Security-Hardening: IDOR-Fixes, XSS-Sanitizer, CORS+Helmet, Data-Exposure
Umfassender Security-Review vor öffentlichem Deployment. Detaillierter Report in docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md. 🔴 KRITISCHE FIXES: 1. CORS offen → jetzt nur explizite Origins (via CORS_ORIGINS env), in Production per default komplett aus (gleiche Origin erzwingt Browser). 2. Keine Security-Headers → helmet-Middleware hinzugefügt. X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy, CORP. 3. JWT-Fallback-Secret entfernt. Beim Server-Start wird jetzt geprüft ob JWT_SECRET (min 32 Zeichen) und ENCRYPTION_KEY (exakt 64 Hex) gesetzt sind, sonst Fail-Fast mit klarer Fehlermeldung. 4. IDOR bei 7 Contract-Endpoints. Portal-Kunden mit 'contracts:read' konnten über geratene IDs fremde Daten abrufen (Passwort, SIM-PIN/PUK, Internet-Zugangsdaten, SIP-Credentials, Vertragsdokumente, Rechnungen). Neuer Helper canAccessContract() in utils/accessControl.ts in allen betroffenen Endpoints eingebaut. Prüft Vertrag-Besitzer + Vollmachten. 5. XSS via Email-Body. email.htmlBody wurde ungefiltert via dangerouslySetInnerHTML gerendert. Angreifer konnte Mail mit <script> schicken → Token-Diebstahl aus localStorage. Jetzt mit DOMPurify sanitized: verbietet script/iframe/form/inline-handler, erlaubt normale Formatierung + Bilder. 6. Customer-API leakte sensible Felder: - portalPasswordHash (bcrypt-Hash) - portalPasswordEncrypted (symmetrisch, mit ENCRYPTION_KEY entschlüsselbar) - portalPasswordResetToken (gültig 2h) Neuer Sanitizer in utils/sanitize.ts, angewendet in getCustomer/getCustomers. Admin mit customers:update darf portalPasswordEncrypted sehen (für UI-Anzeige), alle anderen Rollen nicht. 🟡 WICHTIGE FIXES: 7. Portal-JWT-Invalidation nach Passwort-Reset. Neues Feld Customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt, wird beim Reset auf now() gesetzt. Auth-Middleware prüft Portal-Sessions dagegen. Alte Sessions werden dadurch invalidiert. 8. express.json() mit 5 MB Size-Limit (statt Default 100 KB unklar). Neue Files: - backend/src/utils/accessControl.ts - IDOR-Schutz - backend/src/utils/sanitize.ts - Response-Sanitizer - docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md - vollständiger Report + Deployment-Checkliste Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
8fc050a282
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1c46d7345c
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@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ model Customer {
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// Portal Passwort-Reset
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portalPasswordResetToken String? @unique
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portalPasswordResetExpiresAt DateTime?
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// Portal Session-Invalidation (nach Passwort-Reset / Rechte-Änderung)
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portalTokenInvalidatedAt DateTime?
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// Geburtstagsmodal: Jahr in dem dem Kunden der Geburtstagsgruß gezeigt wurde (vermeidet mehrfaches Anzeigen)
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lastBirthdayGreetingYear Int?
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@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import * as contractHistoryService from '../services/contractHistory.service.js'
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import * as authorizationService from '../services/authorization.service.js';
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import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
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import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
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import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
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export async function getContracts(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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@ -254,9 +255,12 @@ export async function createFollowUp(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<v
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}
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}
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export async function getContractPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getContractPassword(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const password = await contractService.getContractPassword(parseInt(req.params.id));
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const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
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const password = await contractService.getContractPassword(contractId);
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if (password === null) {
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res.status(404).json({
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success: false,
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@ -273,9 +277,21 @@ export async function getContractPassword(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<
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}
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}
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export async function getSimCardCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getSimCardCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const credentials = await contractService.getSimCardCredentials(parseInt(req.params.simCardId));
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const simCardId = parseInt(req.params.simCardId);
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// SimCard → MobileDetails → Contract
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const sim = await prisma.simCard.findUnique({
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where: { id: simCardId },
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select: { mobileDetails: { select: { contractId: true } } },
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});
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if (!sim?.mobileDetails) {
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res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'SIM-Karte nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
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return;
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}
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, sim.mobileDetails.contractId))) return;
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const credentials = await contractService.getSimCardCredentials(simCardId);
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res.json({ success: true, data: credentials } as ApiResponse);
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} catch (error) {
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res.status(500).json({
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@ -285,9 +301,12 @@ export async function getSimCardCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promis
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}
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}
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export async function getInternetCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getInternetCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const credentials = await contractService.getInternetCredentials(parseInt(req.params.id));
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const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
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const credentials = await contractService.getInternetCredentials(contractId);
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res.json({ success: true, data: credentials } as ApiResponse);
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} catch (error) {
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res.status(500).json({
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@ -297,9 +316,21 @@ export async function getInternetCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promi
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}
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}
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export async function getSipCredentials(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getSipCredentials(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const credentials = await contractService.getSipCredentials(parseInt(req.params.phoneNumberId));
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const phoneNumberId = parseInt(req.params.phoneNumberId);
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// PhoneNumber → InternetDetails → Contract
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const phone = await prisma.phoneNumber.findUnique({
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where: { id: phoneNumberId },
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select: { internetDetails: { select: { contractId: true } } },
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});
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if (!phone?.internetDetails) {
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res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Rufnummer nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
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return;
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}
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, phone.internetDetails.contractId))) return;
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const credentials = await contractService.getSipCredentials(phoneNumberId);
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res.json({ success: true, data: credentials } as ApiResponse);
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} catch (error) {
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res.status(500).json({
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@ -415,6 +446,8 @@ export async function removeContractMeter(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Prom
