitution
+// nicht funktioniert hat), aus den DB_*-Komponenten zusammenbauen.
+if (!process.env.DATABASE_URL && process.env.DB_USER && process.env.DB_PASSWORD && process.env.DB_NAME) {
+  const u = encodeURIComponent(process.env.DB_USER);
+  const p = encodeURIComponent(process.env.DB_PASSWORD);
+  const h = process.env.DB_HOST || 'localhost';
+  const port = process.env.DB_PORT || '3306';
+  process.env.DATABASE_URL = `mysql://${u}:${p}@${h}:${port}/${process.env.DB_NAME}`;
+}
 
 import authRoutes from './routes/auth.routes.js';
 import customerRoutes from './routes/customer.routes.js';
@@ -34,11 +60,14 @@ import emailLogRoutes from './routes/emailLog.routes.js';
 import pdfTemplateRoutes from './routes/pdfTemplate.routes.js';
 import birthdayRoutes from './routes/birthday.routes.js';
 import factoryDefaultsRoutes from './routes/factoryDefaults.routes.js';
+import { downloadFile } from './controllers/fileDownload.controller.js';
 import { startBirthdayScheduler } from './services/birthdayScheduler.service.js';
+import { startContractStatusScheduler } from './services/contractStatusScheduler.service.js';
+import { startSecurityMonitorScheduler } from './services/securityAlert.service.js';
+import monitoringRoutes from './routes/monitoring.routes.js';
 import { auditContextMiddleware } from './middleware/auditContext.js';
 import { auditMiddleware } from './middleware/audit.js';
-
+import { authenticate } from './middleware/auth.js';
-dotenv.config();
 
 // ==================== SECURITY: Pflicht-Umgebungsvariablen prüfen ====================
 if (!process.env.JWT_SECRET || process.env.JWT_SECRET.length < 32) {
@@ -55,14 +84,124 @@ if (!process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY.length !== 64) {
 const app = express();
 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;
 
+// Trust-Proxy-Konfiguration für `req.ip` und `X-Forwarded-For`.
+//
+// Zwei Szenarien:
+// 1) **HTTPS_ENABLED=true** (Produktion mit vorgelagertem TLS-Proxy auf
+//    EIGENER Box, z.B. Nginx Proxy Manager): `trust proxy = 1` vertraut
+//    genau einem Hop → req.ip = echter Client (nicht der Proxy).
+//    Voraussetzung: Backend ist NICHT direkt aus dem Internet erreichbar,
+//    sonst könnte ein Direkt-Connect X-Forwarded-For faken und den
+//    Rate-Limiter / Security-Monitor umgehen. Bei NPM-Setup ist das
+//    durch das Docker-Network + nicht-veröffentlichten Backend-Port
+//    gewährleistet.
+// 2) **HTTPS_ENABLED=false** (lokales Dev oder direkter http://ip:port-
+//    Zugriff): `loopback` reicht – kein vertrauenswürdiger Hop davor.
+//
+// Vor dem Fix stand das auf `'loopback'` was im Produktiv-NPM-Setup
+// IMMER die Proxy-IP statt der Client-IP lieferte → Rate-Limit und
+// IDOR-Threshold-Detection sahen alle Angriffe als von „einem" Client.
+const trustProxyValue = process.env.HTTPS_ENABLED === 'true' ? 1 : 'loopback';
+app.set('trust proxy', trustProxyValue);
+
 // ==================== SECURITY MIDDLEWARE ====================
 
-// HTTP Security Headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, etc.)
+// HTTP Security Headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, CSP, ...)
+//
+// CSP ist konservativ aber SPA-tauglich:
+//   - script-src 'self'        → keine externen Skripte, keine inline-Scripts
+//                                 (Vite baut Module-Skripte zu separaten Files,
+//                                 die sind 'self')
+//   - style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' → Tailwind/inline-Styles brauchen das
+//                                        (sicheres Trade-off; XSS via CSS ist
+//                                        marginal vs Lock-Out gegen die UI)
+//   - img-src self/data/blob   → base64-Avatare + blob-URLs für PDFs/Downloads
+//   - font-src self/data       → eingebettete Fonts
+//   - connect-src 'self'       → API + WebSocket nur zur eigenen Origin
+//   - frame-ancestors 'none'   → Clickjacking-Schutz (ersetzt X-Frame-Options)
+//   - object-src 'none'        → keine Flash/<object>/<embed>-Embeds
+//   - base-uri 'self'          → keine <base>-Hijacking-Tricks
+//   - form-action 'self'       → POST-Targets nur auf eigene Origin
+// Permissions-Policy: schaltet Browser-APIs aus, die wir nicht brauchen.
+// Verhindert, dass eingeschleustes JS Zugriff auf Kamera/Mikro/GPS/Payment etc.
+// bekommt. clipboard-write ist 'self' für die CopyButton-Komponenten,
+// fullscreen 'self' falls jemand mal eine Vorschau in Vollbild öffnet.
+app.use((_req, res, next) => {
+  res.setHeader(
+    'Permissions-Policy',
+    [
+      'accelerometer=()',
+      'ambient-light-sensor=()',
+      'autoplay=()',
+      'battery=()',
+      'camera=()',
+      'clipboard-read=()',
+      'clipboard-write=(self)',
+      'cross-origin-isolated=()',
+      'display-capture=()',
+      'encrypted-media=()',
+      'fullscreen=(self)',
+      'geolocation=()',
+      'gyroscope=()',
+      'hid=()',
+      'idle-detection=()',
+      'magnetometer=()',
+      'microphone=()',
+      'midi=()',
+      'payment=()',
+      'picture-in-picture=()',
+      'publickey-credentials-get=()',
+      'screen-wake-lock=()',
+      'sync-xhr=()',
+      'usb=()',
+      'web-share=()',
+      'xr-spatial-tracking=()',
+    ].join(', '),
+  );
+  next();
+});
+
+// HTTPS-only-Header (HSTS + upgrade-insecure-requests) nur setzen, wenn
+// wirklich TLS davor läuft – sonst sperrt sich die App auf direkt-via-IP-
+// Deployments (Browser versucht /assets/* via https zu laden → SSL-Error).
+// Aktivieren mit HTTPS_ENABLED=true in der .env, sobald ein TLS-Proxy
+// (Caddy/Traefik/Nginx) vor OpenCRM steht.
+const httpsEnabled = process.env.HTTPS_ENABLED === 'true';
+
 app.use(
   helmet({
-    // CSP ausschalten – wird bei SPA schwierig, frontend setzt eigene CSP via meta
+    contentSecurityPolicy: {
-    contentSecurityPolicy: false,
+      useDefaults: true,
-    // Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: "same-site" für SPA mit gleicher Origin
+      directives: {
+        'default-src': ["'self'"],
+        'script-src': ["'self'"],
+        'style-src': ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
+        'img-src': ["'self'", 'data:', 'blob:'],
+        'font-src': ["'self'", 'data:'],
+        'connect-src': ["'self'"],
+        // Explizit gesetzt obwohl Fallback auf default-src/script-src greift –
+        // ZAP markiert sonst "No-Fallback-Direktiven" als CSP-Lücke.
+        'worker-src': ["'self'"],
+        'manifest-src': ["'self'"],
+        'media-src': ["'self'"],
+        // 'self': eigene App darf eigene Resourcen in iframes embeden (z.B. die
+        // annotierte PDF-Vorschau in der Auftragsvorlagen-Konfiguration).
+        // 'none' würde sogar same-origin blocken und damit die UI brechen.
+        // Externe Sites bleiben weiterhin gesperrt.
+        'frame-ancestors': ["'self'"],
+        'object-src': ["'none'"],
+        'base-uri': ["'self'"],
+        'form-action': ["'self'"],
+        // useDefaults bringt 'upgrade-insecure-requests' selbst mit – explizit
+        // auf null setzen entfernt es aus dem Header (helmet-API).
+        'upgrade-insecure-requests': httpsEnabled ? [] : null,
+      },
+    },
+    // HSTS NIE in Helmet senden – der vorgelagerte TLS-Reverse-Proxy
+    // (Nginx Proxy Manager) macht das bereits. Doppelter Header verletzt
+    // RFC 6797 (Multiple Header Entries) und wird von ZAP angemahnt.
+    // HTTPS_ENABLED-Flag bleibt für upgrade-insecure-requests (CSP) relevant.
+    strictTransportSecurity: false,
     crossOriginResourcePolicy: { policy: 'same-site' },
   }),
 );
@@ -83,13 +222,115 @@ app.use(
 
 // JSON-Body-Limit: 5 MB (Uploads laufen über multer, brauchen kein json())
 app.use(express.json({ limit: '5mb' }));
+// Cookie-Parser: wird für den httpOnly-Refresh-Token-Cookie gebraucht
+// (POST /api/auth/refresh liest ihn aus req.cookies).
+app.use(cookieParser());
 
 // Audit-Logging Middleware (DSGVO-konform)
 app.use(auditContextMiddleware);
 app.use(auditMiddleware);
 
-// Statische Dateien für Uploads
+// Datei-Download mit Per-File-Ownership-Check (ersetzt das alte
-app.use('/api/uploads', express.static(path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads')));
+// `/api/uploads/*` express.static).
+// Frontend-URLs gehen jetzt über GET /api/files/download?path=/uploads/...
+// Der Controller mappt den Pfad auf eine Resource (BankCard, Contract, etc.)
+// und prüft canAccessCustomer/canAccessContract – damit kann ein Portal-Kunde
+// nur seine eigenen Dateien laden, selbst wenn er fremde Filenames kennt.
+//
+// Kompatibilität: das alte /api/uploads/* bleibt erhalten, leitet aber jeden
+// Request über denselben Owner-Check (kein freier static-Handler mehr).
+
+// Authentifizierter Datei-Download mit Per-File-Ownership-Check.
+// Akzeptiert Pfade wie /uploads/bank-cards/<filename> – egal ob als
+// Query-Parameter oder im Pfad-Suffix. Beide gehen über denselben Handler,
+// der DB-basiert prüft, ob der eingeloggte User die Resource sehen darf.
+app.get('/api/files/download', authenticate as any, downloadFile as any);
+// Backwards-compatibility shim: `/api/uploads/*` sieht weiter aus wie früher
+// für Bestandsclients/Bookmarks, ruft aber denselben Owner-Check-Handler.
+app.get('/api/uploads/*', authenticate as any, (req, res, next) => {
+  // Pfad in Query-Param umschreiben, dann an downloadFile weiterreichen
+  req.query.path = req.originalUrl.replace(/^\/api/, '').split('?')[0];
+  return (downloadFile as any)(req, res, next);
+});
+
+// Cache-Control für alle API-Responses: `no-store` verhindert, dass Shared
+// Caches (CDN/Reverse-Proxy/Browser-History) JSON mit sensiblen Daten
+// vorhalten. Statische Frontend-Assets unter /assets/* sind weiter cacheable
+// (siehe express.static mit immutable weiter unten).
+app.use('/api', (_req, res, next) => {
+  res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+  next();
+});
+
+// Globaler Sanitizer für Fehler-Antworten: bekannte ORM-/Stack-Trace-Muster
+// in `error`/`details`-Strings ersetzen, bevor sie an den Client gehen.
+// So leakten frühere Builds bei z.B. `PUT /api/users/99999` rohe
+// Prisma-Internals wie "Invalid `prisma.user.update()` invocation:
+// Record to update not found" (Pentest Runde 11 M3). Der Original-Text
+// landet weiterhin im Server-Log.
+const ORM_LEAK_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
+  /Invalid `prisma\./i,
+  /PrismaClient/i,
+  /^\s*at\s+[A-Za-z]+\s+\(/m, // Stack-Frame
+  /at\s+[A-Za-z][\w.<>]*\s*\([^)]*:\d+:\d+\)/, // file:line:col
+  // JS-Runtime-Fehler – Pentest Runde 12 (2026-05-18): "Cannot read
+  // properties of undefined (reading 'substring')" leakte aus POST
+  // /contracts. Solche Texte verraten Implementierungs-Details.
+  /^TypeError\b/i,
+  /^ReferenceError\b/i,
+  /^SyntaxError\b/i,
+  /^RangeError\b/i,
+  /Cannot read propert(y|ies) of (undefined|null)/i,
+  /is not a function/i,
+  /is not defined$/i,
+];
+function sanitizeErrorString(s: string): string {
+  if (!s) return s;
+  for (const re of ORM_LEAK_PATTERNS) {
+    if (re.test(s)) {
+      console.error('[orm-leak-guard] Maskierte Fehlermeldung:', s.slice(0, 300));
+      return 'Operation fehlgeschlagen';
+    }
+  }
+  return s;
+}
+app.use('/api', (_req, res, next) => {
+  const originalJson = res.json.bind(res);
+  res.json = (body: any) => {
+    if (body && typeof body === 'object') {
+      if (typeof body.error === 'string') {
+        body.error = sanitizeErrorString(body.error);
+      }
+      if (typeof body.details === 'string') {
+        body.details = sanitizeErrorString(body.details);
+      }
+    }
+    return originalJson(body);
+  };
+  next();
+});
+
+// Numerische ID-Parameter strikt validieren. parseInt('6abc') liefert 6, was
+// dazu führt, dass `/api/customers/6abc` als `/api/customers/6` interpretiert
+// wurde – kein Auth-Bypass (Prisma fängt SQL-Injection), aber fehlende Input-
+// Validierung. Pentest Runde 7 (2026-05-17), LOW.
+//
+// `app.param()` greift nicht auf in Sub-Router gemounteten Routes, deshalb
+// machen wir es als Pfad-Heuristik. Geblockt wird NUR `^\d+[a-zA-Z]+$` –
+// reine Ziffern gefolgt von reinen Buchstaben (`6abc`, `12foo`). UUIDs wie
+// `3018c9b9-b337-4c9a-a402-b47872f8ddae` (Consent-Hash) und Datumsstrings
+// `2024-05-17` haben Bindestriche / gemischten Aufbau und werden korrekt
+// nicht geblockt.
+const TRUNCATED_ID_PATTERN = /^\d+[a-zA-Z]+$/;
+app.use('/api', (req, res, next) => {
+  for (const seg of req.path.split('/')) {
+    if (seg.length > 0 && TRUNCATED_ID_PATTERN.test(seg)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültige ID im URL-Pfad' });
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  next();
+});
 
 // Öffentliche Routes (OHNE Authentifizierung)
 app.use('/api/public/consent', consentPublicRoutes);
@@ -124,9 +365,15 @@ app.use('/api/email-logs', emailLogRoutes);
 app.use('/api/pdf-templates', pdfTemplateRoutes);
 app.use('/api/birthdays', birthdayRoutes);
 app.use('/api/factory-defaults', factoryDefaultsRoutes);
+app.use('/api/monitoring', monitoringRoutes);
 
-// Health check
+// Health check – BEWUSST ohne Auth (Container-Healthcheck und Reverse-Proxy
-app.get('/api/health', (req, res) => {
+// pingen das ohne Bearer-Token). Antwort enthält absichtlich nur statisch
+// "ok" + Timestamp, keine Version, kein DB-Status, kein Hostname – damit
+// auch unauth Caller keine internen Infos einsammeln können. Pentest
+// 2026-05-20 (INFO): kein Auth → akzeptiert, Antwort liefert nichts
+// Sensibles.
+app.get('/api/health', (_req, res) => {
   res.json({ status: 'ok', timestamp: new Date().toISOString() });
 });
 
@@ -134,8 +381,29 @@ app.get('/api/health', (req, res) => {
 if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
   const publicPath = path.join(process.cwd(), 'public');
 
-  // Serve static files
+  // Vite-Build-Assets (z.B. /assets/index-abc123.js) haben einen Content-Hash
-  app.use(express.static(publicPath));
+  // im Dateinamen – das Image ist also versioniert. Daher kann der Browser
+  // sie für ein Jahr aggressiv cachen und muss nicht revalidieren.
+  app.use(
+    '/assets',
+    express.static(path.join(publicPath, 'assets'), {
+      maxAge: '1y',
+      immutable: true,
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // Rest des Frontends (index.html selbst, vite.svg, robots.txt, sitemap.xml).
+  // express.static findet index.html bei GET /, deshalb MUSS hier das gleiche
+  // no-store-Verhalten greifen wie im SPA-Fallback weiter unten – sonst
+  // serviert der erste Static-Handler / mit dem express-Default `max-age=0`,
+  // bevor der Fallback überhaupt greift, und der Browser cached die alte SPA.
+  app.use(
+    express.static(publicPath, {
+      setHeaders: (res) => {
+        res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store, must-revalidate');
+      },
+    }),
+  );
 
