The HID failure came down to the endpoint type map being indexed by endpoint number without the direction bit. A composite device can have endpoint 1 as both interrupt IN (0x81) and bulk OUT (0x01); the last one read won, so interrupt URBs were submitted as bulk and the kernel rejected them. The device attached and stayed silent. Endpoint data now comes from the raw descriptors read from /dev/bus/usb rather than sysfs, which only ever exposes the active alternate setting — a webcam's isochronous endpoints are invisible there because they only exist after SET_INTERFACE. Two sysfs parsing bugs fell out of that too: the numeric endpoint attributes are hex without a prefix (wMaxPacketSize "0040" was read as 40, not 64), and bInterval was never read at all. Reliability: three places could freeze the whole process. The share path fed io.Pipe from the WebSocket read loop, so one slow USB transfer stalled every tunnel and the keepalives with them. The relay wrote to client sockets while holding the hub lock, so one peer that stopped reading blocked routing and registration for everyone. Control transfers ran inline in the protocol loop behind a 5s timeout. Also fixed: a use-after- free where a discarded URB's memory could be collected while the kernel still owned it, a reap loop that spun at 100% CPU on ioctl errors, a missing attach timeout, a double close(done) panic, and Hash[:8] in the relay's log line, which let a client with a short hash take the server down. Adds mode "both", so one client can offer and consume devices at once. The tunnel and client-left callbacks became multicast for it: as plain fields the second manager to register silently unhooked the first. Tunnel traffic is now AES-256-GCM end to end, on the relay path as well as directly. The key is derived from the three tokens, not from the group hash — the relay is told the hash, so a key derived from it would protect nothing from the one party in the middle. Group IDs are unchanged, so existing setups keep working; only clients configured without the tokens drop to unencrypted, relay-only operation. Peers now try to connect directly, with the relay supplying the public address neither side can determine for itself. Candidates are raced because an unreachable address hangs until timeout rather than refusing. Falling back to the relay is not an error. Platform reach: cross-compiled targets for ARM, MIPS and RISC-V (the Linux client needed no code changes — usbdevfs is not architecture specific), multi-arch Docker images, an Android bridge that accepts devices over SCM_RIGHTS because apps cannot open /dev/bus/usb, and macOS builds via system_profiler enumeration. Adds a Windows KMDF filter driver under driver/windows with its Go side. UNTESTED: it has never been compiled or run, needs the WDK to build and an EV certificate to distribute. Treat it as a starting point. Adds "usb-client diag": says per machine whether sharing and using are possible, what stands in the way, and what fixes it. Reports can be uploaded to a relay to get them off machines that are awkward to copy from. 96 tests, all green under -race. Builds for linux, windows and darwin on amd64 and arm64. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
480 lines
12 KiB
Go
480 lines
12 KiB
Go
package client
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/duffy/usb-server/internal/crypto"
|
|
"github.com/duffy/usb-server/internal/protocol"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
testTok1 = "111111111111111111111111111111111111111111="
|
|
testTok2 = "222222222222222222222222222222222222222222="
|
|
testTok3 = "333333333333333333333333333333333333333333="
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func testSecret(t *testing.T) *crypto.TunnelSecret {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
s, err := crypto.DeriveTunnelSecret(testTok1, testTok2, testTok3)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("DeriveTunnelSecret: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return s
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const testTunnelID = "0123456789abcdef" // exactly TunnelHeaderSize
|
|
|
|
func TestHandshakeRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
token := s.PeerToken(testTunnelID)
|
|
|
|
greeting, err := buildHandshake(testTunnelID, token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("buildHandshake: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(greeting) != handshakeSize {
|
|
t.Fatalf("greeting is %d bytes, want %d", len(greeting), handshakeSize)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gotID, gotToken, err := parseHandshake(greeting)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parseHandshake: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if gotID != testTunnelID {
|
|
t.Errorf("tunnel ID = %q, want %q", gotID, testTunnelID)
|
|
}
|
|
if gotToken != token {
|
|
t.Errorf("token = %q, want %q", gotToken, token)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestParseHandshakeRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
valid, _ := buildHandshake(testTunnelID, s.PeerToken(testTunnelID))
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
data []byte
|
|
}{
|
|
{"empty", nil},
|
|
{"truncated", valid[:handshakeSize-1]},
|
|
{"too long", append(append([]byte{}, valid...), 0x00)},
|
|
{"bad magic", func() []byte {
|
|
b := append([]byte{}, valid...)
|
|
b[0] = 'X'
|
|
return b
|
|
}()},
|
|
{"unsupported version", func() []byte {
|
|
b := append([]byte{}, valid...)