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export async function getContractDocuments(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
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const documents = await prisma.contractDocument.findMany({
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where: { contractId },
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orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
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@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ import * as customerService from '../services/customer.service.js';
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import * as authService from '../services/auth.service.js';
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import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
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import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
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import { sanitizeCustomer, sanitizeCustomers, sanitizeCustomerStrict } from '../utils/sanitize.js';
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// Customer CRUD
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export async function getCustomers(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getCustomers(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const { search, type, page, limit } = req.query;
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const result = await customerService.getAllCustomers({
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@ -15,7 +16,12 @@ export async function getCustomers(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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page: page ? parseInt(page as string) : undefined,
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limit: limit ? parseInt(limit as string) : undefined,
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});
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res.json({ success: true, data: result.customers, pagination: result.pagination } as ApiResponse);
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// Portal-Kunden oder andere Rollen sehen kein portalPasswordEncrypted
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const canSeePasswords = req.user?.permissions?.includes('customers:update') ?? false;
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const sanitized = canSeePasswords
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? sanitizeCustomers(result.customers as any)
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: (result.customers as any[]).map((c) => sanitizeCustomerStrict(c)).filter(Boolean);
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res.json({ success: true, data: sanitized, pagination: result.pagination } as ApiResponse);
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} catch (error) {
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res.status(500).json({
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success: false,
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@ -24,14 +30,19 @@ export async function getCustomers(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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}
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}
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export async function getCustomer(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getCustomer(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const customer = await customerService.getCustomerById(parseInt(req.params.id));
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if (!customer) {
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res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Kunde nicht gefunden' } as ApiResponse);
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return;
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}
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res.json({ success: true, data: customer } as ApiResponse);
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// Portal-Kunden/Read-only sehen kein portalPasswordEncrypted
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const canSeePasswords = req.user?.permissions?.includes('customers:update') ?? false;
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const sanitized = canSeePasswords
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? sanitizeCustomer(customer as any)
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: sanitizeCustomerStrict(customer as any);
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res.json({ success: true, data: sanitized } as ApiResponse);
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} catch (error) {
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res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Fehler beim Laden des Kunden' } as ApiResponse);
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}
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@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
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import { Request, Response } from 'express';
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import * as invoiceService from '../services/invoice.service.js';
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import { logChange } from '../services/audit.service.js';
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import { ApiResponse } from '../types/index.js';
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import { ApiResponse, AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
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import { canAccessContract } from '../utils/accessControl.js';
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/**
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* Alle Rechnungen für ein EnergyContractDetails abrufen
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@ -146,9 +147,10 @@ export async function deleteInvoice(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void>
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// ==================== CONTRACT-BASIERTE RECHNUNGEN (für alle Vertragstypen) ====================
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export async function getInvoicesByContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function getInvoicesByContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
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const invoices = await invoiceService.getInvoicesByContract(contractId);
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res.json({ success: true, data: invoices } as ApiResponse);
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} catch (error) {
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@ -156,9 +158,10 @@ export async function getInvoicesByContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promis
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}
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}
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export async function addInvoiceByContract(req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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export async function addInvoiceByContract(req: AuthRequest, res: Response): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const contractId = parseInt(req.params.id);
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if (!(await canAccessContract(req, res, contractId))) return;
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const { invoiceDate, invoiceType, notes } = req.body;
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const invoice = await invoiceService.addInvoiceByContract(contractId, {
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invoiceDate: new Date(invoiceDate),
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import express from 'express';
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import cors from 'cors';
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import helmet from 'helmet';
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import path from 'path';
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import dotenv from 'dotenv';
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@ -39,12 +40,49 @@ import { auditMiddleware } from './middleware/audit.js';
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dotenv.config();
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// ==================== SECURITY: Pflicht-Umgebungsvariablen prüfen ====================
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if (!process.env.JWT_SECRET || process.env.JWT_SECRET.length < 32) {
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console.error('❌ JWT_SECRET ist nicht gesetzt oder zu kurz (min. 32 Zeichen)');
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console.error(' Generiere mit: openssl rand -hex 64');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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if (!process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY.length !== 64) {
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console.error('❌ ENCRYPTION_KEY ist nicht gesetzt oder hat nicht exakt 64 Hex-Zeichen (32 Byte)');
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console.error(' Generiere mit: openssl rand -hex 32');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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const app = express();
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const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;
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// Middleware
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app.use(cors());
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app.use(express.json());
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// ==================== SECURITY MIDDLEWARE ====================
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// HTTP Security Headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, etc.)
