security: JWT raus aus localStorage – Refresh-Cookie-Pattern für SPA

Behebt das Pentest-Finding „JWT in localStorage (MITTEL)": bei XSS war
der Token JS-erreichbar → Angreifer könnte alle Anbieter-Credentials
abrufen. Branchenstandard-Lösung für SPAs jetzt umgesetzt.

Architektur:
- Access-Token: 15 min Lifetime, lebt NUR im JavaScript-Memory
  (api.ts tokenStore + AuthContext). Kein localStorage mehr.
- Refresh-Token: 7 Tage, im httpOnly-Cookie (Secure bei HTTPS_ENABLED,
  SameSite=Strict, Path=/api/auth). JavaScript hat keinen Zugriff →
  XSS klaut max. einen 15-min-Access-Token.

Backend:
- signAccessToken/signRefreshToken mit `type`-Claim
- Auth-Middleware verweigert Tokens mit type=refresh
- POST /api/auth/login + /customer-login: setzt refresh_token-Cookie,
  gibt access-Token im Body
- POST /api/auth/refresh: liest Cookie, rotiert ihn, gibt neuen Access
  aus. Prüft tokenInvalidatedAt (Logout/Rollenänderung = sofortige
  Invalidation auch des Refresh-Tokens)
- POST /api/auth/logout: löscht Cookie + setzt tokenInvalidatedAt
- cookie-parser als neue Dependency

Frontend:
- api.ts: in-memory tokenStore (kein localStorage); withCredentials=true
  für Cookie-Roundtrip; axios-Response-Interceptor mit
  Single-Flight-Refresh-Retry bei 401 (Original-Request wird
  transparent retried mit neuem Token)
- AuthContext: beim App-Start /auth/refresh aufrufen → wenn Cookie
  noch gültig, ist der User automatisch eingeloggt. Tab-Reload
  funktioniert weiterhin obwohl Access-Token nur in memory ist.
- 9 alte `localStorage.getItem('token')`-Stellen migriert auf
  `getAccessToken()` (PDF-Preview-iframe, Audit-Log-CSV-Export,
  DB-Backup-Download, File-Download-URLs, Portal-PDF-Link)

Live verifiziert:
- Login setzt Cookie (httpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/api/auth) + Bearer
- API mit Bearer: 200; ohne: 401
- Refresh mit Cookie: rotiert sauber + neuer Access-Token im Body
- Refresh-Token als Bearer abgewiesen: 401 ("Falscher Token-Typ")
- Logout: Cookie gelöscht, danach /refresh → 401

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-16 16:06:17 +02:00
parent 0943f11999
commit 9830ac29a5
16 changed files with 431 additions and 107 deletions
+35 -18
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@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
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"dependencies": {
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"@types/cookie-parser": "^1.4.10",
"adm-zip": "^0.5.16",
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"bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",
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}
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@@ -659,8 +666,7 @@
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"node_modules/@types/jsonwebtoken": {
"version": "9.0.10",
@@ -697,8 +703,7 @@
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@@ -719,7 +724,6 @@
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"dev": true,
"dependencies": {
"undici-types": "~6.21.0"
}
@@ -752,14 +756,12 @@
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@@ -774,7 +776,6 @@
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@@ -783,7 +784,6 @@
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"dev": true,
"dependencies": {
"@types/http-errors": "*",
"@types/node": "*",
@@ -794,7 +794,6 @@
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"dev": true,
"dependencies": {
"@types/mime": "^1",
"@types/node": "*"
@@ -1252,6 +1251,25 @@
"node": ">= 0.6"
}
},
"node_modules/cookie-parser": {
"version": "1.4.7",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/cookie-parser/-/cookie-parser-1.4.7.tgz",
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"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"cookie": "0.7.2",
"cookie-signature": "1.0.6"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">= 0.8.0"
}
},
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"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/cookie-signature": {
"version": "1.0.7",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/cookie-signature/-/cookie-signature-1.0.7.tgz",
@@ -3374,8 +3392,7 @@