   // SPA fallback: serve index.html for all non-API routes
   app.get('*', (req, res, next) => {
@@ -143,18 +411,37 @@ if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
     if (req.path.startsWith('/api')) {
       return next();
     }
+    // SPA-Wurzel darf NIE gecached werden – sonst sieht der Browser nach einem
+    // Deploy weiterhin die alte index.html mit alten Asset-Hashes.
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store, must-revalidate');
     res.sendFile(path.join(publicPath, 'index.html'));
   });
 }
 
 // Error handling
-app.use((err: Error, req: express.Request, res: express.Response, next: express.NextFunction) => {
+// body-parser wirft 413 (PayloadTooLargeError) bzw. 400 (SyntaxError) mit einem
+// `status`-Feld. Ohne Respektierung werden legitime Client-Fehler als 500
+// kaschiert und landen als "Interner Serverfehler" beim User.
+app.use((err: Error & { status?: number; type?: string }, req: express.Request, res: express.Response, next: express.NextFunction) => {
   console.error(err.stack);
-  res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Interner Serverfehler' });
+  const status = typeof err.status === 'number' && err.status >= 400 && err.status < 600 ? err.status : 500;
+  let message = 'Interner Serverfehler';
+  if (status === 413) message = 'Anfrage zu groß';
+  else if (status === 400 && (err.type === 'entity.parse.failed' || err instanceof SyntaxError)) {
+    message = 'Ungültiges JSON';
+  }
+  res.status(status).json({ success: false, error: message });
 });
 
-app.listen(PORT, () => {
+// Listen-Adresse: in Production typischerweise 127.0.0.1 (nur lokaler
-  console.log(`Server läuft auf Port ${PORT}`);
+// Reverse-Proxy soll connecten dürfen). LISTEN_ADDR per Env überschreibbar.
+const LISTEN_ADDR = process.env.LISTEN_ADDR
+  || (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? '127.0.0.1' : '0.0.0.0');
+
+app.listen(PORT as number, LISTEN_ADDR, () => {
+  console.log(`Server läuft auf ${LISTEN_ADDR}:${PORT}`);
   // Hintergrund-Scheduler (Geburtstagsgrüße etc.) starten
   startBirthdayScheduler();
+  startContractStatusScheduler();
+  startSecurityMonitorScheduler();
 });

backend/src/lib/prisma.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,22 @@
 import { PrismaClient, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
 import { setBeforeValues, setAfterValues } from '../middleware/auditContext.js';
 
+// DATABASE_URL aus DB_*-Komponenten bauen, falls nicht explizit gesetzt.
+// Der entrypoint.sh macht das ebenfalls (für den Server-Start). Aber bei
+// `docker exec opencrm-app npx tsx prisma/<script>.ts` läuft eine neue
+// Shell ohne diese exportierte Variable – die DB_*-Vars sind aus dem
+// docker-compose.yml vererbt, DATABASE_URL aber nicht. Damit alle
+// Wartungsskripte (reset-admin-password, cleanup-xss-...) und Server
+// dieselbe Logik nutzen, machen wir es einmal zentral hier.
+if (!process.env.DATABASE_URL && process.env.DB_USER && process.env.DB_PASSWORD && process.env.DB_NAME) {
+  const u = encodeURIComponent(process.env.DB_USER);
+  const p = encodeURIComponent(process.env.DB_PASSWORD);
+  const h = process.env.DB_HOST || 'db';
+  const port = process.env.DB_PORT || '3306';
+  const n = process.env.DB_NAME;
+  process.env.DATABASE_URL = `mysql://${u}:${p}@${h}:${port}/${n}`;
+}
+
 // Modelle die für Before/After-Tracking relevant sind
 const AUDITED_MODELS = [
   'Customer',

backend/src/middleware/auth.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
 import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import { AuthRequest, JwtPayload } from '../types/index.js';
+import { emit as emitSecurityEvent } from '../services/securityMonitor.service.js';
 
 export async function authenticate(
   req: AuthRequest,
@@ -12,12 +13,15 @@ export async function authenticate(
 
   // Token aus Header oder Query-Parameter (für Downloads)
   let token: string | null = null;
+  let tokenSource: 'header' | 'query' | null = null;
 
   if (authHeader && authHeader.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
     token = authHeader.split(' ')[1];
+    tokenSource = 'header';
   } else if (req.query.token && typeof req.query.token === 'string') {
     // Fallback für Downloads: Token als Query-Parameter
     token = req.query.token;
+    tokenSource = 'query';
   }
 
   if (!token) {
@@ -27,7 +31,32 @@ export async function authenticate(
 
   try {
     // JWT_SECRET wird beim Server-Start geprüft (Fail-Fast in index.ts)
-    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string) as JwtPayload;
+    // Algorithmus explizit auf HS256 festlegen (Defense-in-Depth gegen alg-confusion).
+    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+      algorithms: ['HS256'],
+    }) as JwtPayload & { type?: string };
+
+    // Defense-in-Depth: Refresh-Tokens haben `type: 'refresh'` und dürfen
+    // NICHT für normale API-Calls verwendet werden – nur am /api/auth/refresh-
+    // Endpoint. Legacy-Tokens (vor der Refresh-Token-Einführung) haben kein
+    // `type` und werden als Access akzeptiert, damit bestehende Sessions nicht
+    // zwangsabgemeldet werden.
+    if (decoded.type === 'refresh') {
+      res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Falscher Token-Typ' });
+      return;
+    }
+    // Download-Tokens sind kurzlebig (60s) und dürfen NUR per `?token=`
+    // genutzt werden, NIE als Bearer-Header. Damit kann ein in einer URL
+    // geleakter Download-Token nicht für reguläre API-Aufrufe missbraucht
+    // werden (Pentest Runde 7 – NIEDRIG, Token-in-URL-Defense).
+    if (decoded.type === 'download' && tokenSource !== 'query') {
+      res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Falscher Token-Typ' });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (decoded.type && decoded.type !== 'access' && decoded.type !== 'download') {
+      res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Falscher Token-Typ' });
+      return;
+    }
 
     // Prüfen ob Token durch Rechteänderung/Passwort-Reset invalidiert wurde
     if (decoded.userId && decoded.iat) {
@@ -78,7 +107,16 @@ export async function authenticate(
 
     req.user = decoded;
     next();
-  } catch {
+  } catch (err) {
+    // JWT-Failures sind interessant: alg=none, manipulierte Signature,
+    // expired Token. Emit SecurityEvent (asynchron, blockt nicht).
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'TOKEN_REJECTED',
+      severity: err instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError ? 'LOW' : 'HIGH',
+      message: err instanceof Error ? `JWT abgelehnt: ${err.message}` : 'JWT abgelehnt',
+      ipAddress: req.ip || (req.socket as any)?.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
+      endpoint: `${req.method} ${req.path}`,
+    });
     res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Ungültiger Token' });
   }
 }

backend/src/middleware/rateLimit.ts

@@ -1,24 +1,66 @@
 /**
  * Rate-Limiting-Middleware für sensible Endpoints (Login, Passwort-Reset).
  * Schützt gegen Brute-Force- und Credential-Stuffing-Angriffe.
+ *
+ * Wenn ein Limit überschritten wird, emit() wir zusätzlich ein
+ * SecurityEvent (RATE_LIMIT_HIT) – damit der Monitoring-View und das
+ * Alert-System sehen, wenn jemand auf die Tür hämmert.
  */
 import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
+import { emit as emitSecurityEvent, contextFromRequest } from '../services/securityMonitor.service.js';
+
+function onLimitReached(label: string, severity: 'MEDIUM' | 'HIGH') {
+  return (req: any, _res: any) => {
+    const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
+    emitSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'RATE_LIMIT_HIT',
+      severity,
+      message: `Rate-Limit überschritten: ${label}`,
+      ipAddress: ctx.ipAddress,
+      userEmail: req.body?.email,
+      endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
+      details: { limiter: label },
+    });
+  };
+}
 
 /**
- * Login: 10 Versuche pro 15 Minuten pro IP.
+ * Login-Limiter: 10 Fehlversuche pro 15 min PRO (IP + Email)-Tuple.
- * Nach Überschreitung: 15 Min Sperre für diese IP.
+ *
+ * Das Bucket ist gezielt das Paar, nicht IP allein und nicht Email allein:
+ *  - IP allein wäre kein Schutz: ein Angreifer wechselt Proxy, hat wieder
+ *    10 freie Versuche gegen den gleichen Account.
+ *  - Email allein erzeugt False-Positives (Familie hinter NAT: Max
+ *    vertippt sich → Nina kommt von gleicher IP nicht mehr rein) und
+ *    macht Account-Lockout-DoS möglich (Angreifer sperrt fremde Accounts
+ *    aus, indem er von beliebigen IPs falsche PWs gegen sie probiert).
+ *  - Tuple (IP, Email): Max kann sich nicht mehr einloggen, Nina von
+ *    gleicher IP schon. Max von einer anderen IP auch, solange er das
+ *    richtige PW hat – ihre eigene Spur in den Buckets ist sauber.
+ *
+ * keyGenerator → `${ip}|${email-lowercase}`. Bei fehlender Email
+ * (z.B. komplett leerer Body) Fallback nur auf IP, damit kein
+ * Single-Shared-Bucket entsteht.
  */
 export const loginRateLimiter = rateLimit({
-  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,   // 15 Minuten
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
-  limit: 10,                   // Max. 10 Versuche pro Zeitfenster
+  limit: 10,
   standardHeaders: 'draft-7',
   legacyHeaders: false,
   message: {
     success: false,
-    error: 'Zu viele Login-Versuche. Bitte in 15 Minuten erneut versuchen.',
+    error: 'Zu viele Login-Versuche für diese Kombination aus Account und IP. Bitte in 15 Minuten erneut versuchen.',
   },
-  // Erfolgreiche Logins zählen nicht gegen das Limit
   skipSuccessfulRequests: true,
+  keyGenerator: (req): string => {
+    const email = (req.body?.email || '').toString().trim().toLowerCase();
+    const ip = req.ip || 'unknown';
+    return email ? `${ip}|${email}` : `${ip}|<no-email>`;
+  },
+  handler: (req, res, _next, options) => {
+    onLimitReached('login', 'HIGH')(req, res);
+    res.status(options.statusCode).json(options.message);
+  },
 });
 
 /**
@@ -34,4 +76,31 @@ export const passwordResetRateLimiter = rateLimit({
     success: false,
     error: 'Zu viele Passwort-Reset-Anfragen. Bitte in einer Stunde erneut versuchen.',
   },
+  handler: (req, res, _next, options) => {
+    onLimitReached('password-reset', 'MEDIUM')(req, res);
+    res.status(options.statusCode).json(options.message);
+  },
+});
+
+/**
+ * Public-Consent-Endpoints (/api/public/consent/:hash[/grant|/pdf]) sind
+ * unauthenticated. Der hash ist 128-bit-UUID → kein Brute-Force-Risk,
+ * aber DoS-Vektor: ohne Limit könnte ein Angreifer endlos POSTen und
+ * den Service durch Audit-Log-Spam + Mail-Versand belasten.
+ * (Pentest 2026-05-20 INFO 28.4). 30 Requests pro 15 min pro IP reicht
+ * für legitime Kunden weit aus.
+ */
+export const publicConsentRateLimiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
+  limit: 30,
+  standardHeaders: 'draft-7',
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  message: {
+    success: false,
+    error: 'Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte in 15 Minuten erneut versuchen.',
+  },
+  handler: (req, res, _next, options) => {
+    onLimitReached('public-consent', 'MEDIUM')(req, res);
+    res.status(options.statusCode).json(options.message);
+  },
 });

backend/src/routes/appSetting.routes.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Router } from 'express';
 import multer from 'multer';
 import * as appSettingController from '../controllers/appSetting.controller.js';
 import * as backupController from '../controllers/backup.controller.js';
+import * as rateLimitAdminController from '../controllers/rateLimitAdmin.controller.js';
 import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
 
 // Multer für Backup-Upload (in Memory speichern)
@@ -100,4 +101,32 @@ router.post(
   backupController.factoryReset
 );
 
+// Backup-Operations-Log: Liste (ohne fullLog) + Detail
+router.get(
+  '/backup-logs',
+  authenticate,
+  requirePermission('settings:update'),
+  backupController.listBackupLogs
+);
+router.get(
+  '/backup-logs/:id',
+  authenticate,
+  requirePermission('settings:update'),
+  backupController.getBackupLogDetail
+);
+
+// Rate-Limit-Verwaltung (Admin)
+router.get(
+  '/rate-limits/active',
+  authenticate,
+  requirePermission('settings:read'),
+  rateLimitAdminController.getActiveRateLimits,
+);
+router.post(
+  '/rate-limits/reset',
+  authenticate,
+  requirePermission('settings:update'),
+  rateLimitAdminController.resetRateLimit,
+);
+
 export default router;

backend/src/routes/auth.routes.ts

@@ -5,13 +5,26 @@ import { loginRateLimiter, passwordResetRateLimiter } from '../middleware/rateLi
 
 const router = Router();
 
+// loginRateLimiter sperrt pro (IP + Email)-Tuple. Damit kann sich
+// `nina` von derselben IP einloggen, auch wenn `max` dort gerade
+// 10x vergeigt hat – und umgekehrt darf `max` von einer anderen IP
+// auch dann noch versuchen, wenn IP-A gerade sein Bucket verbrannt
+// hat (Pentest 2026-05-18 Szenario).
 router.post('/login', loginRateLimiter, authController.login);
 router.post('/customer-login', loginRateLimiter, authController.customerLogin);
+router.post('/refresh', authController.refresh);
 router.get('/me', authenticate, authController.me);
+router.post('/logout', authenticate, authController.logout);
 router.post('/register', authenticate, requirePermission('users:create'), authController.register);
 
 // Passwort-Reset-Flow
 router.post('/password-reset/request', passwordResetRateLimiter, authController.requestPasswordReset);
 router.post('/password-reset/confirm', passwordResetRateLimiter, authController.confirmPasswordReset);
 
+// Force-Change-Password nach Einmalpasswort-Login (Kundenportal)
+router.post('/change-initial-portal-password', authenticate, authController.changeInitialPortalPassword);
+
+// Kurzlebiger Download-Token (60s) für ?token=-Aufrufe (PDF/Export-Window)
+router.post('/download-token', authenticate, authController.createDownloadToken);
+
 export default router;

backend/src/routes/consent-public.routes.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
 import { Router } from 'express';
 import * as controller from '../controllers/consent-public.controller.js';
+import { publicConsentRateLimiter } from '../middleware/rateLimit.js';
 
 const router = Router();
 
-// Öffentliche Routes - KEINE Authentifizierung erforderlich
+// Öffentliche Routes - KEINE Authentifizierung erforderlich.
+// Rate-Limit gegen DoS – siehe publicConsentRateLimiter
+// (Pentest 2026-05-20 INFO 28.4).
+router.use(publicConsentRateLimiter);
 router.get('/:hash', controller.getConsentPage);
 router.post('/:hash/grant', controller.grantAllConsents);
 router.get('/:hash/pdf', controller.getConsentPdf);

backend/src/routes/contract.routes.ts

@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ router.delete('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('contracts:delete'), contr
 // Follow-up contract
 router.post('/:id/follow-up', authenticate, requirePermission('contracts:create'), contractController.createFollowUp);
 
+// VVL (Vertragsverlängerung beim selben Anbieter, vollständige Kopie + Datums-Berechnung)
+router.post('/:id/renewal', authenticate, requirePermission('contracts:create'), contractController.createRenewal);
+
 // Snooze (Vertrag zurückstellen)
 router.patch('/:id/snooze', authenticate, requirePermission('contracts:update'), contractController.snoozeContract);
 

backend/src/routes/customer.routes.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ router.get('/:customerId/portal', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:upd
 router.put('/:customerId/portal', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), customerController.updatePortalSettings);
 router.post('/:customerId/portal/password', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), customerController.setPortalPassword);
 router.get('/:customerId/portal/password', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), customerController.getPortalPassword);
+router.post('/:customerId/portal/password/generate', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), customerController.generatePortalPassword);
+router.post('/:customerId/portal/send-credentials', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), customerController.sendPortalCredentials);
 
 // Representatives (Vertreter)
 router.get('/:customerId/representatives', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:read'), customerController.getRepresentatives);

backend/src/routes/developer.routes.ts

@@ -1,54 +1,15 @@
 import { Router, Response } from 'express';
-import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
 import { AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 
 const router = Router();
 
