adc3b70492
MEDIUM – Consent-Mass-Assignment:
PUT /api/gdpr/customer/:id/consents/:type nahm source/documentPath/
version ungefiltert aus dem Body. Portal-User konnte
source="ADMIN_OVERRIDE", version="<script>" oder
documentPath="../../etc/passwd" durchschmuggeln.
Fix: nur status aus Body, source server-seitig auf "portal"
hardcoded, documentPath/version bleiben NULL (werden dediziert
vom Authorization-Upload server-seitig gesetzt). Whitelist
ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES für source-Werte. grantAuthorization
(Admin) erzwingt die Whitelist ebenfalls; notes läuft jetzt
durch stripHtml.
LOW – javascript:-URI in companyName:
stripHtml() entfernte HTML-Tags, ließ aber javascript:/data:/
vbscript:-Schemata stehen. companyName="javascript:alert(1)"
hätte in <a href={companyName}> aktiv werden können.
Fix: stripHtml ersetzt jene Schemata mit "blocked:" – legitimer
Text bleibt unangetastet, das Schema wird unschädlich.
LOW – documentPath ohne Validierung:
Bereits durch obigen Consent-Fix erledigt; Cleanup-Pass strippt
zusätzlich vorhandene dreckige Pfade.
cleanup-xss-and-mass-assignment.ts: neue cleanupConsents() läuft
beim Container-Start, normalisiert source per Whitelist auf
"unknown" + stripHtml über version/documentPath.
Live-verifiziert auf dev (alle drei Payloads geblockt + Cleanup
auf dirty DB greift).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
243 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
243 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Einmal-Bereinigung für Pentest-Reste (Runde 12 / 2026-05-18):
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*
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* 1. HTML-Tags aus Customer/User-Stringfeldern strippen (M2-Stored-XSS-Reste)
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* 2. Unbekannte App-Settings entfernen, die durch Mass-Assignment in die DB
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* gerutscht sind, BEVOR die Whitelist eingezogen wurde (M1-Reste).
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*
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* Idempotent: wenn nichts zu tun ist, ändert sich nichts. Bei Bedarf
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* mehrfach aufrufbar.
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*/
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import prisma from '../src/lib/prisma.js';
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import { stripHtml } from '../src/utils/sanitize.js';
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import { ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS } from '../src/services/appSetting.service.js';
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const CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS = [
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'salutation', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName',
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'birthPlace', 'email', 'phone', 'mobile',
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'taxNumber', 'commercialRegisterNumber', 'notes',
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];
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const USER_STRING_FIELDS = [
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'firstName', 'lastName', 'email',
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'whatsappNumber', 'telegramUsername', 'signalNumber',
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];
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async function cleanupXss() {
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const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
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let touched = 0;
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for (const c of customers) {
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const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const field of CUSTOMER_STRING_FIELDS) {
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const v = (c as any)[field];
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if (typeof v === 'string') {
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const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
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if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
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}
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}
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if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
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console.log(` Customer #${c.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
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await prisma.customer.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data: updates });
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touched++;
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}
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}
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console.log(` → Customer bereinigt: ${touched}`);
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const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
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let userTouched = 0;
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for (const u of users) {
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const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const field of USER_STRING_FIELDS) {
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const v = (u as any)[field];
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if (typeof v === 'string') {
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const cleaned = stripHtml(v) as string;
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if (cleaned !== v) updates[field] = cleaned;
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}
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}
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if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
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console.log(` User #${u.id}: bereinigt:`, Object.keys(updates).join(', '));
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await prisma.user.update({ where: { id: u.id }, data: updates });
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userTouched++;
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}
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}
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console.log(` → User bereinigt: ${userTouched}`);
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}
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// HTML in Plain-Text-Settings strippen: WYSIWYG-Editoren liefern
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// absichtlich HTML, alles andere (companyName, defaultEmailDomain, ...)
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// muss reiner Text bleiben. Pentest 2026-05-19, MEDIUM.
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const HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS = new Set([
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'authorizationTemplateHtml',
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'imprintHtml',
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'privacyPolicyHtml',
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'websitePrivacyPolicyHtml',
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]);
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function stripHtmlString(s: string): string {
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return s
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.replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
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.replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
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.replace(/<\/?[a-z][^>]*>/gi, '')
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.replace(/(?:javascript|data|vbscript)\s*:/gi, 'blocked:');
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}
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// Legitime CustomerConsent.source-Werte. Alles andere wird beim Cleanup
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// auf 'unknown' normalisiert. Pentest 2026-05-20.
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const ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES = new Set([
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'portal',
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'public-link',
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'telefon',
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'papier',
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'email',
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'crm-backend',
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]);
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async function cleanupConsents() {
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// version + documentPath: HTML strippen (waren ohne Validierung).
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// source: Whitelist erzwingen.