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"version": "1.4.1",
+2
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@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"@prisma/client": "^5.22.0",
"@types/cookie-parser": "^1.4.10",
"adm-zip": "^0.5.16",
"archiver": "^7.0.1",
"bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",
"cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
"cors": "^2.8.5",
"dotenv": "^16.4.5",
"dotenv-expand": "^13.0.0",
+69 -3
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@@ -1,9 +1,31 @@
import { Request, Response } from 'express';
import { Request, Response, CookieOptions } from 'express';
import * as authService from '../services/auth.service.js';
import { AuthRequest, ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
import { emit as emitSecurityEvent, contextFromRequest } from '../services/securityMonitor.service.js';
// Refresh-Token-Cookie-Konfiguration. Der Cookie:
// - httpOnly → kein JavaScript-Zugriff → bei XSS nicht klaubar
// - secure → nur über HTTPS (in Prod via HTTPS_ENABLED, in Dev egal)
// - sameSite 'strict' → CSRF-Schutz; Cross-Site-Requests senden den Cookie nicht
// - path '/api/auth' → wird nur an Auth-Endpoints mitgeschickt
const REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME = 'refresh_token';
function getRefreshCookieOptions(): CookieOptions {
return {
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.HTTPS_ENABLED === 'true',
sameSite: 'strict',
path: '/api/auth',
maxAge: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 7 Tage, gleicht Refresh-JWT-Lifetime
};
}
function setRefreshCookie(res: Response, token: string): void {
res.cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, token, getRefreshCookieOptions());
}
function clearRefreshCookie(res: Response): void {
res.clearCookie(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/api/auth' });
}
// Mitarbeiter-Login
export async function login(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
const { email, password } = req.body || {};
@@ -18,6 +40,9 @@ export async function login(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
}
const result = await authService.login(email, password);
// Refresh-Token in httpOnly-Cookie, Access-Token im Body (Frontend hält
// ihn nur in memory). `token`-Feld bleibt aus Kompatibilität bestehen.
setRefreshCookie(res, result.refreshToken);
emitSecurityEvent({
type: 'LOGIN_SUCCESS',
severity: 'INFO',
@@ -27,7 +52,10 @@ export async function login(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
userEmail: email,
endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
});
res.json({ success: true, data: result } as ApiResponse);
res.json({
success: true,
data: { token: result.accessToken, user: result.user },
} as ApiResponse);
} catch (error) {
emitSecurityEvent({
type: 'LOGIN_FAILED',
@@ -58,6 +86,7 @@ export async function customerLogin(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
}
const result = await authService.customerLogin(email, password);
setRefreshCookie(res, result.refreshToken);
emitSecurityEvent({
type: 'LOGIN_SUCCESS',
severity: 'INFO',
@@ -67,7 +96,10 @@ export async function customerLogin(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
userEmail: email,
endpoint: ctx.endpoint,
});
res.json({ success: true, data: result } as ApiResponse);
res.json({
success: true,
data: { token: result.accessToken, user: result.user },
} as ApiResponse);
} catch (error) {
emitSecurityEvent({
type: 'LOGIN_FAILED',
@@ -257,6 +289,10 @@ export async function logout(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
data: { tokenInvalidatedAt: new Date() },
});
}
// Refresh-Cookie löschen, sonst könnte der Browser einen abgemeldeten User
// direkt wieder einloggen (server-seitige Invalidation oben fängt das ab,
// aber UI würde sich verirren).
clearRefreshCookie(res);
const ctx = contextFromRequest(req);
emitSecurityEvent({
type: 'LOGOUT',
@@ -277,6 +313,36 @@ export async function logout(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
}
}
// Neuen Access-Token aus dem httpOnly-Refresh-Cookie holen. Wird vom Frontend
// (axios-Interceptor) bei 401 oder beim App-Start aufgerufen.