-// Setup-Endpunkt: Erstellt die developer:access Permission und fügt sie der Admin-Rolle hinzu
+// HINWEIS: Der frühere `POST /setup`-Endpoint wurde entfernt (Pentest Runde 3
-// Dieser Endpunkt erfordert keine Authentifizierung, da er nur einmalig zum Setup verwendet wird
+// 2026-05-16 – KRITISCH). Er war ohne Auth erreichbar und konnte
-router.post('/setup', async (req, res: Response) => {
+// `developer:access` an die Admin-Rolle hängen → Privilege-Escalation auf
-  try {
+// volle DB-Kontrolle. Wenn die developer:access-Permission manuell gesetzt
-    // Create or get the developer:access permission
+// werden muss, gibt es das CLI-Script `prisma/add-developer-permission.ts`.
-    const developerPerm = await prisma.permission.upsert({
-      where: { resource_action: { resource: 'developer', action: 'access' } },
-      update: {},
-      create: { resource: 'developer', action: 'access' },
-    });
-
-    // Get the Admin role
-    const adminRole = await prisma.role.findUnique({
-      where: { name: 'Admin' },
-      include: { permissions: true },
-    });
-
-    if (!adminRole) {
-      res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Admin-Rolle nicht gefunden' });
-      return;
-    }
-
-    // Check if Admin already has this permission
-    const hasPermission = adminRole.permissions.some(
-      (rp) => rp.permissionId === developerPerm.id
-    );
-
-    if (!hasPermission) {
-      await prisma.rolePermission.create({
-        data: {
-          roleId: adminRole.id,
-          permissionId: developerPerm.id,
-        },
-      });
-      res.json({ success: true, message: 'developer:access Permission wurde zur Admin-Rolle hinzugefügt. Bitte neu einloggen!' });
-    } else {
-      res.json({ success: true, message: 'Admin-Rolle hat bereits die developer:access Permission' });
-    }
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Setup error:', error);
-    res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Setup' });
-  }
-});
 
 // Tabellen-Metadaten mit Beziehungen
 const tableMetadata: Record<string, {

backend/src/routes/factoryDefaults.routes.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,25 @@
 import { Router } from 'express';
+import multer from 'multer';
 import * as factoryDefaultsController from '../controllers/factoryDefaults.controller.js';
 import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
 
 const router = Router();
 
+// In-Memory-Upload für die ZIP – wird direkt verarbeitet, keine temporäre Datei.
+const upload = multer({
+  storage: multer.memoryStorage(),
+  fileFilter: (_req, file, cb) => {
+    const ok =
+      file.mimetype === 'application/zip' ||
+      file.mimetype === 'application/x-zip-compressed' ||
+      file.mimetype === 'application/octet-stream' || // manche Browser senden das für .zip
+      file.originalname.toLowerCase().endsWith('.zip');
+    if (ok) cb(null, true);
+    else cb(new Error('Nur ZIP-Dateien sind erlaubt'));
+  },
+  limits: { fileSize: 50 * 1024 * 1024 },
+});
+
 // Preview (was wäre im Export drin?)
 router.get(
   '/preview',
@@ -20,4 +36,13 @@ router.get(
   factoryDefaultsController.exportFactoryDefaults,
 );
 
+// Import aus ZIP (multipart, Feld 'zip')
+router.post(
+  '/import',
+  authenticate,
+  requirePermission('settings:update'),
+  upload.single('zip'),
+  factoryDefaultsController.importFactoryDefaults,
+);
+
 export default router;

backend/src/routes/monitoring.routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import { Router } from 'express';
+import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
+import * as monitoringController from '../controllers/monitoring.controller.js';
+
+const router = Router();
+router.use(authenticate);
+
+// Monitoring ist Admin-Sache: settings:read fürs Anzeigen, settings:update für Änderungen
+router.get('/events', requirePermission('settings:read'), monitoringController.listEvents);
+router.get('/settings', requirePermission('settings:read'), monitoringController.getMonitoringSettings);
+router.put('/settings', requirePermission('settings:update'), monitoringController.updateMonitoringSettings);
+router.post('/test-alert', requirePermission('settings:update'), monitoringController.testAlert);
+router.post('/run-digest', requirePermission('settings:update'), monitoringController.runDigestNow);
+router.delete('/events', requirePermission('settings:update'), monitoringController.clearEvents);
+
+export default router;

backend/src/routes/provider.routes.ts

@@ -5,15 +5,15 @@ import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
 
 const router = Router();
 
-// Provider routes
+// Provider routes (Portal-Kunden sollen keine Provider-Liste/Tarife sehen)
-router.get('/', authenticate, providerController.getProviders);
+router.get('/', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:read'), providerController.getProviders);
 router.post('/', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:create'), providerController.createProvider);
-router.get('/:id', authenticate, providerController.getProvider);
+router.get('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:read'), providerController.getProvider);
 router.put('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:update'), providerController.updateProvider);
 router.delete('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:delete'), providerController.deleteProvider);
 
 // Nested tariff routes
-router.get('/:providerId/tariffs', authenticate, tariffController.getTariffs);
+router.get('/:providerId/tariffs', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:read'), tariffController.getTariffs);
 router.post('/:providerId/tariffs', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:create'), tariffController.createTariff);
 
 export default router;

backend/src/routes/stressfreiEmail.routes.ts

@@ -12,4 +12,7 @@ router.delete('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:delete'), stres
 // Passwort zurücksetzen (generiert neues Passwort und setzt es beim Provider)
 router.post('/:id/reset-password', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), stressfreiEmailController.resetPassword);
 
+// Weiterleitungen neu setzen (z.B. nach Änderung der Kunden-Stamm-E-Mail)
+router.post('/:id/sync-forwarding', authenticate, requirePermission('customers:update'), stressfreiEmailController.syncForwarding);
+
 export default router;

backend/src/routes/tariff.routes.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
 const router = Router();
 
 // Standalone tariff routes (for update/delete by tariff id)
-router.get('/:id', authenticate, tariffController.getTariff);
+router.get('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:read'), tariffController.getTariff);
 router.put('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:update'), tariffController.updateTariff);
 router.delete('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('providers:delete'), tariffController.deleteTariff);
 

backend/src/routes/upload.routes.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import { authenticate, requirePermission } from '../middleware/auth.js';
 import { AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
 import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
+import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
 
 const router = Router();
 
@@ -546,6 +547,7 @@ async function handleContractDocumentUpload(
     }
 
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
     const relativePath = `/uploads/${subDir}/${req.file.filename}`;
 
     // Alte Datei löschen falls vorhanden
@@ -563,12 +565,51 @@ async function handleContractDocumentUpload(
       }
     }
 
+    // Bei Kündigungsbestätigung(s-Optionen): optionales Datum aus multipart
+    // übernehmen. Ohne Angabe: falls Feld noch leer → heute, sonst nicht anfassen.
+    const updateData: Record<string, unknown> = { [fieldName]: relativePath };
+    if (fieldName === 'cancellationConfirmationPath' || fieldName === 'cancellationConfirmationOptionsPath') {
+      const dateField = fieldName === 'cancellationConfirmationPath'
+        ? 'cancellationConfirmationDate'
+        : 'cancellationConfirmationOptionsDate';
+      const provided = typeof req.body?.confirmationDate === 'string' ? req.body.confirmationDate : null;
+      let target: Date | null = null;
+      if (provided) {
+        const parsed = new Date(provided);
+        if (!isNaN(parsed.getTime())) target = parsed;
+      }
+      if (target) {
+        updateData[dateField] = target;
+      } else if (!contract[dateField]) {
+        updateData[dateField] = new Date();
+      }
+    }
+
     // Vertrag in der DB aktualisieren
     await prisma.contract.update({
       where: { id: contractId },
-      data: { [fieldName]: relativePath },
+      data: updateData,
     });
 
+    // Wenn eine Kündigungsbestätigung (nicht "Optionen") hochgeladen wurde und
+    // der Vertrag noch ACTIVE ist → auf CANCELLED umstellen + Audit-Log.
+    // "Optionen" ist für Vertrags-Änderungen gedacht, nicht für echte Kündigungen.
+    if (fieldName === 'cancellationConfirmationPath' && contract.status === 'ACTIVE') {
+      await prisma.contract.update({
+        where: { id: contractId },
+        data: { status: 'CANCELLED' },
+      });
+      await logChange({
+        req,
+        action: 'UPDATE',
+        resourceType: 'Contract',
+        resourceId: contractId.toString(),
+        label: `Vertrag ${contract.contractNumber} automatisch auf CANCELLED gesetzt (Kündigungsbestätigung hochgeladen)`,
+        details: { vorher: 'ACTIVE', nachher: 'CANCELLED', trigger: 'cancellationConfirmation-Upload' },
+        customerId: contract.customerId,
+      });
+    }
+
     res.json({
       success: true,
       data: {
@@ -592,6 +633,7 @@ async function handleContractDocumentDelete(
 ) {
   try {
     const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
+    if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
 
     const contract = await prisma.contract.findUnique({ where: { id: contractId } });
     if (!contract) {

backend/src/routes/user.routes.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ router.post('/', authenticate, requirePermission('users:create'), userController
 router.get('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('users:read'), userController.getUser);
 router.put('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('users:update'), userController.updateUser);
 router.delete('/:id', authenticate, requirePermission('users:delete'), userController.deleteUser);
+// Passwort-Reset durch Admin – dedizierter Endpoint (Pentest Runde 12)
+router.post('/:id/password', authenticate, requirePermission('users:update'), userController.setUserPassword);
 
 // Roles
 router.get('/roles/list', authenticate, requirePermission('users:read'), userController.getRoles);

backend/src/services/appSetting.service.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import { stripHtml } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
 
 // Default settings
 const DEFAULT_SETTINGS: Record<string, string> = {
@@ -12,6 +13,53 @@ const DEFAULT_SETTINGS: Record<string, string> = {
   documentExpiryWarningDays: '90',  // Gelb: Warnung (Standard 90 Tage)
 };
 
+// Whitelist erlaubter Setting-Keys. PUT /api/settings nimmt KEINE
+// anderen Keys mehr an (Pentest Runde 11 (2026-05-18) – M1: Mass
+// Assignment, "superAdminEmail", "debugMode", "allowedOrigins" landeten
+// vorher ungefiltert in der DB).
+export const ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  ...Object.keys(DEFAULT_SETTINGS),
+  'authorizationTemplateHtml',
+  'imprintHtml',
+  'privacyPolicyHtml',
+  'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
+  'monitoringAlertEmail',
+  'monitoringDigestEnabled',
+  'monitoringLastDigestAt',
+  'companyName',
+  'defaultEmailDomain',
+]);
+
+export function isAllowedSettingKey(key: string): boolean {
+  return ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(key);
+}
+
+// Keys deren Wert legitim HTML enthalten darf (Datenschutz-/Impressum-Editoren
+// liefern WYSIWYG-HTML). Alle anderen Plain-Text-Keys (companyName,
+// defaultEmailDomain, Schwellenwerte etc.) werden vor dem Persistieren durch
+// stripHtml geschickt – Pentest 2026-05-19, MEDIUM: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
+// in companyName landete ungefiltert in der DB und konnte später z.B. in
+// E-Mail-Templates oder PDF-Generatoren unescaped landen.
+const HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  'authorizationTemplateHtml',
+  'imprintHtml',
+  'privacyPolicyHtml',
+  'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Bereinigt den Wert vor dem Speichern: für Plain-Text-Keys werden alle
+ * HTML-Tags entfernt. Die dedizierten Editor-Keys
+ * (imprintHtml/privacyPolicyHtml/...) bleiben unverändert, da sie sonst
+ * den WYSIWYG-Editor unbenutzbar machen würden – sie werden über
+ * dedizierte /api/gdpr-Endpoints gepflegt.
+ */
+export function sanitizeSettingValue(key: string, value: string): string {
+  if (HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(key)) return value;
+  const stripped = stripHtml(value);
+  return typeof stripped === 'string' ? stripped : String(stripped);
+}
+
 export async function getSetting(key: string): Promise<string | null> {
   const setting = await prisma.appSetting.findUnique({
     where: { key },

backend/src/services/audit.service.ts

@@ -112,6 +112,13 @@ function determineSensitivity(resourceType: string): AuditSensitivity {
     Authentication: 'CRITICAL',
     BankCard: 'CRITICAL',
     IdentityDocument: 'CRITICAL',
+    // Klartext-Passwort-Reads – jeder Decrypt-Vorgang muss nachvollziehbar sein
+    PortalPassword: 'CRITICAL',
+    ContractPassword: 'CRITICAL',
+    SimCardCredentials: 'CRITICAL',
+    InternetCredentials: 'CRITICAL',
+    SipCredentials: 'CRITICAL',
+    MailboxCredentials: 'CRITICAL',
     // HIGH
     Customer: 'HIGH',
     User: 'HIGH',

backend/src/services/auth.service.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,76 @@ import { JwtPayload } from '../types/index.js';
 import { encrypt, decrypt } from '../utils/encryption.js';
 import { sendEmail, SmtpCredentials } from './smtpService.js';
 import { getSystemEmailCredentials } from './emailProvider/emailProviderService.js';
+import { getAuthorizedCustomerIds } from './authorization.service.js';
+
+// Token-Lifetimes
+// - Access-Token: kurzlebig, nur im Browser-Memory → XSS klaut max. 15 min
+// - Refresh-Token: lang, im httpOnly-Cookie → kein JS-Zugriff
+const ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '15m') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'];
+const REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = (process.env.JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'];
+
+// Helper: signiert ein Access- bzw. Refresh-JWT mit dem `type`-Claim als
+// Unterscheidung. Der Refresh-Token landet im httpOnly-Cookie und wird beim
+// /auth/refresh-Endpoint geprüft, der dann einen neuen Access ausgibt.
+export function signAccessToken(payload: JwtPayload): string {
+  return jwt.sign({ ...payload, type: 'access' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+    expiresIn: ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,
+  });
+}
+export function signRefreshToken(payload: JwtPayload): string {
+  return jwt.sign({ ...payload, type: 'refresh' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+    expiresIn: REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,
+  });
+}
+
+// Kurzlebiger Download-Token (60s, single-purpose). Wird vom Frontend
+// abgerufen, wenn ein Endpoint per `?token=` aufgerufen werden muss
+// (z.B. PDF-iframe, Audit-Export-Window). Selbst wenn dieser Token in
+// nginx-Access-Logs oder der Browser-History landet, ist er nach
+// 60 Sekunden wertlos. Pentest Runde 7 (2026-05-17) – NIEDRIG.
+export function signDownloadToken(payload: JwtPayload): string {
+  return jwt.sign({ ...payload, type: 'download' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+    expiresIn: '60s',
+  });
+}
+
+// Bcrypt-Cost-Faktor: 12 = OWASP-empfohlen (Stand 2026), ca. 250 ms pro Hash.
+// Bestehende Hashes mit Faktor 10 bleiben gültig (bcrypt kodiert den Faktor im Hash).
+const BCRYPT_COST = 12;
+
+// Dummy-Hash mit Cost 12 für Timing-Attack-Schutz: bei nicht-existierendem User
+// führen wir trotzdem ein bcrypt.compare() durch, damit die Antwortzeit nicht
+// verrät, ob die E-Mail existiert. Konstanter Hash hat keine Bedeutung außer
+// dem Timing-Angleich.
+const DUMMY_BCRYPT_HASH = '$2a$12$CwTycUXWue0Thq9StjUM0uJ8gQKwqKjq8lZ3TZ9qg8aJ0A9hPn4Wy';
+
+/**
+ * Upgrade eines bestehenden Passwort-Hashes auf aktuellen BCRYPT_COST.
+ * Wird nach erfolgreichem Login aufgerufen. Alte User (z.B. admin mit Cost 10
+ * aus der Installation) werden so lazy auf Cost 12 migriert – damit sich die
+ * Antwortzeit beim Login der Dummy-Zeit bei ungültigen Usern angleicht.
+ */
+async function maybeUpgradePasswordHash(
+  table: 'user' | 'customer',
+  id: number,
+  plaintextPassword: string,
+  currentHash: string,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const match = currentHash.match(/^\$2[aby]\$(\d+)\$/);
+  const currentCost = match ? parseInt(match[1], 10) : 0;
+  if (currentCost === BCRYPT_COST) return;
+  try {
+    const newHash = await bcrypt.hash(plaintextPassword, BCRYPT_COST);
+    if (table === 'user') {
+      await prisma.user.update({ where: { id }, data: { password: newHash } });
+    } else {
+      await prisma.customer.update({ where: { id }, data: { portalPasswordHash: newHash } });
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Nicht kritisch – Login war erfolgreich, Rehash kann beim nächsten Login nachgeholt werden
+    console.warn('[maybeUpgradePasswordHash] Fehler beim Rehash:', err);
+  }
+}
 