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app.use(
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helmet({
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// CSP ausschalten – wird bei SPA schwierig, frontend setzt eigene CSP via meta
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contentSecurityPolicy: false,
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// Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: "same-site" für SPA mit gleicher Origin
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crossOriginResourcePolicy: { policy: 'same-site' },
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}),
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);
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// CORS: in Production nur explizit erlaubte Origins. In Dev: alles erlauben.
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const corsOrigins = process.env.CORS_ORIGINS
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? process.env.CORS_ORIGINS.split(',').map((s) => s.trim())
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: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'
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? false // Gar kein Cross-Origin zulässig (Frontend wird unter gleicher Origin ausgeliefert)
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: true; // Dev: alles erlauben
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app.use(
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cors({
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origin: corsOrigins,
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credentials: true,
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}),
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);
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// JSON-Body-Limit: 5 MB (Uploads laufen über multer, brauchen kein json())
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app.use(express.json({ limit: '5mb' }));
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// Audit-Logging Middleware (DSGVO-konform)
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app.use(auditContextMiddleware);
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@ -26,27 +26,24 @@ export async function authenticate(
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}
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try {
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const decoded = jwt.verify(
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token,
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process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fallback-secret'
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) as JwtPayload;
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// JWT_SECRET wird beim Server-Start geprüft (Fail-Fast in index.ts)
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const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string) as JwtPayload;
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// Prüfen ob Token durch Rechteänderung invalidiert wurde (nur für Mitarbeiter)
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// Prüfen ob Token durch Rechteänderung/Passwort-Reset invalidiert wurde
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if (decoded.userId && decoded.iat) {
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// Mitarbeiter-Login
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const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
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where: { id: decoded.userId },
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select: { tokenInvalidatedAt: true, isActive: true },
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});
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// Benutzer nicht gefunden oder deaktiviert
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if (!user || !user.isActive) {
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res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Benutzer nicht mehr aktiv' });
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return;
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}
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// Token wurde vor der Invalidierung ausgestellt
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if (user.tokenInvalidatedAt) {
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const tokenIssuedAt = decoded.iat * 1000; // iat ist in Sekunden, Date ist in Millisekunden
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const tokenIssuedAt = decoded.iat * 1000;
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if (tokenIssuedAt < user.tokenInvalidatedAt.getTime()) {
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res.status(401).json({
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success: false,
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@ -55,6 +52,28 @@ export async function authenticate(
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return;
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}
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}
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} else if (decoded.isCustomerPortal && decoded.customerId && decoded.iat) {
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// Portal-Kunden-Login: gleiche Prüfung
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const customer = await prisma.customer.findUnique({
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where: { id: decoded.customerId },
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select: { portalTokenInvalidatedAt: true, portalEnabled: true },
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});
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if (!customer || !customer.portalEnabled) {
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res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Portal-Zugang nicht mehr aktiv' });
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return;
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}
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if (customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt) {
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const tokenIssuedAt = decoded.iat * 1000;
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if (tokenIssuedAt < customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt.getTime()) {
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res.status(401).json({
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success: false,
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error: 'Ihre Sitzung ist ungültig. Bitte melden Sie sich erneut an.',
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});
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return;
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}
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}
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}
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req.user = decoded;
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@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
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isCustomerPortal: false,
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};
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const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fallback-secret', {
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const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
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expiresIn: (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'],
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});
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@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ export async function customerLogin(email: string, password: string) {
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representedCustomerIds,
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};
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const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fallback-secret', {
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const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET as string, {
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expiresIn: (process.env.JWT_EXPIRES_IN || '7d') as jwt.SignOptions['expiresIn'],
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});
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@ -501,6 +501,8 @@ export async function confirmPasswordReset(token: string, newPassword: string):
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portalPasswordEncrypted: encrypt(newPassword),
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portalPasswordResetToken: null,
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portalPasswordResetExpiresAt: null,
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// Alle bestehenden Portal-Sessions kicken
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portalTokenInvalidatedAt: new Date(),
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},
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});
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return;
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@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
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/**
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* Access-Control-Helper für Portal-Kunden-Isolation.