export async function refresh(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
try {
const cookies = (req as any).cookies || {};
const refreshToken = cookies[REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME];
if (!refreshToken) {
res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Refresh-Token vorhanden' } as ApiResponse);
return;
}
const result = await authService.refreshAccessToken(refreshToken);
// Refresh-Cookie rotieren verhindert Replay eines geklauten Refresh-Tokens
// bis zur vollen Lifetime.
setRefreshCookie(res, result.refreshToken);
res.json({
success: true,
data: { token: result.accessToken, user: result.user },
} as ApiResponse);
} catch (error) {
// Refresh fehlgeschlagen: Cookie wegputzen, damit der Browser nicht
// weiter mit einem invaliden Token weiterhin den Endpoint klopft.
clearRefreshCookie(res);
res.status(401).json({
success: false,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Refresh fehlgeschlagen',
} as ApiResponse);
}
}
export async function register(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
try {
const { email, password, firstName, lastName, roleIds } = req.body;
+4
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import express from 'express';
import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
import cors from 'cors';
import helmet from 'helmet';
import path from 'path';
@@ -212,6 +213,9 @@ app.use(
// JSON-Body-Limit: 5 MB (Uploads laufen über multer, brauchen kein json())
app.use(express.json({ limit: '5mb' }));
// Cookie-Parser: wird für den httpOnly-Refresh-Token-Cookie gebraucht
// (POST /api/auth/refresh liest ihn aus req.cookies).
app.use(cookieParser());
// Audit-Logging Middleware (DSGVO-konform)
app.use(auditContextMiddleware);
+11 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,17 @@ export async function authenticate(
// Algorithmus explizit auf HS256 festlegen (Defense-in-Depth gegen alg-confusion).
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
}) as JwtPayload;
}) as JwtPayload & { type?: string };
// Defense-in-Depth: Refresh-Tokens haben `type: 'refresh'` und dürfen
// NICHT für normale API-Calls verwendet werden nur am /api/auth/refresh-
// Endpoint. Legacy-Tokens (vor der Refresh-Token-Einführung) haben kein
// `type` und werden als Access akzeptiert, damit bestehende Sessions nicht
// zwangsabgemeldet werden.
if (decoded.type && decoded.type !== 'access') {
res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Falscher Token-Typ' });
return;
}
// Prüfen ob Token durch Rechteänderung/Passwort-Reset invalidiert wurde
if (decoded.userId && decoded.iat) {
+1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const router = Router();
router.post('/login', loginRateLimiter, authController.login);
router.post('/customer-login', loginRateLimiter, authController.customerLogin);
router.post('/refresh', authController.refresh);
router.get('/me', authenticate, authController.me);
router.post('/logout', authenticate, authController.logout);
router.post('/register', authenticate, requirePermission('users:create'), authController.register);
+116 -8
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,26 @@ import { encrypt, decrypt } from '../utils/encryption.js';
import { sendEmail, SmtpCredentials } from './smtpService.js';
import { getSystemEmailCredentials } from './emailProvider/emailProviderService.js';
// Token-Lifetimes
// - Access-Token: kurzlebig, nur im Browser-Memory → XSS klaut max. 15 min
// - Refresh-Token: lang, im httpOnly-Cookie → kein JS-Zugriff
const ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '15m') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'];
const REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = (process.env.JWT_REFRESH_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'];
// Helper: signiert ein Access- bzw. Refresh-JWT mit dem `type`-Claim als
// Unterscheidung. Der Refresh-Token landet im httpOnly-Cookie und wird beim
// /auth/refresh-Endpoint geprüft, der dann einen neuen Access ausgibt.
export function signAccessToken(payload: JwtPayload): string {
return jwt.sign({ ...payload, type: 'access' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
expiresIn: ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,
});
}
export function signRefreshToken(payload: JwtPayload): string {
return jwt.sign({ ...payload, type: 'refresh' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
expiresIn: REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,
});
}
// Bcrypt-Cost-Faktor: 12 = OWASP-empfohlen (Stand 2026), ca. 250 ms pro Hash.