 // Mitarbeiter-Login
 export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
@@ -29,6 +99,9 @@ export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
   });
 
   if (!user || !user.isActive) {
+    // Timing-Attack-Schutz: Dummy-bcrypt-compare damit die Antwortzeit bei
+    // nicht-existierendem/deaktiviertem User der eines gültigen Users entspricht.
+    await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_BCRYPT_HASH);
     throw new Error('Ungültige Anmeldedaten');
   }
 
@@ -37,6 +110,10 @@ export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
     throw new Error('Ungültige Anmeldedaten');
   }
 
+  // Lazy-Upgrade: ältere Cost-10-Hashes auf aktuellen BCRYPT_COST rehashen.
+  // Async, nicht blockierend für die Response.
+  maybeUpgradePasswordHash('user', user.id, password, user.password).catch(() => {});
+
   // Collect all permissions from all roles
   const permissions = new Set<string>();
   for (const userRole of user.roles) {
@@ -55,12 +132,12 @@ export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
     isCustomerPortal: false,
   };
 
-  const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+  const accessToken = signAccessToken(payload);
-    expiresIn: (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'],
+  const refreshToken = signRefreshToken(payload);
-  });
 
   return {
-    token,
+    accessToken,
+    refreshToken,
     user: {
       id: user.id,
       email: user.email,
@@ -103,6 +180,8 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
 
   if (!customer || !customer.portalEnabled || !customer.portalPasswordHash) {
     console.log('[CustomerLogin] Abbruch: Kunde nicht gefunden oder Portal nicht aktiviert');
+    // Timing-Attack-Schutz (siehe login())
+    await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_BCRYPT_HASH);
     throw new Error('Ungültige Anmeldedaten');
   }
 
@@ -113,16 +192,42 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
     throw new Error('Ungültige Anmeldedaten');
   }
 
+  // Einmalpasswort-Check: wurde es per "Zugangsdaten versenden" verschickt?
+  // Falls ja, jetzt sofort verbrauchen – Hash + Encrypted nullen, damit
+  // weder Re-Login noch Klartext-Abruf möglich ist. Customer landet im
+  // Force-Change-Password-Flow.
+  const mustChangePassword = customer.portalPasswordMustChange === true;
+  if (mustChangePassword) {
+    await prisma.customer.update({
+      where: { id: customer.id },
+      data: {
+        portalPasswordHash: null,
+        portalPasswordEncrypted: null,
+        portalLastLogin: new Date(),
+      },
+    });
+  } else {
+    // Lazy-Upgrade analog zu Mitarbeiter-Login
+    maybeUpgradePasswordHash('customer', customer.id, password, customer.portalPasswordHash).catch(() => {});
+
     // Letzte Anmeldung aktualisieren
     await prisma.customer.update({
       where: { id: customer.id },
       data: { portalLastLogin: new Date() },
     });
+  }
 
-  // IDs der Kunden sammeln, die dieser Kunde vertreten kann
+  // IDs der Kunden sammeln, die dieser Kunde vertreten kann –
-  const representedCustomerIds = customer.representingFor.map(
+  // GEFILTERT auf aktive Vollmacht (isGranted: true). Ohne diesen Filter
-    (rep) => rep.customer.id
+  // hätte das frische JWT nach Vollmacht-Widerruf weiterhin die alte
+  // representedCustomerIds-Liste; die UI würde dem Vertreter noch
+  // anzeigen, dass er vertreten kann, obwohl der Live-Check beim
+  // Datenzugriff dann 403 wirft. Pentest Runde 10 (2026-05-17), MEDIUM.
+  const grantedCustomerIds = new Set(await getAuthorizedCustomerIds(customer.id));
+  const grantedRepresentingFor = customer.representingFor.filter((rep) =>
+    grantedCustomerIds.has(rep.customer.id),
   );
+  const representedCustomerIds = grantedRepresentingFor.map((rep) => rep.customer.id);
 
   // Kundenportal-Berechtigungen (eingeschränkt)
   const customerPermissions = [
@@ -138,12 +243,13 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
     representedCustomerIds,
   };
 
-  const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+  const accessToken = signAccessToken(payload);
-    expiresIn: (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'],
+  const refreshToken = signRefreshToken(payload);
-  });
 
   return {
-    token,
+    accessToken,
+    refreshToken,
+    mustChangePassword,
     user: {
       id: customer.id,
       email: customer.portalEmail,
@@ -152,7 +258,8 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
       permissions: customerPermissions,
       customerId: customer.id,
       isCustomerPortal: true,
-      representedCustomers: customer.representingFor.map((rep) => ({
+      mustChangePassword,
+      representedCustomers: grantedRepresentingFor.map((rep) => ({
         id: rep.customer.id,
         customerNumber: rep.customer.customerNumber,
         firstName: rep.customer.firstName,
@@ -164,26 +271,142 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
   };
 }
 
+// Refresh-Token verifizieren und neuen Access-Token ausstellen. Wirft bei
+// ungültigem/abgelaufenem/invalidiertem Token. Greift auch tokenInvalidatedAt
+// vom User/Customer ab → bei Rolle-Ändern oder Logout sind alle Tokens (auch
+// das Refresh) sofort tot.
+export async function refreshAccessToken(refreshToken: string): Promise<{
+  accessToken: string;
+  refreshToken: string;
+  user: any;
+}> {
+  let decoded: any;
+  try {
+    decoded = jwt.verify(refreshToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
+      algorithms: ['HS256'],
+    });
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error('Refresh-Token ungültig oder abgelaufen');
+  }
+  if (decoded.type !== 'refresh') {
+    throw new Error('Falscher Token-Typ');
+  }
+  const issuedAt = decoded.iat ? decoded.iat * 1000 : 0;
+
+  // Mitarbeiter
+  if (!decoded.isCustomerPortal && decoded.userId) {
+    const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
+      where: { id: decoded.userId },
+      include: {
+        roles: { include: { role: { include: { permissions: { include: { permission: true } } } } } },
+      },
+    });
+    if (!user || !user.isActive) throw new Error('Benutzer nicht aktiv');
+    if (user.tokenInvalidatedAt && issuedAt < user.tokenInvalidatedAt.getTime()) {
+      throw new Error('Refresh-Token wurde invalidiert (Logout/Rechteänderung)');
+    }
+    const permissions = new Set<string>();
+    for (const ur of user.roles) {
+      for (const rp of ur.role.permissions) {
+        permissions.add(`${rp.permission.resource}:${rp.permission.action}`);
+      }
+    }
+    const payload: JwtPayload = {
+      userId: user.id,
+      email: user.email,
+      permissions: Array.from(permissions),
+      customerId: user.customerId ?? undefined,
+      isCustomerPortal: false,
+    };
+    return {
+      accessToken: signAccessToken(payload),
+      refreshToken: signRefreshToken(payload),
+      user: {
+        id: user.id,
+        email: user.email,
+        firstName: user.firstName,
+        lastName: user.lastName,
+        permissions: Array.from(permissions),
+        customerId: user.customerId,
+        isCustomerPortal: false,
+      },
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Customer-Portal
+  if (decoded.isCustomerPortal && decoded.customerId) {
+    const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({ where: { id: decoded.customerId } });
+    if (!customer || !customer.portalEmail) throw new Error('Portal-Konto nicht gefunden');
+    if (customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt && issuedAt < customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt.getTime()) {
+      throw new Error('Refresh-Token wurde invalidiert');
+    }
+    const portalUser = await getCustomerPortalUser(customer.id);
+    if (!portalUser) throw new Error('Portal-Konto nicht gefunden');
+    const payload: JwtPayload = {
+      email: customer.portalEmail,
+      permissions: portalUser.permissions,
+      customerId: customer.id,
+      isCustomerPortal: true,
+      representedCustomerIds: portalUser.representedCustomers?.map((c: any) => c.id),
+    };
+    return {
+      accessToken: signAccessToken(payload),
+      refreshToken: signRefreshToken(payload),
+      user: portalUser,
+    };
+  }
+
+  throw new Error('Refresh-Token konnte nicht interpretiert werden');
+}
+
 // Kundenportal-Passwort setzen/ändern
 export async function setCustomerPortalPassword(customerId: number, password: string) {
   console.log('[SetPortalPassword] Setze Passwort für Kunde:', customerId);
 
-  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(password, 10);
+  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(password, BCRYPT_COST);
   const encryptedPassword = encrypt(password);
 
   console.log('[SetPortalPassword] Hash erstellt, Länge:', hashedPassword.length);
 
+  // Manuelles Setzen ist KEIN Einmalpasswort → Flag immer zurücksetzen,
+  // falls vorher ein OTP gesetzt war.
   await prisma.customer.update({
     where: { id: customerId },
     data: {
       portalPasswordHash: hashedPassword,
       portalPasswordEncrypted: encryptedPassword,
+      portalPasswordMustChange: false,
     },
   });
 
   console.log('[SetPortalPassword] Passwort gespeichert');
 }
 
+// Vom Endkunden selbst gesetztes Initial-Passwort nach OTP-Login.
+// Speichert neuen Hash, löscht das verbrauchte Encrypted-Feld (Klartext-
+// Speicherung soll bei OFF self-service nicht zurückkommen) und invalidiert
+// sofort alle bestehenden Sessions, damit Login mit dem neuen Passwort
+// gefordert wird.
+export async function changeInitialPortalPassword(customerId: number, newPassword: string) {
+  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, BCRYPT_COST);
+  await prisma.customer.update({
+    where: { id: customerId },
+    data: {
+      portalPasswordHash: hashedPassword,
+      portalPasswordEncrypted: null,
+      portalPasswordMustChange: false,
+      portalTokenInvalidatedAt: new Date(),
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export async function markPortalPasswordForChange(customerId: number) {
+  await prisma.customer.update({
+    where: { id: customerId },
+    data: { portalPasswordMustChange: true },
+  });
+}
+
 // Kundenportal-Passwort im Klartext abrufen
 export async function getCustomerPortalPassword(customerId: number): Promise<string | null> {
   const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
@@ -211,7 +434,7 @@ export async function createUser(data: {
   roleIds: number[];
   customerId?: number;
 }) {
-  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(data.password, 10);
+  const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(data.password, BCRYPT_COST);
 
   const user = await prisma.user.create({
     data: {
@@ -323,6 +546,13 @@ export async function getCustomerPortalUser(customerId: number) {
     'customers:read',
   ];
 
+  // Selbe Live-Vollmacht-Filterung wie in customerLogin (Pentest Runde 10):
+  // ohne sie zeigt /me dem Vertreter weiterhin widerrufene Beziehungen.
+  const grantedCustomerIds = new Set(await getAuthorizedCustomerIds(customer.id));
+  const grantedRepresentingFor = customer.representingFor.filter((rep) =>
+    grantedCustomerIds.has(rep.customer.id),
+  );
+
   return {
     id: customer.id,
     email: customer.portalEmail,
@@ -332,7 +562,7 @@ export async function getCustomerPortalUser(customerId: number) {
     customerId: customer.id,
     permissions: customerPermissions,
     isCustomerPortal: true,
-    representedCustomers: customer.representingFor.map((rep) => ({
+    representedCustomers: grantedRepresentingFor.map((rep) => ({
       id: rep.customer.id,
       customerNumber: rep.customer.customerNumber,
       firstName: rep.customer.firstName,
@@ -355,6 +585,86 @@ function getPublicUrl(): string {
   return process.env.PUBLIC_URL || 'http://localhost:5173';
 }
 
+/**
+ * Portal-Zugangsdaten per E-Mail an den Kunden versenden. Nur durch Admin-
+ * UI ausgelöst – nie automatisch –, weil das Klartext-Passwort im Mail-
+ * Body steht. Login-URL zeigt auf das `/portal/login`-Frontend-Route.
+ */
+export async function sendPortalCredentialsEmail(params: {
+  to: string;
+  customer: { firstName: string | null; lastName: string | null; salutation: string | null; companyName: string | null };
+  loginEmail: string;
+  password: string;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  const systemEmail = await getSystemEmailCredentials();
+  if (!systemEmail) {
+    throw new Error('Kein System-E-Mail-Konto konfiguriert (Einstellungen → E-Mail-Provider)');
+  }
+
+  const credentials: SmtpCredentials = {
+    host: systemEmail.smtpServer,
+    port: systemEmail.smtpPort,
+    user: systemEmail.emailAddress,
+    password: systemEmail.password,
+    encryption: systemEmail.smtpEncryption,
+    allowSelfSignedCerts: systemEmail.allowSelfSignedCerts,
+  };
+
+  const loginUrl = `${getPublicUrl()}/portal/login`;
+  const name = params.customer.companyName?.trim()
+    || `${params.customer.firstName || ''} ${params.customer.lastName || ''}`.trim()
+    || 'Kunde';
+
+  // HTML-Escape – Customer-Namen können theoretisch Sonderzeichen enthalten,
+  // die wir nicht ungefiltert in die Mail rendern wollen.
+  const esc = (s: string) =>
+    s.replace(/&/g, '&amp;').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;').replace(/"/g, '&quot;');
+
+  const html = `
+    <div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; max-width: 600px; margin: 0 auto;">
+      <h2 style="color: #1e40af;">Ihre Zugangsdaten zum Kundenportal</h2>
+      <p>Hallo ${esc(name)},</p>
+      <p>anbei Ihre Zugangsdaten zum Kundenportal:</p>
+      <table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: 16px 0;">
+        <tr><td style="padding: 6px 12px; color: #6b7280;">Login-URL:</td>
+            <td style="padding: 6px 12px;"><a href="${loginUrl}">${esc(loginUrl)}</a></td></tr>
+        <tr><td style="padding: 6px 12px; color: #6b7280;">E-Mail:</td>
+            <td style="padding: 6px 12px; font-family: monospace;">${esc(params.loginEmail)}</td></tr>
+        <tr><td style="padding: 6px 12px; color: #6b7280;">Passwort:</td>
+            <td style="padding: 6px 12px; font-family: monospace;">${esc(params.password)}</td></tr>
+      </table>
+      <p style="color: #b91c1c; font-size: 14px; font-weight: 600;">
+        ⚠️ Dieses Passwort ist ein <u>Einmalpasswort</u>.
+      </p>
+      <p style="color: #6b7280; font-size: 14px;">
+        Beim ersten Login werden Sie aufgefordert, ein eigenes Passwort zu vergeben.
+        Danach ist dieses Passwort hier <strong>nicht mehr gültig</strong> – falls Sie den
+        Vorgang abbrechen, fordern Sie bitte neue Zugangsdaten an oder nutzen die
+        Passwort-vergessen-Funktion.
+      </p>
+      <hr style="border: none; border-top: 1px solid #e5e7eb; margin: 24px 0;">
+      <p style="color: #9ca3af; font-size: 12px;">
+        Diese Nachricht enthält sensible Zugangsdaten – bitte sicher verwahren oder nach
+        dem Login löschen.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+  `;
+
+  await sendEmail(
+    credentials,
+    systemEmail.emailAddress,
+    {
+      to: params.to,
+      subject: 'Ihre Zugangsdaten zum Kundenportal',
+      html,
+    },
+    {
+      context: 'portal-credentials',
+      triggeredBy: 'admin-action',
+    },
+  );
+}
+
 /**
  * Passwort-Reset-Link per Email senden.
  * Findet User/Customer per Email. Wirft keinen Error wenn nicht gefunden
@@ -458,6 +768,26 @@ export async function requestPasswordReset(email: string, userType: 'admin' | 'p
   );
 }
 
+/**
+ * Stellt fest, ob ein Reset-Token zu einem Mitarbeiter (admin) oder einem
+ * Portal-Customer (portal) gehört. Wird vom Controller benötigt, um den
+ * passenden Komplexitäts-Schwellwert (25 bzw. 12 Zeichen) anzuwenden,
+ * BEVOR das Passwort tatsächlich gesetzt wird. Pentest Runde 13.
+ */
+export async function getPasswordResetAudience(token: string): Promise<'admin' | 'portal' | null> {
+  const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
+    where: { passwordResetToken: token },
+    select: { id: true },
+  });
+  if (user) return 'admin';
+  const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
+    where: { portalPasswordResetToken: token },
+    select: { id: true },
+  });
+  if (customer) return 'portal';
+  return null;
+}
+
 /**
  * Passwort-Reset bestätigen: Token prüfen, Passwort setzen, Token löschen.
  * Invalidiert alle bestehenden JWT-Sessions des Users.
@@ -471,7 +801,7 @@ export async function confirmPasswordReset(token: string, newPassword: string):
       throw new Error('Der Link ist abgelaufen. Bitte fordere einen neuen an.');
     }
 