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*
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* Portal-Kunden haben die Permission `contracts:read` / `customers:read`, damit
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* sie ihre eigenen Daten sehen können. Damit sie aber NICHT fremde Daten über
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* geratene IDs abrufen (IDOR), muss bei jedem Endpoint der eine sensible
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* Ressource (Vertrag, Rechnung, Passwort, ...) zurückliefert, der Kunde auf
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* Besitz/Vollmacht geprüft werden.
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*/
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import { Response } from 'express';
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import prisma from '../lib/prisma.js';
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import * as authorizationService from '../services/authorization.service.js';
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import { AuthRequest } from '../types/index.js';
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/**
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* Prüft ob der authentifizierte User auf einen bestimmten Vertrag zugreifen darf.
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* - Mitarbeiter/Admin mit customers:read / contracts:read: ja, immer
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* - Portal-Kunde: nur wenn contract.customerId = eigener customerId ODER
|
||||
* wenn er einen Vertreter für diesen Kunden ist MIT gültiger Vollmacht
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns true = erlaubt, false = Zugriff verweigert (Response wurde bereits gesendet)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function canAccessContract(
|
||||
req: AuthRequest,
|
||||
res: Response,
|
||||
contractId: number,
|
||||
): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
// Nicht-Portal-User (Mitarbeiter/Admin) kommen hier immer durch, wenn sie die Permission haben
|
||||
if (!req.user?.isCustomerPortal) {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!req.user.customerId) {
|
||||
res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Zugriff' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Vertrag laden, Besitzer-ID prüfen
|
||||
const contract = await prisma.contract.findUnique({
|
||||
where: { id: contractId },
|
||||
select: { customerId: true },
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!contract) {
|
||||
res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Vertrag nicht gefunden' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Eigene Verträge = immer erlaubt
|
||||
if (contract.customerId === req.user.customerId) {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fremde Verträge nur mit aktiver Vollmacht
|
||||
const representedIds: number[] = (req.user as any).representedCustomerIds || [];
|
||||
if (!representedIds.includes(contract.customerId)) {
|
||||
res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Zugriff auf diesen Vertrag' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const hasAuth = await authorizationService.hasAuthorization(
|
||||
contract.customerId,
|
||||
req.user.customerId,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (!hasAuth) {
|
||||
res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Vollmacht erforderlich' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Prüft Zugriff auf einen Kunden (analog zu canAccessContract).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function canAccessCustomer(
|
||||
req: AuthRequest,
|
||||
res: Response,
|
||||
customerId: number,
|
||||
): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
if (!req.user?.isCustomerPortal) {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!req.user.customerId) {
|
||||
res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Zugriff' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (customerId === req.user.customerId) {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const representedIds: number[] = (req.user as any).representedCustomerIds || [];
|
||||
if (!representedIds.includes(customerId)) {
|
||||
res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Kein Zugriff auf diese Kundendaten' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const hasAuth = await authorizationService.hasAuthorization(customerId, req.user.customerId);
|
||||
if (!hasAuth) {
|
||||
res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Vollmacht erforderlich' });
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||
/**
|
||||
* Sanitize-Helpers: entfernen sensible Felder aus DB-Ergebnissen, bevor sie
|
||||
* als API-Response rausgehen. Zentrale Stelle, damit keine Passwort-Hashes,
|
||||
* Verschlüsselungen oder Reset-Tokens versehentlich durch die API leaken.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
// Felder die NIE in einer API-Response an den Client gehen dürfen
|
||||
const SENSITIVE_CUSTOMER_FIELDS = [
|
||||
'portalPasswordHash',
|
||||
'portalPasswordResetToken',
|
||||
'portalPasswordResetExpiresAt',
|
||||
] as const;
|
||||
|
||||
const SENSITIVE_USER_FIELDS = [
|
||||
'password',
|
||||
'passwordResetToken',
|
||||
'passwordResetExpiresAt',
|
||||
'tokenInvalidatedAt',
|
||||
] as const;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Entfernt Passwort-Hash, Reset-Token etc. aus einem Customer-Objekt.
|
||||
* `portalPasswordEncrypted` bleibt nur drin, wenn der Caller Admin-Rechte hat
|
||||
* (wird in einem zweiten Schritt vom Controller gemacht). Dieser Helper entfernt
|
||||
* es standardmäßig.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function sanitizeCustomer<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(customer: T | null): T | null {
|
||||
if (!customer) return customer;
|
||||
const copy = { ...customer };
|
||||
for (const field of SENSITIVE_CUSTOMER_FIELDS) {
|
||||
delete copy[field];
|
||||
}
|
||||
// portalPasswordEncrypted bleibt hier zunächst drin, damit Mitarbeiter das
|
||||
// Portal-Passwort ggf. in der UI anzeigen können. Wird per requirePermission
|
||||
// auf 'customers:update' implizit gesichert.
|
||||
return copy;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Entfernt portalPasswordEncrypted zusätzlich zu den anderen sensiblen Feldern.