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let versionStripped = 0;
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let pathStripped = 0;
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let sourceFixed = 0;
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const consents = await prisma.customerConsent.findMany({
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select: { id: true, source: true, documentPath: true, version: true },
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});
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for (const c of consents) {
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const data: Record<string, string | null> = {};
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if (c.version && c.version !== stripHtmlString(c.version)) {
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data.version = stripHtmlString(c.version);
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versionStripped++;
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}
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if (c.documentPath && c.documentPath !== stripHtmlString(c.documentPath)) {
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data.documentPath = stripHtmlString(c.documentPath);
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pathStripped++;
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}
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if (c.source && !ALLOWED_CONSENT_SOURCES.has(c.source)) {
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data.source = 'unknown';
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sourceFixed++;
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}
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if (Object.keys(data).length > 0) {
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await prisma.customerConsent.update({ where: { id: c.id }, data });
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}
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}
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console.log(
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` → Consent bereinigt: version-stripped=${versionStripped}, ` +
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`documentPath-stripped=${pathStripped}, source-whitelist=${sourceFixed}`,
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);
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}
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async function cleanupAppSettings() {
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const settings = await prisma.appSetting.findMany();
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const removed: string[] = [];
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let stripped = 0;
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for (const s of settings) {
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if (!ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
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removed.push(s.key);
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await prisma.appSetting.delete({ where: { key: s.key } });
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continue;
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}
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if (!HTML_ALLOWED_SETTING_KEYS.has(s.key)) {
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const cleaned = stripHtmlString(s.value);
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if (cleaned !== s.value) {
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await prisma.appSetting.update({ where: { key: s.key }, data: { value: cleaned } });
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stripped++;
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}
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}
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}
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console.log(` → AppSettings entfernt: ${removed.length}${removed.length ? ' (' + removed.join(', ') + ')' : ''}`);
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if (stripped > 0) {
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console.log(` → AppSettings HTML-gestrippt: ${stripped}`);
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}
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}
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// Pattern, die auf typische Pentest-/Test-Daten hindeuten. Bewusst eng
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// gefasst – legitime Kunden mit "Hacker" als Nachnamen sollen nicht
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// fälschlich getroffen werden (gibt's reichlich, gerade hier).
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// Konkret weggelassen: `^hacker@` würde Verwandte/Kunden mit
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// `hacker@familie-hacker.de` o.ä. fängen.
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const PENTEST_MARKERS = [
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/@evil\./i,
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/^attacker@/i,
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/^pentest@/i,
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/<script\b/i, // unverwechselbarer XSS-Marker
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/\bonerror\s*=/i, // <img onerror=…>
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/javascript:/i, // javascript:-URL
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/'\s*OR\s*'1'\s*=\s*'1/i, // SQL-Injection
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/\.\.\/.*etc\/passwd/i, // Path-Traversal
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];
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function looksLikePentestData(value: unknown): boolean {
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if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
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return PENTEST_MARKERS.some((re) => re.test(value));
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}
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async function findOrPurgePentestRecords() {
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const purge = process.env.CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST === 'true';
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const suspect: Array<{ kind: string; id: number; reason: string }> = [];
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const customers = await prisma.customer.findMany();
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for (const c of customers) {
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for (const f of ['email', 'phone', 'mobile', 'firstName', 'lastName', 'companyName', 'notes']) {
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if (looksLikePentestData((c as any)[f])) {
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suspect.push({ kind: 'Customer', id: c.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((c as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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const users = await prisma.user.findMany();
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for (const u of users) {
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for (const f of ['email', 'firstName', 'lastName']) {
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if (looksLikePentestData((u as any)[f])) {
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suspect.push({ kind: 'User', id: u.id, reason: `${f}=${JSON.stringify((u as any)[f]).slice(0, 60)}` });
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (suspect.length === 0) {
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console.log(' → Keine Pentest-Marker in Customer/User-Records gefunden.');
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return;
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}
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console.log(` → ${suspect.length} verdächtige Records (Pentest-Marker):`);
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for (const s of suspect) {
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console.log(` [${s.kind}#${s.id}] ${s.reason}`);
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}
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if (!purge) {
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console.log(' ℹ️ Zum Löschen Container mit CLEANUP_PURGE_PENTEST=true neu starten,');
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console.log(' oder Records manuell über adminer entfernen.');
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return;
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}
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for (const s of suspect) {
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if (s.kind === 'Customer') {
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await prisma.customer.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
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console.log(` [Customer#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
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});
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} else if (s.kind === 'User') {
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await prisma.user.delete({ where: { id: s.id } }).catch((e: any) => {
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console.log(` [User#${s.id}] Löschen fehlgeschlagen: ${e.message?.slice(0, 80)}`);
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});
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}
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}
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console.log(` → ${suspect.length} verdächtige Records gelöscht.`);
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}
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async function main() {
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console.log('=== Cleanup: XSS-Reste + Mass-Assignment-AppSettings ===');
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await cleanupXss();
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await cleanupAppSettings();
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await cleanupConsents();
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await findOrPurgePentestRecords();
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console.log('=== Fertig. ===');
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}
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main()
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.catch((e) => {
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console.error('Cleanup fehlgeschlagen:', e);
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process.exit(1);
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})
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.finally(async () => {
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await prisma.$disconnect();
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});
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