-    const hash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, 10);
+    const hash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, BCRYPT_COST);
     await prisma.user.update({
       where: { id: user.id },
       data: {
@@ -493,16 +823,23 @@ export async function confirmPasswordReset(token: string, newPassword: string):
       throw new Error('Der Link ist abgelaufen. Bitte fordere einen neuen an.');
     }
 
-    const hash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, 10);
+    const hash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, BCRYPT_COST);
     await prisma.customer.update({
       where: { id: customer.id },
       data: {
         portalPasswordHash: hash,
-        portalPasswordEncrypted: encrypt(newPassword),
+        // Pentest Runde 6 (MITTEL-01): Beim Self-Service-Reset speichern wir
+        // KEINEN Klartext mehr. Encrypted-Feld ist nur für Admin-generierte
+        // Einmalpasswörter sinnvoll (damit Admin sie in der UI sehen + per
+        // Mail versenden kann); für ein vom Kunden selbst gesetztes Passwort
+        // ist Klartext-Speicherung ein unnötiges Recover-Risiko bei DB+Key-Leak.
+        portalPasswordEncrypted: null,
         portalPasswordResetToken: null,
         portalPasswordResetExpiresAt: null,
         // Alle bestehenden Portal-Sessions kicken
         portalTokenInvalidatedAt: new Date(),
+        // OTP-Flow-Flag ist nach selbstgesetztem Passwort definitiv aus
+        portalPasswordMustChange: false,
       },
     });
     return;

backend/src/services/backup.service.ts

@@ -138,6 +138,24 @@ function deleteDirectory(dirPath: string): void {
   fs.rmdirSync(dirPath);
 }
 
+// Wie deleteDirectory, ABER das Ziel-Verzeichnis selbst bleibt stehen –
+// nur die Inhalte verschwinden. Notwendig für Docker-Bind-Mounts wie
+// `/app/uploads`: dort wirft `rmdir` ein EBUSY, weil das Volume vom Host
+// gemountet ist und sich nicht aushängen lässt.
+function emptyDirectory(dirPath: string): void {
+  if (!fs.existsSync(dirPath)) return;
+  const items = fs.readdirSync(dirPath);
+  for (const item of items) {
+    const itemPath = path.join(dirPath, item);
+    const stats = fs.lstatSync(itemPath);
+    if (stats.isDirectory()) {
+      deleteDirectory(itemPath);
+    } else {
+      fs.unlinkSync(itemPath);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Liste aller verfügbaren Backups
  */
@@ -249,6 +267,7 @@ export async function createBackup(): Promise<BackupResult> {
       { name: 'EmailLog', query: () => prisma.emailLog.findMany() },
       { name: 'AuditRetentionPolicy', query: () => prisma.auditRetentionPolicy.findMany() },
       { name: 'AuditLog', query: () => prisma.auditLog.findMany() },
+      { name: 'SecurityEvent', query: () => prisma.securityEvent.findMany() },
     ];
 
     let totalRecords = 0;
@@ -310,6 +329,7 @@ export async function restoreBackup(backupName: string): Promise<RestoreResult>
     // Logs & Audit zuerst (hängen an allem)
     await prisma.auditLog.deleteMany({});
     await prisma.emailLog.deleteMany({});
+    await prisma.securityEvent.deleteMany({});
 
     // Detail-Tabellen
     await prisma.carInsuranceDetails.deleteMany({});
@@ -887,6 +907,18 @@ export async function restoreBackup(backupName: string): Promise<RestoreResult>
           }
         },
       },
+      {
+        name: 'SecurityEvent',
+        restore: async (data: any[]) => {
+          for (const item of data) {
+            await prisma.securityEvent.upsert({
+              where: { id: item.id },
+              update: convertDates(item),
+              create: convertDates(item),
+            });
+          }
+        },
+      },
     ];
 
     let totalRestored = 0;
@@ -912,10 +944,10 @@ export async function restoreBackup(backupName: string): Promise<RestoreResult>
     let restoredFiles = 0;
     const uploadsBackupDir = path.join(backupDir, 'uploads');
     if (fs.existsSync(uploadsBackupDir)) {
-      // Bestehenden Uploads-Ordner leeren (optional: könnte auch nur überschreiben)
+      // Inhalte leeren, das Verzeichnis selbst NICHT löschen –
-      if (fs.existsSync(UPLOADS_DIR)) {
+      // UPLOADS_DIR ist im Container ein Bind-Mount auf den Host und
-        deleteDirectory(UPLOADS_DIR);
+      // `rmdir` darauf liefert EBUSY (siehe emptyDirectory()).
-      }
+      emptyDirectory(UPLOADS_DIR);
       restoredFiles = copyDirectory(uploadsBackupDir, UPLOADS_DIR);
     }
 

backend/src/services/cachedEmail.service.ts

@@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ export interface EmailListOptions {
   limit?: number;
   offset?: number;
   includeBody?: boolean;
+  // Suche / Filter (alle AND-verknüpft)
+  search?: string;                // Volltextsuche über subject + from + body
+  fromFilter?: string;            // Absender enthält
+  toFilter?: string;              // Empfänger enthält
+  subjectFilter?: string;         // Subject enthält
+  bodyFilter?: string;            // Body enthält (text/html)
+  attachmentNameFilter?: string;  // Anhang-Dateiname enthält
+  hasAttachments?: boolean;       // Nur mit/ohne Anhang
+  isRead?: boolean;               // Gelesen-Status
+  isStarred?: boolean;            // Markiert-Status
+  receivedFrom?: Date;            // Empfangen ab
+  receivedTo?: Date;              // Empfangen bis
 }
 
 // ==================== SYNC FUNCTIONS ====================
@@ -273,6 +285,59 @@ export async function getCachedEmails(
     where.folder = EmailFolder.INBOX;
   }
 
+  // ===== Such-/Filter-Parameter =====
+  // Volltext-Quicksearch: durchsucht parallel Subject, From-Address/Name und
+  // Body. MariaDB `contains` ist case-insensitive bei utf8mb4_unicode_ci.
+  if (options.search && options.search.trim()) {
+    const q = options.search.trim();
+    where.OR = [
+      { subject: { contains: q } },
+      { fromAddress: { contains: q } },
+      { fromName: { contains: q } },
+      { textBody: { contains: q } },
+    ];
+  }
+
+  // Feldspezifische Filter (alle AND-verknüpft mit dem Rest)
+  if (options.fromFilter?.trim()) {
+    const q = options.fromFilter.trim();
+    // Treffer in fromAddress ODER fromName – für den Nutzer ist „Von" beides
+    where.AND = [
+      ...(Array.isArray(where.AND) ? where.AND : where.AND ? [where.AND] : []),
+      { OR: [{ fromAddress: { contains: q } }, { fromName: { contains: q } }] },
+    ];
+  }
+  if (options.toFilter?.trim()) {
+    where.toAddresses = { contains: options.toFilter.trim() };
+  }
+  if (options.subjectFilter?.trim()) {
+    where.subject = { contains: options.subjectFilter.trim() };
+  }
+  if (options.bodyFilter?.trim()) {
+    const q = options.bodyFilter.trim();
+    where.AND = [
+      ...(Array.isArray(where.AND) ? where.AND : where.AND ? [where.AND] : []),
+      { OR: [{ textBody: { contains: q } }, { htmlBody: { contains: q } }] },
+    ];
+  }
+  if (options.attachmentNameFilter?.trim()) {
+    where.attachmentNames = { contains: options.attachmentNameFilter.trim() };
+  }
+  if (typeof options.hasAttachments === 'boolean') {
+    where.hasAttachments = options.hasAttachments;
+  }
+  if (typeof options.isRead === 'boolean') {
+    where.isRead = options.isRead;
+  }
+  if (typeof options.isStarred === 'boolean') {
+    where.isStarred = options.isStarred;
+  }
+  if (options.receivedFrom || options.receivedTo) {
+    where.receivedAt = {};
+    if (options.receivedFrom) (where.receivedAt as Prisma.DateTimeFilter).gte = options.receivedFrom;
+    if (options.receivedTo) (where.receivedAt as Prisma.DateTimeFilter).lte = options.receivedTo;
+  }
+
   // Body-Felder nur wenn explizit angefordert (spart Bandbreite)
   const select: Prisma.CachedEmailSelect = {
     id: true,

backend/src/services/consent.service.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,24 @@ import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import fs from 'fs';
 import path from 'path';
 
+// Whitelist legitimer Werte für CustomerConsent.source. Schema-Kommentar:
+// "portal", "telefon", "papier", "email". Public-Link-Flow nutzt
+// 'public-link', CRM-Backend-Override 'crm-backend'. Alles andere
+// (z.B. "ADMIN_OVERRIDE", "<script>") wird abgelehnt – Pentest 2026-05-20.
+export const ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  'portal',
+  'public-link',
+  'telefon',
+  'papier',
+  'email',
+  'crm-backend',
+]);
+
+export function sanitizeConsentSource(value: unknown, fallback: string): string {
+  const v = typeof value === 'string' ? value : '';
+  return ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES.has(v) ? v : fallback;
+}
+
 export interface UpdateConsentData {
   status: ConsentStatus;
   source?: string;

backend/src/services/contract.service.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { ContractType, ContractStatus } from '@prisma/client';
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 import { generateContractNumber, paginate, buildPaginationResponse } from '../utils/helpers.js';
 import { encrypt, decrypt } from '../utils/encryption.js';
+import { sanitizeCustomerStrict } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
 
 export interface ContractFilters {
   customerId?: number;
@@ -154,7 +155,18 @@ export async function getContractById(id: number, decryptPassword = false) {
 
   if (!contract) return null;
 
-  // Decrypt password if requested and exists
+  // SECURITY: Embedded Customer-Objekt sanitizen, sonst leaken
+  // portalPasswordHash + portalPasswordEncrypted + Reset-Token in jede
+  // contract.customer-Response. Der direkte `/customers/:id`-Endpoint hat
+  // den Schutz schon; hier wäre er ohne Sanitize bypassbar.
+  if (contract.customer) {
+    (contract as Record<string, unknown>).customer = sanitizeCustomerStrict(
+      contract.customer as Record<string, unknown>,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt password if requested and exists (Contract-Anbieter-Passwort,
+  // nicht zu verwechseln mit Customer-Portal-Passwort)
   if (decryptPassword && contract.portalPasswordEncrypted) {
     try {
       (contract as Record<string, unknown>).portalPasswordDecrypted = decrypt(
@@ -385,6 +397,15 @@ export async function createContract(data: ContractCreateData) {
     },
   });
 
+  // Embedded Customer-Objekt sanitizen (siehe getContractById – derselbe
+  // Schutz; createContract gibt den frisch erstellten Vertrag inkl. Customer
+  // zurück, und der darf keine Passwort-Hashes/-Encryptions leaken).
+  if (contract.customer) {
+    (contract as Record<string, unknown>).customer = sanitizeCustomerStrict(
+      contract.customer as Record<string, unknown>,
+    );
+  }
+
   return contract;
 }
 
@@ -765,6 +786,251 @@ export async function createFollowUpContract(previousContractId: number) {
   return createContract(newContractData);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Hilfsfunktion: extrahiert die Anzahl Monate aus einer ContractDuration.
+ * Code-Beispiele: "12M", "24M", "1J", "2J". Falls nichts erkannt wird, fällt
+ * sie auf 12 Monate als sicheren Default zurück.
+ */
+function durationToMonths(code: string | null | undefined, description: string | null | undefined): number {
+  const c = (code || '').trim();
+  const d = (description || '').trim();
+  let m = c.match(/^(\d+)\s*M$/i);
+  if (m) return parseInt(m[1], 10);
+  m = c.match(/^(\d+)\s*J$/i);
+  if (m) return parseInt(m[1], 10) * 12;
+  m = d.match(/(\d+)\s*Monat/i);
+  if (m) return parseInt(m[1], 10);
+  m = d.match(/(\d+)\s*Jahr/i);
+  if (m) return parseInt(m[1], 10) * 12;
+  return 12;
+}
+
+/**
+ * VVL = Vertragsverlängerung beim selben Anbieter.
+ *
+ * Im Gegensatz zu createFollowUpContract werden ALLE Daten 1:1 kopiert:
+ * Provider, Tarif, Portal-Credentials, Preise, Notes, ContractDocuments.
+ *
+ * Berechnet wird das neue Startdatum: altes startDate + Vertragslaufzeit.
+ * Stimmt das gefundene Datum nicht mit dem späteren Auftrag überein, kann
+ * der User es im Vertrag manuell anpassen.
+ *
+ * NICHT mitkopiert wird:
+ *   - das Auftragsdokument (documentType "Auftragsformular") – das ist
+ *     schließlich die NEU zu unterschreibende VVL.
+ *   - Kündigungsschreiben/-bestätigung (das war der ALTE Cancel-Flow,
+ *     bei einer VVL nicht relevant)
+ */
+export async function createRenewalContract(previousContractId: number) {
+  const previousContract = await getContractById(previousContractId, true);
+  if (!previousContract) {
+    throw new Error('Vorgängervertrag nicht gefunden');
+  }
+
+  // Bereits ein Folge-/VVL-Vertrag vorhanden?
+  const existing = await prisma.contract.findFirst({
+    where: { previousContractId },
+    select: { id: true, contractNumber: true },
+  });
+  if (existing) {
+    throw new Error(`Es existiert bereits ein Folgevertrag: ${existing.contractNumber}`);
+  }
+
+  // Neues Startdatum = altes Start + Laufzeit
+  let newStartDate: Date | null = null;
+  let newEndDate: Date | null = null;
+  if (previousContract.startDate && previousContract.contractDuration) {
+    const months = durationToMonths(
+      previousContract.contractDuration.code,
+      previousContract.contractDuration.description,
+    );
+    newStartDate = new Date(previousContract.startDate);
+    newStartDate.setMonth(newStartDate.getMonth() + months);
+    newEndDate = new Date(newStartDate);
+    newEndDate.setMonth(newEndDate.getMonth() + months);
+  }
+
+  // Vertrags-Daten 1:1 kopieren (außer id/contractNumber/Datums-/Cancellation-Felder)
+  const contractNumber = generateContractNumber(previousContract.type);
+
+  const newContract = await prisma.contract.create({
+    data: {
+      contractNumber,
+      customerId: previousContract.customerId,
+      type: previousContract.type,
+      status: 'DRAFT',
+      contractCategoryId: previousContract.contractCategoryId,
+      addressId: previousContract.addressId,
+      billingAddressId: previousContract.billingAddressId,
+      bankCardId: previousContract.bankCardId,
+      identityDocumentId: previousContract.identityDocumentId,
+      salesPlatformId: previousContract.salesPlatformId,
+      cancellationPeriodId: previousContract.cancellationPeriodId,
+      contractDurationId: previousContract.contractDurationId,
+      previousContractId: previousContract.id,
+      previousProviderId: previousContract.previousProviderId,
+      providerId: previousContract.providerId,
+      tariffId: previousContract.tariffId,
+      providerName: previousContract.providerName,
+      tariffName: previousContract.tariffName,
+      customerNumberAtProvider: previousContract.customerNumberAtProvider,
+      portalUsername: previousContract.portalUsername,
+      portalPasswordEncrypted: previousContract.portalPasswordEncrypted,
+      commission: previousContract.commission,
+      notes: previousContract.notes,
+      startDate: newStartDate,
+      endDate: newEndDate,
+      // Cancellation-Felder bewusst leer lassen – die VVL hat den alten
+      // Cancel-Flow nicht geerbt.
+    },
+  });
+
+  // Detail-Tabellen 1:1 kopieren (id rausnehmen, contractId neu)
+  if (previousContract.energyDetails) {
+    const ed = previousContract.energyDetails;
+    const newEnergy = await prisma.energyContractDetails.create({
+      data: {
+        contractId: newContract.id,
+        meterId: ed.meterId,
+        maloId: ed.maloId,
+        annualConsumption: ed.annualConsumption,
+        annualConsumptionKwh: ed.annualConsumptionKwh,
+        basePrice: ed.basePrice,
+        unitPrice: ed.unitPrice,
+        unitPriceNt: ed.unitPriceNt,
+        bonus: ed.bonus,
+        previousProviderName: ed.previousProviderName,
+        previousCustomerNumber: ed.previousCustomerNumber,
+      },
+    });
+    // ContractMeter-Verknüpfungen mitkopieren
+    for (const cm of ed.contractMeters || []) {
+      await prisma.contractMeter.create({
+        data: {
+          energyContractDetailsId: newEnergy.id,
+          meterId: cm.meterId,
+          position: cm.position,
+          installedAt: cm.installedAt,
+          removedAt: cm.removedAt,
+          finalReading: cm.finalReading,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  if (previousContract.internetDetails) {
+    const id = previousContract.internetDetails;
+    const newInet = await prisma.internetContractDetails.create({
+      data: {
+        contractId: newContract.id,
+        downloadSpeed: id.downloadSpeed,
+        uploadSpeed: id.uploadSpeed,
+        routerModel: id.routerModel,
+        routerSerialNumber: id.routerSerialNumber,
+        installationDate: id.installationDate,
+        internetUsername: id.internetUsername,
+        internetPasswordEncrypted: id.internetPasswordEncrypted,
+        propertyType: id.propertyType,
+        propertyLocation: id.propertyLocation,
+        connectionLocation: id.connectionLocation,
+        homeId: id.homeId,
+        activationCode: id.activationCode,
+      },
+    });
+    for (const pn of id.phoneNumbers || []) {
+      await prisma.phoneNumber.create({
+        data: {
+          internetContractDetailsId: newInet.id,
+          phoneNumber: pn.phoneNumber,
+          isMain: pn.isMain,
+          sipUsername: pn.sipUsername,
+          sipPasswordEncrypted: pn.sipPasswordEncrypted,
+          sipServer: pn.sipServer,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  if (previousContract.mobileDetails) {
+    const md = previousContract.mobileDetails;
+    const newMob = await prisma.mobileContractDetails.create({
+      data: {
+        contractId: newContract.id,
+        requiresMultisim: md.requiresMultisim,
+        dataVolume: md.dataVolume,
+        includedMinutes: md.includedMinutes,
+        includedSMS: md.includedSMS,
+        deviceModel: md.deviceModel,
+        deviceImei: md.deviceImei,
+        phoneNumber: md.phoneNumber,
+        simCardNumber: md.simCardNumber,
+      },
+    });
+    for (const sc of md.simCards || []) {
+      await prisma.simCard.create({
+        data: {
+          mobileDetailsId: newMob.id,
+          phoneNumber: sc.phoneNumber,
+          simCardNumber: sc.simCardNumber,
+          isMultisim: sc.isMultisim,
+          isMain: sc.isMain,
+          pin: sc.pin,
+          puk: sc.puk,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  if (previousContract.tvDetails) {
+    await prisma.tvContractDetails.create({
+      data: {
+        contractId: newContract.id,
+        receiverModel: previousContract.tvDetails.receiverModel,
+        smartcardNumber: previousContract.tvDetails.smartcardNumber,
+        package: previousContract.tvDetails.package,
+      },
+    });
+  }
+  if (previousContract.carInsuranceDetails) {
+    const ci = previousContract.carInsuranceDetails;
+    await prisma.carInsuranceDetails.create({
+      data: {
+        contractId: newContract.id,
+        licensePlate: ci.licensePlate,
+        hsn: ci.hsn,
+        tsn: ci.tsn,
+        vin: ci.vin,
+        vehicleType: ci.vehicleType,
+        firstRegistration: ci.firstRegistration,
+        noClaimsClass: ci.noClaimsClass,
+        insuranceType: ci.insuranceType,
+        deductiblePartial: ci.deductiblePartial,
+        deductibleFull: ci.deductibleFull,
+        previousInsurer: ci.previousInsurer,
+      },
+    });
+  }
+
+  // ContractDocuments mitkopieren – AUSSER "Auftragsformular" (das ist die
+  // neue Unterschrift, die der User selbst hochlädt). Files werden NICHT
+  // physisch dupliziert; beide Verträge zeigen auf dieselbe Datei.
+  const docs = await prisma.contractDocument.findMany({
+    where: { contractId: previousContract.id },
+  });
+  for (const d of docs) {
+    if (d.documentType.toLowerCase().includes('auftragsformular')) continue;
+    await prisma.contractDocument.create({
+      data: {
+        contractId: newContract.id,
+        documentType: d.documentType,
+        documentPath: d.documentPath,
+        originalName: d.originalName,
+        notes: d.notes,
+        uploadedBy: d.uploadedBy,
+      },
+    });
+  }
+
+  return prisma.contract.findUnique({ where: { id: newContract.id } });
+}
+
 // Decrypt password for viewing
 export async function getContractPassword(id: number): Promise<string | null> {
   const contract = await prisma.contract.findUnique({