|
||||
* Für Kontexte in denen der Caller KEIN Admin ist (z.B. Portal-Kunde).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function sanitizeCustomerStrict<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(customer: T | null): T | null {
|
||||
if (!customer) return customer;
|
||||
const copy = sanitizeCustomer(customer) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
|
||||
if (!copy) return null;
|
||||
delete copy.portalPasswordEncrypted;
|
||||
return copy as T;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sanitize-Liste von Customers.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function sanitizeCustomers<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(customers: T[]): T[] {
|
||||
return customers.map((c) => sanitizeCustomer(c)).filter((c): c is T => c !== null);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sanitize User-Objekt für API-Responses.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function sanitizeUser<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(user: T | null): T | null {
|
||||
if (!user) return user;
|
||||
const copy = { ...user };
|
||||
for (const field of SENSITIVE_USER_FIELDS) {
|
||||
delete copy[field];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return copy;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -97,6 +97,20 @@ isolierte Instanz (keine Multi-Tenancy im Code), Provisioning + Abrechnung
|
|||
|
||||
## ✅ Erledigt
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] **🛡️ Security-Review + Hardening vor Production-Deployment**
|
||||
- Vollständiger Review aller kritischen Bereiche, dokumentiert in **[docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md](../docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md)**
|
||||
- **6 kritische Findings gefixt:**
|
||||
- CORS offen → explizit konfigurierbar über `CORS_ORIGINS`
|
||||
- Helmet (Security-Headers) hinzugefügt
|
||||
- JWT-Fallback-Secret entfernt, ENV-Pflicht-Check beim Start
|
||||
- IDOR bei 7 sensiblen Contract-Endpoints (Portal-Kunden konnten fremde Credentials abrufen)
|
||||
- XSS via Email-Body (DOMPurify als Sanitizer)
|
||||
- Customer-API leakte Passwort-Hashes + Reset-Tokens
|
||||
- **2 wichtige Findings gefixt:**
|
||||
- Portal-JWT-Invalidation nach Passwort-Reset (`Customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt`)
|
||||
- Body-Size-Limit auf 5 MB
|
||||
- Deployment-Checkliste dokumentiert (neue Secrets generieren, HSTS, DB-User-Rechte, Backup-Cron)
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] **🎉 Version 1.0.0 Feinschliff: Passwort-Reset + Rate-Limiting + Auto-Geburtstagsgrüße**
|
||||
- **Passwort vergessen-Flow** (Login → "Passwort vergessen?" Link)
|
||||
- Email-Reset-Token mit 2h Gültigkeit (kryptografisch sicher: 32 Byte Random)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
|
|||
# Security-Review vor 1.0.0
|
||||
|
||||
Systematischer Review des Codebase mit Fokus auf Produktions-Hardening
|
||||
vor öffentlichem Deployment (hinter HTTPS-Proxy).
|
||||
|
||||
## Gefundene Probleme & Fixes
|
||||
|
||||
### 🔴 KRITISCH (sofort gefixt)
|
||||
|
||||
#### 1. CORS komplett offen
|
||||
**Vorher:** `app.use(cors())` – jede Origin darf Requests senden.
|
||||
**Risiko:** Fremde Websites können bei eingeloggtem User Requests mit dessen
|
||||
JWT durchführen (wenn Token in Cookies wäre – bei localStorage weniger relevant,
|
||||
aber trotzdem schlechte Praxis).
|
||||
**Fix:** CORS nur für explizit konfigurierte Origins (via `CORS_ORIGINS` ENV),
|
||||
in Production per Default komplett aus (Frontend läuft unter gleicher Origin).
|
||||
|
||||
#### 2. Keine Security-Headers (Helmet fehlt)
|
||||
**Vorher:** Keine HTTP-Security-Headers gesetzt.
|
||||
**Risiko:** XSS, Clickjacking, MIME-Sniffing, Missing HSTS.
|
||||
**Fix:** `helmet`-Middleware aktiviert – setzt automatisch:
|
||||
X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, HSTS (in HTTPS),
|
||||
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 3. JWT-Fallback-Secret
|
||||
**Vorher:** `jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'fallback-secret')`
|
||||
**Risiko:** Wenn `.env` kaputt ist oder Secret leer → bekannter String
|
||||
"fallback-secret" → **Tokens können gefälscht werden!**
|
||||
**Fix:** Beim Server-Start wird geprüft, dass JWT_SECRET mindestens 32 Zeichen lang
|
||||
und ENCRYPTION_KEY exakt 64 Hex-Zeichen hat. Sonst Abbruch mit klarer Fehlermeldung.