|
|
b[4] = 99
|
|
return b
|
|
}()},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if _, _, err := parseHandshake(tt.data); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("malformed handshake was accepted")
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHandshakeReplyStatuses(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if err := parseHandshakeReply(buildHandshakeReply(directAccepted)); err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("accepted reply reported an error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, status := range []byte{directUnknownTun, directBadToken, directWrongVerson, 99} {
|
|
if err := parseHandshakeReply(buildHandshakeReply(status)); err == nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("status %d was treated as success", status)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBuildHandshakeRejectsBadInput(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
good := s.PeerToken(testTunnelID)
|
|
|
|
if _, err := buildHandshake("short", good); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("a wrong-length tunnel ID was accepted")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := buildHandshake(testTunnelID, "not-hex"); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("a non-hex token was accepted")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := buildHandshake(testTunnelID, "abcd"); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("a short token was accepted")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A listener must only hand over connections whose peer proves group
|
|
// membership. The relay knows tunnel IDs, so the token is what stops it — or
|
|
// anyone else who reaches the port — from taking a device over.
|
|
func TestListenerAcceptsOnlyValidToken(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
|
|
dl, err := newDirectListener(0, s)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("newDirectListener: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer dl.Close()
|
|
|
|
accepted, err := dl.Expect(testTunnelID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Expect: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(dl.Port()))
|
|
|
|
t.Run("wrong token is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
other, _ := crypto.DeriveTunnelSecret(testTok1, testTok2, "different")
|
|
greeting, _ := buildHandshake(testTunnelID, other.PeerToken(testTunnelID))
|
|
|
|
conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, time.Second)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
conn.Write(greeting)
|
|
reply := make([]byte, handshakeReplySize)
|
|
conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second))
|
|
if _, err := readFull(conn, reply); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("reading reply: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := parseHandshakeReply(reply); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("listener accepted a connection with the wrong token")
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("unknown tunnel is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
greeting, _ := buildHandshake("fedcba9876543210", s.PeerToken("fedcba9876543210"))
|
|
|
|
conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, time.Second)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
conn.Write(greeting)
|
|
reply := make([]byte, handshakeReplySize)
|
|
conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second))
|
|
readFull(conn, reply)
|
|
if err := parseHandshakeReply(reply); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("listener accepted a connection for an unregistered tunnel")
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("valid token is accepted", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
conn, _, err := dialDirect([]string{addr}, testTunnelID, s.PeerToken(testTunnelID))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("dialDirect: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
case got := <-accepted:
|
|
if got == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("listener delivered a nil connection")
|
|
}
|
|
got.Close()
|
|
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
|
|
t.Fatal("listener never delivered the accepted connection")
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// End-to-end over a real socket pair: the two ends must agree on framing and
|
|
// on which direction each encrypts in.
|
|
func TestDirectTunnelCarriesTrafficBothWays(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
|
|
dl, err := newDirectListener(0, s)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("newDirectListener: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer dl.Close()
|
|
|
|
accepted, err := dl.Expect(testTunnelID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Expect: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(dl.Port()))
|
|
useConn, _, err := dialDirect([]string{addr}, testTunnelID, s.PeerToken(testTunnelID))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("dialDirect: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer useConn.Close()
|
|
|
|
var shareConn *directConn
|
|
select {
|
|
case shareConn = <-accepted:
|
|
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
|
|
t.Fatal("listener never delivered the connection")
|
|
}
|
|
defer shareConn.Close()
|
|
|
|
shareCodec, err := newTunnelCodec(s, testTunnelID, crypto.DirShareToUse)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("share codec: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
useCodec, err := newTunnelCodec(s, testTunnelID, crypto.DirUseToShare)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("use codec: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// use -> share
|
|
want := []byte("USBIP CMD_SUBMIT payload")
|
|
if err := send(useCodec, directSender(useConn), want); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("sending use->share: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
frame, err := shareConn.ReadFrame()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("share reading frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
got, err := shareCodec.decode(frame)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("share decoding frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("share received %q, want %q", got, want)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// share -> use
|
|
want2 := []byte("USBIP RET_SUBMIT payload")
|
|
if err := send(shareCodec, directSender(shareConn), want2); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("sending share->use: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
frame2, err := useConn.ReadFrame()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("use reading frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
got2, err := useCodec.decode(frame2)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("use decoding frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(got2, want2) {
|
|
t.Errorf("use received %q, want %q", got2, want2)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestDirectConnFramingPreservesBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
|
|
client, server := net.Pipe()
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
|
defer server.Close()
|
|
|
|
sender := newDirectConn(client)
|
|
receiver := newDirectConn(server)
|
|
|
|
payloads := [][]byte{
|
|
[]byte("a"),
|
|
bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), 1000),
|
|
[]byte("last one"),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
for _, p := range payloads {
|
|
if err := sender.WriteFrame(p); err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
for i, want := range payloads {
|
|
got, err := receiver.ReadFrame()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("frame %d: %v", i, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("frame %d is %d bytes, want %d", i, len(got), len(want))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestDirectConnRejectsOversizedLength(t *testing.T) {
|
|
client, server := net.Pipe()
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
|
defer server.Close()
|
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
// A length prefix claiming far more than the cap must be refused
|
|
// before anything is allocated.
|
|
client.Write([]byte{0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF})
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
receiver := newDirectConn(server)
|
|
if _, err := receiver.ReadFrame(); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("an oversized frame length was accepted")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestDialDirectFailsWithoutReachableAddress(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
|
|
// Port 1 on loopback refuses immediately, so this stays fast.
|
|
_, _, err := dialDirect([]string{"127.0.0.1:1"}, testTunnelID, s.PeerToken(testTunnelID))
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("dialDirect succeeded against a closed port")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, _, err := dialDirect(nil, testTunnelID, s.PeerToken(testTunnelID)); err == nil {
|
|
t.Error("dialDirect succeeded with no candidate addresses")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The dialer races candidates; an unreachable one alongside a good one must
|
|
// not stop the good one from winning.
|
|
func TestDialDirectPicksTheReachableAddress(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
|
|
dl, err := newDirectListener(0, s)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("newDirectListener: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer dl.Close()
|
|
|
|
accepted, _ := dl.Expect(testTunnelID)
|
|
good := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(dl.Port()))
|
|
|
|
conn, addr, err := dialDirect(
|
|
[]string{"127.0.0.1:1", good, "127.0.0.1:2"},
|
|
testTunnelID, s.PeerToken(testTunnelID))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("dialDirect: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer conn.Close()
|
|
|
|
if addr != good {
|
|
t.Errorf("connected to %s, want %s", addr, good)
|
|
}
|
|
select {
|
|
case c := <-accepted:
|
|
c.Close()
|
|
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
|
|
t.Error("listener never saw the connection")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestLocalEndpointsExcludeLoopback(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if got := localEndpoints(0); got != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("localEndpoints(0) = %v, want nil — port 0 means no listener", got)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, ep := range localEndpoints(9000) {
|
|
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(ep)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("endpoint %q is not host:port: %v", ep, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if port != "9000" {
|
|
t.Errorf("endpoint %q has port %q, want 9000", ep, port)
|
|
}
|
|
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
|
|
if ip == nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("endpoint %q has an unparseable host", ep)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if ip.IsLoopback() {
|
|
t.Errorf("endpoint %q is loopback; a peer cannot reach that", ep)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTunnelCodecNilPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
|
|
var codec *tunnelCodec
|
|
|
|
if codec.encrypted() {
|
|
t.Error("a nil codec reported itself as encrypted")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
payload := []byte("cleartext")
|
|
encoded, err := codec.encode(payload)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(encoded, payload) {
|
|
t.Error("a nil codec altered the payload")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decoded, err := codec.decode(encoded)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(decoded, payload) {
|
|
t.Error("round trip through a nil codec changed the payload")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTunnelCodecEncryptsWhenSecretPresent(t *testing.T) {
|
|
s := testSecret(t)
|
|
|
|
codec, err := newTunnelCodec(s, testTunnelID, crypto.DirShareToUse)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("newTunnelCodec: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !codec.encrypted() {
|
|
t.Fatal("codec with a secret reported itself as unencrypted")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
payload := []byte("this must not appear on the wire")
|
|
encoded, err := codec.encode(payload)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if bytes.Contains(encoded, payload) {
|
|
t.Error("the encoded frame contains its plaintext")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer, _ := newTunnelCodec(s, testTunnelID, crypto.DirUseToShare)
|
|
decoded, err := peer.decode(encoded)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("peer decode: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(decoded, payload) {
|
|
t.Errorf("peer decoded %q, want %q", decoded, payload)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestConstantTimeEqual(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if !constantTimeEqual("abc", "abc") {
|
|
t.Error("equal strings compared unequal")
|
|
}
|
|
if constantTimeEqual("abc", "abd") {
|
|
t.Error("different strings compared equal")
|
|
}
|
|
if constantTimeEqual("abc", "abcd") {
|
|
t.Error("strings of different length compared equal")
|
|
}
|
|
if !constantTimeEqual("", "") {
|
|
t.Error("empty strings compared unequal")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Guards the assumption baked into the wire format.
|
|
func TestTunnelIDFitsHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if protocol.TunnelHeaderSize != 16 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("TunnelHeaderSize is %d; the handshake layout assumes 16", protocol.TunnelHeaderSize)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(testTunnelID) != protocol.TunnelHeaderSize {
|
|
t.Fatalf("test tunnel ID is %d bytes, want %d", len(testTunnelID), protocol.TunnelHeaderSize)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- helpers ---
|
|
|
|
func readFull(conn net.Conn, buf []byte) (int, error) {
|
|
total := 0
|
|
for total < len(buf) {
|
|
n, err := conn.Read(buf[total:])
|
|
total += n
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return total, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return total, nil
|
|
}
|