backend/src/services/contractCockpit.service.ts

@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ function calculateCancellationDeadline(
   return end;
 }
 
-export async function getCockpitData(): Promise<CockpitResult> {
+export async function getCockpitData(opts?: { customerIds?: number[] }): Promise<CockpitResult> {
   // Lade Einstellungen
   const settings = await appSettingService.getAllSettings();
   const criticalDays = parseInt(settings.deadlineCriticalDays) || 14;
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ export async function getCockpitData(): Promise<CockpitResult> {
   const docExpiryCriticalDays = parseInt(settings.documentExpiryCriticalDays) || 30;
   const docExpiryWarningDays = parseInt(settings.documentExpiryWarningDays) || 90;
 
+  // Portal-Filter: Wenn customerIds gesetzt sind (Kundenportal-User), beschränken
+  // wir ALLE Cockpit-Queries auf diese Customer-IDs. Leeres Array → keine Treffer.
+  const customerScopeFilter = opts?.customerIds
+    ? { customerId: { in: opts.customerIds } }
+    : {};
+
   // Lade alle relevanten Verträge (inkl. CANCELLED/DEACTIVATED für Schlussrechnung-Check)
   const contracts = await prisma.contract.findMany({
     where: {
       status: {
         in: ['ACTIVE', 'PENDING', 'DRAFT', 'CANCELLED', 'DEACTIVATED', 'EXPIRED'],
       },
+      ...customerScopeFilter,
     },
     include: {
       customer: {
@@ -283,9 +290,9 @@ export async function getCockpitData(): Promise<CockpitResult> {
     },
   };
 
-  // Consent-Daten batch-laden für alle Kunden
+  // Consent-Daten batch-laden für alle (erlaubten) Kunden
   const allConsents = await prisma.customerConsent.findMany({
-    where: { status: 'GRANTED' },
+    where: { status: 'GRANTED', ...customerScopeFilter },
     select: { customerId: true, consentType: true },
   });
 
@@ -300,7 +307,7 @@ export async function getCockpitData(): Promise<CockpitResult> {
 
   // Widerrufene Consents laden
   const withdrawnConsents = await prisma.customerConsent.findMany({
-    where: { status: 'WITHDRAWN' },
+    where: { status: 'WITHDRAWN', ...customerScopeFilter },
     select: { customerId: true, consentType: true },
   });
   const withdrawnConsentsMap = new Map<number, Set<string>>();
@@ -733,10 +740,10 @@ export async function getCockpitData(): Promise<CockpitResult> {
   });
 
   // Vertragsunabhängige Ausweis-Warnungen
-  const documentAlerts = await getDocumentExpiryAlerts(docExpiryCriticalDays, docExpiryWarningDays);
+  const documentAlerts = await getDocumentExpiryAlerts(docExpiryCriticalDays, docExpiryWarningDays, opts?.customerIds);
 
   // Gemeldete Zählerstände (REPORTED Status)
-  const reportedReadings = await getReportedMeterReadings();
+  const reportedReadings = await getReportedMeterReadings(opts?.customerIds);
 
   return {
     contracts: cockpitContracts,
@@ -754,7 +761,11 @@ export async function getCockpitData(): Promise<CockpitResult> {
 /**
  * Alle aktiven Ausweise die ablaufen oder abgelaufen sind (vertragsunabhängig)
  */
-async function getDocumentExpiryAlerts(criticalDays: number, warningDays: number): Promise<DocumentAlert[]> {
+async function getDocumentExpiryAlerts(
+  criticalDays: number,
+  warningDays: number,
+  customerIds?: number[],
+): Promise<DocumentAlert[]> {
   const now = new Date();
   const inWarningDays = new Date(now.getTime() + warningDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
 
@@ -762,6 +773,7 @@ async function getDocumentExpiryAlerts(criticalDays: number, warningDays: number
     where: {
       isActive: true,
       expiryDate: { lte: inWarningDays },
+      ...(customerIds ? { customerId: { in: customerIds } } : {}),
     },
     include: {
       customer: {
@@ -798,9 +810,12 @@ async function getDocumentExpiryAlerts(criticalDays: number, warningDays: number
 /**
  * Vom Kunden gemeldete Zählerstände die noch nicht übertragen wurden
  */
-async function getReportedMeterReadings(): Promise<ReportedMeterReading[]> {
+async function getReportedMeterReadings(customerIds?: number[]): Promise<ReportedMeterReading[]> {
   const readings = await prisma.meterReading.findMany({
-    where: { status: 'REPORTED' },
+    where: {
+      status: 'REPORTED',
+      ...(customerIds ? { meter: { customerId: { in: customerIds } } } : {}),
+    },
     include: {
       meter: {
         include: {

backend/src/services/contractHistory.service.ts

@@ -129,3 +129,35 @@ export async function createNewContractFromPredecessorEntry(
     createdBy,
   });
 }
+
+/**
+ * Automatischen Historie-Eintrag für VVL (Vertragsverlängerung) im Vorgängervertrag.
+ */
+export async function createRenewalHistoryEntry(
+  previousContractId: number,
+  newContractNumber: string,
+  createdBy: string
+) {
+  return createHistoryEntry(previousContractId, {
+    title: `Vertragsverlängerung erstellt: ${newContractNumber}`,
+    description: `Eine Vertragsverlängerung (VVL) als ${newContractNumber} wurde aus diesem Vertrag erstellt – alle Daten wurden 1:1 übernommen, das Auftragsdokument muss neu hochgeladen werden.`,
+    isAutomatic: true,
+    createdBy,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Automatischen Historie-Eintrag im neuen VVL-Vertrag.
+ */
+export async function createNewRenewalFromPredecessorEntry(
+  newContractId: number,
+  previousContractNumber: string,
+  createdBy: string
+) {
+  return createHistoryEntry(newContractId, {
+    title: `VVL zu ${previousContractNumber}`,
+    description: `Dieser Vertrag wurde als Vertragsverlängerung (VVL) zu ${previousContractNumber} erstellt.`,
+    isAutomatic: true,
+    createdBy,
+  });
+}

backend/src/services/contractStatusScheduler.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/**
+ * Scheduler für automatische Vertrags-Status-Übergänge.
+ *
+ * Einmal täglich um 02:00: alle Verträge mit status=ACTIVE und
+ * endDate < heute werden auf EXPIRED umgestellt (+ Audit-Log).
+ *
+ * Läuft zusätzlich 60 Sekunden nach Server-Start als Catch-up falls
+ * der Prozess zum 02:00-Slot neu gestartet wurde.
+ */
+import cron from 'node-cron';
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import { createAuditLog, logChange } from './audit.service.js';
+
+async function runExpireCheck(): Promise<void> {
+  const today = new Date();
+  today.setHours(0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+  const expiring = await prisma.contract.findMany({
+    where: {
+      status: 'ACTIVE',
+      endDate: { not: null, lt: today },
+    },
+    select: {
+      id: true,
+      contractNumber: true,
+      customerId: true,
+      endDate: true,
+    },
+  });
+
+  if (expiring.length === 0) {
+    console.log('[ContractStatusScheduler] Keine abgelaufenen Verträge.');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  console.log(`[ContractStatusScheduler] ${expiring.length} Vertrag/Verträge auf EXPIRED setzen.`);
+
+  for (const c of expiring) {
+    try {
+      await prisma.contract.update({
+        where: { id: c.id },
+        data: { status: 'EXPIRED' },
+      });
+
+      await createAuditLog({
+        userEmail: 'system',
+        userRole: 'System',
+        action: 'UPDATE',
+        resourceType: 'Contract',
+        resourceId: c.id.toString(),
+        resourceLabel: `Vertrag ${c.contractNumber} automatisch auf EXPIRED gesetzt (Laufzeit überschritten)`,
+        endpoint: 'scheduler:contract-status',
+        httpMethod: 'SYSTEM',
+        ipAddress: 'localhost',
+        dataSubjectId: c.customerId,
+        changesBefore: { status: 'ACTIVE' },
+        changesAfter: { status: 'EXPIRED', endDate: c.endDate?.toISOString() },
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error(`[ContractStatusScheduler] Fehler bei Vertrag #${c.id}:`, err);
+    }
+  }
+
+  console.log('[ContractStatusScheduler] Fertig.');
+}
+
+export function startContractStatusScheduler(): void {
+  // Täglich um 02:00 Uhr (Server-Zeit)
+  cron.schedule('0 2 * * *', () => {
+    runExpireCheck().catch((err) =>
+      console.error('[ContractStatusScheduler] Daily run failed:', err),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // Catch-up 60 Sekunden nach Start
+  setTimeout(() => {
+    runExpireCheck().catch((err) =>
+      console.error('[ContractStatusScheduler] Catch-up run failed:', err),
+    );
+  }, 60_000);
+
+  console.log('[ContractStatusScheduler] Gestartet – täglich um 02:00 + Catch-up nach 60s');
+}
+
+export { runExpireCheck };
+
+/**
+ * Wird nach einem ContractDocument-Upload aufgerufen. Wenn der Typ eine
+ * Lieferbestätigung ist:
+ *   - Contract.status von DRAFT auf ACTIVE setzen (falls DRAFT)
+ *   - Contract.startDate auf deliveryDate (oder heute) setzen, falls noch leer
+ *
+ * Schreibweise "Lieferbestätigung" stammt aus dem Frontend-Dropdown
+ * (SaveAttachmentModal / ContractDetail). Vergleich case-insensitive +
+ * getrimmt zur Robustheit.
+ */
+export async function maybeActivateOnDeliveryConfirmation(
+  contractId: number,
+  documentType: string,
+  req: unknown,
+  deliveryDate?: Date | string | null,
+): Promise<void> {
+  if (!documentType || typeof documentType !== 'string') return;
+  if (documentType.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'lieferbestätigung') return;
+
+  const contract = await prisma.contract.findUnique({
+    where: { id: contractId },
+    select: { status: true, contractNumber: true, customerId: true, startDate: true },
+  });
+  if (!contract) return;
+
+  // deliveryDate parsen, Fallback auf heute
+  let parsedDate: Date | null = null;
+  if (deliveryDate) {
+    const parsed = new Date(deliveryDate);
+    if (!isNaN(parsed.getTime())) parsedDate = parsed;
+  }
+  const effectiveDate = parsedDate || new Date();
+
+  const updateData: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  const changes: Record<string, { vorher: unknown; nachher: unknown }> = {};
+
+  if (contract.status === 'DRAFT') {
+    updateData.status = 'ACTIVE';
+    changes.status = { vorher: 'DRAFT', nachher: 'ACTIVE' };
+  }
+
+  if (!contract.startDate) {
+    updateData.startDate = effectiveDate;
+    changes.startDate = { vorher: null, nachher: effectiveDate.toISOString().split('T')[0] };
+  }
+
+  if (Object.keys(updateData).length === 0) return;
+
+  await prisma.contract.update({
+    where: { id: contractId },
+    data: updateData,
+  });
+
+  await logChange({
+    req,
+    action: 'UPDATE',
+    resourceType: 'Contract',
+    resourceId: contractId.toString(),
+    label: `Vertrag ${contract.contractNumber} automatisch aktualisiert (Lieferbestätigung hochgeladen)`,
+    details: { ...changes, trigger: 'Lieferbestätigung-Upload' },
+    customerId: contract.customerId,
+  });
+}

backend/src/services/customer.service.ts

@@ -22,10 +22,13 @@ export interface CustomerFilters {
   type?: CustomerType;
   page?: number;
   limit?: number;
+  // Wenn gesetzt: nur Customer mit id in dieser Liste. Für Portal-User, damit
+  // weder Liste noch pagination.total die globale Kunden-Zahl preisgibt.
+  allowedIds?: number[];
 }
 
 export async function getAllCustomers(filters: CustomerFilters) {
-  const { search, type, page = 1, limit = 20 } = filters;
+  const { search, type, page = 1, limit = 20, allowedIds } = filters;
   const { skip, take } = paginate(page, limit);
 
   const where: Record<string, unknown> = {};
@@ -34,6 +37,10 @@ export async function getAllCustomers(filters: CustomerFilters) {
     where.type = type;
   }
 
+  if (allowedIds) {
+    where.id = { in: allowedIds };
+  }
+
   if (search) {
     where.OR = [
       { firstName: { contains: search } },

backend/src/services/emailProvider/emailProviderService.ts

@@ -469,6 +469,22 @@ export async function deprovisionEmail(localPart: string): Promise<EmailOperatio
   }
 }
 