|
||||
Fallback wurde aus dem Code entfernt.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 4. IDOR bei sensiblen Contract-Endpoints
|
||||
**Vorher:** Portal-Kunden haben `contracts:read` Permission → können über
|
||||
geratene IDs auf **fremde** Daten zugreifen:
|
||||
- `GET /contracts/:id/password` → Passwort im Klartext
|
||||
- `GET /contracts/simcard/:id/credentials` → PIN/PUK
|
||||
- `GET /contracts/:id/internet-credentials` → Internet-Passwort
|
||||
- `GET /contracts/phonenumber/:id/sip-credentials` → SIP-Passwort
|
||||
- `GET /contracts/:id/documents` → Vertragsdokumente
|
||||
- `GET /contracts/:id/invoices` → Rechnungen
|
||||
- `POST /contracts/:id/invoices` → Rechnung zu fremdem Vertrag hinzufügen
|
||||
**Fix:** Neuer Helper `canAccessContract()` in `backend/src/utils/accessControl.ts`.
|
||||
Wird in allen sensiblen Endpoints aufgerufen und prüft:
|
||||
- Mitarbeiter/Admin → OK
|
||||
- Portal-Kunde + eigener Vertrag → OK
|
||||
- Portal-Kunde + vertretener Kunde MIT gültiger Vollmacht → OK
|
||||
- Sonst 403 Forbidden
|
||||
|
||||
#### 5. XSS via Email-Body
|
||||
**Vorher:** `<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: email.htmlBody }} />`
|
||||
**Risiko:** Ein Angreifer sendet Mail mit `<script>fetch('/api/...')` →
|
||||
wird im Browser des Mitarbeiters ausgeführt → JWT-Token-Diebstahl möglich.
|
||||
**Fix:** DOMPurify sanitized `htmlBody` vor dem Rendern:
|
||||
- Verbietet: script, style, iframe, object, embed, form, inline-handler
|
||||
- Erlaubt: normale Formatierung, Bilder, Links
|
||||
- Zusätzlich: target=_blank damit Links neue Tabs öffnen
|
||||
|
||||
#### 6. Customer-API leakt Passwort-Hashes + Reset-Tokens
|
||||
**Vorher:** `getCustomer` / `getCustomers` gab alle Felder zurück inklusive:
|
||||
- `portalPasswordHash` (bcrypt)
|
||||
- `portalPasswordEncrypted` (symmetrisch, entschlüsselbar mit Key)
|
||||
- `portalPasswordResetToken` (gültig 2h, damit könnte man das Passwort zurücksetzen)
|
||||
**Fix:** Zentrale Sanitizer-Helper in `backend/src/utils/sanitize.ts`:
|
||||
- `sanitizeCustomer` → entfernt Hash + Reset-Token
|
||||
- `sanitizeCustomerStrict` → zusätzlich ohne Encrypted-Passwort
|
||||
(für Nicht-Admin-Rollen)
|
||||
- Im `getCustomer`/`getCustomers` angewendet: Admins sehen encrypted
|
||||
(um Passwort in UI anzeigen zu können), alle anderen nicht.
|
||||
|
||||
### 🟡 WICHTIG (gefixt)
|
||||
|
||||
#### 7. Portal-JWT-Invalidation fehlte
|
||||
**Vorher:** Nach einem Portal-Passwort-Reset blieben alte JWTs bis zum Ablauf (7d) gültig.
|
||||
**Risiko:** Wenn ein Angreifer einen Token geklaut hat, konnte der Kunde das
|
||||
Passwort zwar ändern, aber der Angreifer blieb eingeloggt.
|
||||
**Fix:** Neues Feld `Customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt` analog zu
|
||||
`User.tokenInvalidatedAt`. Wird bei Portal-Passwort-Reset auf `now()` gesetzt.
|
||||
Auth-Middleware prüft bei Portal-Sessions diesen Timestamp gegen `token.iat`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 8. express.json() ohne Size-Limit
|
||||
**Vorher:** Default 100KB – aber unklar und nicht explizit.
|
||||
**Fix:** `express.json({ limit: '5mb' })` – deckt normale API-Bodies mit
|
||||
eingebetteten Base64-Attachments ab, blockt aber DoS-Versuche mit 100MB-Payloads.
|
||||
|
||||
## Nicht kritische Findings (Empfehlungen für später)
|
||||
|
||||
### 🟢 Token in Query-Parameter
|
||||
Für Attachment-Downloads/iframes wird das JWT als `?token=...` mitgegeben.
|
||||
**Risiko:** Token landet in Server-Access-Logs, Browser-History, Referer-Headers.
|
||||
**Mitigation aktuell:** JWT läuft nach 7d ab, und bei `password-reset` werden
|
||||
alle Sessions gekickt.
|
||||
**Bessere Lösung (später):** Kurzlebige Download-Tokens (5 Min) statt JWT direkt.
|
||||
|
||||
### 🟢 Upload: nur Browser-MIME-Check
|
||||
Multer prüft nur den vom Browser gesendeten Content-Type. Ein Angreifer könnte
|
||||
eine Shell mit `application/pdf` hochladen.
