Files
opencrm/backend/prisma/cleanup-xss-and-mass-assignment.ts
T
duffyduck adc3b70492 Pentest 2026-05-20 MEDIUM+LOW Follow-ups
MEDIUM – Consent-Mass-Assignment:
PUT /api/gdpr/customer/:id/consents/:type nahm source/documentPath/
version ungefiltert aus dem Body. Portal-User konnte
source="ADMIN_OVERRIDE", version="<script>" oder
documentPath="../../etc/passwd" durchschmuggeln.

Fix: nur status aus Body, source server-seitig auf "portal"
hardcoded, documentPath/version bleiben NULL (werden dediziert
vom Authorization-Upload server-seitig gesetzt). Whitelist
ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES für source-Werte. grantAuthorization
(Admin) erzwingt die Whitelist ebenfalls; notes läuft jetzt
durch stripHtml.

LOW – javascript:-URI in companyName:
stripHtml() entfernte HTML-Tags, ließ aber javascript:/data:/
vbscript:-Schemata stehen. companyName="javascript:alert(1)"
hätte in <a href={companyName}> aktiv werden können.

Fix: stripHtml ersetzt jene Schemata mit "blocked:" – legitimer
Text bleibt unangetastet, das Schema wird unschädlich.

LOW – documentPath ohne Validierung:
Bereits durch obigen Consent-Fix erledigt; Cleanup-Pass strippt
zusätzlich vorhandene dreckige Pfade.

cleanup-xss-and-mass-assignment.ts: neue cleanupConsents() läuft
beim Container-Start, normalisiert source per Whitelist auf
"unknown" + stripHtml über version/documentPath.

Live-verifiziert auf dev (alle drei Payloads geblockt + Cleanup
auf dirty DB greift).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 01:13:19 +02:00