+// Weiterleitungsziele ersetzen (set:, nicht add:) – nutzen wir, um nach einer
+// Kunden-Email-Änderung die Forwards einer Stressfrei-Adresse auf den neuen
+// Kunden-Inbox + unsere Service-Adresse zu setzen.
+export async function setEmailForwardTargets(
+  localPart: string,
+  targets: string[],
+): Promise<EmailOperationResult> {
+  try {
+    const provider = await getProviderInstance();
+    return provider.updateForwardTargets(localPart, targets);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unbekannter Fehler';
+    return { success: false, error: errorMessage };
+  }
+}
+
 // E-Mail umbenennen
 export async function renameProvisionedEmail(
   oldLocalPart: string,

backend/src/services/factoryDefaults.service.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,32 @@
 /**
  * Factory-Defaults: Export + Import von Stammdaten-Katalogen.
- * Enthält KEINE Kundendaten, Verträge, Dokumente oder Einstellungen –
+ * Enthält KEINE Kundendaten, Verträge, Dokumente oder E-Mails –
  * nur reine Kataloge: Anbieter, Tarife, Kündigungsfristen, Laufzeiten,
- * Vertragskategorien und PDF-Auftragsvorlagen.
+ * Vertragskategorien, PDF-Auftragsvorlagen und ausgewählte
+ * HTML-Templates (Datenschutz / Impressum / Vollmacht).
  */
 
 import fs from 'fs';
 import path from 'path';
 import archiver from 'archiver';
+import AdmZip from 'adm-zip';
 import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
 
+// Whitelist der AppSetting-Keys, die ins Factory-Default-Bundle gehören.
+// Bewusst klein gehalten: nur HTML-Templates für rechtliche Standardtexte –
+// keine Secrets, keine SMTP-Konfiguration, keine User-spezifischen Settings.
+export const FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS = [
+  'privacyPolicyHtml',
+  'authorizationTemplateHtml',
+  'imprintHtml',
+  'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
+] as const;
+
+export interface AppSettingExport {
+  key: (typeof FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS)[number];
+  value: string;
+}
+
 export interface FactoryDefaultsManifest {
   version: 1;
   exportedAt: string;
@@ -20,6 +37,7 @@ export interface FactoryDefaultsManifest {
     contractDurations: number;
     contractCategories: number;
     pdfTemplates: number;
+    appSettings: number;
   };
 }
 
@@ -49,7 +67,7 @@ export interface PdfTemplateExport {
  * Sammelt alle Katalog-Daten aus der DB.
  */
 export async function collectFactoryDefaults() {
-  const [providers, cancellationPeriods, contractDurations, contractCategories, pdfTemplates] =
+  const [providers, cancellationPeriods, contractDurations, contractCategories, pdfTemplates, appSettings] =
     await Promise.all([
       prisma.provider.findMany({
         include: { tariffs: { select: { name: true, isActive: true } } },
@@ -59,6 +77,11 @@ export async function collectFactoryDefaults() {
       prisma.contractDuration.findMany({ orderBy: { code: 'asc' } }),
       prisma.contractCategory.findMany({ orderBy: { sortOrder: 'asc' } }),
       prisma.pdfTemplate.findMany({ orderBy: { name: 'asc' } }),
+      prisma.appSetting.findMany({
+        where: { key: { in: [...FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS] } },
+        select: { key: true, value: true },
+        orderBy: { key: 'asc' },
+      }),
     ]);
 
   return {
@@ -108,6 +131,7 @@ export async function collectFactoryDefaults() {
         pdfFilename: sanitizeFilename(t.name) + path.extname(t.originalName || '.pdf'),
       };
     }),
+    appSettings: appSettings as AppSettingExport[],
   };
 }
 
@@ -132,6 +156,7 @@ export async function exportFactoryDefaults(): Promise<Buffer> {
       contractDurations: data.contractDurations.length,
       contractCategories: data.contractCategories.length,
       pdfTemplates: data.pdfTemplates.length,
+      appSettings: data.appSettings.length,
     },
   };
 
@@ -160,6 +185,9 @@ export async function exportFactoryDefaults(): Promise<Buffer> {
     archive.append(JSON.stringify(data.pdfTemplates, null, 2), {
       name: 'pdf-templates/pdf-templates.json',
     });
+    archive.append(JSON.stringify(data.appSettings, null, 2), {
+      name: 'app-settings/app-settings.json',
+    });
 
     // PDF-Dateien physisch hinzufügen (Pfade aus DB laden)
     const uploadsRoot = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads');
@@ -192,3 +220,244 @@ export async function exportFactoryDefaults(): Promise<Buffer> {
     })();
   });
 }
+
+// ============================================================
+// IMPORT
+// ============================================================
+
+export interface FactoryDefaultsImportResult {
+  providers: number;
+  tariffs: number;
+  cancellationPeriods: number;
+  contractDurations: number;
+  contractCategories: number;
+  pdfTemplates: number;
+  pdfTemplatesSkipped: number;
+  appSettings: number;
+  warnings: string[];
+}
+
+function parseJsonEntry<T>(zip: AdmZip, name: string): T[] {
+  const entry = zip.getEntry(name);
+  if (!entry) return [];
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(entry.getData().toString('utf-8'));
+    return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [];
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wendet ein Factory-Defaults-ZIP idempotent auf die DB an.
+ * - upsert über unique-Keys: nichts wird gelöscht
+ * - PDFs landen in `${uploads}/pdf-templates/` mit eindeutigem Suffix
+ * - AppSettings nur Whitelist-Keys (FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS)
+ *
+ * Robust gegen Zip-Slip: wir greifen nur auf bekannte Entry-Namen zu
+ * (`pdf-templates/<basename>`), niemals auf einen aus dem ZIP konstruierten
+ * Pfad im Filesystem.
+ */
+export async function importFactoryDefaults(
+  zipBuffer: Buffer,
+): Promise<FactoryDefaultsImportResult> {
+  const zip = new AdmZip(zipBuffer);
+  const result: FactoryDefaultsImportResult = {
+    providers: 0,
+    tariffs: 0,
+    cancellationPeriods: 0,
+    contractDurations: 0,
+    contractCategories: 0,
+    pdfTemplates: 0,
+    pdfTemplatesSkipped: 0,
+    appSettings: 0,
+    warnings: [],
+  };
+
+  // --- Providers + Tariffs
+  const providers = parseJsonEntry<ProviderExport>(zip, 'providers/providers.json');
+  for (const p of providers) {
+    if (!p.name) continue;
+    const provider = await prisma.provider.upsert({
+      where: { name: p.name },
+      update: {
+        portalUrl: p.portalUrl ?? null,
+        usernameFieldName: p.usernameFieldName ?? null,
+        passwordFieldName: p.passwordFieldName ?? null,
+        isActive: p.isActive ?? true,
+      },
+      create: {
+        name: p.name,
+        portalUrl: p.portalUrl ?? null,
+        usernameFieldName: p.usernameFieldName ?? null,
+        passwordFieldName: p.passwordFieldName ?? null,
+        isActive: p.isActive ?? true,
+      },
+    });
+    result.providers++;
+    for (const t of p.tariffs ?? []) {
+      if (!t.name) continue;
+      await prisma.tariff.upsert({
+        where: { providerId_name: { providerId: provider.id, name: t.name } },
+        update: { isActive: t.isActive ?? true },
+        create: { providerId: provider.id, name: t.name, isActive: t.isActive ?? true },
+      });
+      result.tariffs++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // --- Contract-Meta
+  const cancellationPeriods = parseJsonEntry<{ code: string; description: string; isActive?: boolean }>(
+    zip,
+    'contract-meta/cancellation-periods.json',
+  );
+  for (const c of cancellationPeriods) {
+    if (!c.code || !c.description) continue;
+    await prisma.cancellationPeriod.upsert({
+      where: { code: c.code },
+      update: { description: c.description, isActive: c.isActive ?? true },
+      create: { code: c.code, description: c.description, isActive: c.isActive ?? true },
+    });
+    result.cancellationPeriods++;
+  }
+
+  const contractDurations = parseJsonEntry<{ code: string; description: string; isActive?: boolean }>(
+    zip,
+    'contract-meta/contract-durations.json',
+  );
+  for (const d of contractDurations) {
+    if (!d.code || !d.description) continue;
+    await prisma.contractDuration.upsert({
+      where: { code: d.code },
+      update: { description: d.description, isActive: d.isActive ?? true },
+      create: { code: d.code, description: d.description, isActive: d.isActive ?? true },
+    });
+    result.contractDurations++;
+  }
+
+  const contractCategories = parseJsonEntry<{
+    code: string;
+    name: string;
+    icon?: string | null;
+    color?: string | null;
+    sortOrder?: number;
+    isActive?: boolean;
+  }>(zip, 'contract-meta/contract-categories.json');
+  for (const c of contractCategories) {
+    if (!c.code || !c.name) continue;
+    await prisma.contractCategory.upsert({
+      where: { code: c.code },
+      update: {
+        name: c.name,
+        icon: c.icon ?? null,
+        color: c.color ?? null,
+        sortOrder: c.sortOrder ?? 0,
+        isActive: c.isActive ?? true,
+      },
+      create: {
+        code: c.code,
+        name: c.name,
+        icon: c.icon ?? null,
+        color: c.color ?? null,
+        sortOrder: c.sortOrder ?? 0,
+        isActive: c.isActive ?? true,
+      },
+    });
+    result.contractCategories++;
+  }
+
+  // --- PDF-Vorlagen (JSON + binär aus dem ZIP)
+  const pdfTemplates = parseJsonEntry<PdfTemplateExport>(
+    zip,
+    'pdf-templates/pdf-templates.json',
+  );
+  if (pdfTemplates.length > 0) {
+    const uploadsRoot = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads');
+    const pdfDestDir = path.join(uploadsRoot, 'pdf-templates');
+    if (!fs.existsSync(pdfDestDir)) {
+      fs.mkdirSync(pdfDestDir, { recursive: true });
+    }
+    for (const t of pdfTemplates) {
+      if (!t.name || !t.pdfFilename) continue;
+      // Anti-Zip-Slip: nur basename verwenden, kein Pfad
+      const basename = path.basename(t.pdfFilename);
+      const entry = zip.getEntry(`pdf-templates/${basename}`);
+      if (!entry) {
+        result.pdfTemplatesSkipped++;
+        result.warnings.push(`PDF fehlt im ZIP: ${basename} – Vorlage "${t.name}" übersprungen`);
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      const ext = path.extname(t.originalName || basename) || '.pdf';
+      const uniqueSuffix = Date.now() + '-' + Math.round(Math.random() * 1e9);
+      const safeName = t.name.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, '-');
+      const destFilename = `seed-${safeName}-${uniqueSuffix}${ext}`;
+      const destPdf = path.join(pdfDestDir, destFilename);
+      const relativePath = `/uploads/pdf-templates/${destFilename}`;
+
+      fs.writeFileSync(destPdf, entry.getData());
+
+      // Bei existierender Vorlage die alte Datei aufräumen
+      const existing = await prisma.pdfTemplate.findUnique({ where: { name: t.name } });
+      if (existing?.templatePath) {
+        const oldRel = existing.templatePath.startsWith('/uploads/')
+          ? existing.templatePath.substring('/uploads/'.length)
+          : existing.templatePath;
+        const oldAbs = path.join(uploadsRoot, oldRel);
+        if (fs.existsSync(oldAbs)) {
+          try {
+            fs.unlinkSync(oldAbs);
+          } catch {
+            // ignore
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      const fieldMappingJson = JSON.stringify(t.fieldMapping ?? {});
+      await prisma.pdfTemplate.upsert({
+        where: { name: t.name },
+        update: {
+          description: t.description ?? null,
+          providerName: t.providerName ?? null,
+          templatePath: relativePath,
+          originalName: t.originalName,
+          fieldMapping: fieldMappingJson,
+          phoneFieldPrefix: t.phoneFieldPrefix ?? null,
+          maxPhoneFields: t.maxPhoneFields ?? 8,
+          isActive: t.isActive ?? true,
+        },
+        create: {
+          name: t.name,
+          description: t.description ?? null,
+          providerName: t.providerName ?? null,
+          templatePath: relativePath,
+          originalName: t.originalName,
+          fieldMapping: fieldMappingJson,
+          phoneFieldPrefix: t.phoneFieldPrefix ?? null,
+          maxPhoneFields: t.maxPhoneFields ?? 8,
+          isActive: t.isActive ?? true,
+        },
+      });
+      result.pdfTemplates++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // --- AppSettings (HTML-Templates, Whitelist)
+  const appSettings = parseJsonEntry<AppSettingExport>(zip, 'app-settings/app-settings.json');
+  const allowedKeys = new Set<string>(FACTORY_DEFAULT_APP_SETTING_KEYS);
+  for (const s of appSettings) {
+    if (!s.key || typeof s.value !== 'string') continue;
+    if (!allowedKeys.has(s.key)) {
+      result.warnings.push(`AppSetting-Key '${s.key}' nicht auf Whitelist – ignoriert`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    await prisma.appSetting.upsert({
+      where: { key: s.key },
+      update: { value: s.value },
+      create: { key: s.key, value: s.value },
+    });
+    result.appSettings++;
+  }
+
+  return result;
+}

backend/src/services/fileDownload.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/**
+ * Pfad → Resource → Owner Mapping für `/api/files/download`.
+ *
+ * Jeder Upload-Subdirectory ist mit genau einem Prisma-Model + Path-Field
+ * verknüpft. Wir suchen den Record, der diesen Path referenziert, und
+ * leiten daraus den zuständigen Customer/Contract ab. canAccessCustomer /
+ * canAccessContract entscheidet danach über Zugriff.
+ *
+ * Pfade werden 1:1 mit dem in der DB gespeicherten Wert verglichen
+ * (z.B. `/uploads/bank-cards/12345.pdf`). Damit ist Path-Traversal
+ * automatisch ausgeschlossen – ein konstruierter Pfad findet keinen Record.
+ */
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+
+export type FileOwner =
+  | { kind: 'customer'; customerId: number }
+  | { kind: 'contract'; contractId: number }
+  | { kind: 'admin' }
+  | { kind: 'gdpr-admin' };
+
+export async function findUploadOwner(uploadPath: string): Promise<FileOwner | null> {
+  // Format-Check: muss mit /uploads/<subDir>/<filename> beginnen, kein Traversal.
+  if (!uploadPath.startsWith('/uploads/')) return null;
+  if (uploadPath.includes('..') || uploadPath.includes('\0')) return null;
+
+  const parts = uploadPath.split('/');
+  // ['', 'uploads', '<subDir>', '<filename...>']
+  if (parts.length < 4) return null;
+  const subDir = parts[2];
+
+  switch (subDir) {
+    case 'bank-cards': {
+      const r = await prisma.bankCard.findFirst({
+        where: { documentPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { customerId: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'customer', customerId: r.customerId } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'documents': {
+      const r = await prisma.identityDocument.findFirst({
+        where: { documentPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { customerId: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'customer', customerId: r.customerId } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'business-registrations': {
+      const r = await prisma.customer.findFirst({
+        where: { businessRegistrationPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { id: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'customer', customerId: r.id } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'commercial-registers': {
+      const r = await prisma.customer.findFirst({
+        where: { commercialRegisterPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { id: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'customer', customerId: r.id } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'privacy-policies': {
+      const r = await prisma.customer.findFirst({
+        where: { privacyPolicyPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { id: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'customer', customerId: r.id } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'authorizations': {
+      const r = await prisma.representativeAuthorization.findFirst({
+        where: { documentPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { customerId: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'customer', customerId: r.customerId } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'contract-documents': {
+      const r = await prisma.contractDocument.findFirst({
+        where: { documentPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { contractId: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'contract', contractId: r.contractId } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'invoices': {
+      const r = await prisma.invoice.findFirst({
+        where: { documentPath: uploadPath },
+        select: { contractId: true },
+      });
+      return r?.contractId ? { kind: 'contract', contractId: r.contractId } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'cancellation-letters':
+    case 'cancellation-confirmations':
+    case 'cancellation-letters-options':
+    case 'cancellation-confirmations-options': {
+      const fieldMap: Record<string, 'cancellationLetterPath' | 'cancellationConfirmationPath' | 'cancellationLetterOptionsPath' | 'cancellationConfirmationOptionsPath'> = {
+        'cancellation-letters': 'cancellationLetterPath',
+        'cancellation-confirmations': 'cancellationConfirmationPath',
+        'cancellation-letters-options': 'cancellationLetterOptionsPath',
+        'cancellation-confirmations-options': 'cancellationConfirmationOptionsPath',
+      };
+      const field = fieldMap[subDir];
+      const r = await prisma.contract.findFirst({
+        where: { [field]: uploadPath },
+        select: { id: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'contract', contractId: r.id } : null;
+    }
+
+    case 'pdf-templates': {
+      // Admin-only Resource: Vorlagen gehören keinem Customer.
+      const r = await prisma.pdfTemplate.findFirst({
+        where: { templatePath: uploadPath },
+        select: { id: true },
+      });
+      return r ? { kind: 'admin' } : null;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      return null;
+  }
+}

backend/src/services/imapService.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ export interface ImapCredentials {
   password: string;
   encryption?: MailEncryption;     // SSL, STARTTLS oder NONE (Standard: SSL)
   allowSelfSignedCerts?: boolean;  // Selbstsignierte Zertifikate erlauben
+  // DNS-Rebinding-Schutz: Caller hat den Hostname zu IP aufgelöst und
+  // setzt host=IP, servername=originalHostname für TLS-SNI / Cert-Validation.
+  servername?: string;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -29,6 +32,12 @@ function buildTlsOptions(credentials: ImapCredentials): Record<string, unknown>
   const rejectUnauthorized = !credentials.allowSelfSignedCerts;
   const options: Record<string, unknown> = { rejectUnauthorized };
 