|
||||
**Mitigation aktuell:**
|
||||
- Uploads-Ordner hat keine Execute-Rechte (Linux-Standard)
|
||||
- Dateien werden mit uniquem Namen + Original-Extension gespeichert
|
||||
- Apache/Caddy served Uploads mit `Content-Disposition: attachment` inline (keine Ausführung)
|
||||
**Besser (später):** Magic-Byte-Check via `file-type` npm-Paket.
|
||||
|
||||
### 🟢 `.env` in git history
|
||||
Die initiale `.env` mit Demo-Secrets ist im ersten Commit eingecheckt.
|
||||
**Risiko:** Wenn das Repo öffentlich wird, sind die Demo-Keys bekannt.
|
||||
**Action:** Vor Öffentlich-Machen: `openssl rand -hex 64` für neuen JWT_SECRET
|
||||
und `openssl rand -hex 32` für neuen ENCRYPTION_KEY in `.env.production`.
|
||||
Optional: `git filter-repo` um `.env` aus History zu löschen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment-Checkliste vor Go-Live
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **ENV-Vars setzen:**
|
||||
- `JWT_SECRET` neu generiert (`openssl rand -hex 64`)
|
||||
- `ENCRYPTION_KEY` neu generiert (`openssl rand -hex 32`)
|
||||
- `NODE_ENV=production`
|
||||
- `CORS_ORIGINS=https://crm.meinedomain.de` (oder leer wenn SPA unter gleicher Origin)
|
||||
- `PUBLIC_URL=https://crm.meinedomain.de` (für Reset-Links in E-Mails)
|
||||
- [ ] **Helmet HSTS aktiv** (automatisch mit helmet + HTTPS hinter Caddy)
|
||||
- [ ] **Dependencies aktuell:** `npm audit fix` lauen lassen
|
||||
- [ ] **DB-User minimal:** Prod-User darf nur INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE/SELECT auf opencrm DB,
|
||||
nicht DROP/ALTER/CREATE
|
||||
- [ ] **Uploads-Ordner:** chmod 750, keine Execute-Rechte
|
||||
- [ ] **Backup-Job:** Crontab mit täglichem `npm run db:backup`
|
||||
- [ ] **Log-Rotation:** logrotate für Node-Process-Logs
|
||||
- [ ] **Monitoring:** uptime-kuma o.Ä. auf `/api/health`
|
||||
- [ ] **Reverse-Proxy (Caddy) setzt:**
|
||||
- HSTS (mindestens 1 Jahr)
|
||||
- automatisches SSL via Let's Encrypt
|
||||
- Body-Size-Limit (Caddy-Config)
|
||||
|
||||
## Was getestet werden MUSS (vor öffentlichem Deployment)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **IDOR-Tests:** Als Portal-Kunde A einloggen, fremde IDs per URL/API probieren
|
||||
→ alle müssen 403 geben (siehe TESTING.md)
|
||||
2. **XSS-Tests:** Test-Mail mit `<script>alert(1)</script>` in HTML-Body senden,
|
||||
im Email-Client öffnen → kein Alert
|
||||
3. **Rate-Limit-Tests:** 11x falsch einloggen → muss blocken
|
||||
4. **Password-Reset-Tests:** Reset-Link 2x nutzen → zweites Mal fehlschlägt
|
||||
|
||||
## Übersicht der Code-Änderungen
|
||||
|
||||
| Datei | Änderung |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `backend/src/index.ts` | Helmet, CORS-Config, Body-Limit, ENV-Check beim Start |
|
||||
| `backend/src/middleware/auth.ts` | JWT-Fallback raus, Portal-Token-Invalidation |
|
||||
| `backend/src/services/auth.service.ts` | JWT-Fallback raus, `portalTokenInvalidatedAt` setzen |
|
||||
| `backend/src/utils/accessControl.ts` | **NEU** – `canAccessContract`, `canAccessCustomer` |
|
||||
| `backend/src/utils/sanitize.ts` | **NEU** – Sanitizer für Customer/User |
|
||||
| `backend/src/controllers/contract.controller.ts` | IDOR-Schutz in 5 Endpoints |
|
||||
| `backend/src/controllers/invoice.controller.ts` | IDOR-Schutz in 2 Endpoints |
|
||||
| `backend/src/controllers/customer.controller.ts` | Sanitizer in getCustomer/getCustomers |
|
||||
| `backend/prisma/schema.prisma` | `Customer.portalTokenInvalidatedAt` |
|
||||
| `frontend/src/components/email/EmailDetail.tsx` | DOMPurify für htmlBody |
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
|
|||
"@tiptap/react": "^3.19.0",
|
||||
"@tiptap/starter-kit": "^3.19.0",
|
||||
"axios": "^1.7.7",
|
||||
"dompurify": "^3.4.1",
|
||||
"lucide-react": "^0.454.0",
|
||||
"react": "^18.3.1",
|
||||
"react-dom": "^18.3.1",
|
||||
|
|
@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
|
|||
"react-router-dom": "^6.28.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",
|
||||
"@types/react": "^18.3.12",
|
||||
"@types/react-dom": "^18.3.1",
|
||||
"@vitejs/plugin-react": "^4.3.3",
|
||||
|
|
@ -1595,6 +1597,16 @@