243 lines
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/**
* Einmal-Bereinigung für Pentest-Reste (Runde 12 / 2026-05-18):
*
* 1. HTML-Tags aus Customer/User-Stringfeldern strippen (M2-Stored-XSS-Reste)
* 2. Unbekannte App-Settings entfernen, die durch Mass-Assignment in die DB
* gerutscht sind, BEVOR die Whitelist eingezogen wurde (M1-Reste).
*
* Idempotent: wenn nichts zu tun ist, ändert sich nichts. Bei Bedarf
* mehrfach aufrufbar.
*/
import prisma from '../src/lib/prisma.js';
import { stripHtml } from '../src/utils/sanitize.js';
import { ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS } from '../src/services/appSetting.service.js';
const CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS = [
'salutation', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName',
'birthPlace', 'email', 'phone', 'mobile',
'taxNumber', 'commercialRegisterNumber', 'notes',
];
const USER_STRING_FIELDS = [
'firstName', 'lastName', 'email',
'whatsappNumber', 'telegramUsername', 'signalNumber',
];
async function cleanupXss() {
const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
let touched = 0;
for (const c of customers) {
const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const field of CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS) {
const v = (c as any)[field];
if (typeof v === 'string') {
const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
}
}
if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
console.log(` Customer #${c.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
await prisma.customer.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data: updates });
touched++;
}
}
console.log(` → Customer bereinigt: ${touched}`);
const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
let userTouched = 0;
for (const u of users) {
const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const field of USER_STRING_FIELDS) {
const v = (u as any)[field];
if (typeof v === 'string') {
const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
}
}
if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
console.log(` User #${u.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
await prisma.user.update({ where: { id: u.id }, data: updates });
userTouched++;
}
}
console.log(` → User bereinigt: ${userTouched}`);
}
// HTML in Plain-Text-Settings strippen: WYSIWYG-Editoren liefern
// absichtlich HTML, alles andere (companyName, defaultEmailDomain, ...)
// muss reiner Text bleiben. Pentest 2026-05-19, MEDIUM.
const HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS = new Set([
'authorizationTemplateHtml',
'imprintHtml',
'privacyPolicyHtml',
'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
]);
function stripHtmlString(s: string): string {
return s
.replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
.replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
.replace(/<\/?[a-z][^>]*>/gi, '')
.replace(/(?:javascript|data|vbscript)\s*:/gi, 'blocked:');
}
// Legitime CustomerConsent.source-Werte. Alles andere wird beim Cleanup
// auf 'unknown' normalisiert. Pentest 2026-05-20.
const ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES = new Set([
'portal',
'public-link',
'telefon',
'papier',
'email',
'crm-backend',
]);
async function cleanupConsents() {
// version + documentPath: HTML strippen (waren ohne Validierung).
// source: Whitelist erzwingen.
let versionStripped = 0;
let pathStripped = 0;
let sourceFixed = 0;
const consents = await prisma.customerConsent.findMany({
select: { id: true, source: true, documentPath: true, version: true },
});
for (const c of consents) {
const data: Record<string, string | null> = {};
if (c.version && c.version !== stripHtmlString(c.version)) {
data.version = stripHtmlString(c.version);
versionStripped++;
}
if (c.documentPath && c.documentPath !== stripHtmlString(c.documentPath)) {
data.documentPath = stripHtmlString(c.documentPath);
pathStripped++;
}
if (c.source && !ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES.has(c.source)) {
data.source = 'unknown';
sourceFixed++;
}
if (Object.keys(data).length > 0) {
await prisma.customerConsent.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data });
}
}
console.log(
` → Consent bereinigt: version-stripped=${versionStripped}, ` +
`documentPath-stripped=${pathStripped}, source-whitelist=${sourceFixed}`,
);
}
async function cleanupAppSettings() {
const settings = await prisma.appSetting.findMany();
const removed: string[] = [];
let stripped = 0;
for (const s of settings) {
if (!ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
removed.push(s.key);
await prisma.appSetting.delete({ where: { key: s.key } });
continue;
}
if (!HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
const cleaned = stripHtmlString(s.value);
if (cleaned !== s.value) {
await prisma.appSetting.update({ where: { key: s.key }, data: { value: cleaned } });
stripped++;
}
}
}
console.log(` → AppSettings entfernt: ${removed.length}${removed.length ? ' (' + removed.join(', ') + ')' : ''}`);
if (stripped > 0) {
console.log(` → AppSettings HTML-gestrippt: ${stripped}`);
}
}
// Pattern, die auf typische Pentest-/Test-Daten hindeuten. Bewusst eng
// gefasst legitime Kunden mit "Hacker" als Nachnamen sollen nicht
// fälschlich getroffen werden (gibt's reichlich, gerade hier).
// Konkret weggelassen: `^hacker@` würde Verwandte/Kunden mit
// `hacker@familie-hacker.de` o.ä. fängen.
const PENTEST_MARKERS = [
/@evil\./i,
/^attacker@/i,
/^pentest@/i,
/<script\b/i, // unverwechselbarer XSS-Marker
/\bonerror\s*=/i, // <img onerror=…>
/javascript:/i, // javascript:-URL
/'\s*OR\s*'1'\s*=\s*'1/i, // SQL-Injection
/\.\.\/.*etc\/passwd/i, // Path-Traversal
];
function looksLikePentestData(value: unknown): boolean {
if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
return PENTEST_MARKERS.some((re) => re.test(value));
}
async function findOrPurgePentestRecords() {
const purge = process.env.CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST === 'true';
const suspect: Array<{ kind: string; id: number; reason: string }> = [];
const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
for (const c of customers) {
for (const f of ['email', 'phone', 'mobile', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName', 'notes']) {
if (looksLikePentestData((c as any)[f])) {
suspect.push({ kind: 'Customer', id: c.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((c as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
break;
}
}
}
const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
for (const u of users) {
for (const f of ['email', 'firstName', 'lastName']) {
if (looksLikePentestData((u as any)[f])) {
suspect.push({ kind: 'User', id: u.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((u as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
break;
}
}
}
if (suspect.length === 0) {
console.log(' → Keine Pentest-Marker in Customer/User-Records gefunden.');
return;
}
console.log(`${suspect.length} verdächtige Records (Pentest-Marker):`);
for (const s of suspect) {
console.log(` [${s.kind}#${s.id}] ${s.reason}`);
}
if (!purge) {
console.log(' ️ Zum Löschen Container mit CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST=true neu starten,');
console.log(' oder Records manuell über adminer entfernen.');
return;
}
for (const s of suspect) {
if (s.kind === 'Customer') {
await prisma.customer.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
console.log(` [Customer#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
});
} else if (s.kind === 'User') {
await prisma.user.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
console.log(` [User#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
});
}
}
console.log(`${suspect.length} verdächtige Records gelöscht.`);
}
async function main() {
console.log('=== Cleanup: XSS-Reste + Mass-Assignment-AppSettings ===');
await cleanupXss();
await cleanupAppSettings();
await cleanupConsents();
await findOrPurgePentestRecords();
console.log('=== Fertig. ===');
}
main()
.catch((e) => {
console.error('Cleanup fehlgeschlagen:', e);
process.exit(1);
})
.finally(async () => {
await prisma.$disconnect();
});