// Bestehende Hashes mit Faktor 10 bleiben gültig (bcrypt kodiert den Faktor im Hash).
const BCRYPT_COST = 12;
@@ -100,12 +120,12 @@ export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
isCustomerPortal: false,
};
const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
expiresIn: (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'],
});
const accessToken = signAccessToken(payload);
const refreshToken = signRefreshToken(payload);
return {
token,
accessToken,
refreshToken,
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
@@ -188,12 +208,12 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
representedCustomerIds,
};
const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
expiresIn: (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'],
});
const accessToken = signAccessToken(payload);
const refreshToken = signRefreshToken(payload);
return {
token,
accessToken,
refreshToken,
user: {
id: customer.id,
email: customer.portalEmail,
@@ -214,6 +234,94 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
};
}
// Refresh-Token verifizieren und neuen Access-Token ausstellen. Wirft bei
// ungültigem/abgelaufenem/invalidiertem Token. Greift auch tokenInvalidatedAt
// vom User/Customer ab → bei Rolle-Ändern oder Logout sind alle Tokens (auch
// das Refresh) sofort tot.
export async function refreshAccessToken(refreshToken: string): Promise<{
accessToken: string;
refreshToken: string;
user: any;
}> {
let decoded: any;
try {
decoded = jwt.verify(refreshToken, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
});
} catch {
throw new Error('Refresh-Token ungültig oder abgelaufen');
}
if (decoded.type !== 'refresh') {
throw new Error('Falscher Token-Typ');
}
const issuedAt = decoded.iat ? decoded.iat * 1000 : 0;
// Mitarbeiter
if (!decoded.isCustomerPortal && decoded.userId) {
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
where: { id: decoded.userId },
include: {
roles: { include: { role: { include: { permissions: { include: { permission: true } } } } } },
},
});
if (!user || !user.isActive) throw new Error('Benutzer nicht aktiv');
if (user.tokenInvalidatedAt && issuedAt < user.tokenInvalidatedAt.getTime()) {
throw new Error('Refresh-Token wurde invalidiert (Logout/Rechteänderung)');
}
const permissions = new Set<string>();
for (const ur of user.roles) {
for (const rp of ur.role.permissions) {
permissions.add(`${rp.permission.resource}:${rp.permission.action}`);
}
}
const payload: JwtPayload = {
userId: user.id,
email: user.email,
permissions: Array.from(permissions),
customerId: user.customerId ?? undefined,
isCustomerPortal: false,
};
return {
accessToken: signAccessToken(payload),
refreshToken: signRefreshToken(payload),
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
firstName: user.firstName,
lastName: user.lastName,
permissions: Array.from(permissions),
customerId: user.customerId,
isCustomerPortal: false,
},
};
}
// Customer-Portal
if (decoded.isCustomerPortal && decoded.customerId) {
const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({ where: { id: decoded.customerId } });
if (!customer || !customer.portalEmail) throw new Error('Portal-Konto nicht gefunden');
if (customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt && issuedAt < customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt.getTime()) {
throw new Error('Refresh-Token wurde invalidiert');
}
const portalUser = await getCustomerPortalUser(customer.id);
if (!portalUser) throw new Error('Portal-Konto nicht gefunden');
const payload: JwtPayload = {
email: customer.portalEmail,
permissions: portalUser.permissions,
customerId: customer.id,
isCustomerPortal: true,
representedCustomerIds: portalUser.representedCustomers?.map((c: any) => c.id),
};
return {
accessToken: signAccessToken(payload),
refreshToken: signRefreshToken(payload),
user: portalUser,
};
}
throw new Error('Refresh-Token konnte nicht interpretiert werden');
}
// Kundenportal-Passwort setzen/ändern
export async function setCustomerPortalPassword(customerId: number, password: string) {
console.log('[SetPortalPassword] Setze Passwort für Kunde:', customerId);