+  // DNS-Rebinding-Schutz: wenn host eine IP ist und der ursprüngliche
+  // Hostname als servername mitgeliefert wird, nutze ihn für SNI/Cert.
+  if (credentials.servername) {
+    options.servername = credentials.servername;
+  }
+
   if (credentials.allowSelfSignedCerts) {
     options.minVersion = 'TLSv1';
     options.ciphers = 'DEFAULT:@SECLEVEL=0';

backend/src/services/securityAlert.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+/**
+ * Security-Alerting:
+ *   - **Sofort-Alert** für CRITICAL-Events (sobald sie entstehen, vom
+ *     Cron alle 60s gepollt) – z.B. Threshold-Überschreitungen.
+ *   - **Hourly-Digest**: einmal pro Stunde Sammlung von HIGH+ Events,
+ *     wenn `monitoringDigestEnabled = true` und mindestens 1 Event vorhanden.
+ *   - **Threshold-Detection**: prüft Brute-Force-Patterns (z.B. >10
+ *     LOGIN_FAILED/h aus gleicher IP) und erzeugt synthetische CRITICAL-
+ *     Events wenn die Schwelle erreicht ist.
+ *
+ * Alle E-Mails laufen über die System-E-Mail-Konfiguration des Providers
+ * (genau wie Geburtstagsgrüße / Passwort-Reset). Daher gleiche Voraussetzungen.
+ */
+import cron from 'node-cron';
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import { sendEmail, SmtpCredentials } from './smtpService.js';
+import { getSystemEmailCredentials } from './emailProvider/emailProviderService.js';
+import * as appSettingService from './appSetting.service.js';
+import { emit as emitSecurityEvent } from './securityMonitor.service.js';
+import type { SecurityEvent } from '@prisma/client';
+
+interface AlertEmailParams {
+  subject: string;
+  events: SecurityEvent[];
+  isDigest: boolean;
+}
+
+interface SendResult {
+  success: boolean;
+  error?: string;
+}
+
+function severityIcon(s: string): string {
+  switch (s) {
+    case 'CRITICAL': return '🚨';
+    case 'HIGH': return '⚠️';
+    case 'MEDIUM': return '🟡';
+    case 'LOW': return '🟢';
+    default: return 'ℹ️';
+  }
+}
+
+function eventToHtmlRow(e: SecurityEvent): string {
+  const ts = e.createdAt.toLocaleString('de-DE', { dateStyle: 'short', timeStyle: 'medium' });
+  const ip = e.ipAddress || '–';
+  const who = e.userEmail || (e.userId ? `User #${e.userId}` : e.customerId ? `Kunde #${e.customerId}` : '–');
+  const ep = e.endpoint || '–';
+  return `<tr>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px;font-family:monospace;font-size:11px">${ts}</td>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px">${severityIcon(e.severity)} ${e.severity}</td>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px">${e.type}</td>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px">${e.message}</td>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px">${who}</td>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px;font-family:monospace;font-size:11px">${ip}</td>
+    <td style="padding:4px 8px;font-family:monospace;font-size:11px">${ep}</td>
+  </tr>`;
+}
+
+function buildHtmlEmail(params: AlertEmailParams): string {
+  const rows = params.events.map(eventToHtmlRow).join('\n');
+  const heading = params.isDigest
+    ? `<h2>OpenCRM Security-Digest</h2><p>Übersicht der wichtigen Events der letzten Stunde:</p>`
+    : `<h2>OpenCRM Security-Alert</h2><p>Folgendes Event wurde als kritisch eingestuft:</p>`;
+  return `<!doctype html><html><body style="font-family:sans-serif;color:#222">
+${heading}
+<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;font-size:13px">
+  <thead style="background:#f3f4f6">
+    <tr>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">Zeit</th>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">Severity</th>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">Typ</th>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">Nachricht</th>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">Wer</th>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">IP</th>
+      <th align="left" style="padding:6px 8px">Endpoint</th>
+    </tr>
+  </thead>
+  <tbody>${rows}</tbody>
+</table>
+<p style="margin-top:20px;color:#666;font-size:12px">Diese Mail wurde vom OpenCRM Monitoring-System gesendet.
+Konfiguration: Einstellungen → Monitoring.</p>
+</body></html>`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Versendet einen Alert per E-Mail. Nutzt die System-E-Mail des Providers.
+ */
+export async function sendAlertEmail(toAddress: string, params: AlertEmailParams): Promise<SendResult> {
+  const sysEmail = await getSystemEmailCredentials();
+  if (!sysEmail) {
+    return { success: false, error: 'System-E-Mail nicht konfiguriert (in Einstellungen → E-Mail-Provider)' };
+  }
+
+  const credentials: SmtpCredentials = {
+    host: sysEmail.smtpServer,
+    port: sysEmail.smtpPort,
+    user: sysEmail.emailAddress,
+    password: sysEmail.password,
+    encryption: sysEmail.smtpEncryption,
+    allowSelfSignedCerts: sysEmail.allowSelfSignedCerts,
+  };
+
+  const result = await sendEmail(
+    credentials,
+    sysEmail.emailAddress,
+    {
+      to: toAddress,
+      subject: params.subject,
+      html: buildHtmlEmail(params),
+    },
+    { context: 'security-alert', triggeredBy: 'monitor' },
+  );
+
+  return result.success
+    ? { success: true }
+    : { success: false, error: result.error };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Threshold-Detection: prüft ob in den letzten N Minuten verdächtige Patterns
+ * aufgetreten sind, die einen CRITICAL-Alert rechtfertigen.
+ *
+ * Regeln (alle pro IP):
+ *   - >= 10 LOGIN_FAILED in 60 min  → CRITICAL Brute-Force-Verdacht
+ *   - >=  5 ACCESS_DENIED in 5 min  → CRITICAL IDOR-Probing-Verdacht
+ *   - >=  3 SSRF_BLOCKED in 60 min  → CRITICAL SSRF-Probing
+ *   - >=  3 TOKEN_REJECTED HIGH in 5 min → CRITICAL JWT-Manipulation
+ */
+export async function detectThresholds(): Promise<void> {
+  const now = new Date();
+  const fiveMinAgo = new Date(now.getTime() - 5 * 60 * 1000);
+  const sixtyMinAgo = new Date(now.getTime() - 60 * 60 * 1000);
+
+  type Bucket = {
+    windowStart: Date;
+    type: 'LOGIN_FAILED' | 'ACCESS_DENIED' | 'SSRF_BLOCKED' | 'TOKEN_REJECTED';
+    threshold: number;
+    label: string;
+  };
+  const buckets: Bucket[] = [
+    { windowStart: sixtyMinAgo, type: 'LOGIN_FAILED', threshold: 10, label: 'Brute-Force-Login-Verdacht' },
+    { windowStart: fiveMinAgo, type: 'ACCESS_DENIED', threshold: 5, label: 'IDOR-Probing-Verdacht' },
+    { windowStart: sixtyMinAgo, type: 'SSRF_BLOCKED', threshold: 3, label: 'SSRF-Probing-Verdacht' },
+    { windowStart: fiveMinAgo, type: 'TOKEN_REJECTED', threshold: 3, label: 'JWT-Manipulations-Verdacht' },
+  ];
+
+  for (const b of buckets) {
+    const grouped = await prisma.securityEvent.groupBy({
+      by: ['ipAddress'],
+      where: {
+        type: b.type as any,
+        createdAt: { gte: b.windowStart },
+      },
+      _count: true,
+    });
+    for (const g of grouped) {
+      if ((g._count as number) < b.threshold) continue;
+      // Debounce: pro IP max. 1 SUSPICIOUS-Alert pro 60min (sliding window).
+      // Vorher: floor(now, hour) → resettete bei Stundenwechsel und produzierte
+      // doppelte Alerts (Bug aus Runde 10).
+      const oneHourAgo = new Date(now.getTime() - 60 * 60 * 1000);
+      const existing = await prisma.securityEvent.findFirst({
+        where: {
+          type: 'SUSPICIOUS',
+          severity: 'CRITICAL',
+          ipAddress: g.ipAddress,
+          createdAt: { gte: oneHourAgo },
+        },
+      });
+      if (existing) continue;
+
+      await emitSecurityEvent({
+        type: 'SUSPICIOUS',
+        severity: 'CRITICAL',
+        message: `${b.label}: ${g._count}× ${b.type} in ${b.windowStart === fiveMinAgo ? '5min' : '60min'} von ${g.ipAddress}`,
+        ipAddress: g.ipAddress,
+        details: { rule: b.type, count: g._count, threshold: b.threshold },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sendet pending CRITICAL-Events sofort als Einzel-Mails (debounced auf
+ * 1 Mail pro IP pro Stunde, damit nicht spammend).
+ */
+async function sendPendingCriticalAlerts(): Promise<{ sent: number; skipped: number }> {
+  const alertEmail = await appSettingService.getSetting('monitoringAlertEmail');
+  if (!alertEmail) return { sent: 0, skipped: 0 };
+
+  const pending = await prisma.securityEvent.findMany({
+    where: { severity: 'CRITICAL', alerted: false },
+    orderBy: { createdAt: 'asc' },
+    take: 50,
+  });
+
+  let sent = 0;
+  let skipped = 0;
+  for (const ev of pending) {
+    const result = await sendAlertEmail(alertEmail, {
+      subject: `[OpenCRM] 🚨 ${ev.type}: ${ev.message.substring(0, 80)}`,
+      events: [ev],
+      isDigest: false,
+    });
+    if (result.success) {
+      sent++;
+      await prisma.securityEvent.update({
+        where: { id: ev.id },
+        data: { alerted: true, alertedAt: new Date() },
+      });
+    } else {
+      skipped++;
+      console.error(`[securityAlert] Send failed for event #${ev.id}:`, result.error);
+    }
+  }
+  return { sent, skipped };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hourly-Digest: alle HIGH-Events der letzten Stunde, die noch nicht
+ * alert-versendet wurden, in einer einzigen Mail zusammenfassen.
+ */
+export async function sendDigest(opts: { force?: boolean } = {}): Promise<{ sent: boolean; eventCount: number; reason?: string }> {
+  const alertEmail = await appSettingService.getSetting('monitoringAlertEmail');
+  if (!alertEmail) return { sent: false, eventCount: 0, reason: 'Keine Alert-E-Mail konfiguriert' };
+  const enabled = await appSettingService.getSettingBool('monitoringDigestEnabled');
+  if (!enabled && !opts.force) return { sent: false, eventCount: 0, reason: 'Digest deaktiviert' };
+
+  const lastDigestAt = await appSettingService.getSetting('monitoringLastDigestAt');
+  const since = lastDigestAt ? new Date(lastDigestAt) : new Date(Date.now() - 60 * 60 * 1000);
+
+  const events = await prisma.securityEvent.findMany({
+    where: {
+      severity: { in: ['HIGH', 'MEDIUM'] },
+      alerted: false,
+      createdAt: { gte: since },
+    },
+    orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
+    take: 200,
+  });
+
+  if (events.length === 0) {
+    await appSettingService.setSetting('monitoringLastDigestAt', new Date().toISOString());
+    return { sent: false, eventCount: 0, reason: 'Keine neuen Events seit letztem Digest' };
+  }
+
+  const result = await sendAlertEmail(alertEmail, {
+    subject: `[OpenCRM] Security-Digest (${events.length} Events)`,
+    events,
+    isDigest: true,
+  });
+
+  if (result.success) {
+    await prisma.securityEvent.updateMany({
+      where: { id: { in: events.map((e) => e.id) } },
+      data: { alerted: true, alertedAt: new Date() },
+    });
+    await appSettingService.setSetting('monitoringLastDigestAt', new Date().toISOString());
+    return { sent: true, eventCount: events.length };
+  }
+
+  return { sent: false, eventCount: events.length, reason: result.error };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cron-Scheduler:
+ *   - Jede Minute: Threshold-Detection + Sofort-Alerts für CRITICAL
+ *   - Jede volle Stunde: Hourly-Digest (HIGH+MEDIUM)
+ */
+export function startSecurityMonitorScheduler(): void {
+  cron.schedule('* * * * *', async () => {
+    try {
+      await detectThresholds();
+      await sendPendingCriticalAlerts();
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error('[securityAlert] minute-cron failed:', err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  cron.schedule('0 * * * *', async () => {
+    try {
+      await sendDigest();
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error('[securityAlert] hourly-digest failed:', err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  console.log('[securityAlert] Scheduler gestartet (1min Threshold-Check, hourly Digest)');
+}

backend/src/services/securityMonitor.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/**
+ * Security-Monitor: zentrale `emit()`-Funktion für sicherheitsrelevante
+ * Events. Schreibt in die `SecurityEvent`-Tabelle (nicht im AuditLog,
+ * weil hier andere Anforderungen gelten: schnelles Filtern, Threshold-
+ * Detection, Realtime-Alerting statt forensischer Hash-Chain).
+ *
+ * Hooks für die wichtigsten Klassen:
+ *   - LOGIN_FAILED            → Login mit falschem Passwort
+ *   - LOGIN_SUCCESS           → erfolgreicher Login (informativ)
+ *   - RATE_LIMIT_HIT          → express-rate-limit hat zugeschlagen
+ *   - ACCESS_DENIED           → 403 von canAccess* (versuchter IDOR)
+ *   - SSRF_BLOCKED            → ssrfGuard hat geblockt
+ *   - PASSWORD_RESET_REQUEST  → Reset angefordert
+ *   - PASSWORD_RESET_CONFIRM  → Reset abgeschlossen
+ *   - LOGOUT                  → expliziter Logout
+ *   - TOKEN_REJECTED          → JWT verify-Failure
+ *   - PERMISSION_CHANGED      → Rolle/Permission-Update
+ *
+ * Sofort-Alert für CRITICAL+HIGH-Events (wenn `monitoringAlertEmail`
+ * konfiguriert), sonst Sammlung im stündlichen Digest.
+ */
+import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
+import type { SecurityEventType, SecuritySeverity } from '@prisma/client';
+
+export interface SecurityEventInput {
+  type: SecurityEventType;
+  severity: SecuritySeverity;
+  message: string;
+  ipAddress?: string | null;
+  userId?: number | null;
+  customerId?: number | null;
+  userEmail?: string | null;
+  endpoint?: string | null;
+  details?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Schreibt ein SecurityEvent. Fehler beim Schreiben werden geschluckt,
+ * damit ein kaputtes Monitoring nicht den Login-Flow stoppt.
+ */
+export async function emit(event: SecurityEventInput): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await prisma.securityEvent.create({
+      data: {
+        type: event.type,
+        severity: event.severity,
+        message: event.message,
+        ipAddress: event.ipAddress || null,
+        userId: event.userId || null,
+        customerId: event.customerId || null,
+        userEmail: event.userEmail || null,
+        endpoint: event.endpoint || null,
+        details: event.details ? (event.details as any) : undefined,
+      },
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('[securityMonitor] emit failed:', err);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper: aus einem Express-Request die wichtigsten Kontextfelder extrahieren.
+ * Funktioniert sowohl mit AuthRequest (eingeloggt) als auch mit anonymen
+ * Requests (Login-Versuch etc.).
+ */
+export function contextFromRequest(req: any): {
+  ipAddress: string;
+  userId?: number;
+  customerId?: number;
+  userEmail?: string;
+  endpoint: string;
+} {
+  const user = req?.user;
+  return {
+    ipAddress: req?.ip || req?.socket?.remoteAddress || 'unknown',
+    userId: user?.userId,
+    customerId: user?.customerId,
+    userEmail: user?.email,
+    endpoint: `${req?.method || ''} ${req?.path || req?.originalUrl || ''}`.trim(),
+  };
+}