|
|||
"@babel/types": "^7.28.2"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@types/dompurify": {
|
||||
"version": "3.0.5",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/dompurify/-/dompurify-3.0.5.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-1Wg0g3BtQF7sSb27fJQAKck1HECM6zV1EB66j8JH9i3LCjYabJa0FSdiSgsD5K/RbrsR0SiraKacLB+T8ZVYAg==",
|
||||
"dev": true,
|
||||
"license": "MIT",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"@types/trusted-types": "*"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@types/estree": {
|
||||
"version": "1.0.8",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/estree/-/estree-1.0.8.tgz",
|
||||
|
|
@ -1642,6 +1654,13 @@
|
|||
"@types/react": "^18.0.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@types/trusted-types": {
|
||||
"version": "2.0.7",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/trusted-types/-/trusted-types-2.0.7.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-ScaPdn1dQczgbl0QFTeTOmVHFULt394XJgOQNoyVhZ6r2vLnMLJfBPd53SB52T/3G36VI1/g2MZaX0cwDuXsfw==",
|
||||
"devOptional": true,
|
||||
"license": "MIT"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@types/use-sync-external-store": {
|
||||
"version": "0.0.6",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/use-sync-external-store/-/use-sync-external-store-0.0.6.tgz",
|
||||
|
|
@ -1976,6 +1995,15 @@
|
|||
"integrity": "sha512-+HlytyjlPKnIG8XuRG8WvmBP8xs8P71y+SKKS6ZXWoEgLuePxtDoUEiH7WkdePWrQ5JBpE6aoVqfZfJUQkjXwA==",
|
||||
"dev": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/dompurify": {
|
||||
"version": "3.4.1",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dompurify/-/dompurify-3.4.1.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-JahakDAIg1gyOm7dlgWSDjV4n7Ip2PKR55NIT6jrMfIgLFgWo81vdr1/QGqWtFNRqXP9UV71oVePtjqS2ebnPw==",
|
||||
"license": "(MPL-2.0 OR Apache-2.0)",
|
||||
"optionalDependencies": {
|
||||
"@types/trusted-types": "^2.0.7"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/dunder-proto": {
|
||||
"version": "1.0.1",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dunder-proto/-/dunder-proto-1.0.1.tgz",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
|
|||
"@tiptap/react": "^3.19.0",
|
||||
"@tiptap/starter-kit": "^3.19.0",
|
||||
"axios": "^1.7.7",
|
||||
"dompurify": "^3.4.1",
|
||||
"lucide-react": "^0.454.0",
|
||||
"react": "^18.3.1",
|
||||
"react-dom": "^18.3.1",
|
||||
|
|
@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
|
|||
"react-router-dom": "^6.28.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",
|
||||
"@types/react": "^18.3.12",
|
||||
"@types/react-dom": "^18.3.1",
|
||||
"@vitejs/plugin-react": "^4.3.3",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
|||
import { useState, useEffect } from 'react';
|
||||
import { Reply, Star, Paperclip, Link2, X, Download, ExternalLink, Trash2, Undo2, Save, FileDown } from 'lucide-react';
|
||||
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
|
||||
import { CachedEmail, cachedEmailApi } from '../../services/api';
|
||||
import { useMutation, useQueryClient } from '@tanstack/react-query';
|
||||
import Button from '../ui/Button';
|
||||
|
|
@ -384,7 +385,16 @@ export default function EmailDetail({
|
|||
{showHtml && email.htmlBody ? (
|
||||
<div
|
||||
className="prose prose-sm max-w-none"
|
||||
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: email.htmlBody }}
|
||||
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{
|
||||
__html: DOMPurify.sanitize(email.htmlBody, {
|
||||
// Scripte, Inline-Handler, Form-Elemente, externe Referenzen verbieten.
|
||||
// Bilder + Links mit target=_blank bleiben zugelassen.
|
||||
FORBID_TAGS: ['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'form'],
|
||||
FORBID_ATTR: ['onerror', 'onload', 'onclick', 'onmouseover', 'onfocus'],
|
||||
// Links in neuen Tabs öffnen (verhindert window.opener-Angriffe)
|
||||
ADD_ATTR: ['target'],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
}}
|
||||
/>
|
||||
) : (
|
||||
<pre className="whitespace-pre-wrap text-sm text-gray-700 font-sans">
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue