b3a6620da6
Pentest-Befund (MEDIUM): companyName und weitere Plain-Text-Setting- Keys nahmen via PUT /api/settings/:key XSS-Payloads wie <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> ungefiltert entgegen. Nur Admin triggerbar, aber E-Mail-Templates/PDF-Generatoren hätten den Wert unescaped rendern können. Fix in appSetting.service.ts: sanitizeSettingValue(key, value) strippt HTML außer für die expliziten Editor-Keys (imprintHtml, privacyPolicyHtml, authorizationTemplateHtml, websitePrivacyPolicyHtml). Greift in updateSetting + updateSettings. cleanup-xss-and-mass-assignment.ts bereinigt bestehende dreckige Werte beim Container-Start (idempotent). Live-verifiziert auf dev: - PUT companyName="<img onerror=alert(1)>OpenCRM<script>alert(2)</script>" → DB: "OpenCRM" - Bulk-PUT mit XSS auf companyName + defaultEmailDomain → gestrippt - imprintHtml mit "<h1>...<p>" → unverändert (HTML-allowed) - Cleanup-Skript auf dirty value: "EvilCo" statt mit Tags Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
197 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript
197 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Einmal-Bereinigung für Pentest-Reste (Runde 12 / 2026-05-18):
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*
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* 1. HTML-Tags aus Customer/User-Stringfeldern strippen (M2-Stored-XSS-Reste)
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* 2. Unbekannte App-Settings entfernen, die durch Mass-Assignment in die DB
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* gerutscht sind, BEVOR die Whitelist eingezogen wurde (M1-Reste).
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*
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* Idempotent: wenn nichts zu tun ist, ändert sich nichts. Bei Bedarf
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* mehrfach aufrufbar.
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*/
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import prisma from '../src/lib/prisma.js';
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import { stripHtml } from '../src/utils/sanitize.js';
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import { ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS } from '../src/services/appSetting.service.js';
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const CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS = [
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'salutation', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName',
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'birthPlace', 'email', 'phone', 'mobile',
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'taxNumber', 'commercialRegisterNumber', 'notes',
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];
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const USER_STRING_FIELDS = [
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'firstName', 'lastName', 'email',
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'whatsappNumber', 'telegramUsername', 'signalNumber',
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];
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async function cleanupXss() {
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const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
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let touched = 0;
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for (const c of customers) {
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const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const field of CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS) {
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const v = (c as any)[field];
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if (typeof v === 'string') {
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const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
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if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
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}
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}
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if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
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console.log(` Customer #${c.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
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await prisma.customer.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data: updates });
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touched++;
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}
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}
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console.log(` → Customer bereinigt: ${touched}`);
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const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
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let userTouched = 0;
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for (const u of users) {
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const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const field of USER_STRING_FIELDS) {
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const v = (u as any)[field];
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if (typeof v === 'string') {
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const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
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if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
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}
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}
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if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
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console.log(` User #${u.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
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await prisma.user.update({ where: { id: u.id }, data: updates });
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userTouched++;
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}
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}
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console.log(` → User bereinigt: ${userTouched}`);
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}
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// HTML in Plain-Text-Settings strippen: WYSIWYG-Editoren liefern
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// absichtlich HTML, alles andere (companyName, defaultEmailDomain, ...)
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// muss reiner Text bleiben. Pentest 2026-05-19, MEDIUM.
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const HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS = new Set([
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'authorizationTemplateHtml',
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'imprintHtml',
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'privacyPolicyHtml',
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'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
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]);
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function stripHtmlString(s: string): string {
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return s
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.replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
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.replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
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.replace(/<\/?[a-z][^>]*>/gi, '');
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}
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async function cleanupAppSettings() {
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const settings = await prisma.appSetting.findMany();
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const removed: string[] = [];
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let stripped = 0;
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for (const s of settings) {
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if (!ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
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removed.push(s.key);
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await prisma.appSetting.delete({ where: { key: s.key } });
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continue;
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}
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if (!HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
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const cleaned = stripHtmlString(s.value);
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if (cleaned !== s.value) {
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await prisma.appSetting.update({ where: { key: s.key }, data: { value: cleaned } });
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stripped++;
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}
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}
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}
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console.log(` → AppSettings entfernt: ${removed.length}${removed.length ? ' (' + removed.join(', ') + ')' : ''}`);
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if (stripped > 0) {
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console.log(` → AppSettings HTML-gestrippt: ${stripped}`);
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}
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}
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// Pattern, die auf typische Pentest-/Test-Daten hindeuten. Bewusst eng
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// gefasst – legitime Kunden mit "Hacker" als Nachnamen sollen nicht
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// fälschlich getroffen werden (gibt's reichlich, gerade hier).
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// Konkret weggelassen: `^hacker@` würde Verwandte/Kunden mit
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// `hacker@familie-hacker.de` o.ä. fängen.
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const PENTEST_MARKERS = [
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/@evil\./i,
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/^attacker@/i,
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/^pentest@/i,
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/<script\b/i, // unverwechselbarer XSS-Marker
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/\bonerror\s*=/i, // <img onerror=…>
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/javascript:/i, // javascript:-URL
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/'\s*OR\s*'1'\s*=\s*'1/i, // SQL-Injection
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/\.\.\/.*etc\/passwd/i, // Path-Traversal
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];
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function looksLikePentestData(value: unknown): boolean {
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if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
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return PENTEST_MARKERS.some((re) => re.test(value));
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}
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async function findOrPurgePentestRecords() {
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const purge = process.env.CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST === 'true';
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const suspect: Array<{ kind: string; id: number; reason: string }> = [];
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const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
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for (const c of customers) {
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for (const f of ['email', 'phone', 'mobile', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName', 'notes']) {
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if (looksLikePentestData((c as any)[f])) {
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suspect.push({ kind: 'Customer', id: c.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((c as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
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for (const u of users) {
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for (const f of ['email', 'firstName', 'lastName']) {
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if (looksLikePentestData((u as any)[f])) {
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suspect.push({ kind: 'User', id: u.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((u as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (suspect.length === 0) {
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console.log(' → Keine Pentest-Marker in Customer/User-Records gefunden.');
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return;
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}
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console.log(` → ${suspect.length} verdächtige Records (Pentest-Marker):`);
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for (const s of suspect) {
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console.log(` [${s.kind}#${s.id}] ${s.reason}`);
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}
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if (!purge) {
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console.log(' ℹ️ Zum Löschen Container mit CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST=true neu starten,');
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console.log(' oder Records manuell über adminer entfernen.');
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return;
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}
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for (const s of suspect) {
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if (s.kind === 'Customer') {
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await prisma.customer.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
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console.log(` [Customer#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
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});
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} else if (s.kind === 'User') {
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await prisma.user.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
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console.log(` [User#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
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});
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}
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}
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console.log(` → ${suspect.length} verdächtige Records gelöscht.`);
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}
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async function main() {
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console.log('=== Cleanup: XSS-Reste + Mass-Assignment-AppSettings ===');
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await cleanupXss();
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await cleanupAppSettings();
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await findOrPurgePentestRecords();
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console.log('=== Fertig. ===');
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}
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main()
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.catch((e) => {
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console.error('Cleanup fehlgeschlagen:', e);
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process.exit(1);
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})
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.finally(async () => {
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await prisma.$disconnect();
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});
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